The Dragon Rises High

The Dragon Rises High

Realm of the Sun

Prologue: Edo

The end of the Ashikaga Shogunate in the decade of the 1570s brought a new period of Civil war to the Empire of Japan, with Daimyo Oda Nobunaga quickly finally being able to unify most of the old realm before passing away and leaving two ambitious generals to continue his legacy: Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu.
Toyotomi prevailed in the initial struggle to succeed Oda and thus became the effective ruler of Japan, continuing with his old master’s legacy and bringing Japan under a single rule, under a single sword.
Yet the great conqueror would finally meet great defeats in the campaigns in Korea in the decade of 1590, and eventually his own death in 1598.
His son and successor, Toyotomi Hideyori was only 5 and thus placed under the regency of five elders, a system created with the intention of balancing the power and ambition of the regents, yet amongst them was the most ambitious general of Oda Nobunaga, Tokugawa Ieyasu, who was able to rally the west behind him and thus he began to bring Japan under his rule.
The followers of the Toyotomi thus formed the Army of the West under Ishida Mitsunari and engaged the forces of the Tokugawa at the epic battle of Sekigahara.
Upon the victory of the Tokugawa, Ieyasu became the Shogun and absolute ruler of Japan, moving the capital to Edo and thus beginning the Edo Period.
Now it is the 13th year since his victory at Sekigahara and the shogun is his son, Tokugawa Hidetada, yet it is Ieyasu who rules Japan with the power of a god, but sometimes even the gods that live in the land of mortals cannot elude their own destinies.

The End of the Tokugawa order

It is the inevitable that most times comes as the most shocking. The very concept assures that some things are to be expected and thus not take us by surprise, yet they do.
Thirteen years ago the Tokugawa Shogunate was built upon the victory gained over the western armies at Sekigahara, and now the great conqueror of Japan laid helpless in his deathbed, dying of fever, after over 30 years of battle.
Tokugawa Ieyasu’s death in early 1613 left his son, Tokugawa Hidetada as the absolute ruler of Japan. It also left him in the middle of a terrible political crisis that would soon result in a new civil war, a return to the Period of the Warring states.

Despite the Tokugawa Victory in 1600, Toyotomi Hideyori and his followers still enjoyed great power and influence, and from their base at Osaka castle, the Tokugawa feared that the Toyotomi Clan would be able to rebuild their power base in western Japan and probably even rally all the daimyo of the area behind him. And that was something that Hidetada could not allow.

The very news of the death of Ieyasu sent shockwaves through the Empire, from Hokkaido to Nagasaki.
Soon, the followers of the Toyotomi and the rivals of the Tokugawa began plotting and meeting at Osaka, starting a lose coalition of Daimyos of western Japan allied against the rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate and under the de facto leadership of Toyotomi Hideyori, although the new “Western Army” could not gather enough forces to engage Hidetada for the time being, not for a major battle in 1613, at least.
The time was meanwhile used to rebuild Osaka Castle and to gather as much Ronin and enemies of the Tokugawa as possible.
Every one in the Empire was expecting a preemptive attack from the west, but nothing imminent, but the formation of a formal anti-Tokugawa coalition forced Hidetada to make a decision and the decision was that of marching on Osaka.

To make matters even worse for the Tokugawa, many of the old allies of Ieyasu were now hesitant and reluctant to overtly support the regime of the Shogun. In the North the daimyos found themselves under the influence of the powerful ruler of the Sendai domain, Date Masamune, a man of great talent both military and administrative and also one of the most powerful daimyos of the time.
Masamune was not only incredibly talented and powerful, but also reluctant to interfere in the new dynastic war between the Tokugawa and the Toyotomi. He had only reluctantly participated in Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s campaign in Korea in the 1590s and had also served under Tokugawa at Sekigahara because Ieyasu was the virtual ruler of the country.
Now the situation was different. With Ieyasu dead and with Toyotomi Hideyori having rallied half of the country behind him, Hidetada did not have the power to force the daimyos of the North to do anything. Actually, if the daimyos of the Tohoku region had decided to support Hideyori, Hidetada would be doomed. Yet Date Masamune preferred to remain neutral in the conflict, much to the anger of the Shogun, who instead was forced to gather as much support as possible from the Eastern forces of the Empire

The prospect of returning to the Sengoku period and the times of the warring daimyos forced the Tokugawa regime to make several emergency decisions to face the Western forces rallying at Osaka.
It is interesting to note that although the death of Tokugawa Ieyasu in early 1613 was the main reason that allowed so many conspirators to gather against Hidetada, the very actions of the new shogun, including the mobilization of an army in mid-1613 played an important part in the affair, radicalizing the position of several daimyos and forcing them to pick a side, which in many cases was the side of the Toyotomi.
In the north, the situation of Date Masamune was slightly different. Although unwilling to fight another bloody war that would surely endanger the life of his men and himself, as well as the safety of his domains and position, he had no reasons to either fight for Hidetada or for Hideyori. What Masamune really wanted was the opportunity to extend his power through northern Japan, something that he could not do with the Tokugawa’s in charge.

Thus, while the armies of the West and the East were gathering at Osaka and Edo, in the north Date Masamune began a new campaign against his rival daimyo, a strategy that Masamune hoped would give him enough time to strengthen his power base and consolidate his position. At the end, his chance to be his own master came, after years of serving the Toyotomi and the Tokugawa.


To be Continued...

A very interesting start. Just to be sure, the POD is an early death of Ieyasu Tokugawa?

From what I've read so far, I'm really impressed with the idea you have. It looks like the beginning of a very good timeline, and now that I think of it, it does come across as ASB that Japan was able to avoid a period of Civil War for 250 Wars. Though I must admit that I'm Chinese, it would be very interesting if Japan were to become the equivalent of an East Asian Great Britain and become a global colonial power much earlier.

Hope you continue with this, and I'm looking forward to seeing more.

Indeed. IOTL, Ieyasu died in 1616, with the Siege of Osaka happening in 1613-1614, technically under his command, although Hidetada had the final call.

War of the Daimyo

By 1614, Japan was once again divided. In the East, Tokugawa Hidetada had the Han of Kantō and Chūbu, while in the West Toyotomi Hideyori had the Han of Kansai and Chūgoku, with some supporters at Shikoku and Kyushu, although most of the daimyo of those islands, such as the Satsuma domain under the Shimazu family chose to be neutral.
And as said before, the Tōhoku region in the north was at the time under the control of the then neutral Date Masamune, who was at the time in a pacification campaing against some of his opponents.

Tokugawa Hidetada had rallied a force of 103,000 men by the winter of 1614, while Toyotomi Hideyori’s army numbered around 96,000 men, although its numbers would continue to increase through the year of 1614, gathering as much as 107,000 men by the summer of that year.

In the North, meanwhile, Date Masamune was spending his time consolidating his position. He did not face much opposition in the fields, despite the distrust from his neighbor daimyo, only a few dared to actually face him in battle. So, after a few skirmishes he was able to have all the lords of the North under his leadership. Even the Matsumae Clan of Ezo was nominally under his control.
The rest of the years of 1614 onwards were used to expand and prepare his men, not to mention the modernization of his army and the expansion of Sendai Castle. It was also in the 1614-1620 period that the activity of foreigners in the North increased dramatically, including catholic missionaries, European merchants and sailors and even soldiers and sailors from the Spanish domain wanting to gain some money or who were working for the European powers directly or indirectly.

The players were in position and now the fate of the Empire was at stake, thus started the real war of the second Sengoku period.


March to the West

Tokugawa Hidetada and his army made their move in March of 1614, after months of waiting and preparing, they would finally go to Osaka, where the Toyotomi and their allies were rallying against the Shogunate.
The first major engagement between the Eastern and Western Armies took place on the eastern banks of Yodo River, south of the former Imperial capital of Kyoto.
The battle itself was short and fought between a force of 1,900 men loyal to the Toyotomi and 2,400 loyal to the Tokugawa, proving to be a somewhat easy victory for the Eastern Armies, although the battles that followed would fail to become great victories for the Shogun’s army.

The spring campaign of 1614 would only see another three major battles fought at the Kansai Han.
The first one was a skirmish of somewhat large proportions at the Kizu river, in which 8,000 men of the Western army and 12,000 men of the Eastern army briefly engaged, before the Toyotomi force under Hirano Nagayasu, and old follower of Hideyoshi, and other commanders still loyal to the Toyotomi.

The second major battle was actually a combination of three battles that would nevertheless be known as the Battle of Tennoji, which was fought at the outskirts of Osaka itself, due to some miscalculations on both sides that lead to a breach in the defenses of the castle. At the battle, Hideroyi had a force of 70,000 men, while Hidetada’s force only amounted to 86,000 out of the 107,000 that had left Edo with him, due to problems with other Daimyo, defections, casualties and at some times just logistical problems that forced some daimyo and their forces to stay behind.

The Battle of Tennoji took place on June 19th. Toyotomi’s army planned a hammer-and-anvil operation, with 50,000 men attacking the central line of the Tokugawa force while the other 20,000 would flank them from the rear. A series of lucky circumstances including exceptionally good weather and problems within the ranks of the Eastern army would ensure a victory for the Toyotomi Force.

The armies under Hirano Nagayasu and Sanada Yukimura were able to outflank the Tokugawa force at several points, forcing them to retreat while losing thousands of men within hours, including some of the loyal daimyo loyal to Hidetada, who lost about 20,000 men at the battle, not to mention the equipment, which included modern artillery pieces and the morale of his army.

The Eastern army retreated to Kyoto before beginning the long return to Edo, where Hidetada would be forced to rally another army, which would probably not be ready until late 1614 or even mid 1615, while Hideyori and his army were strengthening at Osaka, gaining new allies and a massive morale boost for its Army of the West.
Hidetada had underestimated his enemy, a mistake that would come to haunt him even sooner that he believed.

To be continued...

So if what I suspect is going to happen will happen, are we going to see a more open Japan?

Part III

Act II: The Toyotomi campaign of 1614

The Victory of the Western army at Tennoji was greatly greeted at Osaka and all of western Japan. Now Hidetada was retreating back to Edo, leaving thousands of men laying at the fields in the west. Toyotomi Hideyori’s army was now the biggest force in Japan, not to mention the one with the highest morale. But it wasn’t the time to celebrate, but the time to make a decision. Staying at Osaka and wait for Hidetada to come once more would have been the more sensible strategy, especially considering the dangers of taking the army to engage Tokugawa in the East. But waiting could be seen as a sign of weakness to several daimyos, not to mention that the Shogun would probably be less prone to make the same mistakes the second time he was forced to fight for Osaka.
Thus it was decided to take the 102,000 men that were ready to leave, while a smaller force of reinforcements would remain at Osaka castle until they could join the battle.

Kyoto, the old Imperial capital, was the first city visited by the Western Army, followed by Nagoya, where the army rested for several days in order to be more prepared to engage the Army of the East in better conditions.
The only engagements that took place between the Toyotomi and the Tokugawa forces in the summer campaign of 1614 were skirmishes at Okazaki and Toyokawa, in which the bigger Toyotomi force defeated the Tokugawa allies. Nevertheless, the Western army was forced to stop its march due to his small engagements, regrouping around Toyokawa, without knowing that Hidetada and his loyal daimyo were gathering a new force west of them, much faster that they had anticipated.

The stand at the Tenryu River

It is perhaps one of the greatest and most remarkable campaigns of the War the engagement that took place in the early fall of 1614.
Upon being stalled by smaller Tokugawa forces, the Army of the West continued its march towards Edo, where Tokugawa Hidetada was forming a new army to face the forces coming from the West.

The campaign that would later be known as the Great Stand at the Tenryu River began when the main force under Sanada Yukimura reached the castle of Hamamatsu, at the time a Tokugawa stronghold. The siege began on October 1st, with Saneda’s troops surrounding the fortress unknowing of the fact that a large Tokugawa army was being gathered east of the Tenryu River.
The Shogun himself was at the command of the army, just as he had been when the troops were standing just miles from Osaka. But now he was even more determined than a few months ago. He had been humiliated and such an offense could not be bared.

With half of the Western army at Hamamatsu and the other half camping just miles west of the battlefront, Hidetada decided that it was the perfect time to strike at Saneda’s army. If he attacked at the right moment, it would take too long for the main army to come in the rescue of the second force.

With 75,000 men under his command, the Shogun launched his counterattack on October 4th.
The Western force had been divided into four groups so as to siege the castle, so when the first Tokugawa soldiers attacked their lines they were forced to end the siege and gather west of Hamamatsu to regroup. A good use of arquebusiers and light artillery gave Tokugawa the victory, forcing the Western Force to engage them at two separate fights, north and south of the castle, and in both the Western army was repelled, retreating to meet with the main Toyotomi force.
Now with only 98,000 men, Toyotomi Hideyori and his generals were faced with the prospect of retreating back to safety in Osaka or to engage Tokugawa Hidetada in another bloody battle in which victory could not be assured. Once more the necessity of regaining the lost momentum became a priority and the army prepared itself to battle again.

To be continued...

This shall prove to be interesting. I think this will be the battle to decide Japan's fate...

Act II: finale.

Hamamatsu and the Tenryu River

The Shogun’s army at Hamamatsu was tired and in not particularly good conditions after expelling the Western forces. Casualties had been high in the battle and it was night by the time it ended, so the Tokugawa camp was not well defended in the aftermath of the battle. They had won the battle not knowing that the bulk of the Toyotomi force would be ready to strike back sooner than expected.
Many of Hideyori’s generals urged him to take more time to prepare the army before launching a counterattack towards Hamamatsu, but the defeat suffered by his men and his desire to end the war as soon as possible drove him to make a terribly hasty decision: to launch a counterattack immediately.
Not all of the army was ready, so only 67,000 men took part in the second battle for the Hamamatsu castle. The offensive was to be as swift and effective as possible, with the elements of speed and surprise being fundamental for the success of the plan.

The battle itself took place on October 6th, when the Western army attacked the Tokugawa positions from East and West in a pincer movement. A diversionary attack from the north forced to Shogun’s tired and confused army to fall right into the trap. The loss of 10,000 men to Toyotomi Hideyori and the demoralization of his army forced Tokugawa Hidetada to order a retreat, leaving Hamamatsu defenseless.
Toyotomi Hideyori and his generals entered the castle on October 7th, finding it undefended and in place inhabited by wounded warriors who could not even put up a fight against the Army of the west.
The rest of the army arrived at Hamamatsu on October 8th and Toyotomi Hideyori began to plan a new strategy with his generals.
As far as they knew, Tokugawa Hidetada only had a small, beaten and demoralized army east of the Tenryu River, a force that to the best of their knowledge was the only thing between them and Edo. Nevertheless, some generals recommended that Hideyori waited for reinforcements from Osaka, yet just as his father, Hideyoshi, the leader of the army of the west was too bold and aggressive to just sit around doing nothing while his enemy was quietly regrouping a few miles from there. The army rested for several days before being ready to march again.
On October 14th, the Tenryu River was crossed by an Army of the West numbering about 86,000 men, expecting to meet the last remains of the Tokugawa army.

A terrible feeling of disappointment and surprise invaded the Daimyos of the west once the River was crossed, for there was the real force of Tokugawa Hidetada that was waiting for them west of the Tenryu.
Despite the information the Western army had, the Shogun had in fact gathered an army bigger than expected, with a force of well over 80,000 men. The Eastern force itself was divided into two forces, one directly facing the Western force and another one north of the crossing, ready to intervene in a surprise flanking maneuver.
Yet the first part of the battle started with an even nastier surprise for Toyotomi Hideyori and his men: enemy artillery fire.
Tokugawa Hidetada had placed his artillery batteries and his arquebusiers in several strategic positions along a defensive line running in a south-north direction. The improvised trenches were used to hide the artillery until the Western force was close enough and at the worst moment possible for Toyotomi Hideyori, fire was opened upon his men.
The first line collapsed while the rest of the force regrouped. Confusion and chaos reigned through the lines for several minutes until the artillery fire was stopped and the generals were able to rally the troops again. Then the real battle commenced.

The Battle of the Tenryu River thus began with a massive attack along the Tokugawa defensive line, which was able to hold the superior Toyotomi forces long enough until the Northern reinforcements arrived. Once again, confusion and bad luck prevailed in the battlefield. The Tokugawa line was breached at the center, forcing the Shogun to send more reinforcements, an order that lead to even more bloodshed and death. But fortune would eventually prove to be on his side, when the fire of his arquebusiers reached General Sanada Yukimura, one of Hideyori’ most important generals. Despite being only wounded in his left leg and his right shoulder, the General had to be evacuated, and with him leaving, demoralization and panic spread through the lines of the Western army. Over 10,000 retreated after a new assault of the Eastern army, while several officers were forced to escort Sanada back to Hamamatsu, and probable all the way back to Osaka.
The situation finally reached a breaking point when the Northern force arrived at the battlefield, sealing the fate of the Western army.
An hour later, the western army retreated to Hamamatsu Castle, leaving over 37,000 dead warriors on the field and 4,500 captured ones.
Intriguingly enough, Tokugawa Hidetada did not use this chance to chase the Western army and destroy it around Hamamatsu. Instead he chose to wait and regroup his forces, while at the same time increasing the size of his army and the extent of his power. Many Daimyo had decided to remain neutral in the early stages of the conflict. Now it was time to see what they true allegiances were.

Friends by force and friends by convenience

The winter of 1614 was a hard time for Japan. There was always some kind of trouble with the crops or the agriculture in general. Daimyos always quarreled and now, there was a general war through the Empire, East and West, while North and South had chosen to remain neutral to later offer their friendship to the victorious party of the conflict.

In the North, Date Masamune had gathered an army of 40,000 men and was now marching towards Edo, to then move to the Tenryu theatre. The Shogun himself had ordered him to come and fight. Toyotomi Hideyoshi had done the same years ago, when he was the ruler of Japan and Date Masamune failed to please the wishes of the Kampaku, something that nearly cost him his life in 1590. He would then reluctantly serve in the Korean campaigns. He had always preferred to stay out of the conflicts of the big Daimyo wars, deciding to remain neutral until one side was the clear winner instead. But now his fortune, his fief and his power were in direct danger. He still had spies in Edo, Osaka and Hamamatsu, and his army was not particularly fast in its march towards the Battlefield. Despite the fierce engagements at Tenryu, there was no clear victor yet, and the daimyo of the north was not about to fight if there was a chance of defeat.

Meanwhile, the situation in the South was incredibly similar. Most daimyos of Shikoku were allied to either Toyotomi Hideyori or Tokugawa Hidetada, but at Kyushu, the situation was like the one of Tohoku.
The Satsuma domain, ruled by the ageing Shimazu Yoshihiro, was at the time neutral, although the armies were being mobilized under his son, Shimazu Tadatsune. The Satsuma domain was the strongest fief in the island, not to mention one of the most powerful ones in the Empire. Tadatsune had been amassing an army since the first march on Osaka in 1614, to then rally most of the lords of Kyushu under his de facto leadership, either peacefully or by force.
And just as Date Masamune, Shimazu was asked to ally Toyotomi Hideyoshi, while being asked as well by Tokugawa Hidetada.
Besides the mobilization of an army, the Satsuma domain also began to entertain foreign merchants and missionaries, as well as sending emissaries to the west with the Dutch and the Portuguese. Kagoshima became a perfect place for the Europeans to do their trading, and some would even say that the Shimazu were even trying to negotiate the building of trading factories and even Christian missions in their domain.
The army was completely mobilized by early 1615, but Shimazu Tadatsune decided not to make his move before the spring. One never knew when a war could make a turn in a different direction.

Retreat

War was continued in the spring of 1615. Toyotomi Hideyori and his army, now reduced to a force of 56,000 men defending Hamamatsu Castle, had spent the winter regrouping and preparing themselves to fight the Tokugawa armies, which had at the same time used the winter to expand and prepare the Eastern Army.
Hidetada and an army of 85,000 men crossed the Tenryu River on April 1st and began to lay siege upon the Eastern Army.
The first battles around the castle proved to be terrible for both sides. Eventually though, the northern flank of the Western defenses collapsed and the proper siege truly began. Reinforcements would finally arrive from Osaka on late May, allowing the Western Force to regroup and take advantage of the opportunity to end the siege. Only 15,000 men arrived from Osaka Castle, but it would be more than enough to provide a distraction and allow the main force to escape. It wasn’t a plan to win the war, but the war would be lost anyway if Toyotomi Hideyori died with the bulk of his followers.
The campaign around Hamamatsu lasted well into June of 1615, with the Castle not being actually surrounded and besieged by the Tokugawa force until late April, with the siege being temporarily broken several times afterwards. But the situation finally changed on June 2nd.
The final battle of the Hamamatsu campaign started in the early hours of that day, when the force arriving from Osaka and secretly in contact with the main army at Hamamatsu, launched several probing attacks against the Tokugawa lines north and west of the city with Arquebusiers. The diversionary attacks were perceived as a general attack on the Eastern army by a larger force and thus several daimyos decided to gather at one point and started to chase the forces from Osaka, weakening the force besieging Hamamatsu and reducing it severely.
A few hours later, the Western army launched an attack of its own on the Tokugawa lines, decimating several weak points and managing to end the siege once and for all. But despite the victory, the bulk of the Eastern army would soon be gathered again and the Toyotomi army was in no conditions of facing the Shogun’s armies for the time being. The army under Hideyori began its retreat to the West that day. At Osaka they would be able to fight the Shogun in better conditions. The fortress was in perfect conditions and more followers would surely join the Western army. It was all a matter of time and opportunity.


To be Continued...

But does Toyotomi have either? This really proving to be a intruiging TL and I'm keen to see where it goes next.

Act III: Allegro

The Road to take

No longer did Toyotomi Hideyori found himself in the position of defeating Tokugawa Hidetada after the Hamamatsu and Tenryu campaigns. His army had been battered and nearly reduced to half. The army of the West found itself in a terrible predicament in the summer of 1615.
On the other side of the board, Tokugawa Hidetada was now contemplating the imminence of Victory in his war against the West. Not even his father, the Great Ieyasu, had been able to turn a war in such a spectacular manner. Only Sekigahara had proved a more impressive victory that the one achieved by Hidetada at Hamamatsu. Yet he was not in the position to chase Hideyori immediately after the battle. He had lost many warriors and now he was being forced to wait for reinforcements and the regrouping of his army. Date Masamune was taking his time in his march to the battlefield, and so was Shimazu Tadatsune.

All both sides could do at the time was to regroup and prepare for the impending end of the war. The situation looked grim for the Toyotomi Faction, yet a course of action was finally taken by the commanders of the Army of the West and Toyotomi Hideyori himself: they would fight to the last man.
The plan was simply to retreat to Osaka, a quite impressive fortress at the time, and resist the Tokugawa attack there, maybe even try to convince more daimyos to join them and fight the Shogun together, despite the unlikeness of such a possibility.

But once again, the forces of destiny would interfere in the conflict, this time against Toyotomi Hideyori. As it happened, at the time in which Toyotomi Hideyori reached Nagoya Castle, the army of Shimazu Tadatsune was camping near Osaka. The true intentions of the ruler of Satsuma were of course unknown at the time, but the generals of the West nonetheless decided not to take the risk of being trapped between two armies, not at Osaka anyway. So, a new decision had to be taken and it had to be taken fast, since Tokugawa’s army was on the move again, although taking it’s time, waiting as well to discover Shimazu’s real allegiance.

A new strategy was devised, with the same final conclusion but with different scenery for the dramatic and bloody last stand of Toyotomi Hideyori. Now it was the Castle of Gifu the one to serve as the stage for the final act of the War.
The Castle itself was known for its peculiar and dramatic history, even serving as Oda Nobunaga’s stronghold once he took the fortress and expanded it. There were mountains to the North and fields to the South. Two armies would be deployed with the task of defending Gifu, one at the West and one at the South, with smaller units guarding the North and the East, although the daimyos of the west knew that the main force would come from the South, from Nagoya.

Last Stand

As expected by the Generals of the West, the main force came from the South.
Tokugawa Hidetada’s Army took positions along the Kiso River, south of Gifu.
The summer and autumn campaign started with the deployment of 87,900 troops from the Eastern Army south and East of Gifu, facing a number roughly over 54,000. The first stage of the campaign began with a series of skirmishes along the nearby rivers. Most of the early engagements tended to end in draws or narrow victories for the Toyotomi Faction. By October of 1615, both sides were exhausted due to the two years of civil war, yet the Shogun was not about to let Toyotomi Hideyori make a fool of him.

On October 19th, two days before the anniversary of the Battle of Sekigahara, Tokugawa Hidetada ordered a three pronged assault on Gifu, in an action later known as the ‘First Battle of Gifu’, the most important military action of the autumn campaign of 1615.
50,000 troops launched the offensive, attacking the enemy defenses at several points.
But despite the fact that the forces under Toyotomi Hideyori numbered only around 35,000 men at the frontlines, the battle was soon bogged down in a bloody melee that lasted for hours, well into the night of October 20th. The defenses set by the Toyotomi side, combined with their tenacious resistance and the poor communication in the Tokugawa camp allowed a narrow victory for the Army of the West. Later historians would also point out that the Tokugawa force sent to attack Gifu was poorly organized, with some Daimyo just sitting with their armies while rivaling lords were being butchered by surprise ambushes and pincer movements. Others would stress the importance of the terrain, while stating that the Tokugawa force was too big to operate in the fields and forests around Gifu.
The fact remains that the First battle of Gifu was an unmitigated disaster for the Army of the East, losing between 17,000 and 23,000 men in the campaign.
The victory would nonetheless prove to be short-lived, as the Tokugawa force would remain in its positions for the next part of the drama: the Winter Campaign.


To be Continued...

Nice to see you're keepng us guessing with this. I'm looking forward to the next part.

I rather like it. New non Western threads are nice to see. Hope you continue.

Act III

Toyotomi Hideyori The fields around Gifu were covered by snow and blood. The war was nearing its third year and the possibility of an end to the conflict was not seen as a possibility until the start of the winter campaign of 1615. Toyotomi Hideyori was surrounded and he knew it, yet he and his men were determined to fight to the last man if necessary. Most observers would assess that the situation was pretty much lost for the Army of the West, but the sense of honor of the commanders and daimyos could not allow them to surrender. There was also the possibility of the Shogun showing himself less than lenient towards the lords that had decided to follow Hideyori. There were rumors about planned executions for several daimyos of the West. One last hope finally came, in the form of General Sanada Yukimura, who had been able to elude the besieging army of the West to join the Army of the East at Gifu. With him he brought 7,000 soldiers from Osaka. The Shogun’s army was still superior, but the fight would simply not end with a decisive victory. Tokugawa Hidetada’s army tried to end the siege and eliminate the resistance of the Army of the East through the winter of 1615-1616, with little result other than the death of hundreds of men. Sanada Yukimura and others like him proved to remain capable and devoted, fighting in the fields around Gifu and even launching surprise attacks at times, eroding the capabilities of the Eastern Army. Nevertheless, the Shogun was confidant in his victory, enough to maintain a large army besieging Gifu for the remainder of the winter. Most campaigns would take place at the fields of the Province, particularly along the Kiso and Nagara Rivers, where the armies loyal to Toyotomi Hideyori were able to repel the forces of Tokugawa Hidetada more than once, much to the anger of Hidetada. Unfortunately for the Army of the West, the Shogun’s confidence would prove to be well founded, as finally the armies of Date Masemune and Shimazu Tadatsune arrived to fight in the name of Tokugawa Hidetada. Both daimyos had stalled enough and finally found themselves unable to wait any longer. At least they would be able to escape the wrath of the Shogun. The situation at Gifu castle deteriorated swiftly upon the arrival of the daimyos of North and South. Now the numerical superiority of the enemy was much more apparent, as was the level of support enjoyed by Hidetada, a support that had been denied to Hideyori. Soon the spring would arrive and thus the full strength of the Army of the West could be unleashed upon the defenders of Gifu Castle. Many generals and daimyos loyal to Toyotomi now began contemplating either desertion or death. Nevertheless, the majority were willing to fight to the bitter end if necessary, either for their masters or for their honor. Nobody was expecting much forgiveness from Hidetada once the war was over. Meanwhile, Toyotomi Hideyori and his family were making different arrangements. The army of the East would most likely destroy the forces of the East as well as Gifu castle, not to mention that Osaka would surely suffer the same fate soon. Rather than allowing himself and his family to be captured, Toyotomi took another decision and instead of continuing the war and causing the deaths of thousands of soldiers, he would end his own life by his own hand. At a ceremony at Gifu Castle, Toyotomi Hideyori, his family and many loyal followers took matters into their own hands, following the young pretender to the next life. By taking his own life with his own sword Toyotomi had hoped to bring an end to the war, having asked the Shogun to show mercy on his men if he ended the war. The ritual suicide of Hideyori, his family and several generals would nevertheless fail to appease Tokugawa Hidetada. He had been openly defied and now he demanded revenge. After Toyotomi’s death on March 4th of 1615, the remaining generals loyal to the defunct Toyotomi Clan began preparations for their final battle, knowing well that it would truly be the last battle of the campaign.

Window of Opportunity Once the Army of the West was gone, Gifu would follow and Osaka after that. Tokugawa Hidetada would make sure that his rule would not be defied during the following generations, while his family’s rule was to remain without defiance for the ten thousand generations to come. The Army of the East was finally gathered at its full strength. One final battle was to be enough to put an end to the war. But in spite of the Shogun’s grand plans for the Empire, there are some factors that are to remain outside the control of man during one’s lifetime. Little did the shogun know that while one rebellion was on its final hours, its seeds would spread through the ranks of the men he had trusted to follow him as they had followed his father. He never stopped to think that many of the men that had been loyal to his father had previously served Toyotomi Hideyoshi or other lords. This time, the shock that the Empire was to receive came as a total and unexpected surprise, starting with some secret meetings between some retainers and daimyos of two peripherycal provinces of the Empire. Date Masemune and Shimazu Tadatsune shared a strong dislike of the Shogun’s authoritarian rule, which severely undermined their own power and influence. Not only did both men have grand ambitions, but they also enjoyed positions of great power and commanded great armies. At the time, the Shogun was absolutely sure of his own victory in the war, something that would make him even more dangerous once peace returned to the Empire. Both men had to some point hoped to join Toyotomi Hideyori against Tokugawa so as to make themselves de facto rulers of large areas of the nation, once the new shogun had made himself the new ruler of Japan. That chance was gone, ever since the Army of the West was defeated at Hamamatsu. And with Hideyori’s death, there was no real leader that could rally the opposition to the Shogun, Thus a perfect time for new able and ambitious daimyos to step in. They agreed on all the aspects of their plan, to the point in which they made direct contact with the generals of the Army of the West. The fate of Japan would be decided by the outcome of a single battle.

Help from aboveThe Second Battle of Gifu took place on March 7th of 1616. It was, according to History, a calm day, perfect for a battle. The two enemy armies were in their positions at Dawn. Sanada’s army of the West was divided into three main forces spread through the frontline and tasked with stopping the advance of the Tokugawa Army. Arquebusiers and artillery batteries specially positioned and coordinated with the infantry would ensure that the Eastern force would pay dearly for every meter gained.A small reserve waited at Gifu, ready to fight all the Tokugawa soldiers that had survived the first lines of defenses.The Tokugawa army was on the other hand divided into five groups. One would wait in the rear, acting as a reserve force, while the other four would cross the river and charge against the Western force, outflanking them and routing them. Date Masamune was in charge of the force in the Right Flank, while Shimazu Tadatsune guarded the center-left flank with his army from Satsuma. The forces in the left and the center-right were loyal to the Shogun, as was the reserve, although the daimyos in which Hidetada did not particularly trust were forced to serve in the rear. The daimyos of Sendai and Satsuma would have to prove their loyalty, and that was the main reason why Tokugawa Hidetada decided to give them such important positions. There was also the matter of what to do once peace returned, and the daimyos would have to be appeased, or at least so did the Shogun think at the time.The Kiso River was crossed in the early morning, and so did the battle begin.The first moments of the battle were spent with the crossing of the River and the skirmishes between the soldiers in the frontline. The smoke from the Arquebuses and the artillery fire created a great deal of confusion, as did the large number of soldiers involved and the rapid movement of troops.Around noon, Date Masamune’s army marched into battle, after allowing the center forces of the Eastern army to advance well into the enemy line. The army from Tohoku reached the battlefield and met with the army from Satsuma, much to the surprise of the attending daimyos. Then the course of the History of Japan took a sudden and unexpected turn. 50,000 men under Date Masamune and Shimazu Tadatsune joined the army of the West. Not only did throw the Tokugawa Force into utter chaos and confusion, but it also left large gaps in the Eastern army, while giving the force under Sanada Yukimura the necessary advantage and numbers to throw the enemy army back.What followed was one of the most dramatic and bloody moments in the history of Japan, as the Date force moved back across the river to outflank the Tokugawa force, while the joint army of Shimazu and Sanada stroke the frontlines of the Eastern force, completely routing them and dispersing much of the group. By the time Hidetada knew what had truly happened, it was too late to send in the reserve force. A fifth of his army had joined the enemy, while another significant part of his forces had either been killed or scattered. Many daimyos started to either escape or join the rebels. With only his reserve force left, only a miracle could save the Shogun. The retreat war ordered before the battle was truly finished, and by the time the new coalition of Daimyos realized, Tokugawa Hidetada had escaped. They knew that it was Toyotomi Hiderori’s escape from Hamamatsu that allowed the war to continue, and they could not afford to make the same mistake Hidetada had made.Another unexpected turn in the History of man, one that would forever shape the face of the nations.

To be Continued...

Could someone fix the update?There's a problem with the titles apparently.I think its a problem with the site, since I can't use things like smilies or insert links or maps...

Fixed the update (you're lucky I'm reading almost all the threads - next time better tell me or Glen). A few paragraphs more hadn't hurt either. Which browser are you using?

Act III: Finale.

The one-eyed Dragon

It was in the aftermath of the Gifu campaign that the new structure of power in the Empire was shaped. Tokugawa Hidetada could not hold onto power for much longer, and once he was gone, someone would have to come forward and take the reigns of power. Not too many daimyos were eager for a disappearance of central authority and a return to the period of the warring states and constant war.
The coalition of Daimyos that had defeated the Shogun at Gifu was leaded by a triumvirate consisting of General Sanada Yukimura, Satsuma ruler Shimazu Tadatsune and Sendai daimyo, Date Masamune.
Of the three, it would be Date Masamune the one to come on top and become the leader of the coalition, being able to persuade many of the daimyos and form several alliances within the greater alliance. Sanada Yukimura and Shimazu Tadatsune accepted the ‘election’ of Date Masamune as leader of the Armies of the West and North, although it is often disputed the part Masamune himself played in the scheme, with some alleging that he had been proposed as a compromise candidate, while others believe that the daimyo of the North did in fact planned the whole situation so as to make himself the most powerful man in Japan, if not the virtual ruler.

As new de facto leader of the ‘League of the Daimyo’, Date Masamune wasted little time, going after the retreating army of the Shogun as soon as it was possible for the army, a move contrary to the early strategies of the war, in which the armies would wait so as to be strengthened before attacking, thus prolonging the conflict. But by moving at such a speed only half of the army was able to reach Tokugawa Hidetada’s camp, and yet it was all that it was needed.

Date Masamune’s army neared the Shogun’s position around Nagoya Castle, forcing Hidetada to take defensive positions much sooner that he had expected. Actually, what he expected was for the daimyo to begin arguing over the leadership of the alliance, allowing him to return to Edo Castle and fight from there. He found himself terribly disappointed when over 50,000 men coming from the North encircled his army, eliminating the left flank and forcing over 10,000 soldiers to escape eastwards, leaving only two thirds of the already depleted army of the East to fight the Date army.

Once at Nagoya, the battle took another ugly turn for the Shogun. The new leader of the Eastern army had little interest in fighting a long siege against the Shogun, thus he began to harass the forces in the besieged castle, trying to force them into the open field to fight one last decisive battle. Masamune’s boldness and recklessness is said to have caused many casualties on both sides, at some times suffering major setbacks during the siege, yet the Shogun’s army was not about to go quietly, starving to death defending the Castle.
The battle of Nagoya was not by itself a great feat for any of the parts involved. The previous campaigns at Osaka, Hamamatsu and Gifu had been much larger and spectacular, but it finally brought an end to the war.
There was little of notice in the battle itself as well. Date Masamune’s forces were able to exploit the weaknesses of the Tokugawa force, breaking through the soft spots in the defensive line at the center and forcing the rest of the army to fall back. The Shogun found himself in the same position his rival had been just a few months ago. An appropriate ending for the war, a work of Poetic justice worthy of a few lines in the long history of the world and the Empire of Japan, yet the end of the war and the Tokugawa Shogunate is not the end of History, nor the end of this story.

Edo

The Death of Tokugawa Hidetada on April 22nd of 1616 is usually seen as the end of the war. But the end of a war can sometimes be nothing but the beginning of something new.
Tokugawa Hidetada was dead, and so was Toyotomi Hideyori. One house had faded and the other would forever be banned from having any real power or recognition in Japanese politics. The reality was that the Empire was being de facto ruled by the three leaders of the great daimyo alliance of 1616, with Date Masamune as the nominal head of the group and thus the ruler of Japan.

Although Date Masamune would not be recognized as Shogun of Japan until the spring of 1617, changes were already taking place in the aftermath of the war. The Shimazu clan became the effective ruler of the island of Kyushu, with the other daimyo being nominally under the leadership of Shimazu Tadatsune. Sanada Yukimura on the other hand, was awarded with Osaka Castle, and the virtual leadership of the daimyo of the West. Finally, Date Masamune would become Shogun, while at the same time retaining the lands in the North and expanding them.
It was of course an impossibility to move the capital from Edo to Sendai. Date Masamune’s castle was simply too far to be an effective capital for the Empire, while Osaka presented the problem of having represented the West in the last war, thus threatening with drastically altering the balance of power in the Empire.
At the end, Edo would remain the capital of the Empire and the residence of the Shogun, although Date Masamune himself would end up spending more time at Sendai, Osaka or Kyoto. The last two still remained as capitals of Japan at the same time, with Osaka serving as the informal capital of the merchants and Kyoto as the residence for the Emperor of Japan.

Meanwhile, as land and power were exchanging hands, the seas were about to bring new surprises to the Empire of the Sun, as in the Horizon new and old banners approached carrying new and surprising changes especially fitting in the aftermath of the events of 1613-1617.

So we're seeing a more balanced system of power in Japan? Could lead to either great prosperity or at least one other civil war.

Act IV

A banner in the Horizon

The first years of the Date Shogunate were characterized by a continuous sense of change and reorganization. For once, peace finally returned after several generations of fighting between the Daimyos and the Central power of the Shogunate. The times of Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu were over, and now the daimyos were tired of war, tired of death and tired of expenses, especially after the last war, which was particularly expensive in terms of money and human lives.

Despite the change of regime and the somewhat liberalization of the Shogunate’s power, the Date government continued with many of the practices and policies that had been established under the rule of Oda, Toyotomi and Tokugawa. Stability, Peace and Prosperity returned to Japan after decades of warfare and change, yet little could anyone at the time had known of the changes that were to arrive.

The years between 1613 and 1620 had seen a great increase in the activity and influence of foreign powers in the Empire. Missionaries and merchants could be regularly seen in the main ports and cities of Japan, and the sight of European ships in places such as Edo, Sendai, Osaka, Nagasaki and Kagoshima, to name a few, became as common as the sight of the sea and the clouds in the Sky.
Dutch and British merchants and sailors grew in influence particularly in Nagasaki and Edo, the last in which a Trading factory for the British East India Company had been created under the guidance of British sailor and Tokugawa Servant William Adams in the 1610s, and had grown in size and influence in the following years.

The Portuguese and the Spanish were meanwhile growing in power and influence mostly in the South and in the East, although the domain in which they were mostly courted was Sendai, the personal domain of Shogun Date Masamune.
The Shogun had since long been convinced of the importance of Western technology and influence, being particularly impressed by the role of European military applications in the recent war of the Daimyos. He had also been impressed by the Catholic missionaries, specially an old Spanish friar by the name of Luis Sotelo, a man in which Masamune trusted enough to have him represent him before the courts of Europe.

The famous Keicho Embassy of 1613-1620 began the same year of the death of Tokugawa Ieyasu and the beginning of the last civil war. On all accounts a perfect opportunity to seize. Date Masamune was aware of the xenophobia of the Tokugawa, as he was of the importance of foreign trade for Japan. Thus he sent his retainer, Hasekura Tsunenaga with Luis Sotelo to New Spain and Europe to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with the West.The daimyo was more than convinced of the imminent defeat of the Shogun, being either replaced by the less xenophobic Toyotomi Hideyori or by a period of chaos and internal crisis in which he could seize enough power to deal with the West personally.
In any case, the development of the situation in Japan managed to amaze Date Masamune himself, not having been able to predict such a result, nor the amount of power he would have been conferred.

The Embassy made an incredible impression in New Spain and Europe, having an outstandingly positive impact in regards to the image of Japan. The Embassy was not the only group bringing stories about Japan. Through the course of the war, European and Japanese merchants brought news about the conflict, the changing of allegiances and the impact of the war in commerce and the evangelization of the Japanese.
A new opportunity was presented to Hasekura Tsunenaga. Now he would be able to claim the end of the viciously anti-Christian Tokugawa Shogunate and the birth of a more open Japanese Empire.

The baptism of the Japanese ambassador and the agreement with King Philip III of Spain was followed by an accidental yet amusing visit to Southern France and finally, the arrival at Rome to see the Pope, Paul V.

The then ‘King of Wôshû’, Date Masamune, had authorized his representative to open commercial relations with the West, as well as requesting the sending of more missionaries, particularly to Northern Japan, the personal domain of the Shogun.
It is rumored that the Ambassador to Rome and Madrid had in fact persuaded the Pope by claiming that his ruler would soon become the supreme ruler of Japan, thus being in the position of bringing the Empire under the guidance of the Church of Rome.

Whether this is true or not, it can with no doubt be said that the news of Date Masamune’s victories over Tokugawa Hidetada did much to impress the new catholic allies of ‘Felipe Francisco Hasekura’, as well as the Ambassador himself.

A treaty would eventually be signed on March of 1618, 5 years after leaving Japan on board of the San Juan Bautista.

The Treaty provided for the establishment of trade and commerce between the Empire of Japan and the Kingdom of Spain, and most importantly, between Japan and New Spain. Indeed, the growth of commerce in the Pacific in the 17th Century was due mostly to the establishment of the Hispano-Japanese trade relations, and within years Japanese merchants in Mexico and Spanish ones in Japan would become parts of everyday life in those parts of the world.

Finally, but no least importantly, the Embassy of 1613-1620 brought not only new ‘padres’ to Japan, but also the construction of a new Diocese in Japan. The Diocese built at Sendai was created with the twin purposes of spreading Christianity to northern Japan as well as checking the influence of the Portuguese-Jesuit Diocese at Nagasaki and the protestant missionaries at Edo.


To be continued...

A Spanish Alliance with Japan? I do like the idea of the knock on affects this could lead to. Please continue.