Part 6
There is not a lot of action in Part 6, which deals to a large extent with political developments in Rome.
In the decade after the death of Megas Alexandros, despite occasional setbacks, the Macedonian dominions continued to expand, reaching their farthest extent during the reign of Alexander’s grandson Archelaos II.
While Philip III dealt with problems at home and in the eastern provinces, he sent west one of his most able captains. The youthful Prince Pyrrhus of Epirus, a cousin of Megas Alexandros, was a flamboyant but skilled commander. In a two-year campaign, 459-461, he conquered Hispania and the Baleares. Bomilcar, the renegade Poenic leader, was killed in battle, although his son Hamilcar continued the fight, enlisting the support of the local Gallic tribes. The native peoples, however, in reaction against two centuries of exploitation by Carthage, gave their support to the Macedonians. Pyrrhus took advantage of this resentment to lure away many of Hamilcar’s mercenaries.
The prince’s success had two important consequences for Macedonia, one immediate and the other long-term. Emboldened by his victories, Pyrrhus gave in to overweening ambition to challenge for the Macedonian throne in 479, re-igniting civil war.* Less obviously at the time, the acquisition of Hispania (which Hellenes called Iberia) that gave Macedonia access to rich mineral reserves also created future problems. As the local population learned they had merely exchanged one foreign occupier for another, they grew increasingly restive, and an aggrieved sense of national identity supplanted the disunity of their clan-based social organization.
The Macedonian diversion in Hispania also provided an opportunity for Rome. With the Gallic threat at least temporarily in abeyance, Rome could concentrate on expanding her power and dominions without the fear of foreign intervention. The war against the Samnites was dragging on. Although the issue was no longer seriously in doubt, the thrust into the mountains of central Italia was a tedious and costly process. In 460, however, the Consul L. Papirius Cursor captured the citadel of Saepinum, a key enemy stronghold. The Samnites sued for peace; but when they resumed the war - dissatisfied with Roman interpretation of the terms - the following year, the countryside was laid waste by four legions converging from different directions. The long, laborious policy of building roads and settling colonies had paid off. Subsequent victories over rebellious Etruscan and Sabine subjects entrenched Roman domination of central and southern Italia.
In ten years, Rome had not suffered a defeat. Yet this very achievement had a dramatic effect on Roman social and political life. The four legions operating almost permanently in the field during this phase (452-462) represented what was in effect a standing army. With soldiers now receiving regular pay to sustain them on long campaigns and help standardize equipment, the day of the citizen levies was just about past, that of the professional soldier beginning to dawn. At the same time, the reorganization of the command system was creating what would eventually become a professional officer class, with long-term political implications for the Republic.
The demands of a campaign that might continue for years and cover the length and breadth of the peninsula made the twin pillars of the republican constitution - annuality and collegiality in the senior magistracies - both impractical and potentially dangerous. In 426, against the wishes of the Senate but on account of the military situation at that time, the retiring Consul Q. Publilius Philo had been granted an extension of his command by the popular assembly. This device, the prorogatio imperii - protraction of an outgoing magistrate’s imperium at the end of his year in office and in a couple of instances conferring the imperium on a private citizen as proconsul or propraetor - became almost a fixture of military policy. The lex Genucia of 410 had attempted to address this issue but was ignored at the height of the wars against the Samnites and Macedonia. In time of crisis, military expediency displaced constitutional principle. On the other hand, the dictatorship was superseded. The period AUC 380-450 saw dictators appointed in two out of every three years. After that time, the dictatorship as a military institution lapsed, except in dire emergencies, for two centuries.
These developments paralleled political evolution in Rome. In the late fourth century and first half of the fifth, under the pressure of campaigning demands and popular unrest, the solidarity of the senatorial oligarchy had begun to dissolve. Political power was vested no longer in the corporate membership of the Senate but in a few charismatic individuals, successful military commanders who were members of the elite but deriving their power from and exercising their authority through popular appeal, as expressed in the public assemblies, rather than in a partnership with the patres. By means of dictatorship, prorogation and iteration (re-election), these men dominated the Republic as none before and as none would again until its breakdown in the late eighth century. The quintessential luminary of the age was Q. Fabius Rullianus, the hero of Aquinum who had barely escaped execution for insubordination in 427 and nevertheless would go on to be five times Consul and twice Dictator.
Yet after AUC 462, this trend would be dramatically reversed. The influence of the popular assemblies and the personal power of the commanders suffered a precipitate decline. The reversion to the old pattern of rotation of office in the decades following 462 reflects the resurgence of the Senate, but also the expansion of the ruling elite and, accordingly, an increase in the number of ambitious would-be magistrates and generals contending for a limited number of senior offices.
The creation of the new nobility had been brought about, with some irony, by the achievement of plebeian equality. The lex Aelia of AUC 471 gave resolutions (plebiscita) of the plebeian assembly the force of law, henceforth binding on the entire Roman community. This enactment, a strengthening of the lex Publilia of 413 ensuring the formal equality of the patricians and plebeians, is regarded as the end of the Struggle of the Orders. Instead of giving rise to democracy, however, political reform had the effect of producing a marriage of convenience between the aristocrats and wealthy plebs. A plebeian family was raised to nobile status when one of its members held the high office of Consul; and thus the most eminent of the plebeians were co-opted into the oligarchy. Eventually, denuded of its "best blood", the plebeian organization lost much of its revolutionary character. Its richer members had made common cause in the past with the poor in order to gain access to the senior magistracies; but now they shared the outlook and interests of the aristocracy. (The patriciate nevertheless survived as a prestigious and influential group within the nobility, and some of these class distinctions would outlive the Republic itself.)
This period had witnessed a profound transformation of the Roman economy, with social structures and political traditions and institutions overhauled or overturned. In particular, the age saw the ascendance of the Senate, from the status of an advisory council with little formal authority and ill-defined membership and function to that of principal organ of government with lifelong, hereditary tenure. In tandem, the popular sovereignty expressed in theresolutions of the assemblies and the imperium ofpublic officials elected by and effectively responsible to the comitia was rendered obsolete. The growth of the Roman state, the vast expansion of territory, the increasing complexity of the civil administration, especially in financial affairs and diplomatic relations, and the logistical demands of extended military campaigns drew political power away from the assembly and people, and into the hands of the senatorial oligarchy with its experience, and material resources and the corporate solidarity which allowed it to close ranks against all challenges to its pre-eminence.
The age of the charismatic commander and populist politician was over, at least for the time being. When the Senate took over the process of prorogatio imperii in the mid-fifth century, the dictatorship (by convention appointed by a Consul or by the assembly) was discontinued. Thereafter, prorogation and iteration were also for the most part abandoned. The lex Valeria annalis of 537 was the culmination of this process. A revival of the Genucian law, it established a cursus honorum, the career path with mandatory age provisions and prescribed intervals between offices. The system did not promote optimum efficiency but it consolidated the oligarchy, forestalled the acquisition of power by a few individuals and families and generally broadened and deepened the pool of administrative and military experience available to the Republic. This proved timely.
* q.v. Part VII
There is not a lot of action in Part 6, which deals to a large extent with political developments in Rome.
In the decade after the death of Megas Alexandros, despite occasional setbacks, the Macedonian dominions continued to expand, reaching their farthest extent during the reign of Alexander’s grandson Archelaos II.
While Philip III dealt with problems at home and in the eastern provinces, he sent west one of his most able captains. The youthful Prince Pyrrhus of Epirus, a cousin of Megas Alexandros, was a flamboyant but skilled commander. In a two-year campaign, 459-461, he conquered Hispania and the Baleares. Bomilcar, the renegade Poenic leader, was killed in battle, although his son Hamilcar continued the fight, enlisting the support of the local Gallic tribes. The native peoples, however, in reaction against two centuries of exploitation by Carthage, gave their support to the Macedonians. Pyrrhus took advantage of this resentment to lure away many of Hamilcar’s mercenaries.
The prince’s success had two important consequences for Macedonia, one immediate and the other long-term. Emboldened by his victories, Pyrrhus gave in to overweening ambition to challenge for the Macedonian throne in 479, re-igniting civil war.* Less obviously at the time, the acquisition of Hispania (which Hellenes called Iberia) that gave Macedonia access to rich mineral reserves also created future problems. As the local population learned they had merely exchanged one foreign occupier for another, they grew increasingly restive, and an aggrieved sense of national identity supplanted the disunity of their clan-based social organization.
The Macedonian diversion in Hispania also provided an opportunity for Rome. With the Gallic threat at least temporarily in abeyance, Rome could concentrate on expanding her power and dominions without the fear of foreign intervention. The war against the Samnites was dragging on. Although the issue was no longer seriously in doubt, the thrust into the mountains of central Italia was a tedious and costly process. In 460, however, the Consul L. Papirius Cursor captured the citadel of Saepinum, a key enemy stronghold. The Samnites sued for peace; but when they resumed the war - dissatisfied with Roman interpretation of the terms - the following year, the countryside was laid waste by four legions converging from different directions. The long, laborious policy of building roads and settling colonies had paid off. Subsequent victories over rebellious Etruscan and Sabine subjects entrenched Roman domination of central and southern Italia.
In ten years, Rome had not suffered a defeat. Yet this very achievement had a dramatic effect on Roman social and political life. The four legions operating almost permanently in the field during this phase (452-462) represented what was in effect a standing army. With soldiers now receiving regular pay to sustain them on long campaigns and help standardize equipment, the day of the citizen levies was just about past, that of the professional soldier beginning to dawn. At the same time, the reorganization of the command system was creating what would eventually become a professional officer class, with long-term political implications for the Republic.
The demands of a campaign that might continue for years and cover the length and breadth of the peninsula made the twin pillars of the republican constitution - annuality and collegiality in the senior magistracies - both impractical and potentially dangerous. In 426, against the wishes of the Senate but on account of the military situation at that time, the retiring Consul Q. Publilius Philo had been granted an extension of his command by the popular assembly. This device, the prorogatio imperii - protraction of an outgoing magistrate’s imperium at the end of his year in office and in a couple of instances conferring the imperium on a private citizen as proconsul or propraetor - became almost a fixture of military policy. The lex Genucia of 410 had attempted to address this issue but was ignored at the height of the wars against the Samnites and Macedonia. In time of crisis, military expediency displaced constitutional principle. On the other hand, the dictatorship was superseded. The period AUC 380-450 saw dictators appointed in two out of every three years. After that time, the dictatorship as a military institution lapsed, except in dire emergencies, for two centuries.
These developments paralleled political evolution in Rome. In the late fourth century and first half of the fifth, under the pressure of campaigning demands and popular unrest, the solidarity of the senatorial oligarchy had begun to dissolve. Political power was vested no longer in the corporate membership of the Senate but in a few charismatic individuals, successful military commanders who were members of the elite but deriving their power from and exercising their authority through popular appeal, as expressed in the public assemblies, rather than in a partnership with the patres. By means of dictatorship, prorogation and iteration (re-election), these men dominated the Republic as none before and as none would again until its breakdown in the late eighth century. The quintessential luminary of the age was Q. Fabius Rullianus, the hero of Aquinum who had barely escaped execution for insubordination in 427 and nevertheless would go on to be five times Consul and twice Dictator.
Yet after AUC 462, this trend would be dramatically reversed. The influence of the popular assemblies and the personal power of the commanders suffered a precipitate decline. The reversion to the old pattern of rotation of office in the decades following 462 reflects the resurgence of the Senate, but also the expansion of the ruling elite and, accordingly, an increase in the number of ambitious would-be magistrates and generals contending for a limited number of senior offices.
The creation of the new nobility had been brought about, with some irony, by the achievement of plebeian equality. The lex Aelia of AUC 471 gave resolutions (plebiscita) of the plebeian assembly the force of law, henceforth binding on the entire Roman community. This enactment, a strengthening of the lex Publilia of 413 ensuring the formal equality of the patricians and plebeians, is regarded as the end of the Struggle of the Orders. Instead of giving rise to democracy, however, political reform had the effect of producing a marriage of convenience between the aristocrats and wealthy plebs. A plebeian family was raised to nobile status when one of its members held the high office of Consul; and thus the most eminent of the plebeians were co-opted into the oligarchy. Eventually, denuded of its "best blood", the plebeian organization lost much of its revolutionary character. Its richer members had made common cause in the past with the poor in order to gain access to the senior magistracies; but now they shared the outlook and interests of the aristocracy. (The patriciate nevertheless survived as a prestigious and influential group within the nobility, and some of these class distinctions would outlive the Republic itself.)
This period had witnessed a profound transformation of the Roman economy, with social structures and political traditions and institutions overhauled or overturned. In particular, the age saw the ascendance of the Senate, from the status of an advisory council with little formal authority and ill-defined membership and function to that of principal organ of government with lifelong, hereditary tenure. In tandem, the popular sovereignty expressed in theresolutions of the assemblies and the imperium ofpublic officials elected by and effectively responsible to the comitia was rendered obsolete. The growth of the Roman state, the vast expansion of territory, the increasing complexity of the civil administration, especially in financial affairs and diplomatic relations, and the logistical demands of extended military campaigns drew political power away from the assembly and people, and into the hands of the senatorial oligarchy with its experience, and material resources and the corporate solidarity which allowed it to close ranks against all challenges to its pre-eminence.
The age of the charismatic commander and populist politician was over, at least for the time being. When the Senate took over the process of prorogatio imperii in the mid-fifth century, the dictatorship (by convention appointed by a Consul or by the assembly) was discontinued. Thereafter, prorogation and iteration were also for the most part abandoned. The lex Valeria annalis of 537 was the culmination of this process. A revival of the Genucian law, it established a cursus honorum, the career path with mandatory age provisions and prescribed intervals between offices. The system did not promote optimum efficiency but it consolidated the oligarchy, forestalled the acquisition of power by a few individuals and families and generally broadened and deepened the pool of administrative and military experience available to the Republic. This proved timely.
* q.v. Part VII
