Lines in the Sand: A History of the Gulf War
- Thread starter NeoDesperado
- Start date
Yikes again! Sorry to hear about that, man. Maybe you can work it out amicably, and get things sorted out.
I remember reading a Time or Newsweek article about Uday and it mentioned that he even raped the daughter of a district official, then paid him off and threatened to execute the entire family and rape the next oldest daughter if the official tried to make any waves about it.
The sick thing is that their father groomed both Uday and Qusay...he took them to torture chambers to see what was done, and gave them unarmed grenades to play with when they were kids. Uday was the playboy, but Qusay was the one in the shadows, waiting for his brother to make a mistake-and IOTL, it was the aftermath of the failed hit on Uday that put Qusay in as the assumed successor to Saddam.
Qusay was no saint, though: he liked feeding political prisoners into a wood chipper-feet first. When told to create room in prisons, he did, all right: mass executions. But the generals despised him because he had no military experience, and ran the real-world defense of Baghdad like he was playing a computer game. All of the generals said after Baghdad fell that if they had been allowed to fight the way they wanted, the end result would have been the same, but the U.S. and it's allies would've had a far more costly time of it getting to Baghdad.
Qusay was no saint, though: he liked feeding political prisoners into a wood chipper-feet first. When told to create room in prisons, he did, all right: mass executions. But the generals despised him because he had no military experience, and ran the real-world defense of Baghdad like he was playing a computer game. All of the generals said after Baghdad fell that if they had been allowed to fight the way they wanted, the end result would have been the same, but the U.S. and it's allies would've had a far more costly time of it getting to Baghdad.
First off, sorry to hear about RL personal troubles esp during the holidays, NeoD. You deserve better. I hope you can surf it with grace and move on w minimal emotional and financial casualties.
Second, love your TL. Get back to it when you can.
A real fight between the Iraqis and Western allies would have been interesting as you've amply demonstrated.
The Saudi civil war would've torn the lid off and shown the US and others to see Saudi society as far more fractious and hostile than OTL and not been near as surprised by OBL, Al-Qaeda, et al.
How much more seriously and effectively the Western intel and police agencies would've responded is another matter.
Second, love your TL. Get back to it when you can.
A real fight between the Iraqis and Western allies would have been interesting as you've amply demonstrated.
The Saudi civil war would've torn the lid off and shown the US and others to see Saudi society as far more fractious and hostile than OTL and not been near as surprised by OBL, Al-Qaeda, et al.
How much more seriously and effectively the Western intel and police agencies would've responded is another matter.
Salutations, all.
First of all, I'd like to extend my thanks to all of you for your kind words and understanding with everything that happened. I really, truly appreciate it. To say it's been an interesting couple of months would be somewhat of an understatement, but I've made it this far so I'll call that a win.
Second, today was a very special day for me because for the first time in quite a while my brain started throwing out passages of TL for me to write down, which makes me a very, very happy writer. That said, I think I'll need to go read back and refresh myself concerning the 5 gazillion plot points I currently have dangling everywhere. Anyhoo, work on Chapter XIX is now underway and barring any unforeseen difficulties and/or inexplicable writer's block we should be back on track in another week or so.
Until then, a small appetizer to help tide you over. It's something that I had originally written back in November (man, but time flies) for the quotes section, but scrapped it because it didn't quite mesh with how I'd written things.
“My father was a truly great man, but even great men may have their flaws. My father was too merciful with the imperialists, too merciful to take that final step and do what was necessary to achieve victory for our people.” - Uday Hussein
Thanks again for your patience, and of course thanks for reading and enjoying this yarn of woe.
First of all, I'd like to extend my thanks to all of you for your kind words and understanding with everything that happened. I really, truly appreciate it. To say it's been an interesting couple of months would be somewhat of an understatement, but I've made it this far so I'll call that a win.
Second, today was a very special day for me because for the first time in quite a while my brain started throwing out passages of TL for me to write down, which makes me a very, very happy writer. That said, I think I'll need to go read back and refresh myself concerning the 5 gazillion plot points I currently have dangling everywhere. Anyhoo, work on Chapter XIX is now underway and barring any unforeseen difficulties and/or inexplicable writer's block we should be back on track in another week or so.
Until then, a small appetizer to help tide you over. It's something that I had originally written back in November (man, but time flies) for the quotes section, but scrapped it because it didn't quite mesh with how I'd written things.
“My father was a truly great man, but even great men may have their flaws. My father was too merciful with the imperialists, too merciful to take that final step and do what was necessary to achieve victory for our people.” - Uday Hussein
Thanks again for your patience, and of course thanks for reading and enjoying this yarn of woe.
Orville_third
Banned
This is why, while I'm no fan of the Iraq War, I'd have minded less if Bush had sent someone to assassinate Saddam. (I did contribute an idea toa TL where the US helps set up Hussein Kamil after Saddam's kicked out or killed.)
Hey everyone. Well, it ended up taking a bit longer than I anticipated, but we are indeed back and raring to see how things play out in this unfortunate Middle East. Thank you all for your patience, and hope that you like the latest, very belated offering. This chapter doesn't cover quite as much as I was initially planning, but I think it sets the stage nicely for the next update. Anyway, enjoy!
XIX
“It is not, nor has it ever been, the policy of this government to sanction or give the order to assassinate a foreign head of state. With that said, I do believe that the long suffering people of Iraq and the world as a whole will greatly benefit from Saddam Hussein’s departure.” – President George Bush
“SEE YA, SADDAM!!” – Front page headline of The Sun, May 18, 1991
“I don’t care what the frilled shirts over in Geneva think. There’s still a Hussein in charge of Iraq and our guys are still getting shot at, and that means there’s still a goddamn war on. Until ordered otherwise, our mission is still to annihilate the enemy, and that’s exactly what we’re going to do.” – General Norman Schwarzkopf
Transcript of Speech by Acting Iraqi President Uday Hussein
May 17 1991
Beloved fathers, brothers and sons of Babylon,
It is with a heavy heart that I must inform you tonight of grave news. As you know, my father, Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti, is a man of near boundless courage and fortitude who has ceaselessly led and encouraged our mighty armies in this great war of liberation. Very often, against the warnings of advisors fearful for his personal safety, he has visited the front lines and sat with our brave soldiers, shared their meals and heard the tales of their exploits against the enemy. His drive and passion, his love for Iraq and all Arabian peoples suffering under the whip of the oppressors, are what inspired our soldiers with the resolve to sweep the opposition before them. Through his genius, we revealed the so-called vaunted American military forces for the paper tigers they are.
But even the greatest of men are still susceptible to the stresses and pressures of leadership and my father, great man that he may be, is no exception. This war has taken a toll on his health and in the interest of preserving his body to see our great republic through to the final victory over the oppressors, he has informed me of his desire to temporarily step down so that he might convalesce. In the meantime, he has commanded that I assume the mantle of leadership in his stead, a wish that I accept with honor and gratitude. I have been personally assured by him that his absence will be brief and that upon his return he shall be stronger than ever. It is my intention that while I serve Iraq, I will make both my father and you, my dearly beloved people, proud of my decisions and accomplishments. I will defend our great nation from her enemies, both from outside our borders and from within.
Yes, from within. For even now there are those that would seek to undermine my father and take advantage of his condition to clutch at power for themselves. Even my dear brother Qusay al-Tikriti proved himself to be susceptible and left me no choice but to reprimand him for his cowardly greed.
The oppressors would have us tear out our neighbor’s throats, but we are not the goat herders of the house of Saud. We must stand firm and stand united in these times of crisis, as we always have. Do not listen to the seditious whispers of the Americans and their Saudi puppets, do not believe their lies. I have been called upon to lead our forces, and I will do this with every weapon at my disposal. Our enemies will burn before us, and we will stand triumphant over all those who dare oppose us. Let your hearts be glad, for we have been shown the way to victory. Stand with me, beloved Iraq, and let us walk into the light together.
Excerpt from Mother of All Battles: A New History of the Arabian War
By Simon Anderson Naval Institute Press 1995
Uncorking the Djinn
With the sudden removal of Saddam Hussein from the playing field, the conflict in the Middle East suddenly took on a confusing, uncertain aspect for all participants. Gone was the very man who had gathered his allies and set the entire plot into motion to begin with some months before, leaving behind the headless remnant of the largest military machine of any country in the region midstride in its ongoing mission of fulfilling his boundless ambition. For a country that had spent over a decade being systematically restructured to trust in and obey one man only, the sudden vacuum in the seat of power was a matter that had to be dealt with quickly and decisively. Despite numerous purges during his time as President, Saddam’s paranoia had been unable to completely stamp out envious contenders to the throne, and as stunned and incredulous whispers spread like wildfire through the echelons of the Iraqi high command, several key figures began quietly positioning themselves for a grab at power. Within 2 days of the fateful airstrike however, such jockeying just as quickly faded back into the shadows as Saddam’s eldest son Uday Hussein loudly proclaimed his right to serve as President in his father’s ‘temporary’ absence. While the 27 year old had indeed been designated by Saddam as his heir apparent, Uday’s erratic behavior and questionable actions throughout the late 1980s had thrown the choice into doubt, particularly an incident at a 1988 dinner party when he had attacked one of his father’s food tasters and stabbed him to death in front of the horrified guests, including the wife of Egyptian President Mubarak. Following that public debacle, the relationship between father and son had become increasingly strained and a reassignment as an assistant to the Iraqi ambassador to Switzerland only served to bring more bad press when Uday was kicked out the of the country within a year for repeated fighting offences.
The onset of the Arabian War found Uday back in his home country and given a title with few actual powers of command and more as a means for his father to keep close tabs on his actions. Saddam’s favor was already shifting to his second eldest son Qusay, who while as ruthless as his brother managed to keep an even temper in his decisions. Qusay had been placed in charge of Iraq’s internal security forces as well as a supervisor for the Republican Guard, and was clearly being groomed to usurp his brother’s title as heir in the not too distant future. Such maneuvering did not go unnoticed by Uday however and as luck would have it the matter of fortuitous timing was on his side when the news of their father’s death reached him. March 14 found both brothers within a command bunker in Baghdad listening to scattered reports of the ongoing Marine attacks along Highway 615 when a frantic report came in of the airstrike near Al Khafji. With Qusay away from the radio to confer with an air defense general elsewhere in the complex, his brother realized the opportunity at hand and moved quickly to cement his tenuous position as heir. Without a word, Uday strode in on the surprised occupants of the meeting room and shot his brother in the head at close range with a pistol while his bodyguards gunned down their counterparts on Qusay’s payroll.
In the wake of dispatching his brother, Uday assembled the majority of his father’s advisors and confidants in a bunker now heavily manned by troops of his personal guard and announced his desired intention to assume command of the nation. Though the heir to the Iraqi throne had negligible experience in command and no experience whatsoever in combat operations, the high command begrudgingly agreed to accept Uday’s leadership, with general consensus behind the scenes being that the new leader could no doubt be manipulated to their own ends until such time as they could prepare their own assets for a power bid. For the moment, Uday Hussein would rule as President of Iraq while the cover story of a sudden illness would explain Saddam’s absence until it was felt advantageous to release the truth to the Iraqi people.
On the allied side of the conflict, in spite of the propaganda smokescreen from Baghdad it was increasingly obvious that Saddam Hussein had been gravely injured and quite probably killed by their forces, a theory supported by Iraqi radio intercepts and satellite images revealing a flurry of activity around a wrecked command convoy near Al Khafji. While allied governments had repeatedly stated their public intentions to not seek out the assassination of a foreign head of state, it was an open secret that standing orders among CENTCOM’s forces were to approve strikes against the euphemistic ‘targets of opportunity’ in a command decapitation role. So while Saddam Hussein’s death may have been quietly hoped for by allied command in the course of the campaign’s air strikes, the actuality of his passing brought intensive debate among the various generals over what should be done next. VII Corps and 1st MEF were both fully engaged in their action to cut off and envelop the Republican Guard within Saudi Arabia and General Schwarzkopf was adamant that the attack continue as planned as it would give the allies a far superior negotiating position with the removal of such a large percentage of Iraq’s elite fighting divisions. Others pressed to take advantage of the new ramifications of the political situation to achieve a ceasefire with Iraq, arguing that the mere threat of VII Corps astride Iraqi supply lines would force Baghdad to see reason and surrender, allowing the allies to turn their full attention to the crisis in Saudi Arabia while details about restoring Saudi and Kuwaiti sovereignty were worked out. In the end, Schwarzkopf’s camp won out, with the general stating ‘stopping a hammer in mid-swing rarely produces the desired effect in your opponent’. Until the President ordered CENTCOM otherwise, Operation Swift Sword would continue to obliterate Iraqi forces caught in their path.
Here of course lies another decision that Schwarzkopf’s critics have pointed to numerous times in their arguments that the general threw away an opportunity to save countless lives among both the allied and Iraqi forces by continuing the attack instead of ordering a pause in operations. On the one hand, such arguments hold merit on the basis of the Iraqi high command being quite open to the possibility of a ceasefire, albeit under the same terms they had been advocating for months in Switzerland that would leave them in control of Kuwait and making no mention of a Yemeni pullout from their own claims upon Saudi territory. It’s certainly plausible that given the period of panic that engulfed the Iraqi general staff, they might have been more amenable to overtures more in line with allied conditions, but it must be remembered that the window before Uday Hussein assumed power was quite brief and the well-documented episodes highlighting his mental instability and viciousness must have played a large role in Schwarzkopf’s assumptions that the new leader would choose to stay the course and fight on. Of equal concern would have also been the ever present memories of Vietnam weighing upon the general’s thoughts and the consequences of leaving a job half done. Despite the growing distraction of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and its military forces had to be dealt with decisively before the allies could move forward, lest it remain partially intact to lick its wounds and attempt to cause trouble again down the line. In sum, the continuation order remains yet another point in the conflict that consisted of no easy choices and fateful consequences for all involved.
Whatever thoughts of controlling their new leader the Iraqi generals might have entertained, in reality Uday quickly proved to drag along his new military toys in a series of whims, or ‘master strategies’ as he termed them, that he declared would finally reverse their rapidly declining fortunes and salvage some measure of honor from the conflict. First and foremost, no thoughts of peace with the Western imperialists would come about until they and their Arab allies had been properly chastised. Though under siege and in disarray, Iraq still maintained extensive military forces deployed throughout the region to oppose the allies, and plentiful forces still remained within Iraq to move south and reinforce them if necessary. Their air forces were battered but still capable of limited support operations, and their mobile missile forces had enjoyed a surprisingly good survival rate despite numerous allied air assets being diverted on a daily basis to hunt them down. Most importantly, though most of their facilities for the production and storage of chemical and biological weapons had been taken out on the opening day of the allied air campaign, the majority of Iraq’s ‘special weapons’ remained in reserve in scattered secondary sites as an ongoing threat to hold over their opponent’s ground forces.
With VII Corps’ initial task of severing the primary Iraqi supply artery and trapping the majority of its forces deployed along the coast, the potential employment of these special weapons took on an ever increasing attraction to the new President of Iraq. Initial reports from his division commanders varied wildly about the strength and composition of the American forces now sitting astride Highway 95, with estimates ranging from a low level reconnaissance in force to a full blown assault with over 10 allied divisions, no doubt American forces operating with extensive Egyptian and Syrian support. Though commanders remained highly skeptical of the sudden appearance of a major allied armored force deep within the occupied zone, such doubts were increasingly hard to maintain in the face of reports from the shattered remnants of 10th Armored and the lopsided nature of their brief but decisive engagement with the Americans. While some dismissed the action as irrelevant in light of their previous victories against the Americans, others fearfully noted the growing disparity in the strength of their respective forces and the increasing certainty that things would only grow worse unless something radically changed the tactical equation.
As the full realization of the Republican Guard’s situation sank in, the first objective became attempting a breakout from the allied encirclement and a withdrawal to establish a new defensive line along the Tapline Highway running just south of the Iraqi-Saudi border. Dhahran and Al Jubayl regrettably would have to be abandoned but much could be done to loot and destroy anything of potential value to the allies before the Iraqis left for good. Likewise, orders went out to detonate explosive charges amidst the region’s extensive oil fields to slow the allied advance and cover the withdrawal. Though most of the best trained and supplied divisions were now behind enemy lines, steps could still be taken to launch a simultaneous attack from the north in support of the breakout attempt, ideally trapping VII Corps in an armored pincer. The Iraqi 2nd Armored and 4th Mechanized Divisions, bedecked with medals and praises for their earlier seizure of Riyadh, were still relatively intact and resupplying in their positions around Hafar al Batin and were ideally placed to form the spearhead of this new assault with 3 additional divisions from Kuwait providing support. Iraq was pulling back, but still taking steps to ensure that it could make things as difficult for the allies as possible.
Tragically, the first outside target of Uday Hussein’s wrath proved to be not the allied military forces but the citizens of Bahrain. On the night of May 18, Al Hussein missile battalions operating southwest of Al Jubayl were ordered to break out and attach a number of specially modified warheads to their launchers as part of a ‘vengeance strike’ to punish the island nation for its decision to re-enter the allied fold. Over the course of several hours 8 Al Husseins were lobbed in Bahrain’s direction, 5 of them with warheads containing payloads of Sarin nerve gas. 2 of these warheads successfully delivered their payload onto the island, striking urban areas in Al Manama and Riffa. Thankfully, the timing of the attacks meant that most citizens were inside their homes instead of out in the open, but the 2 strikes nonetheless killed 37 people and hospitalized a further 82 with minor to severe neurological and shrapnel related injuries. A third missile, non-chemical in nature, impacted near the waterfront at Al Budaiyah, ironically near to the damaged area where the Iraqi amphibious assault had taken place a month earlier and inflicted a further 12 casualties. After sitting poised over the battlefield as a feared bogeyman, the specter of chemical warfare had at last been brought forth in all of its horror.
The so-called Night of Vengeance as termed by Baghdad sent CENTCOM into utter pandemonium. The new Bahraini Emir Hamad Al Khalifa was apoplectic and screaming for medical assistance and an expanded role for his military in delivering retribution on the Iraqis. The medical crisis could be dealt with swiftly enough, as the threat of chemical attacks had been foremost among the fears of allied commanders and plentiful antidotes and counteragents had been dispersed to forces in the region. Likewise, the matter of incorporating Bahrain’s expeditionary force into the alliance had also been plotted out well in advance. The main issue came in facing that Iraq had crossed the metaphorical Rubicon and from this point onward chemical attacks on their soldiers and bases were not so much a possibility but a certainty. It was unknown how many more modified chemical warheads Iraq retained in their arsenal, and the list of potential targets, including Israel, was extensive to say the least. On the international front, a UN Security Council resolution condemning the attacks on May 19 was met with near unanimous approval, though Yemen abstained from the vote. President Bush had threatened Saddam at the beginning of the conflict that any use of chemical or biological agents would be responded to with overwhelming force, the exact nature of which had been left intentionally vague in the hope of deterring the dictator from making any rash decisions. While there was no question that CENTCOM had to respond immediately and decisively to the transgression, the matter of what form it should take provoked intensive debate. The use of tactical nuclear weapons was quickly ruled out; though certainly decisive in making a statement on the battlefield Schwarzkopf harbored concerns that their use in combat would constitute the breaking of a deeply felt taboo against using nukes unless there was absolutely no other choice. Given their extensive precautions in the form of antidotes and MOPP protective gear, the prevailing belief was that Iraqi chemical attacks would certainly raise the casualty rate as the campaign progressed, but that such a threat would be insufficient in ultimately stopping VII Corps from achieving its objectives.
In the end, the decision was made to respond to Iraqi chemical attacks with their own chemical arsenal, to be employed in the form of GB and VX munitions delivered by artillery and aerial means. To limit collateral damage among the Saudi civilian population trapped in the occupied zone, these attacks would be launched against military facilities within Iraq proper. Beginning on May 20, allied attack aircraft began Operation Sandstorm, contaminating dozens of Iraqi bases and forcing their personnel to go to ground in area denial chemical dispersal runs. On the ground, soldiers among the VII Corps and 1st MEF began receiving shipments of chemical rounds as both forces continued to close in on the trapped Republican Guard, with the northern task force expected to run into Iraqi divisions around Al Jubayl within 36 hours. A timely elimination of the enemy pocket was essential, as air recon reported elements of 2 Iraqi armored divisions racing down Highway 85 towards Nairyah, currently defended only by a portion of the 82nd Airborne. The Air Force promised to do what it could to slow their advance, but with it already spread thin due to ongoing missions in Iraq and Kuwait, support missions along the coast and now responding to reports of additional Iraqi armored movement south of Kuwait City, it seemed that the beleaguered paratroopers would be operating with limited assistance from the skies for the near future.
As the two military juggernauts circled ever closer towards a showdown in the Saudi desert, far to the northwest another front was about to open in an area many had fervently hoped the conflict would avoid. When Uday’s order to initiate the Night of Vengeance went into effect, coded transmissions went out to PLO command posts hidden across the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to put Option Scimitar into effect. Ever since Saddam Hussein’s fateful meeting with Yasser Arafat, PLO forces had spent several months slowly building up weapons caches and infiltrating a number of cells into the region, taking full advantage of the IDF’s distraction with the ongoing Intifada among the Palestinian populace. Though Arafat’s promise to assist Saddam in his goals had netted the PLO plentiful heavy weapons to oppose the IDF’s armored might, the true crown jewels of the exchange had been smuggled across the Jordanian border only recently. Scimitar made its opening moves on the morning of May 20, when a van parked near a marketplace in West Jerusalem detonated in a massive blast of black smoke and shrapnel. As the shell-shocked survivors began carefully picking themselves from the dusty pavement, a scent not unlike overripe fruit wafted over the area. Within moments, dozens were choking and convulsing on the ground.
Lines in the Sand: A History of the Gulf War
XIX
“It is not, nor has it ever been, the policy of this government to sanction or give the order to assassinate a foreign head of state. With that said, I do believe that the long suffering people of Iraq and the world as a whole will greatly benefit from Saddam Hussein’s departure.” – President George Bush
“SEE YA, SADDAM!!” – Front page headline of The Sun, May 18, 1991
“I don’t care what the frilled shirts over in Geneva think. There’s still a Hussein in charge of Iraq and our guys are still getting shot at, and that means there’s still a goddamn war on. Until ordered otherwise, our mission is still to annihilate the enemy, and that’s exactly what we’re going to do.” – General Norman Schwarzkopf
Transcript of Speech by Acting Iraqi President Uday Hussein
May 17 1991
Beloved fathers, brothers and sons of Babylon,
It is with a heavy heart that I must inform you tonight of grave news. As you know, my father, Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti, is a man of near boundless courage and fortitude who has ceaselessly led and encouraged our mighty armies in this great war of liberation. Very often, against the warnings of advisors fearful for his personal safety, he has visited the front lines and sat with our brave soldiers, shared their meals and heard the tales of their exploits against the enemy. His drive and passion, his love for Iraq and all Arabian peoples suffering under the whip of the oppressors, are what inspired our soldiers with the resolve to sweep the opposition before them. Through his genius, we revealed the so-called vaunted American military forces for the paper tigers they are.
But even the greatest of men are still susceptible to the stresses and pressures of leadership and my father, great man that he may be, is no exception. This war has taken a toll on his health and in the interest of preserving his body to see our great republic through to the final victory over the oppressors, he has informed me of his desire to temporarily step down so that he might convalesce. In the meantime, he has commanded that I assume the mantle of leadership in his stead, a wish that I accept with honor and gratitude. I have been personally assured by him that his absence will be brief and that upon his return he shall be stronger than ever. It is my intention that while I serve Iraq, I will make both my father and you, my dearly beloved people, proud of my decisions and accomplishments. I will defend our great nation from her enemies, both from outside our borders and from within.
Yes, from within. For even now there are those that would seek to undermine my father and take advantage of his condition to clutch at power for themselves. Even my dear brother Qusay al-Tikriti proved himself to be susceptible and left me no choice but to reprimand him for his cowardly greed.
The oppressors would have us tear out our neighbor’s throats, but we are not the goat herders of the house of Saud. We must stand firm and stand united in these times of crisis, as we always have. Do not listen to the seditious whispers of the Americans and their Saudi puppets, do not believe their lies. I have been called upon to lead our forces, and I will do this with every weapon at my disposal. Our enemies will burn before us, and we will stand triumphant over all those who dare oppose us. Let your hearts be glad, for we have been shown the way to victory. Stand with me, beloved Iraq, and let us walk into the light together.
Excerpt from Mother of All Battles: A New History of the Arabian War
By Simon Anderson Naval Institute Press 1995
Uncorking the Djinn
With the sudden removal of Saddam Hussein from the playing field, the conflict in the Middle East suddenly took on a confusing, uncertain aspect for all participants. Gone was the very man who had gathered his allies and set the entire plot into motion to begin with some months before, leaving behind the headless remnant of the largest military machine of any country in the region midstride in its ongoing mission of fulfilling his boundless ambition. For a country that had spent over a decade being systematically restructured to trust in and obey one man only, the sudden vacuum in the seat of power was a matter that had to be dealt with quickly and decisively. Despite numerous purges during his time as President, Saddam’s paranoia had been unable to completely stamp out envious contenders to the throne, and as stunned and incredulous whispers spread like wildfire through the echelons of the Iraqi high command, several key figures began quietly positioning themselves for a grab at power. Within 2 days of the fateful airstrike however, such jockeying just as quickly faded back into the shadows as Saddam’s eldest son Uday Hussein loudly proclaimed his right to serve as President in his father’s ‘temporary’ absence. While the 27 year old had indeed been designated by Saddam as his heir apparent, Uday’s erratic behavior and questionable actions throughout the late 1980s had thrown the choice into doubt, particularly an incident at a 1988 dinner party when he had attacked one of his father’s food tasters and stabbed him to death in front of the horrified guests, including the wife of Egyptian President Mubarak. Following that public debacle, the relationship between father and son had become increasingly strained and a reassignment as an assistant to the Iraqi ambassador to Switzerland only served to bring more bad press when Uday was kicked out the of the country within a year for repeated fighting offences.
The onset of the Arabian War found Uday back in his home country and given a title with few actual powers of command and more as a means for his father to keep close tabs on his actions. Saddam’s favor was already shifting to his second eldest son Qusay, who while as ruthless as his brother managed to keep an even temper in his decisions. Qusay had been placed in charge of Iraq’s internal security forces as well as a supervisor for the Republican Guard, and was clearly being groomed to usurp his brother’s title as heir in the not too distant future. Such maneuvering did not go unnoticed by Uday however and as luck would have it the matter of fortuitous timing was on his side when the news of their father’s death reached him. March 14 found both brothers within a command bunker in Baghdad listening to scattered reports of the ongoing Marine attacks along Highway 615 when a frantic report came in of the airstrike near Al Khafji. With Qusay away from the radio to confer with an air defense general elsewhere in the complex, his brother realized the opportunity at hand and moved quickly to cement his tenuous position as heir. Without a word, Uday strode in on the surprised occupants of the meeting room and shot his brother in the head at close range with a pistol while his bodyguards gunned down their counterparts on Qusay’s payroll.
In the wake of dispatching his brother, Uday assembled the majority of his father’s advisors and confidants in a bunker now heavily manned by troops of his personal guard and announced his desired intention to assume command of the nation. Though the heir to the Iraqi throne had negligible experience in command and no experience whatsoever in combat operations, the high command begrudgingly agreed to accept Uday’s leadership, with general consensus behind the scenes being that the new leader could no doubt be manipulated to their own ends until such time as they could prepare their own assets for a power bid. For the moment, Uday Hussein would rule as President of Iraq while the cover story of a sudden illness would explain Saddam’s absence until it was felt advantageous to release the truth to the Iraqi people.
On the allied side of the conflict, in spite of the propaganda smokescreen from Baghdad it was increasingly obvious that Saddam Hussein had been gravely injured and quite probably killed by their forces, a theory supported by Iraqi radio intercepts and satellite images revealing a flurry of activity around a wrecked command convoy near Al Khafji. While allied governments had repeatedly stated their public intentions to not seek out the assassination of a foreign head of state, it was an open secret that standing orders among CENTCOM’s forces were to approve strikes against the euphemistic ‘targets of opportunity’ in a command decapitation role. So while Saddam Hussein’s death may have been quietly hoped for by allied command in the course of the campaign’s air strikes, the actuality of his passing brought intensive debate among the various generals over what should be done next. VII Corps and 1st MEF were both fully engaged in their action to cut off and envelop the Republican Guard within Saudi Arabia and General Schwarzkopf was adamant that the attack continue as planned as it would give the allies a far superior negotiating position with the removal of such a large percentage of Iraq’s elite fighting divisions. Others pressed to take advantage of the new ramifications of the political situation to achieve a ceasefire with Iraq, arguing that the mere threat of VII Corps astride Iraqi supply lines would force Baghdad to see reason and surrender, allowing the allies to turn their full attention to the crisis in Saudi Arabia while details about restoring Saudi and Kuwaiti sovereignty were worked out. In the end, Schwarzkopf’s camp won out, with the general stating ‘stopping a hammer in mid-swing rarely produces the desired effect in your opponent’. Until the President ordered CENTCOM otherwise, Operation Swift Sword would continue to obliterate Iraqi forces caught in their path.
Here of course lies another decision that Schwarzkopf’s critics have pointed to numerous times in their arguments that the general threw away an opportunity to save countless lives among both the allied and Iraqi forces by continuing the attack instead of ordering a pause in operations. On the one hand, such arguments hold merit on the basis of the Iraqi high command being quite open to the possibility of a ceasefire, albeit under the same terms they had been advocating for months in Switzerland that would leave them in control of Kuwait and making no mention of a Yemeni pullout from their own claims upon Saudi territory. It’s certainly plausible that given the period of panic that engulfed the Iraqi general staff, they might have been more amenable to overtures more in line with allied conditions, but it must be remembered that the window before Uday Hussein assumed power was quite brief and the well-documented episodes highlighting his mental instability and viciousness must have played a large role in Schwarzkopf’s assumptions that the new leader would choose to stay the course and fight on. Of equal concern would have also been the ever present memories of Vietnam weighing upon the general’s thoughts and the consequences of leaving a job half done. Despite the growing distraction of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and its military forces had to be dealt with decisively before the allies could move forward, lest it remain partially intact to lick its wounds and attempt to cause trouble again down the line. In sum, the continuation order remains yet another point in the conflict that consisted of no easy choices and fateful consequences for all involved.
Whatever thoughts of controlling their new leader the Iraqi generals might have entertained, in reality Uday quickly proved to drag along his new military toys in a series of whims, or ‘master strategies’ as he termed them, that he declared would finally reverse their rapidly declining fortunes and salvage some measure of honor from the conflict. First and foremost, no thoughts of peace with the Western imperialists would come about until they and their Arab allies had been properly chastised. Though under siege and in disarray, Iraq still maintained extensive military forces deployed throughout the region to oppose the allies, and plentiful forces still remained within Iraq to move south and reinforce them if necessary. Their air forces were battered but still capable of limited support operations, and their mobile missile forces had enjoyed a surprisingly good survival rate despite numerous allied air assets being diverted on a daily basis to hunt them down. Most importantly, though most of their facilities for the production and storage of chemical and biological weapons had been taken out on the opening day of the allied air campaign, the majority of Iraq’s ‘special weapons’ remained in reserve in scattered secondary sites as an ongoing threat to hold over their opponent’s ground forces.
With VII Corps’ initial task of severing the primary Iraqi supply artery and trapping the majority of its forces deployed along the coast, the potential employment of these special weapons took on an ever increasing attraction to the new President of Iraq. Initial reports from his division commanders varied wildly about the strength and composition of the American forces now sitting astride Highway 95, with estimates ranging from a low level reconnaissance in force to a full blown assault with over 10 allied divisions, no doubt American forces operating with extensive Egyptian and Syrian support. Though commanders remained highly skeptical of the sudden appearance of a major allied armored force deep within the occupied zone, such doubts were increasingly hard to maintain in the face of reports from the shattered remnants of 10th Armored and the lopsided nature of their brief but decisive engagement with the Americans. While some dismissed the action as irrelevant in light of their previous victories against the Americans, others fearfully noted the growing disparity in the strength of their respective forces and the increasing certainty that things would only grow worse unless something radically changed the tactical equation.
As the full realization of the Republican Guard’s situation sank in, the first objective became attempting a breakout from the allied encirclement and a withdrawal to establish a new defensive line along the Tapline Highway running just south of the Iraqi-Saudi border. Dhahran and Al Jubayl regrettably would have to be abandoned but much could be done to loot and destroy anything of potential value to the allies before the Iraqis left for good. Likewise, orders went out to detonate explosive charges amidst the region’s extensive oil fields to slow the allied advance and cover the withdrawal. Though most of the best trained and supplied divisions were now behind enemy lines, steps could still be taken to launch a simultaneous attack from the north in support of the breakout attempt, ideally trapping VII Corps in an armored pincer. The Iraqi 2nd Armored and 4th Mechanized Divisions, bedecked with medals and praises for their earlier seizure of Riyadh, were still relatively intact and resupplying in their positions around Hafar al Batin and were ideally placed to form the spearhead of this new assault with 3 additional divisions from Kuwait providing support. Iraq was pulling back, but still taking steps to ensure that it could make things as difficult for the allies as possible.
Tragically, the first outside target of Uday Hussein’s wrath proved to be not the allied military forces but the citizens of Bahrain. On the night of May 18, Al Hussein missile battalions operating southwest of Al Jubayl were ordered to break out and attach a number of specially modified warheads to their launchers as part of a ‘vengeance strike’ to punish the island nation for its decision to re-enter the allied fold. Over the course of several hours 8 Al Husseins were lobbed in Bahrain’s direction, 5 of them with warheads containing payloads of Sarin nerve gas. 2 of these warheads successfully delivered their payload onto the island, striking urban areas in Al Manama and Riffa. Thankfully, the timing of the attacks meant that most citizens were inside their homes instead of out in the open, but the 2 strikes nonetheless killed 37 people and hospitalized a further 82 with minor to severe neurological and shrapnel related injuries. A third missile, non-chemical in nature, impacted near the waterfront at Al Budaiyah, ironically near to the damaged area where the Iraqi amphibious assault had taken place a month earlier and inflicted a further 12 casualties. After sitting poised over the battlefield as a feared bogeyman, the specter of chemical warfare had at last been brought forth in all of its horror.
The so-called Night of Vengeance as termed by Baghdad sent CENTCOM into utter pandemonium. The new Bahraini Emir Hamad Al Khalifa was apoplectic and screaming for medical assistance and an expanded role for his military in delivering retribution on the Iraqis. The medical crisis could be dealt with swiftly enough, as the threat of chemical attacks had been foremost among the fears of allied commanders and plentiful antidotes and counteragents had been dispersed to forces in the region. Likewise, the matter of incorporating Bahrain’s expeditionary force into the alliance had also been plotted out well in advance. The main issue came in facing that Iraq had crossed the metaphorical Rubicon and from this point onward chemical attacks on their soldiers and bases were not so much a possibility but a certainty. It was unknown how many more modified chemical warheads Iraq retained in their arsenal, and the list of potential targets, including Israel, was extensive to say the least. On the international front, a UN Security Council resolution condemning the attacks on May 19 was met with near unanimous approval, though Yemen abstained from the vote. President Bush had threatened Saddam at the beginning of the conflict that any use of chemical or biological agents would be responded to with overwhelming force, the exact nature of which had been left intentionally vague in the hope of deterring the dictator from making any rash decisions. While there was no question that CENTCOM had to respond immediately and decisively to the transgression, the matter of what form it should take provoked intensive debate. The use of tactical nuclear weapons was quickly ruled out; though certainly decisive in making a statement on the battlefield Schwarzkopf harbored concerns that their use in combat would constitute the breaking of a deeply felt taboo against using nukes unless there was absolutely no other choice. Given their extensive precautions in the form of antidotes and MOPP protective gear, the prevailing belief was that Iraqi chemical attacks would certainly raise the casualty rate as the campaign progressed, but that such a threat would be insufficient in ultimately stopping VII Corps from achieving its objectives.
In the end, the decision was made to respond to Iraqi chemical attacks with their own chemical arsenal, to be employed in the form of GB and VX munitions delivered by artillery and aerial means. To limit collateral damage among the Saudi civilian population trapped in the occupied zone, these attacks would be launched against military facilities within Iraq proper. Beginning on May 20, allied attack aircraft began Operation Sandstorm, contaminating dozens of Iraqi bases and forcing their personnel to go to ground in area denial chemical dispersal runs. On the ground, soldiers among the VII Corps and 1st MEF began receiving shipments of chemical rounds as both forces continued to close in on the trapped Republican Guard, with the northern task force expected to run into Iraqi divisions around Al Jubayl within 36 hours. A timely elimination of the enemy pocket was essential, as air recon reported elements of 2 Iraqi armored divisions racing down Highway 85 towards Nairyah, currently defended only by a portion of the 82nd Airborne. The Air Force promised to do what it could to slow their advance, but with it already spread thin due to ongoing missions in Iraq and Kuwait, support missions along the coast and now responding to reports of additional Iraqi armored movement south of Kuwait City, it seemed that the beleaguered paratroopers would be operating with limited assistance from the skies for the near future.
As the two military juggernauts circled ever closer towards a showdown in the Saudi desert, far to the northwest another front was about to open in an area many had fervently hoped the conflict would avoid. When Uday’s order to initiate the Night of Vengeance went into effect, coded transmissions went out to PLO command posts hidden across the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to put Option Scimitar into effect. Ever since Saddam Hussein’s fateful meeting with Yasser Arafat, PLO forces had spent several months slowly building up weapons caches and infiltrating a number of cells into the region, taking full advantage of the IDF’s distraction with the ongoing Intifada among the Palestinian populace. Though Arafat’s promise to assist Saddam in his goals had netted the PLO plentiful heavy weapons to oppose the IDF’s armored might, the true crown jewels of the exchange had been smuggled across the Jordanian border only recently. Scimitar made its opening moves on the morning of May 20, when a van parked near a marketplace in West Jerusalem detonated in a massive blast of black smoke and shrapnel. As the shell-shocked survivors began carefully picking themselves from the dusty pavement, a scent not unlike overripe fruit wafted over the area. Within moments, dozens were choking and convulsing on the ground.
RamscoopRaider
Donor
Well things are really heating up, I see occupation of Iraq as pretty much a certainty
I wouldn't be surprised if Uday didn't even tell Arafat what was in there... Gripping and fantastic update.
And it's back!
Great update!
This will be interesting for the Israeli response. The immediate party they will blame will be the PLO of course, but they will also suspect Iraq's hand behind the attack, but unless Uday actually claims responsibility or the PLO openly admits they obtained it from Iraq then there isn't any hard and fast proof that Iraq is at fault. Israel though is likely to strike Iraq anyway because someone must have supplied the PLO with chemical weapons and that someone is most likely Iraq.
What open Israeli involvement in the war against Iraq will do is going to be crucial. Will the already fractured Coalition fracture even further? Will Syria and some others pull out of the Coalition entirely?
Great update!
This will be interesting for the Israeli response. The immediate party they will blame will be the PLO of course, but they will also suspect Iraq's hand behind the attack, but unless Uday actually claims responsibility or the PLO openly admits they obtained it from Iraq then there isn't any hard and fast proof that Iraq is at fault. Israel though is likely to strike Iraq anyway because someone must have supplied the PLO with chemical weapons and that someone is most likely Iraq.
What open Israeli involvement in the war against Iraq will do is going to be crucial. Will the already fractured Coalition fracture even further? Will Syria and some others pull out of the Coalition entirely?