ABLE ARCHER 83: Timeline of a Third World War in 1983

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BlondieBC

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The conflagration in Europe between the two superpowers produce, as its first collateral effect, the loss of any inhibition and restrain applied to force in any other latent or ongoing local conflict, all over the World. All those local conflicts begin immediately to merge in the wider war.

Nice time line. The point of all the regional conflicts flaring sounds right. Someone will try to take advantage of each situation, each has something to win or lose.
 
Thank you for all of your precious informations. I can edit my previous posts with your help.

@Otis Needleman: ok, I assumed that NK Army was a bit stronger, but I trust you. So, the US and SK forces could stop the NK three main Corps North of Seoul. But I think that the artillery barrage against Seoul could be devastating in any case (before it's suppressed by US artillery and USAF)

@Karelian: I think that Kalevi Sorsa, with his not at all clear relations with KGB, would have done exactly what Moscow expected from him. You have to consider that, in war planning, STAVKA assumed a neutral and open Finland, easy to cross. By the way, one thing is the government, all another metter is the Finnish army, whose reaction is still to be seen after the first week of war

@Athelstane: I don't think that airdropping the 82nd in Nicaragua could deprive the Central Front from troops for a long time. Just a short and winning campain, already planned, is good for US morale. Then you can deploy it anywhere after the second week of operations. About the Ekranoplanes: noooo! I want them! Let me write this little ASB!

@MUC: I watched them in Google maps and I see that there are also many firing positions behind the Innner German Border. So I think that a lot of them would survive the first strike
 
Thank you for all of your precious informations. I can edit my previous posts with your help.

@Otis Needleman: ok, I assumed that NK Army was a bit stronger, but I trust you. So, the US and SK forces could stop the NK three main Corps North of Seoul. But I think that the artillery barrage against Seoul could be devastating in any case (before it's suppressed by US artillery and USAF)

@Karelian: I think that Kalevi Sorsa, with his not at all clear relations with KGB, would have done exactly what Moscow expected from him. You have to consider that, in war planning, STAVKA assumed a neutral and open Finland, easy to cross. By the way, one thing is the government, all another metter is the Finnish army, whose reaction is still to be seen after the first week of war

@Athelstane: I don't think that airdropping the 82nd in Nicaragua could deprive the Central Front from troops for a long time. Just a short and winning campain, already planned, is good for US morale. Then you can deploy it anywhere after the second week of operations. About the Ekranoplanes: noooo! I want them! Let me write this little ASB!

@MUC: I watched them in Google maps and I see that there are also many firing positions behind the Innner German Border. So I think that a lot of them would survive the first strike

Yes, there would be some artillery hitting the Seoul area. But thirty years ago Seoul was smaller and the NK artillery not as numerous.

Another observation, too. In 1983 the US Army, and the US military in general, was much larger than it is now. So more troops are available.
 
Preparing for Armageddon (ABMs and Civil Defense, November 9th-14th)

On all battlefields, while chemical and conventional weapons are extensively delivered, no nuke is used by both side, because they could disrupt ongoing ground operations. On the Soviet side, Spetnatz successfully destroy with conventional high yield explosives the three suspected Cruise and Pershing2 missile sites, many nuclear warhead storages and mobile launcher shelters in Germany and in the Low Lands. Nearly all the 600 NATO’s warheads stored in Germany are lost.

All governments begin massive preparations for an all-out nuclear war.

Margaret Thatcher enacts the “War Book”: United Kingdom becomes a de-facto authoritarian regime, divided in 12 administrative regions each commanded by a minister; all the areas close to the air bases bombed with VX chemical warheads are immediately evacuated and isolated; emergency rescue operations begin with dispersal of all firefighters units, Red Cross and rescue teams. Evacuation measures are taken also for large cities and all the potential targets of a nuclear attack. New Nike Hercules anti-aircraft batteries, sent by US, are deployed in large numbers around cities and along the East coast. All the Nike Hercules batteries in strategic locations (plausible targets for Soviet missiles) are loaded with powerful 30 kt warheads.

Ronald Reagan rules a superpower without any organized civil defense plans, few air defenses and no ABM defense. Although he orders the execution of the Crisis Relocation Plan studied in 1980 (and never tested), for the evacuation of large cities, relying mainly in the disciplined attitude of its people and on private resources. He also orders the deployment of all “tested and untested” ABM systems. Stored Spartan and Sprint missiles are immediately dispersed in secret locations. A dozen of MSR missile guidance radars, already built (but never assembled) during the Safeguard Program of the early 70s, begin to be assembled and deployed close to large and strategically important cities: Chicago, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia, Washington DC, Houston, Dallas, San Antonio, Phoenix, San Diego, Los Angeles and San Jose. Given that it is impossible to dig for new hardened silos for the Sprint missiles on short notice (and it could be too visible for Soviet’s eyes), a new project is approved: modify older and unused Honest John’s launcher vehicles, in order to transform them in mobile launchers for Sprints, which have, basically, the same proportions. In the meantime, the old 142 batteries of nuclear-tipped Nike Hercules (deactivated in the 70s) begin emergency works of reactivation. In order to protect the ICBM silos and the underground command and control centers, the engineers prepares a “dust defense” (the most simple and brute ABM defense), burying a certain number of B-53 (Y2 “clean” version) 9Mt nuclear bombs, surrounding them with borated water in their burial shaft, in order to further reduce their radioactivity. They have to be exploded to stop the incoming nuclear warheads, with their large mushroom clouds. After intense consultations with the Joint Chief of Staff and an ad hoc committee of nuclear physicists, Ronald Reagan authorizes a new program proposed by the physicist Edward Teller: use the state-of-the-art know-how derived from the Project Excalibur to deploy a new space nuclear mine, based on the Spartan’s W-71 warheads (X-ray enhanced). Those warheads are absolutely ineffective if used on Spartans, against clouds of MIRVed warheads and decoys, but could be better used against densely packed missiles, in their boost phase (before the release of MIRVs). Then: they have to be deployed in Low Earth Orbit. Aerospace and nuclear facilities begin immediately to build the new mines, using the 60 W-71 already stored.

In Moscow, Yuri Andropov orders the immediate evacuation of all large cities and the quick relocation of all the strategic industrial assets in underground facilities. Works for new ABM batteries, along with their radar systems (already built), begin immediately around Leningrad, Minsk, Kiev, Almaty and Vladivostok in order to cover all of the strategic areas of the Soviet Union. The production lines for the Galosh ABM missiles are reactivated and boosted, in order to produce 500 of them per month. The new Gazelle missiles are already built and tested, but they are not battle ready; given the emergency situation, the STAVKA approves their deployment in new silos, in any case. Live test, with nuclear warheads, will be conducted as soon as possible in the Baikonur site. In the meantime, the PVO (air defense) allocated all its 130 sites armed with SA-5 “improved” anti-aircraft missiles to the ABM mission. The missile launchers are linked to ABM radars. In a desperate situation they could be used as a last ditch terminal defense. Old systems are deployed again: the IS interceptor satellites are positioned on their launch pads in Baikonur site, as well as 18 SS-9 missiles armed with FOBS (Fractional Orbital Bombardment System) are deployed and readied for launch.

In Moscow, the GKO considers that a nuclear escalation is imminent. The “six days to survive” are ended and NATO gives no signs of surrender. Given the previous estimates of the KGB for a US nuclear attack countdown (forecasted for November 15th November, at last), given the extensive preparation for an all-out nuclear war detected in the United States by the satellite reconnaissance, on November 14th, the KGB concludes that a nuclear escalation could start at any given time from now on. Soviet leaders decide not to launch, but they are getting nervous.
 
The Push to the Rhine (Ground operations in Europe, November 15th- 21st)

Soviet intelligence don’t detect any sign of imminent release of NATO’s nuclear weapons, then the conventional and chemical ground offensive continues.

In North-Western Theatre of Operations, the Soviet paratrooper’s pocket in Bodo is finally suppressed by the Norwegian Trondheim Division, supported by the UK Parachute Regiment and the ACE Mobile Force of NATO. The last resistance of the Soviet 76th air assault division is suppressed on November 17th. Then, the Norwegian Trondheim Division and the Allies move North to break the Soviet sieges of Narvik (defended by elements of the Norwegian Northern Division) and Tromso (defended by the bulk of the Northern Division).

In Western Theatre of Operations, the Soviet Second Army push through the positions held by the Netherland First Corps and the German First Corps and occupy Bremen and Bremenhaven by the end of the week, thus sustaining huge losses in manpower and materiel. The advance of the Soviet Twentieth Army is even slower, because of the fierce resistance opposed by the British Army of the Rhine (Baor), whose forces are filled by a continuous flow of fresh units from the UK. The Soviet Third Army is hardly stopped by the First Belgian Corps (supplied and supported by the Baor) and by the German Third. The Soviet Eight Army push again on Frankfurt, but is stopped in the Fulda Gap with heavy losses by a reorganized US Fifth Corps, which manage to launch little flanking counterattacks with its battalions equipped with the new M1 Abrams tanks. In Southern Germany, the surrender of Austria, allow the Soviet Fourth and Thirteenth Armies (the latter coming from the Carpatian Military District, through Austria) to launch a converging offensive against the Second German Corps, which is trapped in the “Munich pocket”. The best the German can do is abandon the city and retreat. The First French Army, coming from the Rhine, is deployed in a second defensive line Southward, stretching from Freiburg to Augusta.

In South-Western Theatre of Operations, the surrender of Austria allow also the Soviet Ninth Army to try a vast encircling maneuver in the South, invading the neutral Switzerland. Spetnatz troops already deployed in that country before the war, attacks air bases and try to ambush the convoys of troops directed to the main fortresses of St. Gotthard and Sargans. But the Swiss Army is already mobilized and nearly all the Spetnatz attacks are stopped or prevented. When the Soviet Ninth Army, coming from Austria, try to attack the fortress of Sargans, the Swiss mountain units stop it with heavy losses. In Italy the situation is getting worse for NATO. With its government almost decapitated by the GRU’s terrorist campaign, huge losses suffered by the army along the Piave line and civil unrest spreading all over the country (a resurgence of red terror, massive anti-war demonstrations and a permanent general strike proclaimed by all the trade unions), a new “National Emergency” government is formed, including the Communist Party. The foreign minister Giulio Andreotti begin separate negotiations with the Soviet emissaries and on November 21st Italy exits the war and leaves NATO. The First Hungarian Army is allowed to occupy all the Northern Italy, until the river Po. All the rest of the country is proclaimed “neutral zone”. But the war is not at all finished for that country. The army units deployed in the Appennini (central Italy mountains) disperse and go into the wilderness, all the Stay Behind units and cadres (under direct command of NATO) are mobilized. On the very day of the armistice, the regular army quickly occupy both Sicily and Sardinia, with all their strategic air and naval bases, transforming them in a de-facto separate State. Abroad, the Italian Navy disobey and continue to fight with the other Allied fleets in the Mediterranean Sea. And also the Italian Alpine troops already deployed in Norway (in the ACE Mobile Force) continue to fight along with the Allies.

By the end of the week, Marshall Kulikov, commander in chief of WP forces, envisages the possibility to achieve a final breakthrough of NATO lines. The two weeks offensive have revealed two weak points in the enemy lines: the North (held by the First Netherland Corps and the First German Corps, both weakened after the loss of Bremen) and the South, where the Second German Corps is nearly destroyed, two main enemies (Austria and Italy) surrendered and a third (Switzerland) could be easily bypassed. Thus, Kulikov decided to deploy the newly come reserves in those two sectors: the Eleventh and Fourteenth Armies have to be deployed in North German Plain and achieve a breakthrough. The First Unified Corps, coming from Belarus, has to be ready to exploit the breakthrough. In South Germany, the already deployed Thirteenth Army have to exploit the fall of Munich pressing through that gap immediately. The Second Unified Corps, coming from Ukraine, has to be ready to exploit the successes of the Thirteenth Army. The maneuver has to be done as fast as possible, because new NATO units are coming but are not yet ready. In the North German Plain, the US Third Corps is not yet deployed and the Second French Army is advancing but still in reserve. In the South, the Second French Army is still digging its defenses under a rain of aerial bombings.

To be continued...

push_to_rhine.jpg
 
Some really good stuff here.

A few observations.

1. Don't believe Spetsnaz will be anywhere near as successful against the cruise missile sites as you have indicated. If these facilities were well-guarded before, they will be much more heavily guarded now. Suggest cutting the Allied losses at least in half, maybe two-thirds.

2. At this time a big part of the Allied strategy against a Soviet/WP invasion in Europe was to hit the follow-on forces. Soviet/WP strategy in the attack was to use formations for five or six days, until they were exhausted, then have new formations pass through and continue. If the follow-on forces are disrupted the attack is in trouble. Haven't seen any mention of Allied disruption of follow-on forces.

3. I don't see factories on either side ramping up and delivering meaningful amounts of equipment quickly. In this war, you fight with what you have now, what was pre-positioned, and what you can get out of storage to the field immediately.

4. Don't believe there would be any long-range testing out of Baikonur. Too easy to interpret as an ICBM launch. It's hair-trigger time now.
 
At this time a big part of the Allied strategy against a Soviet/WP invasion in Europe was to hit the follow-on forces. Soviet/WP strategy in the attack was to use formations for five or six days, until they were exhausted, then have new formations pass through and continue. If the follow-on forces are disrupted the attack is in trouble. Haven't seen any mention of Allied disruption of follow-on forces.
The way I see it, NATO doesn't have assets to do that. All airports in W.Germany are wrecked and NATO has its hands full trying to stop the already advancing Soviet armies. With Greece and Italy out of the picture, NATO bases there are useless in interdicting WP troop reinforcements. In Norway NATO forces are busy fighting the Soviet invasion.
The only asset NATO has for a job like that, would be night attacks by F111s from the UK (or Iceland with tanker support) going in deep and hitting troops concentrations, choke points, etc in WP countries, the rest of NATO airpower simply doesn't have the range to hit troops columns in eastern Poland, Romania or the Ukraine. Heavy bombers are too precious for tasks like this and B52s would be chopped to pieces. B1s were nuclear armed in 1983.

don't see factories on either side ramping up and delivering meaningful amounts of equipment quickly. In this war, you fight with what you have now, what was pre-positioned, and what you can get out of storage to the field immediately.
The Soviets planned the attack, so they may have made preparations.

Don't believe there would be any long-range testing out of Baikonur. Too easy to interpret as an ICBM launch. It's hair-trigger time now.
I disagree. Baikonur will be active, launching military satellites. The Soviets need those to track NATO naval activity and gather intelligence.
Perhaps the author would give us insight on some armed Soyz mission going after NATO satellites?
 
The way I see it, NATO doesn't have assets to do that. All airports in W.Germany are wrecked and NATO has its hands full trying to stop the already advancing Soviet armies. With Greece and Italy out of the picture, NATO bases there are useless in interdicting WP troop reinforcements. In Norway NATO forces are busy fighting the Soviet invasion.
The only asset NATO has for a job like that, would be night attacks by F111s from the UK (or Iceland with tanker support) going in deep and hitting troops concentrations, choke points, etc in WP countries, the rest of NATO airpower simply doesn't have the range to hit troops columns in eastern Poland, Romania or the Ukraine. Heavy bombers are too precious for tasks like this and B52s would be chopped to pieces. B1s were nuclear armed in 1983.


The Soviets planned the attack, so they may have made preparations.


I disagree. Baikonur will be active, launching military satellites. The Soviets need those to track NATO naval activity and gather intelligence.
Perhaps the author would give us insight on some armed Soyz mission going after NATO satellites?

B-52s could do the job. SAC had been trained to operate against the WP integrated air defense system (IADS), which has taken plenty of hits of its' own in this conflict. B-52s could fly from the UK, Spain, possibly the Azores, Portugal or France. Allied electronic warfare was ahead of the WP and the lead got bigger every year.
 
"Don't believe Spetsnaz will be anywhere near as successful against the cruise missile sites as you have indicated. If these facilities were well-guarded before, they will be much more heavily guarded now. Suggest cutting the Allied losses at least in half, maybe two-thirds".

In my timeline they destroy the cruise missiles sites on the very first dawn of the war, when NATO is not yet on high alert. Spetnatz regularly infiltrated peace movements such as "Cruise Watch" and "Pershing Watch", very close to their targets. And (in real OTL) they were discovered only few years after, in UK: http://news.google.com/newspapers?n...=S68yAAAAIBAJ&sjid=oe8FAAAAIBAJ&pg=4631,44032
 
@Karelian: I think that Kalevi Sorsa, with his not at all clear relations with KGB, would have done exactly what Moscow expected from him. You have to consider that, in war planning, STAVKA assumed a neutral and open Finland, easy to cross. By the way, one thing is the government, all another metter is the Finnish army, whose reaction is still to be seen after the first week of war.

I have to agree with Karelian there, kudos to you for writing an excellent timeline, but there is little reason to expect Finland would go down putting up absolutely no fight. What STAVKA expects is not necessarily what will happen.

Say what you may about Sorsa, there is still a line between cozying up to members of the Soviet diplomatic corps and intelligence (you could never be sure which they actually were) to gain some leverage in Finnish domestic politics - everyone and their dog was doing it in Cold War era Finland - and rolling over immediately when the defence and actual independence of the homeland is at stake. Besides, at the time immediately after the Kekkonen era Finland was still a highly presidential system and Mauno Koivisto would be the man constitutionally in charge of the questions of foreign politics and defence, together with the cabinet of course.

I believe that in the event the Finns might bend to many concessions, but the line would be drawn to allowing Soviet ground units into southern and central Finland without a direct invitation from the Finnish government. I think that Koivisto would order the Defence Forces to counter a move like that even if Lapland would be abandoned without a fight. Sitting on his hands while the Soviets roll in to take over the national capital would not be in character for the old fighter. In any case, it is highly likely the Defence Forces would be at least partially mobilized as per FCMA treaty provisions, so militarily such a defensive move would also be possible. It is another thing entirely how effective a defence the Finns could put up, though.
 
B-52s could do the job. SAC had been trained to operate against the WP integrated air defense system (IADS), which has taken plenty of hits of its' own in this conflict. B-52s could fly from the UK, Spain, possibly the Azores, Portugal or France. Allied electronic warfare was ahead of the WP and the lead got bigger every year.

B52s wont survive over E.Europe with all WP radars and air defences still functional. It's just too dense. B52s were limited to deep penetrations over less densely defended airspace (Siberia) or standoff attacks by 1983. the problem is, that ALCMs were only nuclear tipped in 1983. After nuclear release however B52s could fly over the wrecked air defenses. We are just not that far yet. Electronic warfare is good but wont help you, when you are flying that deep alone.
Remember the B52 raid on Keflavik in Red Storm Rising? :)

Allowing a B52 to reach Kiev over Europe is like saying the Soviets can carpet bomb London.
 
The Siviets had a huge bio weapon during the Cold War. I would have expected them to try something. Perhaps a cruise missile attack against the US with bio weapons?
 
"Don't believe Spetsnaz will be anywhere near as successful against the cruise missile sites as you have indicated. If these facilities were well-guarded before, they will be much more heavily guarded now. Suggest cutting the Allied losses at least in half, maybe two-thirds".

In my timeline they destroy the cruise missiles sites on the very first dawn of the war, when NATO is not yet on high alert. Spetnatz regularly infiltrated peace movements such as "Cruise Watch" and "Pershing Watch", very close to their targets. And (in real OTL) they were discovered only few years after, in UK: http://news.google.com/newspapers?n...=S68yAAAAIBAJ&sjid=oe8FAAAAIBAJ&pg=4631,44032

For all their capabilities, Spetsnaz are no supermen (even if they can throw knives while backflipping over burning obstacles :rolleyes:) You don't think that NATO troops (German and US) are alert and waiting for exactly an attack like this? Sorry. This is too far out. You fell into the common trap of underestimating NATO and overstimating the Warsaw Pact. Military historians generally agree that a successful invasion of Western Europe was implausible after roughly 1983. The USA and W.GErmany had the M1 Abrams and Leo 2 in service and the gap in electronics between NATO and WP grew exponentially each year. For this precise reason (SIGINT and ELINT chiefly among it), a surprise invasion was nearly impossible by 1983. The SIGINT guys in the West German navy were so good they could tell the Morse code operatiors in Soviet Naval Aviation Backfires from each other by the idiosyncracies of their morse technique. A general attack across all fronst wothout some electronic burbs is patently impossible.

Finland ALWAYS planned for a Soviet invasion and would not have stood idly by. Sweden had similar plans to secure their northern borders.
The West German navy is a total non-entity here. No sinkings of Baltic Fleet units? No minings of WP harbours by the 206A boats? Those little brown boats were the very best in conventional submatines at that time. No attacks by the extremely capable Danish, Norwegian and West German missile attack craft?

This story has too many holes for my taste. The biggest one is both sides going after the nuclear forces of their opponent. This above all else would trigger a nuclear exchange. Think about it. The boomers were the most important ways of sneak nuclear attacks and a massive second-strike asset. Going after this would tell the other side you were planning a nuclear strike and act accordingly. Blowing up nuclear stockpiles on NATO soil with tacnukes? When the wind blows, here we come...
 
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I believe that in the event the Finns might bend to many concessions, but the line would be drawn to allowing Soviet ground units into southern and central Finland without a direct invitation from the Finnish government. I think that Koivisto would order the Defence Forces to counter a move like that even if Lapland would be abandoned without a fight. Sitting on his hands while the Soviets roll in to take over the national capital would not be in character for the old fighter. In any case, it is highly likely the Defence Forces would be at least partially mobilized as per FCMA treaty provisions, so militarily such a defensive move would also be possible. It is another thing entirely how effective a defence the Finns could put up, though.

The Cold War-era FDF always responded to rising international tensions by calling up as many reservists as possible in the southeastern military districts for additional exercises in OTL. And like he said: areas south from Oulu and West from Vaalimaa are not going to be a free pass for the Soviets. I'd also like to see your sources on the statement that Stavka assumed a neutral or open Finland, easy to cross.

If you're referring to the so-called Finnish corridor in Lappland this statement is somewhat valid, but southern Finland is whole another matter. Any 1980s PM who would attempt anything like Sorsa in TTL would find himself sacked by the President well in advance.
 
Until now (the second week of war), I was speaking only about a limited corridor in Lapland, not even Rovaniemi or larger cities are occupied. The Central and Southern Finland are another matter. To intervene against Soviet Union militarily if they invade a little and mostly inhabited strip of Finland could be a very hard choice, especially if you fear an imminent nuclear escalation of the ongoing conflict. Then I decided to keep Finland neutral, at least in this first phase of the conflict. Be sure that all Finnish troops are mobilized and secret negotiations are progressing on both sides.
 
"The Siviets had a huge bio weapon during the Cold War. I would have expected them to try something. Perhaps a cruise missile attack against the US with bio weapons?"

Bio Preparat program was on its early stages in 1983 and Soviet immunization campaign questionable. I think they would not use them in Europe, because Soviet population could be contaminated. A good bio scenario could be set in late 80s, even early 90s.
 
@Jotun:

"You don't think that NATO troops (German and US) are alert and waiting for exactly an attack like this?"
No, they weren't. Former defense secretary Bob Gates (who was vice-director of CIA at the time) called the Able Archer83 Crisis as one of the hugest mistake in US intelligence. If Soviets would have attacked for real, they could have achieved a complete surprise.

"Military historians generally agree that a successful invasion of Western Europe was implausible after roughly 1983".
Successful? Who suggests you that the Soviets will win in my timeline? This war is just begun. And all military historians I read spoke about the 1987 as the changing year in Europe, not 1983. In 1983 the new generation of NATO weapons and tacticts is just at the beginning.

"No sinkings of Baltic Fleet units?" I remind you that all the Soviet Baltic Fleet is nearly destroyed since the first week of the war, in the Danish Belts.
 
Behind the Enemy Lines (Soviet occupation and special operations in Europe)

Behind the advancing Soviet armies, the Warsaw Pact divisions are used as occupation forces for captured territories. The Polish Fourth Army is deployed in Denmark after the fall of the country and the Polish First Army occupies the area of Kiel Canal. Given the vicinity of the British Home Fleet area of operations, the Polish units are daily subjected to heavy bombings from the sea and from the air and suffers huge losses. Danish population is relatively quiet under occupation, but its armed forces continue to conduct small sabotage operations (and they provide a useful guide for NATO air strikes) under the Stay Behind command. In North German Plain, the Fifth and Third DDR Armies occupy all the area and the city of Hannover. Following a pre-planned course of action, the Stasi units physically eliminates all “political and class enemies” and establishes new administrations in the cities formed by loyal communist elements and leftist politicians of the Social Democrat Party. While the Second Polish Army and the First Czechoslovak Army have very few things to occupy (their sector of the frontline is still close to the German border), the First Hungarian Army occupy almost all Austria. There, political commissars and the most politicized officers, encourage the Hungarian nationalism against the “old Austrian aristocracy” (which no longer exists, indeed) and the occupation results in many acts of expropriations, vandalism and brute violence. After the armistice with Italy, the First Hungarian Army receive the order to occupy the Northern Italy with all of its forces. The First Czechoslovak Army provide its forces for the occupation of Austria.
In all the occupied parts of West Germany and in bordering regions of East Germany, NATO special forces (British SBS and SAS and US Green Berets) begin a large campaign of sabotage. Their main targets are the mobile ramps of nuclear tactical weapons. SCUD and FROG mobile launchers are regularly ambushed and destroyed in large numbers. Smaller teams, illuminates the mobile launchers with lasers, to allow surgical air strikes.
In Western Europe, the main, very huge, problem is the flood of refugees from the occupied territories. Nearly all highways and main roads are flooded with large columns of cars and all kind of vehicles, escaping from Hannover, Hamburg and then Bremen, along with all the other occupied smaller cities and towns. Soviet troops encourages the massive flee of people, because they could damage only NATO operations with their East-to-West movement. Indeed, all the NATO counterattacks in the North German Plain are stopped because of the massive presence of German civilians in distress, in the main advance axis, in front of the firing positions and all around numerous air strike targets.
Spetnatz raids against the West continue, but they decelerate because the surprise effect is vanished after the first days of conflict.
Both sides diffuse massive political propaganda through all possible channels. The message is basically one: nuclear war is imminent, if you don’t surrender, you’ll pay consequences. Pirate radios managed by the Soviet underground broadcast station based in Latvia, diffuse scaring messages and news of imminent (or even already started) nuclear exchanges in all languages of NATO countries. They invite the Western public opinion to revolt against “irresponsible political élites” who “want to sacrifice the people in a Nuclear Holocaust”. On the other side, Radio Free Europe intensify its transmissions in all the Warsaw Pact Languages, informing their peoples that they “are marching ground for the invading Soviet Army” and they would inevitably pay the worst price if the war will go nuclear. All the most respected Eastern European dissidents are mobilized for this information campaign.
 
The WP successes in Southern Germany strike me as odd, considering the geography is extremely suited for defensive operations. Lots of rivers, forests mountain ranges, built-up areas. For example the WP planned to advance along the river Main, the area is so full of valleys, villages every couple kilometers and dense forests. Light infantry units out of Hammelburg or e.g. Aschaffenburg could have easily delayed the WP advance.

For some reason the large pool of reservists (all those field replacement companies and battalions assigned to battalions, regiments, brigades and division would provide a steady stream of manpower) and the Territorial Army of the Bundeswehr (light infantry for guarding the rear area against Soviet Airborne/Special Purpose Forces operations and the mechanized/armored Home Defence Brigades for supporting the Field Army) are completely absent from the action and it seems the German Army is suffering from severe attrition.

Also, you dismiss the Austrian military too easily. While their standing army might have been only a division and mobilizing mechanized reserve forces would have taken some time as in any other European country, their light infantry reserve forces would have been able to delay WP advances, possibly giving the Italian Army enough time to bring in reinforcements.

And finally, while the westernmost WP units were able to deploy from their barracks within hours, the gargantuan logistical effort of an offensive would have been noticed quite early on.
 
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