The Republic of Sindh, Isolation and the decision for war:
As the Republic of Sindh was to be ever-more-isolated, it began to face three interrelated crises. First, the endless oscillation of coups by generals meant that no coherent, consistent government existed in the Republic, none able to define or to act upon policies. This meant in turn that the Republic, facing growing crises and isolation, was unable to adopt proper or correct policies from simply having no government able to adopt policies that would last for more than six months, until the last government, that of General Badahur Singh in January 1991.
The second was a growing economic collapse as the cut-off of aid meant that agriculture in the Republic was proving inefficient as the problems of the ongoing collapse of the system mean people left the countryside to go into the cities, where the tensions and violence absorbed these growing populations and worsened a demographic catastrophe and extreme vulnerability. Adding to this was a problem of emigration to India, whose growing prosperity and stability looked far better than the Republic of Sindh's growing anarchy.
Finally was the attempt by Sindh to build its own stockpile of nuclear weapons, the Russian weapons in Sindh having been withdrawn as the Romanov Restoration had continued and the discussions between Russia and India resulted in the Treaty of Riga, where Russia accepted a unified India and India accepted an Afghanistan controlled by Russia, both sides accepting and agreeing to enforce a DMZ along the new Indo-Afghan Border. India had by the 1980s developed a small stockpile of its own weapons, but expected, and rightfully so, that it could fight and win a conventional war without needing to resort to them. Fear of Sindh with such a weapon proved a regional nightmare, and India's defensive precautions led to the return of Badahur Singh in his third government, this one lasting the longest, into 1992, and to Badahur Singh's desperate decision to unleash Operation Whirlwind, an attempt to defeat the Indian army in a conventional war to both shore up his government and to show that Sindh was a power to be feared if not respected.
What he expected and what occurred, as he sent a ramshackle army torn by deep internal divisions, its modern Russian equipment facing India's US-issue weaponry, on a desperate gamble into the teeth of a far-superior force that was surprised only by the scale of the attack and its suddenness, not by an attack, proved something else again.