Garrison
Donor
So basically just steal resources from multiple other critical areas to build infrastructure that will be of little use with no oil to process.
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
The Germans assuredly would lose the war unless they could capture oil resources. They likely would lose the war anyway, but still, it's essential to make plans to achieve success if all goes well.
The time needed to get any of those suggestions built and functional means the war would be over before they had a major effect on oil supply.
1. What doesn't get built if you are changing your priority?
2. Refineries are not something that you can just build and have working quickly. Some parts take a year from first parts to final assembly and thats not even counting the disruptions that might be happening from the bombing in Germany.
3. Again what doesn't get built? Steel used in tank cars and locomotives can would be normally used to build tanks, Uboats, trucks, parts of refineries.
4. Pipelines are built with steel for the pipes themselves and other parts like the compressors and electrical infrastructure to power it could take a year or more to build. What doesn't get built?
Remember Germany cannot just hand waveum more steel and other products just because they want to build something. You have to decide what doesn't get built then.
Derek Pullem
Donor
1. Danube yards were not building destroyers or aircraft carriers. Danube capacity was close to maxxed out during the war
2. SE Germany can be reached from Italy. By 1944 Danube was being regularly mined from the air.
3. Germany also needs those rail lines for supporting troops on the Eastern Front and in the Caucasus if they have captured the oil. And then there is the rail capacity tied up in the Holocaust.
4. Such a pipeline is beyond the capabilities of the time and if it were built would be a magnet for Aliied special forces. The "Big Inch" pipeline in America was built at about the same time in more favourable terrain and without the threat of enemy action and a transdanube pipeline would have to be longer.
PMN1 above laid out that there was a substantial gap between what the Germans hoped to accomplish, and their logistical and economic plans.
What I attempted to do above was lay out, at least at the 30,000 foot level, such plans.
I agree much of the proposal would be difficult at best.
***
As to what not to build, so as to redirect those resources:
One item: Germany gained little from most of its massive investment in surface warships of cruiser size and larger. Much of that construction primarily occurred in the 1936-40 time frame. That'd be a good time to begin preparing to get oil to Germany.
What I attempted to do above was lay out, at least at the 30,000 foot level, such plans.
I agree much of the proposal would be difficult at best.
***
As to what not to build, so as to redirect those resources:
One item: Germany gained little from most of its massive investment in surface warships of cruiser size and larger. Much of that construction primarily occurred in the 1936-40 time frame. That'd be a good time to begin preparing to get oil to Germany.
On oil, if the Allies liberate Norway, can the Allies simply ship oil to Russia from the Carribean and USA East Coast with increased Arctic Convoys, landing it it northern Russia?
Derek Pullem
Donor
The line from Murmansk would be overloaded (as was the Trans-Siberian line). It was actually easier and closer to Soviet industry most Urals move to ship it from Persia via the new Persian rail line. Even so, if Baku had been mostly put out of action it would have struggled to ship in enough oil, IOTL it primarily was used for avgas.
Garrison
Donor
Not really a good timeframe as this is the height of the autarky program and the construction of the synthetic oil plants. The last thing Hitler or the industrialists involved in the program want is more oil imports. And if Hitler was willing to import oil then I doubt Germany could pay for it. Also removing those surface ships would compromise the Norway campaign and eliminate the 'fleet in being' that tied up so many British warships and bombers.
In the full article which was on line but doesn't seem to be accessable now, all I have is a PDF when it was, the author says that Hitler was reported to have said 'Without the oil, we are finished' or words to that effect, but it doesn't seem to have prompted much in the way of thinking how to get it from A to B.
Inerestingly the article also mentions Ludendorff saying more or less the same thing 25 years earlier...
Inerestingly the article also mentions Ludendorff saying more or less the same thing 25 years earlier...
It all rather reinforces the issue that there is nowhere left for the Wallies to critically engage with the enemy other than non critical diversions such as Italy, Balkans or Norway. It will make it hard to resist Soviet and USA pressure for an Operation Roundup in 1943 or apply more resources to SE Asia. Stalin would not be happy to have their armies on the Eastern front although a Balkan campaign might pass muster with him pro tem.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
The proposed advance into the Caucuses, is yet another example of just how incompetent the German General Staff and Hitler were when it came to making strategic decisions. What was the basic plan, to invade the Caucuses and capture the oil fields thus eliminating the German shortage of oil, which all sounds good, but doesn’t make sense. No one in the German command structure had worked out either how to capture the oil fields in a working condition, or how if they were able to do so, how to get the oil back to Germany and refine it into usable products. Unlike the Americans and British, the Germans do not have massive number of workers skilled in working oil fields, production, transportation and refining oil. And the two companies with the most skills in this field, one is British BP, and the other Anglo Dutch, RDS, Germany has very few oil workers, and little to nothing of the vital equipment needed to exploit an oil field, or the transport assets to move the crude to refineries under its control. If it had been able to capture the oil fields intact, highly doubtful, it would then have the problem of transporting either petroleum products distilled in local refineries, manned by whom, or crude to existing refineries under German control. There are only two ways to transport the oil, overland or a combination of overland and via water. Given the major problems that the Germans were already experiencing with the rail network, and the shortage of rolling stock and engines, plus the high comparative cost of rail transport to water, this method is far from being a solution. To add to the already overloaded Soviet and German rail systems the number of trains required to make up for the shortages of oil that the Germans had is practically impossible. Nor given the lack of experience the Germans had, along with the lack of resources, would it be possible to construct a pipeline, which doesn’t just require the pipeline but also multiple pumping stations. To send the oil by water, requires its transport to a suitable port on the Black Sea, storage at the port and subsequent transfer onto tankers that the Germans don’t have, and convoying by escorts that they also don’t have. To either a port in Romania or Hungry, for refining and onward distribution. Or across the Black Sea, through the Dardanelles, under full observation by the British, and subsequently through the Mediterranean against a fleet of RN surface vessels and submarines, plus ITTL aircraft based in Crete, a recipe for disaster, as the Germans and Italians find out what it is to fight a convoy war in very restricted waters against one of the world’s two major Navies. The Germans who entered this war despite not having a secure virtually unlimited supply of two of the basic requirements of modern warfare, oil and rubber, and subsequently failed to remove their principal opponent preventing them access to these resources Britain. When they failed, having eliminated France from the equation, to either successfully invade the UK or gain a piece agreement, stand no chance of successfully exploiting the Soviet oilfields in the Caucuses even if they should capture them intact.
RR.
RR.
A couple of thoughts on the Afrika Corps being sent to the Caucasus. Again, it is unlikely the Germans will be able to capture the oil facilities intact, although Operation Schamil might capture Grozny intact. And again it is even less likely the Germans could get the oil back to Germany. Even if they could ship it to the Danube, mining the Danube was one of Bomber Command's pet projects for much of the war.
I think the interesting possibility here is (a) will the Soviets destroy more of their own infrastructure if this reinforced Army Gp B gets closer to Baku, and (b) Will the (reinforced) Luftwaffe have forward bases to be able to provide fighter escort to bomb Baku?
In this case, how long would it take for the Soviets to rebuild their oil wells and will it have an effect on the war? At the least, it seems plausible that Stalingrad won't be the turning point, but another city will have the dubious honour of being the attritional hinge. And if so, will it force the WAllies to "do something"?
On the other hand, I believe v. Paulus did say that the wheels would come off Wehrmacht logistics around Stalingrad when he was planning Barbarossa.
I think the interesting possibility here is (a) will the Soviets destroy more of their own infrastructure if this reinforced Army Gp B gets closer to Baku, and (b) Will the (reinforced) Luftwaffe have forward bases to be able to provide fighter escort to bomb Baku?
In this case, how long would it take for the Soviets to rebuild their oil wells and will it have an effect on the war? At the least, it seems plausible that Stalingrad won't be the turning point, but another city will have the dubious honour of being the attritional hinge. And if so, will it force the WAllies to "do something"?
On the other hand, I believe v. Paulus did say that the wheels would come off Wehrmacht logistics around Stalingrad when he was planning Barbarossa.
the key part is, will the germans cross the Volga, because if they do it means the japanese will declare war on the ussr too, which will have loads of butterflies in the far east
Derek Pullem
Donor
I don't believe this was ever Japanese government policy (as opposed to Army faction wish list)
it was one of the things though that Sorge reported back to moscow
Richard Sorge - Wikipedia
if Sorge reported this back ittl too, then with the fall of stalingrad, the soviets will have to take a possible japanese invasion of the primorski into account and thus have to move troops east, which will have effects in the west.
Last edited:
Derek Pullem
Donor
Highly speculative as Sorge had been arrested on 18 October 1941 and had previously advised a much higher threshold for Japanese intervention. To suggest that any other warnings from October 1941 would impact Soviet strategic planning a year later in the war given that they had also broken Japanese diplomatic codes which confirmed that Japan had no intention of joining the war and the Kwantung Army was woefully underprepared is very doubtful.it was one of the things though that Sorge reported back to moscow
from the article:Richard Sorge - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
if Sorge reported this back ittl too, then with the fall of stalingrad, the soviets will have to take a possible japanese invasion of the primorski into account and thus have to move troops east, which will have effects in the west.
the point isn't that it is true, but that Sorge had reported the start of barbarossa pretty close to the correct date.
stalin is a highly paranoid person, so having ignored sorge's info on barbarossa, he might just overcompensate this time, especially considering the intense distrust that already exists towards japan.
Derek Pullem
Donor
Anything is possible - just that this is pretty unlikely. And remember If this information did come from Sorge then it directly contradicted another piece of information he gathered previously and it contradicts the independent evidence the Soviets collected.