Rome versus Macedonia

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The Fall of the Republic, Part 11

In AUC 760, Rome was approaching a crossroads in its political evolution. Macedonia had been defeated, its empire dismantled. The lands east and north of Illyricum were in the process of being pacified and reorganized. Piracy in the Mediterranean had been virtually eliminated, and where merchants followed in the wake of Roman armies, the economic benefits eventually trickled down to all social classes. In Africa, the fruits of peace and security, albeit harvested under foreign dominion, were starting to provide dividends for the local population as well as for Roman businessmen and administrators.
With the reduction of Gallia, the Roman imperium was no longer a purely Mediterranean entity. With the conquest of North Africa, the Roman mind was opened to and broadened by an inflow of exotic ideas and sophisticated tastes. With the absorption of Hellas, Romanitas ceased to be a promotion of narrow-minded parochial values, and was beginning to metamorphose into a more cosmopolitan ideal.
Yet the very success of the Republic had put intolerable strains on its institutions and traditions. The empire was simply too vast, too heterogeneous and too complex to be ruled by institutions and traditions evolved to govern a city-state, or by an aristocratic elite that protected its self-interest by stifling initiative and enterprise. Most ominously, the conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries had given rise to a new breed of political and military leadership refusing to be bound within the restrictive confines of the mos maiorum and the cursus honorum.
The irony was that the Republic was destroyed by the very competitive forces which shaped it. Men strove for pre-eminence in a system which was by its very nature paradoxical. Because no man was king, every man desired to be king; and because no man was king, every man had the opportunity to make himself king. None of the Romans of the late Republic exemplified this more than Tiberius Claudius Nero Germanicus.
It was just one of the paradoxes which Germanicus embodied that his conquests were justified by the need to secure stable frontiers in Gallia, the lands conquered by his grandfather. For this policy of defensive aggression produced its own momentum. As the Roman territories expanded, so did the frontiers needing to be protected. Such is the way of empires. However, Germanicus was driven by more than just the desire to consolidate a legacy.
In the first half of the eighth century, the political and personal rivalry between the Claudii Neroni and the Caecilii Metelli, and their partisans, dominated Roman politics - in the Senate where the Metelli and the conservatores prevailed, and in the assembly, where the Claudii and the populares held sway. The Gallic campaign of Ti. Claudius Nero Africanus in AUC 722 had pacified the Gallic and Germanic peoples west and south of the Rhenus. However, this achievement was overshadowed by the success of L. Caecilius Metellus Creticus in the eastern Mediterranean. Given three centuries of hostility with Macedonia, for most Romans this was where the greatest threat was to be found, and where the greater glory was to be won.
Yet to the vexation of Metellus, it was Gaius Claudius Nero, son of Africanus, who in 748 was acclaimed Imperator and given the nomen Macedonicus. It was he who was in at the kill at Mylae while Lucius Caecilius Metellus Nepos occupied Pella.
Tiberius Claudius Nero, son of Macedonicus, was elected to the consulship in 762. His relative youth - at age 35 - should have disqualified him, but it was now routine practice for both populares and conservatores to ignore the constitution when it suited their purposes.
In contrast to the dour Africanus, Gaius had been a popular, charismatic, innovative commander. He harboured a strong sense of personal destiny, but he was also a man of integrity. As provincial governor, he won the admiration of the local population but did not endear himself to the equestrian class with his measures to stamp out dishonest and exploitative dealings. His son inherited these qualities, but in addition a more finely honed political acumen and a ruthless streak. As a consul, he used his legislative and veto powers to pay off debts and buy political allegiance; and he was not averse to using his family’s clientele - including army veterans - to intimidate his opponents. As proconsul, he flouted the lex Sulpicia which forbade a governor taking his army outside his province without the consent of the Senate.
Like his father and grandfather - and not so different from the Metelli - Tiberius earned the respect and loyalty of his troops by sharing their hardships and by providing decent pay and consistent victory. A strict disciplinarian, he was hard on his men but also on himself. He was conspicuous in battle, facing the same dangers as the troops, whom he addressed as commilitones, comrades. His regimen of intensive training and retraining and rigorous drill created a hardened, disciplined and all-conquering army.
In 763, Tiberius went to his allocated province. Many Romans were surprised when he engineered his appointment to the minor Gallia Alpina. He had his reasons, which soon became apparent.
In the wake of his 722 campaign, Tiberius Africanus had made no substantial changes to the existing tribal structures in central and northern Gallia. Instead, he followed the course of ad hoc expediency, negotiating alliances and imposing treaties, supporting friendly clans and chiefs and aiding in the suppression of their rivals. The policy was designed to keep the peace with a minimum of expenditure; but it required vigilance. Having no great interest in the administrative details, and perhaps being overly optimistic, he left the supervision of the treaties and alliances in the hands of the Senate. Within a few years there were distractions both overseas and domestic. The Senate’s neglect of Gallic affairs - which Tiberius saw as sheer negligence - guaranteed that the peace would not last.
With his arrangements in Gallia and Dacia already beginning to unravel, Africanus retired to private life an embittered man. So there is no doubt that the younger Tiberius was motivated at least partly by the wish to vindicate his grandfather.
One of the responsibilities of the governor of Gallia Alpina was to maintain the vital alliance with the Helvetii. Ironically, it had been to protect Rome’s allies against these people that the Gallic War of 690 had been launched. Seven decades on, the situation was reversed. Now the Helvetii played a crucial role in guarding the northern approaches to Italia through the Alpine passes. This concord was a typical demonstration of the Romans’ diplomatic genius at turning implacable enemies into faithful allies, even if they did not always follow through on their commitments.
Nevertheless, the safety of the Helvetii was nothing more than a pretext, and they were not involved directly in the subsequent campaign.
The trouble in Gallia in the 760s was a legacy of that earlier conflict. The extinction of the Suebi, annihilated by L. Aurelius Cotta in 690, had created something of a vacuum in the territory along the upper reaches of the River Rhenus. The Aedui who occupied the adjacent Gallic lands had been weakened and their neighbours the Averni decimated in their own struggle with Rome. Both had been reduced to the status of subject allies, dependant on Roman financial and military support.
In the late 750s, two warlike peoples, the Marcomanni and Quadi, began a movement across the Rhenus, threatening Rome’s allies. Why these peoples were on the move is not well understood, since their homeland directly north of the Alpes does not appear to have been under any recognizable threat. Certainly not all of the clans joined in the westward migration. Since they are believed to have been related to the Suebi, it is possible that they were claiming the patrimony of their kin.
The Marcomanni were also spreading northwards. At this time the Germanic Ubians and, to their south, the Vangiones also crossed the Rhenus, in the vicinity of the River Mosella, taking advantage of the decline of the Treveri (who had been defeated by Tiberius Africanus). It can be assumed that these tribes had been displaced by the migration of the Marcomanni, although this explanation does not take into account why the Nemetes, neighbours of the Ubians, remained on the east bank of the Rhenus. The affairs of Germania at this time are confusing, and so therefore are the extant historical accounts.
Farther north, the Chatti - a tribe of the Hermiones related to the Suebi - remained for the time being east of the river, inhabiting the upper reaches of the Visurgis. However, the west bank in their vicinity had been largely depopulated by the Roman conquest of 722, and it was only a matter of time before they took advantage of the situation. Roman policy in central and northern Gallia was now bearing the cost of two bitter wars which had destroyed the power and security of the indigenous Gallic peoples without putting in place a viable long-term alternative.
From his base in Gallia Alpina, Tiberius the younger was maneuvering to acquire an army. His allies in the assembly, led by the Tribune Lucius Octavius, had him assigned two legions to support the Helvetii. The wide-ranging lex Octavia also granted him the authority to levy troops in his and neighbouring provinces, to appoint his own officers, to negotiate treaties without prior approval of the Senate (although they would still have to be ratified in Rome) and to establish colonies. Such extraordinary powers were not without precedent, but in 763 Tiberius Claudius Nero was young and untested. He immediately began recruiting in Gallia, both in the provinces and among the allies. Protests in the Senate counted for little.
The German War began with an offensive against the Ubians and Vangiones. On the pretext of shielding the Helvetii, Tiberius took his small army out of his province, proceeding north of Gallia Maritima and setting up headquarters at Vesontio. From here, he despatched envoys to renew the partnership with the Andecavi, on the Liger, and to forge an alliance with the Mediomatrici, a Gallic people living east of the River Mosella who felt threatened by the migrating Germans. He manufactured a casus belli by sending a deputation which was roughly treated by the Ubians who received them. Marching north with just his four trained legions, plus auxiliary cavalry, he attacked without further warning, driving both tribes back to the Rhenus. A truce was arranged and the Germans were permitted to return to their side of the river. Tiberius then sent an expedition towards the coast, to ensure that the Gallic tribes there, pacified by his grandfather, were not preparing to rise against him.
As it was now late summer, Tiberius withdrew to establish winter quarters within the territory of the friendly Andecavi and Lingones. To ease his supply problems, he dispersed his legions. This scattering of his forces might have encouraged the other German tribes, but they were too disunited to take advantage. The following summer, 764, now with six legions at his disposal and having secured enough provisions for a long campaign, he advanced once more to the Rhenus.
Back in Rome, moves had been made in the Senate to relieve Tiberius of his proconsular imperium, for exceeding his legal authority and breaching the lex Sulpicia. Portraying himself, disingenuously, as a professional soldier with no interest in self-promotion, Tiberius expressed dismay that partisan politics should interfere with his military responsibilities. It was a clear signal that he intended to defy the Senate. Even so, the conservatores might have been successful, except that the Metellans overplayed their hand. Instead of the army being recalled, the command was to be handed over to none other than Metellus Nepos.
The proposal was vetoed by a popularis tribune, A. Terentius Varro. Rioting ensued, and Varro was forced to flee the city. However, one of the consuls in 764 was the patrician L. Cornelius Lentulus, no agent of Tiberius but disdainful of Metellan pretensions. His threat to call in legions from the provinces to quell the disorders had its desired effect. The senatorial faction responsible for the worst of the mob violence had no desire to see an army marching on Rome, lest the precedent not be lost on ambitious generals.
Due to Lentulus’s intervention, Tiberius was secure in his command, as he prepared his army for a pre-emptive strike against the Germans across the great river.

 

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European rivers:

 

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German and Gallic tribes, 763

 

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The Fall of the Republic, Part 12

The operation against Germania began at Divodurum, the capital of the Mediomatrici. Here Tiberius concentrated his forces while envoys were despatched to the unpacified communities on the west bank of the Rhenus, to demand submission. Other deputations were sent to his Gallic allies to requisition supplies and reinforcements, in particular cavalry.
The crossing took place north of the Mosella-Rhenus confluence, about ten milles from the modern city of Bonna, in the territory of the Eburones on the edge of the Arduenna forest. The Eburones sullenly accepted the Roman presence, and here Tiberius established an entrenched camp (which became the permanent settlement of Castra Bonnensis).
It is uncertain whether a Rhenine crossing had been part of his original campaign planning. Tiberius certainly gave no indication that he contemplated a permanent occupation beyond the river. More likely he intended to make the river a secure frontier, by neutralizing the peoples on the east bank. He threw a pontoon bridge across the Rhenus and deployed a reconnaissance in force, consisting of cavalry and mounted infantry. This was in the territory of the Chatti. Although these had not yet migrated across the river in large numbers, their raiding had contributed to the disorders that formed the background to Tiberius’s expedition.
The Chatti’s disciplined infantry and understanding of logistics made them more formidable than most other Germanic tribes. Although tough and courageous, like the Galles the Germans usually fought in massed formations that were little more than an armed rabble. Whether infantry or cavalry, they preferred hand-to-hand fighting and made little use of archers. They did not rely much on tactical organization. They fought battles for glory and plunder, and if an attack failed, they quickly lost heart. They rarely made use of reserves because no true warrior wanted to be held back. Logistical planning was rudimentary. Campaigns tended to peter out when supplies ran short.
The Romans had capitalized on these weaknesses in dealing with the Galles and those Germans with whom they had so far had contact. Therefore, subduing the more sophisticated Chatti was a daunting prospect, which is probably why Tiberius chose their territory for his bridgehead. Their defeat would not only enhance his prestige but undermine the will of their neighbours to resist.
Aware of the Romans’ approach, the German tribes in the vicinity had begun to organize. The Ubians and Vangiones, having tasted the power of Rome, did not participate. However, inhabiting the country near the mouth of the Rhenus were a formidable tribe, the Batavians. Later writers depicted them as relatives of the Chatti, although this may have been a result of intermingling after the events described here. Big, strong, brave warriors hardened by continuous warfare with their neighbours, they were skilled at horsemanship but were also renowned for their infantry. Their chieftain, Chariovalda, was a brave and resourceful leader
The expedition sent by Tiberius to the coast the previous year had made contact with the Batavians. Chariovalda turned down an alliance and refused to offer tokens of submission. The nearby Sicambri, under their chief Deudorix, also joined the coalition to fight the invader.
After some skirmishing, the Roman scouting units withdrew across the river. Tiberius then set about constructing a more permanent bridge. This was no easy task, given the breadth and depth of the river and the constant harrying of his men from the east bank. Punitive raids became a regular feature of the project, which took twelve days to complete. It was an engineering feat designed not just to transport the army but to overawe the Germans and in this respect it succeeded. The German attacks proved inconsequential. Instead of contesting the crossing in force, the threatened tribesmen evacuated their towns and villages, taking refuge in the swamps and woods.
Leaving a strong guard on both sides of the river, Tiberius advanced inland from his bridgehead. Although everything had so far gone to plan, he knew that a desperate struggle lay ahead. In the difficult terrain, the Roman army faced severe obstacles - mountains, swamps and forest wilderness which the enemy could use to his advantage. Keeping to the few available tracks exposed the troops to ambush, while leaving the trails broke up the army and separated the units from reinforcements and from their supply train. There would be no time to build roads, bridges, causeways or fortified camps. There was little opportunity for foraging due to the scarcity of food resources but also because foraging slowed the march and dispersed the troops even more.
Yet Tiberius could not afford slow, deliberate progress. Delay not only gave his German foe time to regroup; it also gave his enemies in Rome time to organize against him. So making a virtue of necessity, Tiberius divided his forces into four columns in a campaign to lay waste to the German settlements. Even the shortage of supplies was exploited, as the soldiers’ pillaging spread terror and ruination.
Tiberius emphasized mobility. The army was at its most vulnerable when returning to its bases, particularly when laden with plunder and prisoners. So captives were massacred and looting, except for food, was discouraged. Instead, everything in the path of the legions was destroyed. The men were promised their rewards at the end of their campaign, and such was their discipline and their faith in their general that they obeyed his orders, travelling light but leaving nothing behind. It was a brutal but effective policy, which the Romans called vastare, devastation.
The Romans’ fast-moving campaign made it impossible for the scattered German tribes to regroup or gather their reinforcements. They were unprepared for the swiftness of the operation. Rather than catching the Romans in ambush, more likely it was the German who was surprised in his camp. In the dense forests, the short swords, personal armour and tight formations of the Romans conferred a decisive advantage over the Germans’ large shields and long spears and swords.
Tiberius never underestimated his enemy. Mindful that the Chatti were a formidable opponent, he ensured that they were not allowed any chance to utilize their skills.
The Romans penetrated as far as the River Visurgis, and in their turn the Sicambri and the Batavians felt the full force of the Roman assault. Deudorix fell in battle and Chariovalda appealed for a conference. Since it was nearing the end of summer, Tiberius was in the mood for negotiation. He was aware that a strategic withdrawal to his winter bases would be seen by the Germans as a retreat, so it was important to keep a foothold across the river after he had pulled back. So he offered Chariovalda generous terms. His diplomacy proved masterful, and the Batavians were to become valuable allies. Tiberius was also careful to cultivate and maintain good relations with tribes on the west bank, proffering gifts and promises. It is a tribute to the effectiveness of his arrangements that there was no general uprising in Gallia or Germania while the Roman legions were preoccupied during the civil war.
In Rome, however, the crossing of the Rhenus had been denounced as unprovoked aggression. No sympathy was expended on the Galles or Germans who were his victims. The conservatores feared that Tiberius’s thirst for glory would not be quenched so far from Rome.
In his defence, P. Licinius Nerva addressed the Senate on the benefits of preventive war:
"Our generals always thought it better to act on the defensive, to repel attacks when they came. We did not attack the barbarians. It was enough to resist them and deliver the Republic from imminent harm. Yet they remained a danger... The present strategy [of Tiberius] is to not only overcome those who have taken up arms against us, but to reduce the whole of the enemy’s country to our dominion. For a lasting peace can only be won when all of these peoples, savage, untrustworthy and warlike, have been subdued, by fear and hope, by punishment and reward, by arms and laws... Once Italia was fortified by the Alpes. Now it is our duty to ensure that there is nothing beyond those ramparts, as far as the Ocean, which we should fear. We ought not to recall a general who is so gloriously discharging his duties for the safety of the Republic."
In the end, it would not be words that would resolve the issue. The attempts by the conservatores to deprive Tiberius of his imperium proconsulare were blocked by the Tribunes and by the populares in the assembly, which indeed passed a law extending his command for an extra two years. When a Tribune attached to the senatorial faction attempted to veto the law, he was attacked, in a shocking repudiation of the sacrosanctity of his office. Another Tribune associated with Tiberius proposed to grant full citizenship to the inhabitants of Gallia Citerior. This was an obvious attempt to win support in the province and to stimulate enlistments. It was successfully blocked, but Tiberius had made his point.
Meanwhile, Tiberian agents were recruiting fresh troops in Gallia Transalpina, Hispania and as far as Illyricum. In the spring of 765, when Tiberius again struck across the Rhenus, he had no fewer than ten legions and some ten thousand cavalry under his direct command.
This was to be a more systematic operation than that of the previous year, against the Hermunduri and Marcomanni on the middle reaches of the river, from where stretched eastwards the vast Hercynian forest. These two tribes were traditional enemies but now combined against the Roman threat. Attempts by Tiberius to coax into an alliance the Hermunduri, a branch of the Suebi who had survived the Gallic War of the previous century, failed.
While the main body of the army crossed at Borbetomagus (Roman Vormatia), its flanks were covered by crossings to the north and south. The auxiliary infantry took the lead, clearing the path of obstacles both natural and human, followed by the more heavily equipped legions, who came up quickly when resistance intensified. As before, the army cut a swath of destruction through the countryside; but the intent was to bring the infuriated enemy to pitched battle.
The expected confrontation took place on the banks of the Moenus, a tributary of the Rhenus in what was formerly the territory of the Vangiones. Anticipating an attack, Tiberius moved his army in a hollow square with the baggage train in the middle. This formation slowed the Romans but that was his strategy, to invite the enemy to strike. When they did, they were driven back with heavy losses.
Tiberius did not attempt to pursue the defeated foe. Scattered into the forest, they would be an elusive prey. To prevent them from either rallying or relying on guerrilla tactics to impede his advance, Tiberius did as he had done the previous year, splitting his army into four battle groups to continue the harsh policy of vastare.
The only setback occurred on the southern wing of the advance, a legion and six cohorts of auxiliaries commanded by L. Cossinius. Encamped near the Nicer River, Cossinius had been ordered to keep his men within their entrenchments and avoid engagements except in defence. However, when his grain supplies began to run low, he risked a foraging mission, assigning two regular and three auxiliary cohorts to the task. These were unlucky enough to be intercepted by a horde of Germans, probably Marcomanni heading northwards in the direction of the main Roman army. One of the regular cohorts managed to cut its way free, but the others were surrounded and exterminated. The depleted force inside the camp now came under assault but the attackers were repulsed. The insubordinate Cossinius was later cashiered, but Tiberius took heed of the lesson and enlarged the commissariat attached to each of his legions.
By the end of a second season’s campaigning, Tiberius had pacified an extensive region of western Germania, all of the lands between the Rhenus and the Visurgis, and south to the Nicer. The Hermunduri had been comprehensively defeated and suffered severe reprisal for their defiance; and their allies the Marcomanni were driven away to the south and west.
The Germans in the upper valley of the Rhenus had yet to be conquered, so it was here that Tiberius intended to direct his attention in the new year. Wintering once more in friendly territory in Gallia, he used the duration to send embassies to those tribes which had already submitted to remind them of their obligations and of the consequences of treachery.
During 764, another important campaign was conducted by Terentius Varro, the loyal Tribune whom Tiberius appointed to command an expedition to clear the Alpine passes. On the Italian side, a Ligurian tribe, the Salassi, were making a nuisance of themselves with predatory raids. Varro crushed them and cleared the valleys and passes to the north. He then completed, in the early spring of 766, an epic march with two legions to the headwaters of the Rhenus. He established a fortified colony at Vindonissa (which would eventually become the provincial capital) and then descended the valley to link with the forces of Tiberius. For his efforts, Varro would be promoted to second in command of the Tiberian legions in Germania.
Tiberius resolved to conclude the campaign in 766. His proconsular imperium could not be extended indefinitely. His men were becoming impatient for the rewards they had been promised. In Rome, his allies and supporters were fending off the attacks of his political opponents. His most talented agents, Nerva and Octavius, urged him to return to seek a second consulship, in order to gain immunity from prosecution.
Already Tiberius was being hailed Germanicus and Imperator, and while the Senate blocked his bid for a triumph, he was the people’s hero. And yet public opinion was fickle. Even as he set out on his third year of conquest, the focus of Rome’s attention was shifting, to the eastern Mediterranean, to Aegypt.

 

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The Fall of the Republic, Part 13

In AUC 731, the young general Apollodorus overthrew the governor of Aegypt, Perdiccas, and four years later he proclaimed himself king. Although the upper strata of Aegyptian society remained Macedonian, the new pharaoh attempted to give his regime an indigenous character. He also needed to secure his kingdom, and in 739, he signed a non-aggression pact with Rome. The following year, with Roman assistance, he defeated a counteroffensive from Syria.
In the wake of the Roman conquest of Macedonia, Apollodorus consolidated his position at home, intensifying his efforts to create a national identity. In 744, his daughter (and only child) Lysandra married Phylesius, a Hellenized Aegyptian nobleman; and if the dynasty had survived, within a couple of generations a truly native ruling class might have emerged.
Apollodorus continued to strengthen his foreign ties, negotiating treaties with former opponents Diomedes of Babylon and Arybbas of Syria. The latter’s overthrow by Telephus in 761 did not adversely affect Aegyptian security, the alliance with Babylon or the relationship with Rome. Indeed, Apollodorus considered himself a friend of the Romans. As late as 764, a Roman embassy was received as honoured guests. However, in order not to alienate his Syrian and Mesopotamian counterparts, he never went so far as to arrange a formal alliance. In the end, this omission cost Apollodorus his throne and Aegypt her short-lived independence.
On the western border of Aegypt lay the Roman province of Cyrenaica. Since the conquest in 707 (by M. Sempronius Rutilus), Cyrenaica with its famous Five Cities (the Pentapolis) had become virtually a private preserve of the Metelli. Except for a brief interlude in 742 when M. Aemilius Lepidus was proconsul, the province was always allocated to a member of the family, including the senior members Metellus Creticus and Metellus Nepos, or a partisan of the Metellan faction.
The boundary between Cyrenaica and Aegypt had never been properly defined. Even the treaty of 739 was vague on this detail. Since the colonized portion was restricted to the fertile plateau and adjacent coastline, the Macedonian administration had never bothered to conduct a thorough survey or draw proper borders. However, except as a potential casus belli the issue was irrelevant, since the harshness and vast distances of the intervening desert made overland travel virtually impossible.
Yet in the end, such considerations were irrelevant. Apollodorus and his Aegyptian kingdom would become nothing more than tokens in a game being played out in Italia.
By 765, political tensions in Rome between the populares and the conservatores had reached a pitch verging on civil war. The campaigns of Ti. Claudius Nero Germanicus north of the Alpes had aroused the envy and hatred of the majority of Senators. They feared the arrogance and ambition of the Claudians; and yet, in their efforts to safeguard the Republic against rule by one man, they placed exorbitant power in the hands of one family. Its latest representative was Q. Caecilius Metellus, the son of Nepos and the grandson of Creticus. In 765, Quintus was elected Consul. Unlike his father, he had waited until he was of the legal age for the consulship; but like other politicians with heady aspirations, he saw the consulship as a prelude to the more important office, that of proconsul.
His colleague was another conservative, Gaius Calpurnius Piso. The Pisones claimed an ancient and distinguished pedigree, descent from King Numa Pompilius (through his son Calpus). They felt the aggrieved sense of entitlement which many of their class shared. Piso resented the prominence of the plebeian Metelli; but he was ambitious and saw Germanicus as the greater threat to his own agenda. He was prepared to collaborate with the Metellans to advance his own career.
The main objective of the conservatores was to block the candidacy of Tiberius Germanicus for the consulship of 766. Rejecting his request to be allowed to stand in absentia, the Senate demanded that he terminate his campaign by the end of the year or otherwise turn his command over to a successor. Tiberius’s loyal supporters Lucius Octavius and P. Licinius Nerva worked furiously to thwart the efforts against him, until finally he abandoned his bid. The successful candidates were the conservative C. Coelius Caldus and the moderate L. Roscius Otho.
Rumors, no doubt spread by his enemies, claimed that Tiberius was preparing to march on Rome with his army and seize power. Even the Senate dismissed such allegations, but Metellus played on its fears to secure for himself a wide-ranging proconsular command, in Cyprus, Creta, Africa and Cyrenaica. Piso was assigned the governorship of Gallia Citerior, probably to disrupt the Tiberians’ recruitment campaign there; but he stayed in Rome, sending legates instead.
Metellus stationed himself in Cyrene and immediately fabricated a dispute with Aegypt. His subsequent actions were a blatant example of the sort of aggressive war for which the conservatores, with breathtaking hypocrisy, approved even as they continued to criticize Tiberius. Metellus’s motives were threefold and obvious: to secure an important military command, to create an opportunity for personal enrichment and to win popularity by securing Rome’s grain supply. Aegypt’s vast abundance of food and other riches made it a tempting prize.
With six legions at his disposal and Piso busy at home raising more, Metellus set about assembling a fleet and recruiting auxiliary forces, especially cavalry, in the African provinces. His activities could not have gone unnoticed, and yet Apollodorus remained impassive. The Aegyptian had no evidence to justify a pre-emptive strike, and he expected that diplomacy and his influence in Rome would avert conflict. He may also have been misled by faulty intelligence about the Roman’s intentions.
The king had made a fateful mistake in dismantling the network of spies and informers maintained by his predecessors. The detested intelligence service was almost certainly engaged in conspiracies against him and his ministers, but its agents were as efficient as they were corrupt. Instead of buying their loyalty, Apollodorus abolished their organization. This won him popularity, but it left him oblivious to the ominous developments in Cyrenaica.
In Aprilis 766, Metellus launched his unprovoked war. Citing violations of the 739 treaty, he set sail in a convoy of warships and troop transports, landing at Taposiris, a seaport on the western edge of the Nilus delta, south-west of the Aegyptian capital, Alexandria. The disembarkation was uncontested, but once the Romans were established ashore they came under ferocious attack. The hastily organized civilian militia were beaten off; but the garrison of professional soldiers was not so easily overcome.
Taposiris was located at the southern end of the 40 mille-long spit which separated Lake Mareotis from the sea and on which Alexandria was built. Metellus’s plan was not to advance along the narrow neck of land which could be easily defended, but to encircle the capital from the south-east, via the Canopic branch of the Nilus. However, to protect his left flank and to bring in the rest of his army from Cyrenaica, he needed to secure his port facilities.
The Aegyptian garrison was putting up a stiff resistance. The town site was dominated by a rocky ridge, occupied by the eponymous temple of Osiris; and a long wall ran from the lake to the sea. The Romans had to surmount these obstacles, and every moment’s delay allowed the Aegyptians time to prepare a counterattack. With his limited force, the vanguard of the invasion, Metellus had to take these positions by storm. Casualties were heavy.
A meticulous tactician, Metellus nevertheless had an impulsive nature which often led him to overrule his own careful planning. His original intent was to keep his troops in entrenchments, holding the port until the arrival of the rest of the army. However, rough seas were causing a delay. Impatient to engage the enemy, he decided to strike. Instead of simply consolidating the beachhead, this opening phase was to be an offensive operation.
His troop transports were still standing at anchor in Cyrenaica and Carthage, awaiting a change in the weather, when, leaving just four cohorts in Taposiris, Metellus set out with two understrength legions and a few hundred cavalry. He brushed aside Aegyptian forces defending the river port of Marea, but he bypassed the strong garrison at Apis. This detour caught the Aegyptians off guard and brought on the first major battle of the campaign; but it also left Metellus dangerously isolated.
An Aegyptian army of some thirty thousand commanded by Prince Phylesius met the Romans on a dusty plain. Heavily outnumbered, Metellus ordered a fighting retreat, but the overeager Phylesius attacked. Against the well-equipped, highly disciplined Romans, the lightly-armed Aegyptians suffered grievously, but eventually the weight of numbers prevailed, and Metellus was forced to retreat to Taposiris. His good fortune held; for his garrison there had come under sustained assault and the enemy was on the verge of breaking through when he and his men returned.
The offensive had turned into a siege; but again Metellus was favoured, by good weather. As the Roman fleet arrived with thousands of fresh troops, the Aegyptians launched a desperate attack which was beaten back with appalling losses.
In Rome, the Aegyptian embassy was frantically trying to arrange a truce; but the Senate was preoccupied with the rising tide of violence in the city and in any case was unsympathetic. When they complained of Roman bad faith, the ambassadors were expelled.
In Alexandria, Apollodorus showed a greater sense of honour. The Roman legation, which was in the Aegyptian capital at the time of the unprovoked invasion, had been arrested, and there was a widespread clamour for their execution. Instead, Apollodorus gave them safe conduct to their ship. A similar mercy would not be shown towards him and his family.
The war was still only in its twenty-first day when Metellus again moved out of his siege works. This time, two full legions were left to hold the port while he advanced with twenty-five thousand troops. Marea had to be retaken, and Apis fell soon afterwards. Metellus kept to his original plan of rounding the lake and striking north, but his way was blocked by a new Aegyptian army.
Despite his misgivings, Prince Phylesius knew that he had to take on the Romans on the open field of battle. With sixty thousand men and a hundred elephants, his best hope was to overwhelm the enemy in a single onslaught. He drew up his army on clear ground, inviting an attack.
When Metellus formed his lines, he deployed his slingers and archers on the flanks, interspersed with the auxiliary infantry; for it was on the wings that Phylesius had placed his elephants. He held to the defensive, forcing Phylesius to take the initiative. When the Aegyptians charged, the Roman slingers and archers hurled a volley of missiles which broke up the mass of elephants. The Aegyptian right wing disintegrated amidst the chaos; although the left wing held, shored up by Phylesius himself, who rode up to the front and rallied his men.
While the light infantry on his own left slashed into the Aegyptian right, Metellus ordered his legions in the centre forward. The Aegyptian lines gradually gave way, but at a mounting cost to the Romans. Metellus sent his reserve legion to swing around Phylesius’ collapsing right flank, rolling up the Aegyptian line, while his cavalry held the opposite wing. The result was a fearful slaughter, with fifty thousand Aegyptian dead, including Prince Phylesius.
Distraught at the news, the ageing Apollodorus suffered a seizure, from which he would not fully recover. Yet the Romans had also taken heavy casualties. There was a ten-day lull while the Romans patched their wounds and Metellus brought up the last of his reinforcements, two legions despatched from Hispania and Illyricum.
On the ninth of Maius, exactly one month after the invasion began, the Romans crossed into the delta and turned north, towards the Aegyptian capital. Metellus divided his forces, one column proceeding north-west, directly towards Alexandria, the other on a circuitous route to capture the city of Canopus. Alexandria would then be cut off by Roman forces to the east, west and south.
Apollodorus was advised by his ministers to abandon the capital and continue the fight in the eastern delta, and if necessary into Upper Aegypt. He refused. The war would be won or lost at the gates of Alexandria. Urgent requests for assistance had been sent to Telephus of Syria and Diomedes of Babylon; but even if they responded there was little chance of relief arriving in time to halt the Roman advance.
Yet the Aegyptians fought with great courage and tenacity. Roman progress was slow and costly. Over the next six months Metellus covered less ground than he had in the first. By the end of 766, he was as far from Alexandria as he had been in the early summer.

 

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The Aegyptian campaign

 

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The Fall of the Republic, Part 14

In Rome, Gaius Calpurnius Piso was undertaking his campaign for a second consulship, despite the illegality. His justification was the customary refrain that the safety of the state should override constitutional fidelity. Opposed by the more principled members of the conservative faction, he soon abandoned the attempt but then proceeded to enforce his will by other means. He induced one of the Consuls, Coelius, to postpone all public business, which included the elections. As violent disorders broke out in the forum, the craven Senate proclaimed a tumultus and iustitium - a state of emergency and suspension of the laws. The magistrates were empowered to take whatever steps were deemed necessary to restore order. In reality, Piso and his henchmen were granted a licence for lawlessness.
Without any kind of civil police force to keep the peace, the violence escalated into running street battles; but Piso’s well-financed gangs held the upper hand. Supporters of Germanicus were hunted like common criminals. Octavius and Nerva barely escaped; the Consul L. Roscius Otho prudently withdrew from the capital to his country estate; but hundreds lost their lives.
Once in control of the city, Piso consolidated his position by enforcing the election of his nominees as Consuls for 767. Members of the popularis faction who had escaped the extralegal killings were prosecuted by courts dominated by Piso’s partisans, and sent into exile.
Much of the blame for this extremist reaction must be assigned to Metellus, who had cynically condoned the behaviour of his political ally. Even so, what followed went far beyond anything he could have countenanced.
On the pretext of recruiting for the Aegyptian war, Piso had raised three legions which he stationed, menacingly, near Rome. Instead of being shipped off to Africa, these troops became his private army. The Senate disapproved and even passed a resolution to that effect; but a codicil was added, that the three legions should nonetheless remain in the vicinity of the capital until Tiberius Germanicus relinquished his command.
Tiberius made one last attempt at reconciliation. When his overtures were rebuffed, he summoned his agents and adherents to his headquarters in Germania. Those of his faction who had stayed in or returned to the city fled; and the Senate announced these moves as the prelude to a march on Rome. With all constraints thus eliminated, Piso now moved to end once and for all Tiberius’s proconsular imperium, and to appropriate his legions. The general ignored the recall order and one of the Senate’s agents was killed during a brawl as he tried to deliver the ultimatum. Piso seized on this incident to have Tiberius declared an outlaw.
However, resistance to the duumvirate of Piso and Metellus was growing, and not just within the popularis faction. Arch-conservatives loyal to the traditions of the Republic were dismayed at the Pisonians’ systematic subversion of the constitution. Romans of good breeding were troubled by mob violence perpetrated by the self-proclaimed defenders of libertas, as they were by the flagrantly aggressive nature of the war against Aegypt. The younger generation of the nobility had no serious qualms over these issues, but they were sympathetic to the cause of Tiberius, as they foresaw their own ambition being stifled by the aims and methods of the duumvirs.
The Consuls for 767 were the conservatives M. Atius Balbus and L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. Both were members of the Metellan faction and owed their election to Piso. Yet they soon demonstrated that they were not mere pawns. When renewed rioting threatened anarchy in Rome, they prevailed upon the Senate to declare a senatus consultum de republica defendenda. This was the last thing Piso wanted, particularly when it became clear that the Consuls intended to commandeer his legions stationed near the city. Piso ordered his hired thugs to step up their attacks. During one of these encounters, Atius Balbus was caught in the melee and killed. His surviving colleague, Ahenobarbus, was forced to seek refuge, ignominiously, within the Pisonian camp.
Piso now had his manufactured excuse. The latest outbreaks occurred just as Metellus was suffering further setbacks in Aegypt. That strengthened Piso’s position but it also meant that he had to act quickly. Metellus was asking for his three legions.
On 10 Junius, one of the darkest days in the history of the Republic, Piso called his legions into the capital, ostensibly to restore order. One of the praetors, C. Licinius Sacerdos, courageously went out to confront the soldiers, and for his brave stand he was cut down. A senatorial deputation was more fortunate but no more successful in halting the advance. Those populares still in Rome and determined to oppose him erected barricades, but they were quickly overwhelmed. In the ensuing blood purge, thousands of the duumvirate’s opponents, real, suspected and imagined, were butchered. The slaughter spread beyond the city, as agents of Piso sought out victims in their home towns or their country houses. Among the victims was Gaius Claudius Nero Macedonicus, who had long since retired from public life.
Proceedings of the assembly, had the citizens dared to assemble, were suspended indefinitely. To replace the slain Atius Balbus, a suffect Consul was appointed, none other than Q. Caecilius Metellus. Once again the hypocrisy of the Senate, which had forbidden a candidacy in absentia for Tiberius Germanicus, was exposed. However, just days later, the cowed Senators ratified Piso’s actions by retrospectively appointing him dictator rei publicae constituendae (dictator to restore the republic). His victims were posthumously declared traitors, to legitimize their murders and to enable Piso and his lieutenants to confiscate their estates.
Now that Piso enjoyed absolute authority, he had begun to detach himself from his political ally. Once a dictator had been appointed, the imperium of the Consuls lapsed. This had no immediate practical effect on the demoralized Ahenobarbus, nor on Metellus, commanding in Aegypt. Nevertheless, it reinforced Piso’s position; and in the summer of 767 Gaius Calpurnius Piso was perhaps the most powerful man in the history of the Republic.
However, he now made a major miscalculation. The legions that had marched into Rome acted not so much out loyalty to Piso as from self-interest. They had been persuaded by their officers that they were about to be sent north, to join Tiberius in Germania. This would deprive them of a share of the enormous plunder to be won in Aegypt. So when it became obvious that Piso had no intention of releasing them for service in Africa, mutiny broke out in the ranks. On one occasion, two military tribunes who tried to restore discipline were stoned to death.
To appease the soldiers, Piso found it necessary to order a new round of executions, now formalized in proscriptiones, official death lists. The property of the condemned was sold and the proceeds disbursed among the troops. As a result, Piso’s regime became a reign of terror in which nobody, regardless of family connection or political affiliation, was safe. Dozens of Senators, hundreds of nobles and thousands of equestrians were killed in a bloodletting unprecedented in Roman history. It solved Piso’s short-term problem of paying off the troops, but because no one felt secure, whatever political support he still possessed was quickly eroding, and his rule was turning into an undisguised military dictatorship.
Upon hearing the news from Rome, Tiberius Germanicus commenced preparations for his own march on the capital. He paid a bonus to his troops and used the remainder of his vast war treasury to expand his support base in Italia. He was, ironically, aided in his efforts to build a coalition by the Pisonian proscriptions, which amply demonstrated that neutrality was not enough to guarantee safety. In early Septembris, the first of the Tiberian legions recrossed the Rhenus and set out for Italia.
In the meantime, Metellus was receiving the first reports of Piso’s coup. Politically naive, he had allowed affairs in the capital to get out of hand, and more importantly out of his control. Piso’s liquidation of his opponents had begun to widen into attacks on Metellan supporters and allies. Yet before he could act to redeem his reputation, Piso’s dictatorship had already begun to unravel.
By mid-Septembris, four Tiberian legions were approaching the province of Gallia Maritima. Even if the governor there had the manpower to resist, he would not. He was L. Aemilius Lepidus, Consul in 763 and related by marriage to Germanicus. (Tiberius was married to Aemilia, the daughter of Lucius’s cousin M. Aemilius Lepidus.) Piso’s men were neither trained nor equipped to confront these battle-hardened veterans. Some of his troops began to desert, while others, including the officers, were belatedly demanding their redeployment to Aegypt. On 21 Septembris, the legions entered Gallia Citerior, Piso’s own province. His legates decamped.
As his accomplices began to desert him, Piso lost his nerve. Retiring to his villa, he authorized elections for 768. It is not known whether he meant his retirement to be permanent, although his position was now probably irredeemable. He did not live long enough for retribution, as by year’s end he was dead, presumably from natural causes but perhaps by his own hand.
The crisis was not yet over. The four Tiberian legions were now in northern Italia and others were on the move. However, an invasion of Italia was an act of treason. Regardless of all his misdeeds, Piso had been acting within the letter of the law; and irrespective of his radical career, Tiberius was not a revolutionary. He turned away from Italia. There was unfinished business in Germania.
Still the death of the tyrant did not bring lasting peace. The damage had been done, and the legacy of bitterness remained. The families of victims of the proscriptions did not have their property restored, since their estates had been bought up by men of influence. The Senate was in nominal control but had been discredited by its complicity as well as its weakness. The dignitas of Metellus had been compromised by his association with Piso, and his difficulties in Aegypt tarnished his image even more. Moreover, the atrocities of Piso, the inaction of Metellus and the reaction of Germanicus demonstrated once and for all that the real power in the state resided not in Rome but in the army camps, not with the magistrates but with the generals.
In Octobris, Q. Caecilius Metellus returned to Rome, leaving the continuation of the Aegyptian war in the hands of his deputy, Marcus Petreius. Although the latter was an able soldier, the resurgent populares derided Metellus for abdicating his command and deserting his men. Nevertheless, with the political system in disarray, he was greeted warmly by the conservatores and appointed sole consul by a compliant assembly. Whatever its merits, this latest break with republican tradition further undermined the very cause the senatorials claimed to be protecting.
Empowered by a senatus consultum de republica defendenda - virtually a declaration of civil war against the opponents of the Senate - and authorized to raise as many troops as deemed necessary, Metellus was granted consular imperium in the provinces superior to that of any of the governors. The audacity of the Senate in agreeing to these measures astounded most Romans. Metellus had been as responsible as anyone for the excesses of Piso, and yet he was reaping the dividends.
He was additionally favoured by the success of his legate Petreius, who completed the conquest of Aegypt. For ten months before his return to Rome, Metellus had painstakingly worked his way towards Alexandria, while Petreius commanded the right column advancing on Canopus. The campaign was interrupted by a revolt in Carthage, where a large section of the populace had never been reconciled to Roman dominion. Two legions intended to reinforce Metellus had to be diverted to deal with the Carthaginian uprising, which was put down with savage reprisals.
On 30 Sextilis, Canopus finally fell, and the capital was doomed. Yet the Aegyptians fought on, and in their frustration the Roman troops indiscriminately massacred the civilian population. Estimates of the death toll in the conquest of Aegypt range up to one million.
Not long after Metellus reached Rome, the Romans reached Alexandria. Petreius conducted a masterful albeit brutal campaign. His victory was of such a comprehensive nature that resistance ceased all over Aegypt, despite the Romans having conquered just the western delta. Apollodorus died in his blazing palace. His daughter Lysandra would adorn the triumph celebrated by Metellus but won substantially by his legate. The Metellan faction now had the looted wealth of Aegypt at their disposal. Yet in the end, it was not Metellus who enjoyed the greater prestige and the complete confidence of the soldiers, but rather Tiberius Germanicus.
Facing the intractable opposition of the Senate, and traditionalist enough to balk at being declared an enemy of the state, Tiberius had not taken advantage of the political havoc wrought by Piso. With the collapse of the dictator’s regime, he had called off his invasion of Italia. Now, when the Senate commenced new moves against him, demanding his return to Rome, his determination began to waver. His political mentors, Nerva and Octavius, steadied his resolve, arranging demonstrations of loyalty from his legions and a vote of confidence in an emboldened assembly. The Senate reacted predictably, ordering Tiberius once more to surrender his command or be declared a traitor. Since either way, he would be ruined, the Senate was seen to be forcing his hand. Rome and indeed all of Italia braced for civil war.
However, there was one more surprise in store. Within two years, Tiberius Claudius Nero Germanicus, alleged enemy of the Republic, would be hailed as its saviour.

 

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The Fall of the Republic, Part 15

The civil war of 769-770 was fought over no great issues of state. Its origins can be found in the personal, self-indulgent rivalries and jealousies which lay at the very heart of the social and political organization which had prevailed in Rome for centuries. The Republic was a system built on competition, but ultimately of a self-destructive kind. A contest for pre-eminence was of its very nature a struggle for absolute power.
Both the conservatores and the populares claimed to be defending libertas. In fact, not much separated them. The senatorial elite clung to a corporate mentality which suppressed individual initiative. Its opposition to men like the Claudii Neroni was motivated by fear that the supremacy of one individual would subvert the oligarchical form of government that provided stability and security and which preserved their class interests. The poularis faction was no less elitist or self-serving. Its leaders were "men of the people" only insofar as it suited their agenda. Although they could be genuine reformers, as a group their loyalty was to primarily to themselves, to family and faction, only then to class and country, and only remotely to those from whom they took their name, the people.
Tiberius Claudius Nero Germanicus was seen by many of his contemporaries as a dangerous revolutionary not because he threatened to overthrow the established social order; nor because he seemed determined to make himself primus inter pares, for he was not the only Roman with such aspirations. Rather, in the eyes of his opponents, through his extended commands and his military campaigns he threatened to monopolize political patronage. The greater his success, the more potent the challenge he posed to the Senate and its power base. Most Senators, indeed, had no more affection for the Metelli. It was just that they preferred manageable mediocrity to unrestrained talent. The conservatores believed - or hoped - that the Metellans would be more malleable, less menacing than the Claudii, who were perceived as arrogant and unpredictable.
What the Senators, or at least the reactionaries who controlled the Senate, failed to grasp was that their application of the traditional patron-client relationship they were defending was what forced the Tiberians to adopt radical methods in defence of their dignitas. For a network of patronage permeated the ruling class as well. The lower ranks were dependent on the higher, and the ties of beneficium and officium (benefit and service) bound them to a cause for which they felt no great conviction. The upper echelons found themselves trapped in the same web, unwilling to permit any compromise, for fear of losing their grip on their clientelae.
The shocking events of 767 changed nothing in Rome. If anything, the short-lived dictatorship of Piso reaffirmed in the minds of most Senators the need for tighter constraints and more extreme measures to curb ambition. Yet their methods, typically, contradicted their purported aims and undermined the very institutions they were trying to save. With the appointment of a sole consul, more power was legally concentrated in the hands of one man than ever before in the Republic. Even Piso did not wield the authority nor command the resources of Q. Caecilius Metellus in 767-8.
The populares did not passively accept this constitutional coup. Their rapid response despite the recent bloody purge testifies to their resilience and steadfastness of purpose, and to the intensity and depth of anti-senatorial sentiment. The Tribune P. Varinius gamely put forward a law that ex-praetors and ex-consuls could not assume commands abroad until five years had elapsed. It was a reasonable and indeed sensible proposal, but it was clearly aimed at Metellus and thus intolerable. As usual, the conservatores suborned a fellow Tribune to apply his intercessio; and as usual the Senate went too far in protecting its prerogatives. A decree was put up that Tribunes should be forbidden to propose laws which had not been sanctioned beforehand by the Senate. When Varinius attempted to exercise his constitutional right of veto, he and his supporters in the assembly were set upon by partisans of Metellus, and the motion was carried.
The renewed outbreak of violence was then used by its very instigators as an excuse to delay the elections for the 768 magistracies and to prolong Metellus’s consulship.
Such behaviour convinced many Romans that the Senate was not interested in preserving the republican constitution but rather in overturning it, by upsetting the traditional balance of power in the state. Thus, in the eyes of the Tiberians, direct action against the senatorial government would not be an act of treason but rather one of liberation.
The moves by the Senate to deprive Tiberius of his imperium were gathering pace, and it was obvious that Metellus coveted the command in Germania and the twelve legions now engaged there. Tiberius was left with little room to manoeuvre. If he gave up his army, he would be rendered helpless. The prospect he faced was at best the ruin of his career, and possibly death at the hands of his political enemies. Yet if he continued to defy the Senate, he was in fact committing himself to civil war.
The Senate and the Metellans were playing a dangerous game. The troops in Germania were indignant over the ingratitude shown towards their commander; but they were also aroused by the threat posed to their own interests. The Senate traditionally showed no great consideration for the veterans of Rome’s wars of conquest. It was reluctant to approve bills to grant pensions in the form of land allotments to army veterans and it routinely blocked legislation to establish colonies, in Italia and overseas for the same purpose. They used the spurious pretext of wishing to avoid conflict with the native peoples; but the populares accused the Senators of being more interested in wanting to reserve the land for their own acquisition. Certainly, the Senators, whose wealth was still derived mainly from land ownership, feared that the distribution of land to the troops might be a prelude to broader and more radical agrarian reform. However, they were motivated principally by mistrust of popular commanders.
The Senate’s response was to alienate the recalcitrant general from his soldiers by cutting off his means of patronage - plunder and pensions. Yet this strategy was self-defeating. Blinded by suspicion and pride, the Senate ensured that his troops would remain loyal to their commander. The soldiers feared that the army of Tiberius was to be disbanded and replaced by the African legions, and that they would be cheated of their rewards.
During most of 768, Tiberius continued his advance through Germania. He could afford to ignore the pronouncements of the Senate while he was winning victories against the barbarians. By late summer, he was able to recommend the creation of three new provinces: Belgica, based on the River Mosa, and two provinces on the far side of the Rhenus - Germania Superior with its capital Vormatia and Germania Inferior with its capital at Castra Bonnensis. Of course, it is unlikely that he really expected his arrangements to be ratified by the Senators, to whom he was no conquering hero but rather a public enemy.
Be that as it may, Tiberius prepared for his return to Rome, expecting a triumph, which was his right, and a consulship, which was his guarantee of security. He left two legions in each of his three main bases, under the overall command of A. Terentius Varro. Two more legions were stationed in Gallia, but the remaining four were to accompany their general to Italia for their discharge. Although there is no hint of treacherous design in his actions, the Senate took fright and ordered that these legions be disbanded in Gallia. Tiberius knew that, without his soldiers, he would be defenceless; and the troops suspected that, once dispersed, they would be robbed of their pensions. Tiberius sent a delegation ahead of him to reassure the Senate, but his deputies were snubbed.
Civil war appeared inevitable, and the only man who could prevent it was Q. Caecilius Metellus. He was at present eleven months into his extraordinary consulship, and elections for the following year had not yet been scheduled. The Senate was urging him to restore the constitutional offices; but it was only when he realized that he could not extend his consular imperium indefinitely, and that continued delay played into the hands of his rival, that he relented. Tiberius was denied a chance to run, and the Consuls for 769 were the conservative M. Claudius Marcellus and the moderate M. Caelius Rufus.
Metellus was assigned the proconsular imperium in Gallia Maritima with four legions, all veterans of his Aegyptian campaign. In Januarius, he officially took over the Tiberian legions, in doing so revoking Varro’s command north of the Alpes. Tiberius was still waiting, frustrated, in Gallia Alpina, the province he had governed since 763. Notwithstanding senatorial propaganda, he was desperate to avoid conflict.
Metellus had the option of sailing to Massilia. Instead he chose to march his legions through Italia, in an unsubtle demonstration of his resolution. It was also a gamble. Tiberius had an equal number of legions with him, and eight more that he could call upon, all battle-hardened and staunch loyalists.
Yet Tiberius did not react. At age 41 he was still a young man; but he had inherited, along with his father’s charisma, the dour personality and pessimism of his grandfather which made him seem older and more careworn. On the march, in the heat of battle, these tendencies were submerged; but in times of inactivity they resurfaced. He was increasingly subject to fits of depression, and his sojourn at Nicaea made him morose and listless.
Apologists for Metellus would later claim that he had always had the measure of his rival. Whether or not this was the case, when envoys sent to Nicaea returned with the news that Tiberius was willing to parley, Metellus seized the opportunity. He agreed on a meeting, at Genua close to the border of the Alpine province. The more extremist of the conservatores back in Rome ranted at any hint of compromise, but Metellus was not cut from the same cloth as Piso. He had no enthusiasm for fighting fellow Romans.
Each escorted by a single cohort, the two held their conference. No reliable record of the talks has come down to us, but it is clear that Metellus won over the vacillating Tiberius. Significantly, the latter had not been accompanied by his advisers, Octavius and Nerva, which would seem to indicate that he had already made up his mind. He agreed to relinquish his command and go to Rome attended by a single legion. He would enjoy a hero’s reception and celebrate his triumph. His arrangements in Germania would be confirmed and his soldiers would receive their pensions.
From the perspective of Metellus, himself a successful general, these were not unreasonable concessions. He sent a briefing to the Senate which was in reality a directive; and since the two men between them controlled more than twenty legions, the Senate agreed to all the conditions worked out at Genua.
It appeared that war had been avoided. However, there was one man who was not party to this agreement and yet could not be ignored nor left out of any permanent settlement: Aulus Terentius Varro.

 

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The civil war

 

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The Fall of the Republic, Part 16

Unlike Tiberius, Varro had no intention of surrendering his legions to Metellus or to any other lackey of the Senate. Visiting each of the camps in turn, he harangued the troops with dire warnings, that the legions would be disbanded and they would forfeit their plunder and be denied their pensions. The Senate’s past actions lent credibility to these alarming predictions.
As soon as he received the news that Tiberius had made his pact with Metellus, Varro decided to act. He was undertaking a grand adventure, and a great gamble.
Metellus had reached Pisae, in Etruria, when he heard that Varro was on the march. He had been making deliberately slow progress through Italia to allow time to negotiate with Tiberius; and when the latter came to their agreement, Metellus halted his forces altogether. He had some fifty thousand men at his disposal, the core of his army being the four veteran legions from Aegypt. However, the rest of the troops were inexperienced, mostly raw recruits conscripted for service from his senatorial supporters’ client base. They required training and proper fitting before they could be ready for battle.
It was impossible to know, in Pisae and in Rome, just how many troops Varro had under his command. If the six legions in Germania went over to him in toto, and if he could persuade the five former Tiberian legions still in Gallia to support his cause, then his army would be equal in size to that of Metellus, and much more formidable. And although Varro did not share his former commander’s reputation for invincibility, he was an accomplished general. He had the confidence of the soldiers and they shared his sense of grievance.
Metellus worried that his untested troops would be overawed by the tough, veteran legionaries marching against them, especially if he no longer enjoyed numerical superiority. He was also handicapped by a fragmented command structure. Unlike Tiberius, he had to deal with unruly lieutenants, young ambitious nobles who had raised the new legions and were reluctant to surrender their authority. He also had to contend with a senatorial delegation which was officially an advisory commission but was there to keep the general in line. Both continually subverted his authority and even on occasion countermanded his direct orders.
Metellus tried to delay as long as possible, while he sent urgent communications to his legates and friendly governors in the provinces, to summon more reliable troops and more co-operative officers. He deployed a substantial force to block the coastal approaches to Italia, but he left the Alpine passes undefended. This was no blunder. Both ends of the passes were controlled by allies of Tiberius, and Metellus could not trust them. He had no intention of wasting men and resources on an arduous struggle in the mountains. He moved only as far as Genua, and sent a third of his army to hold the line on the River Trebia, a tributary of the Padus.
However, his hopes of avoiding an early general engagement were soon dashed. He did not expect his opponent to move so quickly. Varro had moved rapidly up the Rhenus and down the Rhodanus; and before the winter snows had cleared, he had crossed the Alpes and advanced through Gallia Citerior to the River Padus. To his embarrassment, Metellus discovered that his advance guard had been outflanked.
The normally impetuous general then acted with uncharacteristic indecision, procrastinating long enough for his opponent to concentrate his forces at Cremona. Metellus possibly held out hope that Varro would negotiate as Tiberius had done. He pulled back to Pisae. Here he gathered his entire army. If Varro chose to bypass the city and march on Rome, he would have to contend with the Metellan legions in his rear.
The Senate sent a delegation to Tiberius, to call on him to restrain his former deputy. They appealed to his patriotism and argued that Varro’s withdrawal of the legions from Germania jeopardized the hard work Tiberius had done to bring order to the conquered territories. But their haughty manner offended him and he sulkily dismissed them.
Varro appeared to have the upper hand. He held the advantage in the quality of his troops, but he had to move quickly, before Metellus could bring in reinforcements from the provinces. As a result, he had just eight legions with him. He had withdrawn all six from Germania, and collected the two assigned to the garrisons in Gallia. The troops were on the whole enthusiastic, and those officers with scruples had been removed, by violence if necessary. Such was the solidarity of the common soldiers and their distrust of the government in Rome that almost to a man they fell in behind their commander. Nevertheless, he could count on no more soldiers. He dared not use the Gallic and German auxiliaries, which would make him appear as a foreign invader rather than as a wronged citizen claiming his due.
His expectation of winning over the troops in Gallia, the two legions stationed there permanently and the three awaiting demobilization, proved a delusion. The outgoing governor of Gallia Maritima was L. Aemilius Lepidus, the ally of Tiberius who had no love for Metellus, his replacement. Nevertheless, he was not to be a partisan or pawn of Varro. He pulled out of the province with his and the Tiberian legions and marched the twenty thousand men to Bononia. He would not yet dismiss them, nor hand them over to Metellus. He waited on developments.
Neither could Varro expect to recruit in Italia. The people had no enthusiasm for war on home soil. They had no great motivation for rising against Rome, but also saw no reason to fight in defence of the Roman constitution. Furthermore, Varro did nothing to endear himself to the local populace. In the early spring of 769, he advanced through Gallia Citerior as if it were enemy territory, his troops plundering the towns along the way.
In contrast to the depredations of the Varronian forces, Tiberius had always kept his army under strict discipline in friendly or neutral country, summarily executing looters. Varro, on the other hand, failed to appreciate that in a campaign of this kind he needed to win the goodwill of the people - to secure his communications and supply lines, to gather intelligence of local conditions and the enemy’s movements, and to enlist new troops. It was later said that Metellus had permitted him to advance for this reason, but there is no real evidence for this.
While Metellus remained at Pisae, marshalling his forces, Varro advanced to Parma and Mutina. His attempts to suborn the legions at Bononia failed, as Lepidus pulled back to Perusia, a town east of Lake Trasimeno in eastern Etruria. In frustration, Varro allowed his troops to loot Bononia, reinforcing his reputation for brutality.
When it became clear that Metellus intended to hold Pisae, Varro continued south along the main highway, then cut through the mountain pass near Pistoria to the River Ausar, planning a descent on Pisae. Metellus, lacking faith in his troops, chose not to face the enemy from entrenchments but to march out and offer battle before Varro could consolidate his position.
Varro had pitched camp on the west bank of the river, opposite the town of Luca. Metellus occupied the town and sent two legions upriver, to attack from the north. During the night, he crossed downstream with the rest of his forces and fell upon Varro’s army just as it was about to strike camp. Why the Metellans achieved such complete surprise remains a mystery. The normally energetic Varro was strangely lethargic. It can be surmised that he was confined to his tent suffering some ailment. Doubtful about the loyalty of his officers - indeed, many of his best lieutenants had defected - he may have entrusted the defence of the camp to reliable but incompetent subordinates. Another factor appears to have been that the cavalry, the vital reconnaissance arm, was at the time engaged in foraging and skirmishing and failed to detect the proximity of the Metellan army. Once again, Metellus’s apologists would later claim that he had deliberately drawn off the cavalry with decoys; but again, there is no solid evidence to support this conclusion.
The simple answer may have been overconfidence on the part of Varro. He did not expect Metellus to come out from behind his fortifications, let alone launch a full-scale assault.
Shocked and disorganized, Varro’s troops did not have time to arrange themselves in their usual formations. Yet their discipline and training held, and the skills of their centurions came into play. Taking up their weapons and what armour they could manage, they went into action under the first banner they came across, rather than waste time and energy dashing about in search of their own units. Varro himself also demonstrated his mastery on the battlefield. The heat of combat seems to have burned off his fever as he joined the front ranks, rallying and steadying the men, deploying them at points of the line that appeared about to collapse, personally hoisting the standards to inspire or shame his troops, exposing himself to constant danger. He had no reserves and the wagon park was temporarily lost. His cavalry, who raced back to the camp when the sounds of the fighting reached them, were driven off in disarray. Yet gradually, as the troops recovered their composure and the Metellans began to tire, the line was restored and impetus regained, just as it seemed that the flanks were about to collapse. It was a superb exhibition of military leadership, even if Varro was lacking in political acumen.
With the tide turning against him, Metellus decided to extricate his army and began a stolid retreat to the coast, crossing to the south bank of the River Arnus and abandoning Pisae. Varro followed at a wary distance. He had won the first round but he had suffered severe casualties, and his army was still disorganized.
Both men had squandered an opportunity to stop the other in northern Italia. As Varro turned southwards once more, Metellus was eager to redeem himself. However, the senatorial advisers accompanying him were becoming nervous. Some were beginning to vocalize what had, just a few days earlier, seemed unthinkable. Perhaps they had overestimated their champion. If that were the case, there was only one man who could save the Republic.

 

[bluestraggler]

The Battle of Luca

 

[marapets]

how very interesting but surely even with an alliance surely the might of macedonia would have prevailed

 

[bluestraggler]

how very interesting but surely even with an alliance surely the might of macedonia would have prevailed

Ultimately, the might of Macedonia rested on the ability of its commanders. Philip and Alexander were two of the most talented military leaders in history (although I believe their political skills were not of the same calibre). However, eventually the Macedonians' tactics became obsolete. As the quality of their cavalry declined, they were actually forced to regress to the inflexible phalanx.
In the end, I don’t think the Macedonians had the resources to conduct wars of indefinite duration. As I mentioned in this ALT, they were stuck in a vicious circle - the wars of conquest were ruinously expensive but the only way to pay for them was by new conquests.
The Hellenistic monarchies sustained themselves with manageably-sized empires but even then exhausted themselves fighting each other and defending their frontiers.
What distinguished the Romans was their stodgy, relentless ability to conduct campaigns that could last generations if necessary. The republican system threw up some incompetents but also cycled through enough fresh talent to provide a constant source of able commanders.
So unless Alexander or one of his successors could take Rome in a single, swift campaign - which I think was beyond their resources - the future belonged to Rome.

 

[Iñaki]

Originally posted by bluestraggler
So unless Alexander or one of his successors could take Rome in a single, swift campaign - which I think was beyond their resources - the future belonged to Rome.

I dissent, as you say in a long run Rome could gain an attrition war, at short term but I think that if Alexander and/or inmediate succesors play well their cards, Rome could be defeated, in the time of Alexander Rome was at a war against the samnites in an struggle that had could be a victory for the sammnites if they had profited better the roman defeat of 321 BC (if for example the army had been totally wiped out, as Gavio Pontio commander of the Sammnite army seems that thought that would be the best solution, in OTL at the end the samnites decided to starve the roman army and this surrender but when the samnites free the roman army in exchange of a peace treaty in the samnites conditions they soon realized that the roman senate was decided to sacrifice the 600 roma prisoners maintained by the samnites before to make an humilliant peace, if the suggerences of Pontio had been pursued: annihilate all the roman army, the romans there were stay undefense against the samnites and other peoples), also Rome was not the potence that in 272 confronted Pirrus and even in this case with Pirrus commanding is supposed a less in number army Pirrus almost succeeded: there is an interesting TL in changing times about a roman defeat at the hands of Pirrus: http://www.changingthetimes.net/samples/prechrist/empire_of_the_aiacids.htm

In the etape of 323-300 Rome was in expansion but Rome was only the principal regional state in Central Italy, anymore if Alexander or other macedonian had pursued a politic of expansion in Italy to the west in alliance with other tribes like the samnites and the greeks of Magna Graecia the romans had had very difficult times.

Also in fact you admits this in your own TL "In Rome, the news of the Carthaginians’ submission caused near panic. Q. Fabius Rullianus, who had won major victories against the Etruscans and Samnites, was invested with dictatorial powers and immediately took the offensive against the Etruscans and Umbrians. The following year, 446, the Consuls P. Decius Mus and P. Cornelius Arvina won major victories against the Samnites, the Hernici and the Aequi. Nevertheless, Roman reserves were by now stretched perilously thin, and had the Macedonians and their allies advanced at this moment on all fronts, Rome would likely have been doomed. Instead, what followed over the next several years was a sequence of lost opportunities for the Macedonians."

So you admits also that the macedonians had good opportunities of defeating Rome forever.

This TL as you indicates in the firsts posts is a TL where Rome could survive the Macedonian mighty, I admit that it is possible and you has made a superb and plaussible timeline about this (there is also a TL like yours in Changing the time about a Macedonian Empire that did not defeat the Roman republic: http://www.changingthetimes.net/samples/prechrist/philip_the_great.htm
http://www.changingthetimes.net/samples/prechrist/glory_that_was_macedon.htm
http://www.changingthetimes.net/samples/NapWar/sun_at_noon.htm), but I think the contrary (a roman total defeat against Macedon) is also possible, and well if you are annihilated at short term (and Alexander had the bad tradition of raze the cities that opposed to his dominion: Thebes, Tiro, Gaza, I think that Rome suffered similar fate and after with his population enslaved and the city destroyed little possibilites of a roman resurgence would exist, in fact any because even in the case that the macedons retreated after destroying the city, we should expect that samnites and latins would repart the territories of the defeated and deceased Roman republic) liitle things could have to win at long term.

In any case a very good and plaussible timeline where the romans succeed in survive and finally defeat the Macedon Empire (My god we should name you Super Writing Sex Machine or the man with Superman fingers capacity to write very fast )

 

[bluestraggler]

I shall discuss a few of your points, one by one.

I think that if Alexander and/or immediate successors play well their cards, Rome could be defeated

Agreed - but the key phrase here is: "if Alexander and/or immediate successors play well their cards". I have to confess that I am not a great fan of Megas Alexandros. He achieved a lot in a brilliant campaign, but I wonder if, in the long term, his success was sustainable. He made mistakes but he was lucky that his opponents made more. I think he might have met his match in India and his troops did him a big favour on the Hyphasis.
Rome on the rise was not Persia in decline.

war against the Samnites in a struggle that had could be a victory for the Samnites if they had profited better the roman defeat of 321

The Samnites were never in a position to directly threaten Rome, and as all Rome’s enemies discovered, the only way to beat them was to destroy them. The Romans were not the most lovable people, but in wars like those against the Samnites, Pyrrhus and Hannibal, they showed a quality one cannot but admire. They kept coming back. Their philosophy was simple: Never surrender; never negotiate until victory has been won.
When the Romans suffered two humiliating defeats, at Caudium and Lautulae, the Romans didn’t just change tactics, they changed their strategy.
Rome was a slow-moving juggernaut that was virtually unstoppable. Because of the corporate mentality of the Roman government, they were prepared to invest years, even decades, in a war. The problem with a tribal system or a monarchy is that the leadership has to perform in the short term or get the chop (usually literally).

http://www.changingthetimes.net/samp...he_aiacids.htm

Interesting, although I think the fall of Rome in 274 is too abrupt. I would need to see a lot more detail to be convinced that (1) Rome’s Latin allies would desert her to become subject to a Hellenistic king, and (2) Rome would be so defenceless.

If Alexander or other Macedonian had pursued a politic of expansion in Italy to the west in alliance with other tribes like the Samnites and the Greeks of Magna Graecia the Romans had had very difficult times.

Agreed - but Rome came through other difficult times. After all, even in my ATL, it took two centuries for the Romans to clear the Macedonians out of Italy.

So you admits also that the Macedonians had good opportunities of defeating Rome forever.

Absolutely - but history is full of lost opportunities. History is messy. Things don’t just happen because they should happen.

I think the contrary (a roman total defeat against Macedon) is also possible

Again, I totally agree; and if Rome had fallen that would most certainly have been the end (and maybe not a good thing for us 2300 years later). However, a Macedonian victory was not inevitable, and obviously in my version it did not happen.
If I were a gambler, I might put the odds at 70-30 in favour of the Romans. Would anyone have bet against Robert E. Lee in June 1863 or Adolf Hitler in June 1940?

In any case a very good and plausible timeline where the Romans succeed in survive and finally defeat the Macedon Empire. (My god we should name you Super Writing Sex Machine or the man with Superman fingers capacity to write very fast )

This we can agree on.
Especially the bit about "sex machine"... How did you know?

 

[bluestraggler]

The Fall of the Republic, Part 17

In the early summer of 769, the Republic was in crisis. Terentius Varro was advancing on Rome, having brushed aside the army of Metellus. In the provinces, the proconsuls and legates were sending what men they could spare, but Rome was a long way off, and the garrisons could not be stripped entirely bare. Furthermore, after Luca, most of the provincial governors were not keen to closely associate themselves with what might be the losing side. The proscriptions of Piso were still fresh in everyone’s mind.
After his defeat at Luca, Metellus began a slow retreat, dividing his army to cover both the coastal and inland roads. He gambled that his opponent would not make a dash for Rome. While taking the capital would be a psychological victory, Varro was a professional soldier, for whom capturing cities was less important than destroying the enemy in the field. So Metellus kept the two halves of his army in constant contact, ready to quickly reunite when Varro struck.
Nevertheless, Metellus was under immense pressure to go onto the offensive. The senatorial commission was pestering him to take decisive action. They were not simply impatient, but were more attuned to the political symbolism of Rome. On a personal level, many Senators had private estates lying in the path of Varro’s depredating army.
Metellus chose to make his stand at Arretium, in the upper valley of the Arnus River. The town was of major strategic importance, commanding the western entrance into Etruria and the highway, known as the Via Valeria, across the Apennines linking Rome with northern Italia. When Lepidus had withdrawn to Bononia, he left a strong garrison in Arretium to guard the vital road junction. However, the main lure for Varro was that here Metellus was concentrating his forces. As at Pisae, should he bypass Arretium he would have the Republicans on his flank and in his rear.
Metellus destroyed the bridges on the Arnus; but with a skilled engineering corps at his disposal, Varro had no difficulty crossing, and Metellus did not contest his bridgeheads. On the second of Maius, they met on the field a short distance west of the town.
One of the Consuls, Marcellus, had come up with four legions, two of which consisted of experienced troops from Africa and Hispania. This restored numerical superiority to Metellus, and he positioned his troops to overlap Varro’s lines on both wings. Varro responded by reducing the depth of his lines in order to extend them laterally. This was a risky deployment, but Varro detected that Metellus had adopted cautious dispositions, alternating his veteran legions with the untested ones. Aware that this could become a trap, Varro ordered his centurions to maintain strict discipline. No man was to break ranks nor any unit to advance beyond the standards, even if the enemy line directly to his front began to collapse.
Varro also observed that Metellus made a mistake in keeping two novice legions in reserve. In contrast, Varro had kept his nerve, holding back one of his best legions. He realized that, should the enemy achieve a breakthrough, only an experienced reserve could avert the all-enveloping chaos.
To draw off the enemy cavalry, Varro sent his to attack the Metellan reserves and baggage train. Their Metellan counterparts charged and scattered Varro’s outnumbered troopers; but as Varro foresaw, they demonstrated their indiscipline by continuing the pursuit instead of returning to their place on the line, where they could threaten the Varronian infantry. Metellus raged, but to pacify the senatorials in his camp he had conceded the cavalry command to one of their number.
Varro sacrificed a large part of his mounted corps to secure this small but important success. Even then, his master of horse, Quintus Valerius, proved his worth, rallying the survivors to keep the enemy cavalry occupied during the main battle.
Metellus ordered his army forward, and within a short time Varro’s men began to waver, driven back on the flanks by Metellus’s greater numbers and forced to give way in the centre to keep the lines straight and tight. As he had done at Luca, Varro threw himself into the fray, personally deploying cohorts, companies, even individuals to threatened parts of the line. Three times he seized one of the standards and held his ground until the troops rallied around him.
There was little science or artistry evident in the conduct of the battle of Arretium. It was a contest of brute force, endurance and raw courage. At the decisive moment, when he sensed that the Metellan attack had reached its peak momentum, Varro called in his reserve to bolster his left, and the Metellan right flank caved in. Crowded from the right, showered with arrows and javelins, the neophyte legions began to falter. Their hesitation opened up gaps in the ranks which the seasoned Varronian commanders immediately exploited. The lines broke, and Metellus watched helplessly as his entire army dissolved.
A competent logistician and an intelligent strategist, Metellus lacked the tactical flair of Varro and was especially clumsy in his handling of reserves. During the battle he prudently stayed well behind the lines to direct operations, but he was thus unable to inspire the troops by personal example as Varro was doing; and amidst the confusion and the obscuring dust, he was not in a position to see where the line was wavering and to respond appropriately. Although the loss of cavalry support was not his fault, he did not rein in the troops on his wings. These, instead of turning and rolling up the Varronian lines, continued to pursue the retreating enemy, or turned away from the battle to loot Varro’s wagons, or just milled about in the rear of the battlefield awaiting orders. This exposed their own lines to flank attacks.
By noon the Metellan offensive had turned into a rout. The cavalrymen, who had performed poorly in the morning, now proved themselves, with almost suicidal frontal assaults on the Varronians to allow the remnants of the beaten army to escape. One legion (Legio II Pontina), veterans of the Aegyptian campaign commanded by Gaius Falcidius, made a final stand astride the Via Valeria, barring the way south until virtually wiped out. Metellus made good use of their sacrifice, demonstrating the skills which had eluded him at the height of the battle. He managed to disengage and retreat in reasonably good order down the valley of the River Clanis, towards Cortona and Lake Trasimeno. Here he dug in with extensive trenchworks, and with raiding and skirmishing to slow Varro’s progress. Growing increasingly anxious and angry about the lack of reinforcements, he curtly informed Rome: "There must be no delays and no excuses."
In the recriminations which followed the struggle at Arretium, Consul Marcellus was accused by his detractors - of whom there were many in the fractious Republican camp - of deliberately holding back his legions, motivated by jealousy and ambition. Nevertheless, it was Metellus who had barely escaped annihilation by a numerically inferior foe. The Senate insisted that Marcellus assume the command, of an army reduced to half its original size.
Varro did not immediately pursue the defeated enemy. His troops were exhausted and disorganized, and his commissariat needed replenishing. However, he was furious when he discovered that Metellus had slipped away. The next morning, he resumed his advance. On the fourth of Maius, his cavalry clashed with the enemy rearguard but were driven back. On the seventh, he launched an abortive attack on the outer perimeter of the entrenchments just north of Cortona. Reports of this minor confrontation sent waves of panic through the Republican camp. Over the next three days, as fighting along the road intensified, morale in the army of Marcellus plummeted, and thousands of men deserted.
By the tenth of Maius, Varro had drawn level with the northern shore of Lake Trasimeno, each day forming his lines to draw out his opponent. Marcellus refused battle, yielding Cortona and retreating down the valley towards the Tiber. With each passing day, desertions and defections further depleted his forces. His counsellors squabbled and his supposed allies demurred, testing which way the wind was blowing. Though most abhorred tyranny, and all dreaded social revolution, the immediate concern in Rome was to not be caught in the maelstrom if the state was to fall into the hands of Varro, his cronies and his soldiers. The Republic’s foremost general and her most noble sons had not stopped them.
Nothing, it appeared, stood between Varro’s pillaging army and the capital. Already, those who could afford to leave had done so. The streets were empty, the market places deserted, the Capitoline abandoned. Senators and commoners alike were clogging the roads heading south.
Then came dramatic news. Tiberius Claudius Nero, Imperator, conqueror of the Germans, was marching north.

 

[bluestraggler]

Arretium and Perusia

 

[bluestraggler]

The Fall of the Republic, Part 18

On the eve of Varro’s invasion, Tiberius was still outside Rome waiting in mounting frustration for his triumph. The Senate continued to deliberate on the question, in spite of the guarantee made by Metellus at Genua. The legal basis of opposition to the triumph was the condition that a war be brought to a conclusion and the enemy country reduced to such a state of peace that the army could be withdrawn. The army of Tiberius was still in Germania at the time, which technically invalidated his claim. Ironically, when Varro marched on Rome, this requirement was fulfilled.
The crisis also furnished Tiberius with a chance to redeem himself on the battlefield. He was still at an age when most members of his class were reaching the pinnacle of their careers, and he did not relish the fact that his, however distinguished, might be over. He had been snubbed and now, as civil war broke out, sidelined. Yet recent events had undermined his main rival, Metellus, and one of his fiercest critics, Marcellus.
Nevertheless, it would be unfair to say that his motivation was purely personal. Tiberius must have viewed the prospect of a Varronian dictatorship with trepidation.
It is difficult to say whether Varro’s plans went much further than capturing Rome and making himself dictator. Preoccupied with his military campaign, Varro revealed little of his long-term intentions. It is unlikely that he had developed any coherent programme beyond the deposition of the senatorial oligarchy and its supplanting with a personal autocracy based on military power. He had no political connections or clientelae outside the army he commanded. He could expect support from the disaffected poor, ruthless opportunists and political outcasts; but this was hardly a stable base upon which to build a coalition to rule Rome and govern the provinces.
According to our sources, the circumstance which forced Tiberius to take a stand against his former deputy was an incriminating letter alleged to have been sent to certain unspecified popularis leaders in Rome. Most likely it is a later fabrication composed to discredit Varro, for it reads more like an indictment than a call to arms. From a modern perspective, the contents reveal an agenda not so radical given the social conditions prevailing in the eighth century, but which would have been anathema to members of the elite. In it, Varro calls for a popular uprising and champions reforms that would lead to economic ruin. For example, the universal cancellation of debts would have been an appeal to the urban proletariat, dispossessed farmers and impoverished army veterans who had exhausted their pensions, but also to profligate nobles and unscrupulous businessmen who could reap enormous fortunes from his proposed tabulae novae.
The letter includes a proclamation that all who had profited during the Pisonian proscriptions or had otherwise collaborated with Piso would be brought to trial. This would clearly be aimed at gaining the support of the populares, but its hint of a new proscription, targeting the conservatores, hardened the resistance to his advance. It ends with a call to arms: "We fight for our country and for liberty, while our enemies contend for what concerns only them, their class and their faction. I bid you to maintain a resolute spirit; and to remember that, if we conquer, we shall have power and riches in abundance."
Whatever the veracity of this letter, Varro’s coup threatened chaos. Despite his alleged appeal for popular support, he was no social revolutionary. The source of his power was the army. Those who might follow him had legitimate grievances; but the overthrow of constitutional government would leave Rome in the hands of adventurers, misfits and opportunists. In the provinces, where peoples seeking relief from oppressive governors might rally to Varro’s cause, the replacement of the rule of law by the rule of force could only fuel further resentment and rebellion.
When Varro crossed the Ariminus River, the official boundary between Italia and Gallia Citerior, Tiberius decided to act. He was genuinely dismayed by this treason. His own integrity had emerged intact from the conference at Genua, as his military reputation had emerged unscathed from the war in Germania. He had voluntarily given up what Varro was aiming to seize by force.
Meanwhile, the battles of Luca and Arretium had convinced the panicked Senate that extreme measures had to be taken. Wild rumors were circulating in the capital, of plots to burn Rome, to incite peasant uprisings and instigate slave revolts. Such was the pervasive terror that the precautions included the suspension of festivals, the closure of public places and the shutting down of the gladiator schools.
On the tenth of Maius, the day Marcellus abandoned Cortona, Tiberius was named Dictator, and called on by what remained of the Senate in Rome to save the Republic. Varro, on hearing a report of the matter, suggested a meeting, but the breach was complete.
The task appeared daunting. Tiberius had just one experienced legion with him, his favoured Ninth which had accompanied him to Rome for his triumph. Although he could have conscripted them all, Tiberius called on his veterans to volunteer, and about three thousand chose to follow their general. He was able to muster two more legions, recently arrived from Hispania. They were essentially garrison troops, not seasoned in battle, but their morale was high. Other forces were on their way, but he could not wait. The very same day, he commenced his march northwards.
Varro was surprised and disappointed that his old commander was coming against him. In a buoyant mood after his string of victories, he had planned to be in Rome within a matter of days. Yet his position was precarious. Twice he had failed to destroy his opponent’s army; and now, for the third time he faced a difficult choice. The proconsul Lepidus was still lodged at Perusia with five legions. Knowing he was no match for Varro, and hostile to Metellus, he had not taken part in the recent battles and he had kept his army largely intact. Upon receiving the news that Tiberius was on his way, he willingly conceded his command to the newly appointed Dictator.
Varro could not ignore the twenty thousand troops at Perusia, who were likely to fall on his rear if he advanced on Rome or attacked Tiberius. Nor could he invest the town and reduce it by siege. Every day’s delay gave the Republicans in the provinces time to assemble reinforcements. So he rounded the southern shore of Lake Trasimeno and hurled his army at Lepidus.
Lepidus had extended his fortified line over the undulating countryside from the town heights to the lake, some fifteen milles of entrenchments in all. Varro’s strategy was to send two of his legions on an encircling route east of the town, to manoeuvre his opponent out of his position. However, the approach of Tiberius forced him to alter his plan and launch a full-scale assault on the centre of Lepidus’ position. His frantic energy in battle was legendary and once more paid off. His inspirational leadership carried the day as his men surged over the defences and Lepidus was forced to retreat behind the walls of Perusia.
With Tiberius marching up the valley of the Tiber, Varro began construction of a contravallation to protect his own camp and prevent Lepidus breaking out. Lacking siege machinery on a scale to take the town quickly, Varro determined to deal with Tiberius first. However, he vindictively executed several hundred prisoners, in full view of the soldiers watching from the walls of Perusia. This was a foolish miscalculation. Meant to break the spirit of the defenders, it did the opposite.
Tiberius came up quickly, before Varro could complete his works; yet outnumbered by at least four to one, he had no choice but to establish his own fortified camp. Still, he had the advantage of time. More legions were on the road, as order and confidence were restored in Rome.
On 20 Maius, Varro determined on an all-out effort. He had dug his entrenchments in such a way that he could threaten Tiberius without his flank being endangered by a sudden foray from Perusia; but Tiberius refused to co-operate, abandoning his camp when it became obvious that his opponent was set to attack. This gave Varro no option but to leave his trenchworks and either entice Tiberius to do battle or chase him away. Instead, Tiberius shifted sideways, bringing his left up against the shores of the lake. To attack, Varro would have to swing around Tiberius’s right flank, taking him further from his trenches. Instead, he returned to his fortifications.
Varro should still have been in a strong position; but he seems to have been intimidated by the prospect of confronting Tiberius. The aborted attack was a squandered opportunity and more importantly a wasted day. The next morning he again came out, assailing Tiberius head-on; but by now it was too late. The Tiberians had been reinforced by two fresh legions and the line held. In the meantime, as soon as he became aware of the fighting at the south-eastern corner of the lake, Lepidus broke out from Perusia. Varro had assigned two legions to deal with Lepidus, who was beaten back, but at the cost of depleting his main force.
After a savage bloodletting in which neither line was breached, Varro ordered his men to pull back, which they did in good order. Badly mauled, the Tiberians were in no condition to follow up.
Under cover of darkness, Varro withdrew to the north. His men, demoralized by the sudden change of fortune, concluded that the cause was lost, and over the next few days half the army melted away. The swiftness of the collapse reveals the ultimately tenuous nature of Varro’s hold on power.
Tiberius set off in pursuit and finally intercepted the remnants of the Varronian army near Florentia in Etruria. With no hope of escape, Varro rallied his men and charged in the direction where the enemy were thickest. There he fell, fighting to the end. His loyal troops, a small fraction of those who had followed him from Germania, held their ground to the last man. Varro’s severed head was presented to Tiberius, who conveyed it back to Rome to assure everyone that the traitor was indeed dead. However, the rest of the fallen were treated with honour. Furthermore, the fugitives from Varro’s defeated army were offered an unconditional amnesty, with discharge or redeployment back to Germania.
In just twenty days, Tiberius Claudius Nero Germanicus had vindicated himself in the eyes of the Senate and the people. He could no longer be ignored. The Senators decreed a public thanksgiving and he celebrated two triumphs - the second, unprecedented, for a victory over fellow Romans. He relinquished the dictatorship but accepted the suffect consulship, and was elected consul ordinarius for 770. At the time, he was universally hailed as the saviour of the Republic. Today he is more rightly seen as the first of the Roman emperors.

 

[Iñaki]

Originally posted by bluestraggler
At the time, he was universally hailed as the saviour of the Republic. Today he is more rightly seen as the first of the Roman emperors.

................

Caton: sob , sob Buuahh! Buuahh!

Ciceron: Buaaah! Buuahh!

Clio: What happens?!

Tucidides: Oh! they are crying because they were reading the TL of Bluestraggler, and seems that they arrive to the part about the fall of the Republic.

Clio: Tsk! Tsk! lately seems there are an epidemy in the Elysean Fields about reading that human forum of Alternate History.

...........

Well apart some crying opinions in the Elysean Fields (principally old roman republicans) it is no doubt that this TL soon will begin a new interesting part: the Roman Empire.

 

[bluestraggler]

................
Caton: sob , sob Buuahh! Buuahh!
Ciceron: Buaaah! Buuahh!
Clio: What happens?!
Tucidides: Oh! they are crying because they were reading the TL of Bluestraggler, and seems that they arrive to the part about the fall of the Republic.
Clio: Tsk! Tsk! lately seems there are an epidemy in the Elysean Fields about reading that human forum of Alternate History.
...........
Well apart some crying opinions in the Elysean Fields (principally old roman republicans) it is no doubt that this TL soon will begin a new interesting part: the Roman Empire.

Cicero: Nihil tam absurde dici potest, quod non dicatur, ab alique AH-auctorum.*


* There is nothing so absurd that no AH author has not said it.