plausible ways of getting Great britian out of WW2?

Deleted member 1487

What, KG100 all on its own?? As the rest of the Luftwaffe was already busy bombing British ports and infrastructure.

Damn, Kg100 must have had an impressive bomb load to destroy Liverpool all on its own...:rolleyes:

The Luftwaffe never focussed on ports or mining in any concerted way. They might bomb one port like Liverpool for a few days consecutively or the London docks and then shift to another target as Hitler or Goering argued. Mining units were used to bomb land targets, naval mines were used as large bombs, and factories were more often than not the target. In fact the Germans shifted targets so much that the British concluded that their only goal was to inflict terror on the population to collapse morale. However it was just the irrational command of the Nazi amateurs at the top that meant that no strategy was actively pursued, despite the advice of the Luftwaffe general staff to focus on ports and pursue it single-mindedly.

KG100 was only one unit of pathfinders. There were at least two others that I've read of, but German pathfinders aren't often written about except in passing. Just like the British they would mark the path, though they could do it within 100 meters according to British sources, and have the regular bomber units drop their bombs on the marked targets.

Liverpool isn't the only target, but the biggest and most important. The Bristol area and Glasgow were critical as well. Though mining the Clyde would probably suffice. Basically Britain had only three cities besides London, which in 1940 was too exposed to send international convoys to, that could handle at least some of the volume of convoys from the colonies and the US. Not to mention also possessing the necessary rail links with the rest of the country to distribute the goods. Though even this was a problem for Liverpool, because the British had not planned on relying on just a few ports to handle trade, so they couldn't clear out the warehouses in a timely manner until mid-1941. So that means Liverpool is a huge, juice target with lots of valuable and flammable material to bomb, especially as OTL it handled 90% of transatlantic convoys from 1939-1945.
 
The Nazis could in the right circumstances of planning and timing force the British to a temporary cease-fire, but the gulf between all that's required for *that* and outright victory rivals Valles Marineris. The most massive single issue with this is that Hitler never, at any point, ever wanted to fight the UK in a fashion that would cripple the British Empire, but without crippling that Empire there's no means for Germany to defeat the UK.
 

Deleted member 1487

The most massive single issue with this is that Hitler never, at any point, ever wanted to fight the UK in a fashion that would cripple the British Empire, but without crippling that Empire there's no means for Germany to defeat the UK.

Prior to 1940 that was true, but things change in war, including Hitler's opinion of Britain. He wanted to force them to the table and could do so without crippling the Empire...though he'd bankrupt it, which happened in 1941, which necessitated the US to provide Lend-Lease to prevent the war ending due to lack of funds.

Cutting off international trade to Britain would force her to the table and end Lend-Lease. Britain could not resume the war without American largess, but if they take terms then that largess ends. And there is no getting back in when the getting is good, especially if the Japanese attack and the British people won't allow the government to start another war with the Germans.
 
The Germans won at Crete due to an absolute superiority in air,adequate troops from the air and the Italian landings at the bay of Mirabellou in the second phase.
A sentiment that doesn't bear up much to reality. The Allies were already retreating when the Italians landed, and the only troops that were bombed before then were those in Heraklion.

Crete was better defended than Malta.
And much larger, which allowed the Germans to get their forces into some sort of order, a luxury they won't have on Malta (one paratrooper at Crete was beaten to death by an old man before he'd managed to disentangle himself from his parachute). I'm not suggesting that Malta can't be taken, just that it's not going to be as easy as mere statistics would suggest.

The Germans would have had greater "punch" with more mechanised and armour units,so Tobruk would fall in the first attempt in 41,without the 8th army in its 42' strength to face in the final leg.
Malta was virtually worthless as a strike base between January and April 1941 anyway (94% of the Axis supplies got through), so excuse me for being critical of this.
 
The Germans won at Crete due to an absolute superiority in air,adequate troops from the air and the Italian landings at the bay of Mirabellou in the second phase.Crete was better defended than Malta.
Malta was a much easier target due to its proximity to Italy and so long as Luftwaffe was pounding it.
The Germans would have had greater "punch" with more mechanised and armour units,so Tobruk would fall in the first attempt in 41,without the 8th army in its 42' strength to face in the final leg.

The Germans won at Crete because the Allies misjudged the where and the how they would land. They didn't realize until too late that there was no amphibious landing, it was *all* airborne. If they had realized that 24 hours sooner Germany would have had its first major defeat just in time for Barbarossa.
 
Whoa! that's a big thread. I frankly didn't read it all, but it did not look like there was any consensus emerging on the issue of Malta. I allso don't see any reason wyh Malta could be considered impregnable when it's closer to Italy and more lightly defended that Crete (which was conquered in OTL) and more difficult to reinforce for the British. In OTL, the Axis had air superiority over the island for extended periods of time and almost starved out the defenders. So an invasion wouldn't be such a difficult task.
Also, taking Malta would secure Axis supply routes to Africa, and the British forces in Egypt would be definitively stuck with using the long (around Africa) supply route, which won't be fun.

Germany having a few more battles like Crete would have ended their war by the summer of 1944. Crete was a horrific clusterfuck. The problems *started* with the Allies having immensely more troops on the island than the Nazis allowed. The Nazis wrecked their airborne forces for the rest of the war, and the victory was solely due to the misperception that there was going to be a sea landing *and* an air landing. If Freyberg had realized this 24 hours before he did, Crete would have been a complete defeat instead of a Pyrrhic victory.
 
The Germans would have had greater "punch" with more mechanised and armour units,so Tobruk would fall in the first attempt in 41,without the 8th army in its 42' strength to face in the final leg.
Given the logistic infustructure in place in Italian North Africa was pressed to support the forces deployed in OTL you'll either need to spend 6 to 12 months improving it (and in doing so, let the British build up their own forces in Egypt) or develop a Panzer capable of running on sand instead of petrol.
:rolleyes:
 
And much larger, which allowed the Germans to get their forces into some sort of order, a luxury they won't have on Malta (one paratrooper at Crete was beaten to death by an old man before he'd managed to disentangle himself from his parachute). I'm not suggesting that Malta can't be taken, just that it's not going to be as easy as mere statistics would suggest.
How strong were the shore defences on Malta? Why couldn't the Italians have simply parked a BB nearby and land troops under the cover of it's guns? No need to rely strictly on airborne troops

Malta was virtually worthless as a strike base between January and April 1941 anyway (94% of the Axis supplies got through), so excuse me for being critical of this.
Maybe they got through because the axis expended important air assets to keep Malta suprressed, which air assets would become available for other tasks if the island was taken.

Germany having a few more battles like Crete would have ended their war by the summer of 1944. Crete was a horrific clusterfuck. The problems *started* with the Allies having immensely more troops on the island than the Nazis allowed. The Nazis wrecked their airborne forces for the rest of the war, and the victory was solely due to the misperception that there was going to be a sea landing *and* an air landing. If Freyberg had realized this 24 hours before he did, Crete would have been a complete defeat instead of a Pyrrhic victory.
could have... would have... In the end it all worked out fine for the Germans. Even the losses were not that great in absolute numbers because the forces engaged were not that great in absolute numbers, when compared to the Wehrmacht as a whole. This is not the kind of battle that could make things worse for the Germans, since the Eastern Front in OTL saw far more phyrric victories, and let's not even speak of the defeats. Even as a defeat Malta would not have compared to those battles.
Also, the airborne forces were not really "wrecked for the rest of the war", it's just that Hitler was to afraid to use them again. But to take Malta it is not necessary to rely chiefly on aiborne forces because a sea landing is much more easier to do that on Crete

Given the logistic infustructure in place in Italian North Africa was pressed to support the forces deployed in OTL you'll either need to spend 6 to 12 months improving it (and in doing so, let the British build up their own forces in Egypt) or develop a Panzer capable of running on sand instead of petrol.
:rolleyes:
The logistic infrastructure in North Africa was good enough for the British to roll through from east to west, so I do not see why it would be impossible for the Germans to roll through from west to east.
 

elkarlo

Banned
The Luftwaffe never focussed on ports or mining in any concerted way. They might bomb one port like Liverpool for a few days consecutively or the London docks and then shift to another target as Hitler or Goering argued. Mining units were used to bomb land targets, naval mines were used as large bombs, and factories were more often than not the target. In fact the Germans shifted targets so much that the British concluded that their only goal was to inflict terror on the population to collapse morale. However it was just the irrational command of the Nazi amateurs at the top that meant that no strategy was actively pursued, despite the advice of the Luftwaffe general staff to focus on ports and pursue it single-mindedly.

KG100 was only one unit of pathfinders. There were at least two others that I've read of, but German pathfinders aren't often written about except in passing. Just like the British they would mark the path, though they could do it within 100 meters according to British sources, and have the regular bomber units drop their bombs on the marked targets.

Liverpool isn't the only target, but the biggest and most important. The Bristol area and Glasgow were critical as well. Though mining the Clyde would probably suffice. Basically Britain had only three cities besides London, which in 1940 was too exposed to send international convoys to, that could handle at least some of the volume of convoys from the colonies and the US. Not to mention also possessing the necessary rail links with the rest of the country to distribute the goods. Though even this was a problem for Liverpool, because the British had not planned on relying on just a few ports to handle trade, so they couldn't clear out the warehouses in a timely manner until mid-1941. So that means Liverpool is a huge, juice target with lots of valuable and flammable material to bomb, especially as OTL it handled 90% of transatlantic convoys from 1939-1945.


Very excellent points. I smell a BoB TL here. This may not win the war, but would change a lot of the aspects of it.
 
could have... would have... In the end it all worked out fine for the Germans. Even the losses were not that great in absolute numbers because the forces engaged were not that great in absolute numbers, when compared to the Wehrmacht as a whole. This is not the kind of battle that could make things worse for the Germans, since the Eastern Front in OTL saw far more phyrric victories, and let's not even speak of the defeats. Even as a defeat Malta would not have compared to those battles.
Also, the airborne forces were not really "wrecked for the rest of the war", it's just that Hitler was to afraid to use them again. But to take Malta it is not necessary to rely chiefly on aiborne forces because a sea landing is much more easier to do that on Crete

Given Hitler was the only brains in the Nazi outfit, that qualifies in itself as "wrecked for the rest of the war."
 
The logistic infrastructure in North Africa was good enough for the British to roll through from east to west, so I do not see why it would be impossible for the Germans to roll through from west to east.

Unlike Germans, British possessed superior logistic capability. They were able to supply their troops with sufficient oil to make transportation of supply across large tracts of desert possible. Even so, British had to stop at Tripoli in order to reorganize after they advanced there. Besides, having a naval superiority helps a lot.
 
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Deleted member 1487

The mediterranean option wasn't an option. To knock out Britain one has to go for the jugular and cut trade off at home. Once Britain cannot import or is reduced so badly that they cannot produce war goods, then its over.
 
Unlike Germans, British possessed superior logistic capability. They were able to supply their troops with sufficient oil to make transportation of supply across large tracts of desert possible.
Unlike the Germans, the British were on a bigger "budget" in North Africa beause they assigned a greater importance to that theater.
If the Germans concentrate on defeating Britain in the Med, they should have been able to match or even exceed British logistics. After all, Germany had a greater industrial capacity overall.

Incidentally, I don't think a "Britain first" strategy would have won the war for Germany because the Soviet Union would have backstabbed it at some point, but if the Germans wanted to try it this is what they could have done.
 
Unlike the Germans, the British were on a bigger "budget" in North Africa beause they assigned a greater importance to that theater.
If the Germans concentrate on defeating Britain in the Med, they should have been able to match or even exceed British logistics. After all, Germany had a greater industrial capacity overall.

Incidentally, I don't think a "Britain first" strategy would have won the war for Germany because the Soviet Union would have backstabbed it at some point, but if the Germans wanted to try it this is what they could have done.

No, just....no. Logistics don't work that way. The Germans were developing a big land army, they didn't have the capability to do that *and* develop a blue-water navy. The degree to which Nazi Germany was a group of feuding elites would see the SS, Wehrmacht, and Luftwaffe try to take down the Navy's sudden predominance by doing things for no better reason than prestige, which is how the Nazi regime worked in practice quite a bit of the time, regardless of the military illogic in this.
 
The logistic infrastructure in North Africa was good enough for the British to roll through from east to west, so I do not see why it would be impossible for the Germans to roll through from west to east.
Axis North African port capacity =/= Allied North African port capacity
 
No, just....no. Logistics don't work that way. The Germans were developing a big land army, they didn't have the capability to do that *and* develop a blue-water navy. The degree to which Nazi Germany was a group of feuding elites would see the SS, Wehrmacht, and Luftwaffe try to take down the Navy's sudden predominance by doing things for no better reason than prestige, which is how the Nazi regime worked in practice quite a bit of the time, regardless of the military illogic in this.

With a massive committment in 1940 and 1941 particularly by the LW; there is no reason that the relatively small British forces in Egypt couldn't be driven back... the Libyan ports were not great, but they supported 3 german divisions and 8 italian divisions all the way to alemein;

If the LW drives the med fleet into the red sea, in conjunction with the ground army capturing additional ports like Tobruk, Bardia, Mersah Matruh etc; that will ease the bottle neck and allow their supplies to be better dispersed and not get all congested at the dockyards; and once they have the egyptian ports the problem is largely eliminated
 
The logistic infrastructure in North Africa was good enough for the British to roll through from east to west, so I do not see why it would be impossible for the Germans to roll through from west to east.

Except it wasn't good enough to roll from East to West until new railway lines had been built...something the Italians and Germans in North Africa were not prepared to take the time to do.
 
With a massive committment in 1940 and 1941 particularly by the LW; there is no reason that the relatively small British forces in Egypt couldn't be driven back... the Libyan ports were not great, but they supported 3 german divisions and 8 italian divisions all the way to alemein;

If the LW drives the med fleet into the red sea, in conjunction with the ground army capturing additional ports like Tobruk, Bardia, Mersah Matruh etc; that will ease the bottle neck and allow their supplies to be better dispersed and not get all congested at the dockyards; and once they have the egyptian ports the problem is largely eliminated

Um, they were driven back IOTL well into Egypt and spent a long time having a can of whoop-ass opened up on them every single time they went to fight Rommel. It didn't do the Germans one damned bit of good either way as no amount of British tactical incompetence was going to alter logistics in their favor. Ultra actually contributed greatly to this by further compounding Rommel's fuel shortages, though given the distribution problem the only result of No-Ultra is that the Germans fight longer in North Africa and the Red Army gets even more of Europe for the USSR in the peace treaties after the war.
 

Deleted member 1487

Um, they were driven back IOTL well into Egypt and spent a long time having a can of whoop-ass opened up on them every single time they went to fight Rommel. It didn't do the Germans one damned bit of good either way as no amount of British tactical incompetence was going to alter logistics in their favor. Ultra actually contributed greatly to this by further compounding Rommel's fuel shortages, though given the distribution problem the only result of No-Ultra is that the Germans fight longer in North Africa and the Red Army gets even more of Europe for the USSR in the peace treaties after the war.

A lot of this tactical skill was based on excellent intelligence, both from a special decryption team that was captured at El Alamein and the US diplomatic codes stolen by the Italians. Both of these dried up around the same time and resulted in the final defeat of the Axis in Africa.
And yes, supply cannot possibly be solved for the Axis in Africa, which means that it was a blackhole of effort, except for keeping Italy in the game, not winning the war.
 
Um, they were driven back IOTL well into Egypt and spent a long time having a can of whoop-ass opened up on them every single time they went to fight Rommel. It didn't do the Germans one damned bit of good either way as no amount of British tactical incompetence was going to alter logistics in their favor. Ultra actually contributed greatly to this by further compounding Rommel's fuel shortages, though given the distribution problem the only result of No-Ultra is that the Germans fight longer in North Africa and the Red Army gets even more of Europe for the USSR in the peace treaties after the war.

The Germans were employing 2 field divisions and a reinforced brigade about 1/9 of the LW's total service aircraft (including suppression and supply forces in Italy) with a few u-boats in support

Put 40 u-boats in the med, 1500 tactical aircraft into the theater and 4 field divisions (at the expense of maintaining as large an italian force until the egyptian ports are captured) and you change the balance dramatically

capturing malta removes a decent portion of the threat to axis shipping, and capturing alexandria removes most of the rest as the RN is driven into the red sea; and the RAF is driven far away from many of the supporting ports; leaving the main remaining risk as subs coming from gibraltar which with the action moving east will have shorter patrols
 
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