In reading about Royal Navy planning prior to (and during) World War 1, it seems there was a lot of thought put into the "close blockade" or attacking/neutralizing the German navy in its bases - things like landing army divisions in Schleswig-Holstein, capturing Heligoland, sinking blockships off Wilhelmshaven or (later) aircraft carrier launched torpedo bomber attacks. None of these plans were felt to be viable to be put into action, and for good reasons, although there was some recent precedent for an assault on a fortified naval base (Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese war). Therefore, the German navy functioned as a fleet-in-being for the duration of the war.
However, it occurs to me that the main operational issues that prevented an assault on Wilhelmshaven are substantially lessened if Pula and the Austro-Hungarian navy was the target instead, and the strategic benefits are similar.
- Allied light forces (like destroyers) could not linger off the German coast since it was 300 miles from their bases on the other side of the North Sea, so a close blockade is not practical. But Pula is much closer, within 100 miles of Italian ports on the other side of the Adriatic Sea.
- The Austro-Hungarian navy cannot relocate through interior lines to an alternative safe port if Pula is threatened, like how the German High Seas Fleet could move to Kiel by means of the Kiel canal (and to a lesser extent by the straights of Denmark).
- The Austro-Hungarian navy is fairly small. The French and Italian navies, both fully commited to the Mediterranean, each outnumbered the Austro-Hungarian navy alone, and the Royal Navy could "surge" substantial forces too. The High Seas Fleet was too large to be overwhelmed by numbers alone in the North Sea (especially while they stayed on the defense like they usually did).
If the Austro-Hungarian navy was destroyed and if Pula was destroyed as a functional naval base, it would have strategic benefits. The (historically highly successful) Mediterranean U-boat campaign would be harder for the Central Powers to conduct. The Italian and French navies would be freed from maintaining a watch on the Austro-Hungarian one. Italy also had expansionist objectives in Istria, making it a target from that perspective.
The downsides are that historically the Allies had disputes over chain of command and placing their forces under foreign leadership, complicating coordination. Also, this kind of campaign could probably only take place as a replacement to the Gallipoli campaign, or with some kind of pre-Gallipoli POD. And Gallipoli was infamously unsuccesful in achieving its objectives.
However, it occurs to me that the main operational issues that prevented an assault on Wilhelmshaven are substantially lessened if Pula and the Austro-Hungarian navy was the target instead, and the strategic benefits are similar.
- Allied light forces (like destroyers) could not linger off the German coast since it was 300 miles from their bases on the other side of the North Sea, so a close blockade is not practical. But Pula is much closer, within 100 miles of Italian ports on the other side of the Adriatic Sea.
- The Austro-Hungarian navy cannot relocate through interior lines to an alternative safe port if Pula is threatened, like how the German High Seas Fleet could move to Kiel by means of the Kiel canal (and to a lesser extent by the straights of Denmark).
- The Austro-Hungarian navy is fairly small. The French and Italian navies, both fully commited to the Mediterranean, each outnumbered the Austro-Hungarian navy alone, and the Royal Navy could "surge" substantial forces too. The High Seas Fleet was too large to be overwhelmed by numbers alone in the North Sea (especially while they stayed on the defense like they usually did).
If the Austro-Hungarian navy was destroyed and if Pula was destroyed as a functional naval base, it would have strategic benefits. The (historically highly successful) Mediterranean U-boat campaign would be harder for the Central Powers to conduct. The Italian and French navies would be freed from maintaining a watch on the Austro-Hungarian one. Italy also had expansionist objectives in Istria, making it a target from that perspective.
The downsides are that historically the Allies had disputes over chain of command and placing their forces under foreign leadership, complicating coordination. Also, this kind of campaign could probably only take place as a replacement to the Gallipoli campaign, or with some kind of pre-Gallipoli POD. And Gallipoli was infamously unsuccesful in achieving its objectives.
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