English Historical Review
In light of my ongoing research, the English Historical Review asked me for a piece on the primary sources I was uncovering as part of an ongoing series of article.
There are plenty of academics who view the events of 1918 as symptomatic of the post Great War malaise, of the build up of sociological tensions among the working classes of all the major nations, and of a desire by those who had hands on the leavers of power to return to the old pre-war order. In this piece I will outline why I think these ideas take the wrong approach, and why there needs to be more a holistic approach to researching the period 1916 to 1922. I argue that a sociological approach akin to the Annales, with keep figures acting as fulcrums, is a more fundamentally honest way of examining the evidence I have collected.
My first example is the Liberal majority that Lloyd-George managed to win in August 1918, the Labour official opposition that was elected to oppose them. The fact that the Tory base collapsed has always been one of the great question marks of history, especially given how strong their vote had been up to this point. Indeed, it was only by examining the recently opened archives in both Marseilles and Prague that I was able to get a clearer indication of how much of a hand Trotsky had to play in that election. While the communists knew they could not act as an open party, especially given the pre-election sinking of the British fleet, they could stump for a socialist party to push an agenda that was more radicalised than before.
Many argue that the conservative decline was inevitable given the social gradient of the late 19th and early 20th century, but given the ambiguous end of the war I would say that the Tories was caught in their own no mans land politically. The empire was strong, while the state of the public purse was in reasonable shape. The liberals occupied the anti-communist/anti-radical ground, while Labour was stumping for the common man. All the Tories were left with was a pro-nationalist agenda which was not in vogue with the majority of voters, especially the newly enfranchised women. Only a military disaster could have sent voters into the arms of the Tories, and while the battle of Marseilles was a body blow, it was by no means a catastrophe. In the end the Tories ship sank because they failed to tack a course away towards the centre of British consciousness. Churchill's election speech made for grim reading in Marseilles, and Trotsky wrote prophetically to Lenin.
Comrade, I fear that the British lion will finally awake to once more try to maul us. We must re-double our efforts to bring to bear the proud working men of Europe in our cause. I fervently believe that if we can bring out the factory workers, railway men, and all the other downtrodden proletariat we will be in a position to force those governments who oppose us to their knees. If we cannot win on the field, then let us win by the will of the people.
Which brings me on to my next piece of evidence based on a series of letters between Trotsy and Lenin over the course of August and September 1918. I suspect everyone would have thought Lenin would have returned to Russian on September fourth when the Tsar announced he was willing to hold open elections for a new constitutional assembly, but the letters clearly show that Lenin believed that without Trotsky acting in concert with him, the Marxists would have suffered a similar reverse to 1904. Which is why it is clear he stayed in Bohemia to spread the revolution against the Joachim led government. Lenin was a proud Russian, as was Trotsky, but they were also arch-pragmatists willing to move forward the idea of revolution. Many in Bohemia were angry at a German king being placed on the throne, especially after the euphoria of independence quickly gave way to the reality of a broken economy.
This begs the question why did Germany or Hungary not seek to strengthen Bohemia, Slovakia, Croatia, and the other smaller nations of central Europe to stave off the rise of the leftist extremists? Maybe they were counting on the nationalists within in each country to have enough of a base to counter the red threat, or, which I believe is more likely, that both nations had major internal issues that needed to be addressed before they could deal with the economic fallout of the Austria-hungarian break-up. Zita's regency had barely begun when she had to manage the putsche by Bavarian nationalists angry at the Kaiser's abdication. It is not entirely clear why Ludendorf decided to use the German Worker's party as tools for his coup, but at his trial in October 1918 he gave this line as his defence.
“I stand here a patriot of the German people, a concerned citizen watching as my once proud country steers a course towards self destruction. We won a war against those who would see us on our knees, yet it feels like those who should be leading us have stabbed us in the back. Convict me, and you may as well convict every right thinking German man and woman of treason.”
Of course when he was executed Zita's government had their immediate legitimacy increased, but given that the whole affair paralysed Berlin for the rest of 1918 it is fair to say that all Ludendorf really achieved was handing central Europe to the wolves.
My third piece of evidence relates to the cables sent by the Serbian government to the Hungarian Foreign Minister on August 30th. Out of all the nations involved in the Great War, Serbia had the most to loose from a destablised central Europe. Faced with an ultra-nationalistic government in the Ottoman empire, an Italian king looking to stabilise his borders, and civil wars breaking out in the remaining countries on their borders, Belgrade needed to act quickly in order to prevent Serbia sliding into chaos. The communique has gone down as one of those pivot points in the 1918-1922 period.
It is our understanding that you will not seek to intervene in our endeavor to stabilise the region to Serbia's south west. We agree by the terms set down in our last meeting, and will provide the Hungarian Republic with full access to the Adriatic at Fiume. We undertake to act in tandam with Hungarian forces at all times, and while past transgressions cannot be overlooked, we hope that this will lead to a greater degree of co-operation between our two nations.
Now obviously the Serbian march into the Balkans proved to be as much a disaster as the last two occasions, but the uprisings in Bosnia, Croatia, and Greece left a power vacuum which the Ottomans were intent on filling. Hungary did not respond favourably to the Serbs, who they had only just given back their freedom, invading the newly formed Croatia in a nationalist fervour. In the end it was inevitable that the Hungarians would look to pursue matters on their own terms than with the Serbians, and once again London was caught on the back foot. This was one more wildfire to add to the list. I cannot stress enough that if the British had been able to deal with one crisis after another southern Europe would not have gone the way of those states to the north, but with the growing wildcat strikes in their industrial base and the need to prevent the BSSR in France, the Balkans were a stepping stone too far. Only Greece benefited from a small amount of British aid, given the standing alliance between the two countries, and even then there were strongly worded letters to both the Times and the Mirror asking why British troops were being risked.
My final piece of evidence, and one which backs up a more sociological approach, is a series of petitions made to Joachim from the people of Bohemia in the first month of his rule. Many republicans simply refused to engage with the democratic institutions set up in the wake of his coronation, citing that Bohemia and Moravia deserved a president not a German king. Many of the petitions wanted full democracy, freedom of speech, and universal suffrage. Others wanted workers rights, universal healthcare, and an end to conscription. Joachim could see the effect the workers strikes and protests were having on neighbouring countries, and in light of this he set up a constitutional commission to decide the fate of Bohemian democracy. To borrow a modern phrase, grass roots activism of both nationalist and socialist colours vied for a voice at the commission, and taking a leaf out of the British election he called a snap election for seats, hoping that the socialists would not have enough time to rally enough support. Lenin seized on this opportunity, and on August 15th released a pamphlet decrying the false king.
People of Bohemia, now is the time to emancipate yourselves from the yoke of tyranny, foreign rule, and class oppression. Do not see this election as anything more than a smokescreen for the Imperialist puppet on the throne, the viper appointed to keep you under the heel of the landlord and capitalist. I urge each and every one of you to vote for those who support your rights, vote for a communist on August twentieth.
So it was that Lenin used the voice of the people, not the might of arms, to achieve a communist majority in the commission. Joachim and the nationalists were sent into a panic, and the King delayed the opening of the commission until the end of September to buy himself more time. Was this a mistake? Was he subverting democracy? Had he not listened to his people and given them a say in their country? Future events obviously show how much borrowed time he was one, but it is safe to say that for the first time since 1848 has a European monarch been forced to concede so much power without a bullet being fired.
In the end it is my assertion that this time frame is not about big man politics, as much as names like Churchill or Trotsky are bandied about, rather it is the will of the common man, whether in support of or against the state that ultimately determined the fate of Europe, indeed the world, at the major fulcrum point of the 20th century. I think the primary evidence speaks for itself, and in my next article I will draw upon my further research to show how the BSSR was able to keep its contiguity in the face of overwhelming Imperial ambition.