Best US result at Pearl Harbor -> Philippines saved?

[prester.john208]

Interesting paper on the US Sanctions of Japan
From Freeze to Fire How Economic Sanctions against Japan Led to the War in the Pacific

The Pearl Harbor Myth :Rethinking the Unthinkable

Two Radio Interviews with Edward S. Miller author of Bankrupting the Enemy; The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan Before Pearl Harbor, plus a video.

1. Oral - NY Military Affairs Symposium
2. Oral - At Library of Congress
3. Video - Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan Before Pearl Harbor

In his book "Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan Before Pearl Harbor" published by the Naval Institute Press, Miller contends that the United States forced Japan into international bankruptcy to deter its aggression. The Japanese government had a huge cache of dollars fraudulently hidden in New York. In July 1941, President Roosevelt froze the money to "bring Japan to its senses, not its knees," Miller asserts. Roosevelt's intentions were thwarted, however, by U.S. bureaucrats who were determined to deny Japan the dollars needed to buy oil and other resources for economic survival. Miller demonstrates that the deprivations facing the Japanese people as a result of the fund cutoff buttressed Japan's choice of war at Pearl Harbor.

Edward Miller, who is retired, served as chief financial officer of a Fortune 500 international mining corporation and as vice president of finance for the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation. Interested in business planning, national strategy and history, Miller extensively researched and wrote his first book in 1991, "War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945," which won numerous awards, including the Society for Military History's Distinguished Book Award and the Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt Naval History Prize.

 

[Gillan1220]

Perhaps the Pensacola Convoy arrives earlier than OTL. Meaning the arms need to equip the USAFFE and the under-trained Philippine Commonwealth Army arrives. Somehow it could hinder the invasion.

Others suggested forming the PCA and PAAC much earlier in the 1930s and equipping them with the newest arms rather than WWI surplus.

The distance between the Philippines and Hawaii will always be the huge disadvantage while Japan was just in the backyard (China, Formosa, FIC, Carolines, etc.).

 

[MattII]

One way to turn PH around with limited input is for the B-17s that were supposed to arrive on December 7 to be delayed until a later date. That way, First Lieutenant Kermit Tyler would have called the approaching air formation in, giving a valuable early warning of the attack.

 

[Gillan1220]

One way to turn PH around with limited input is for the B-17s that were supposed to arrive on December 7 to be delayed until a later date. That way, First Lieutenant Kermit Tyler would have called the approaching air formation in, giving a valuable early warning of the attack.

Are the same B-17s that MacArthur was supposed to use against the invasion barges in Formosa which missed their target?

 

[MattII]

Are the same B-17s that MacArthur was supposed to use against the invasion barges in Formosa which missed their target?

No, they're the ones that were headed for Oahu on December 7, and for which the ill-trained Tyler mistook the Japanese force (because the operators didn't communicate the immense size of the force to him). If he knew there wasn't an inbound friendly flight that day he might well have been more wary.

 

[Gillan1220]

No, they're the ones that were headed for Oahu on December 7, and for which the ill-trained Tyler mistook the Japanese force (because the operators didn't communicate the immense size of the force to him). If he knew there wasn't an inbound friendly flight that day he might well have been more wary.

So the B-17s flew in the path of the Kido Butai and the carrier-launched planes?

 

[MattII]

So the B-17s flew in the path of the Kido Butai and the carrier-launched planes?

To within a few degrees (that few degrees being a perfectly acceptable navigational error due to the long over-water distance). And the flight was expected that morning, so the timing wasn't too badly off either. Even if the 40-odd minutes advanced warning had been whittled down to 5-10 minutes through bureaucracy, it would have meant far more guns manned, more ships prepared, aircraft towed out of line, and some in the air.

 

[Sekhmet_D]

One way to turn PH around with limited input is for the B-17s that were supposed to arrive on December 7 to be delayed until a later date. That way, First Lieutenant Kermit Tyler would have called the approaching air formation in, giving a valuable early warning of the attack.

Hopefully his report doesn't still get flippantly dismissed ("It's probably just a flock of birds, Kermit. Keep ya shirt on.").

 

[MattII]

Hopefully his report doesn't still get flippantly dismissed ("It's probably just a flock of birds, Kermit. Keep ya shirt on.").

Radar of this era doesn't pick up non-metallic objects. A large signature can only be a flight of aircraft.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Radar of this era doesn't pick up non-metallic objects. A large signature can only be a flight of aircraft.

Or a Thunderstorm cell. On Luzon on the 8th the radars operators interpreted a consistent return as a possible group of aircraft. They reported it to the Pursuit plane CP, which launched a large number of planes to reinforce the CAP. About a hour earlier the radar station/s had detected a small group of bombers that attacked auxiliary airfields over northern Luzon and there had been a large scramble of pursuit planes to reinforce the CAP then. Since the CAP was first stood up at dawn there had been repeated launches of fresh planes to rotate the CAP for refueling. Then two hasty scrambles to reinforce it, at 09:30 & again after 10:30 (times approximate here). Since the original alert around 02:00 the pursuit group pilots had been awake, flown at least one sortie, and some flown two, missed breakfast, and been subject to much confusion. The group had to little training in sustained CAP operations, and the other actions that morning, the commanders aloft and on the ground were strained, tired, hungry, and dealing with a complex ongoing operations. They'd also had in effect three false alarms, at dawn, 09:30, and 10:30. When orders came to land the reinforcements and rotate the CAP things finally broke down. All the pursuit flights landed & there was a assumption the operations were standing down. A short version would be everyone went to lunch.

This was the situation when the much delayed Japanese bomber force finally arrived midday. The radar operators reported the new contacts, but the Pursuit group had lost it is command and control. The climb rate of the US pursuit plane models present meant they needed to launch the instant the radar station warning came. Unfortunately most of the groups leaders and pilots never even knew the warning had been given until far too late.

Had the pursuit group, the air control station on the ground, the commanders and the radar operators even a few more weeks training. A half dozen exercises would have done it. Then some credible opposition could have been mounted. Even if just the breakdown in operations late morning had not occurred it would have not been a complete fiasco,

Costellos 'The Pacific War' has a brief but concise description of the actions and confusion within Beretons command that day. Including the best information on what time key decisions were made. Aside from the deterioration of the air defense after 10:00 there was the timing of the decision to bring the B17s & other bombers back from their orbit over Del Monte, the delay in obtaining air reconnaissance of Formosa, waiting on MacArthurs authorization to execute the existing plans.

 

[Butchpfd]

Perhaps the Pensacola Convoy arrives earlier than OTL. Meaning the arms need to equip the USAFFE and the under-trained Philippine Commonwealth Army arrives. Somehow it could hinder the invasion.

Others suggested forming the PCA and PAAC much earlier in the 1930s and equipping them with the newest arms rather than WWI surplus.

The distance between the Philippines and Hawaii will always be the huge disadvantage while Japan was just in the backyard (China, Formosa, FIC, Carolines, etc.).

The Pensacola Convoy would have to have left he Continental U.S. much earlier then it's actual November 27th departure. It would have to arrive in the Philippines by November 1st to even get unloaded and the aircraft assembled. That still leaves virtually no time to train or prepare. OTL when the convoy arrived in Brisbane, on December 22nd ,it still took a week to unload. OTL it took another week to combat load the convoy so troops and their equipment were on the same ship.

 

[Butchpfd]

Or a Thunderstorm cell. On Luzon on the 8th the radars operators interpreted a consistent return as a possible group of aircraft. They reported it to the Pursuit plane CP, which launched a large number of planes to reinforce the CAP. About a hour earlier the radar station/s had detected a small group of bombers that attacked auxiliary airfields over northern Luzon and there had been a large scramble of pursuit planes to reinforce the CAP then. Since the CAP was first stood up at dawn there had been repeated launches of fresh planes to rotate the CAP for refueling. Then two hasty scrambles to reinforce it, at 09:30 & again after 10:30 (times approximate here). Since the original alert around 02:00 the pursuit group pilots had been awake, flown at least one sortie, and some flown two, missed breakfast, and been subject to much confusion. The group had to little training in sustained CAP operations, and the other actions that morning, the commanders aloft and on the ground were strained, tired, hungry, and dealing with a complex ongoing operations. They'd also had in effect three false alarms, at dawn, 09:30, and 10:30. When orders came to land the reinforcements and rotate the CAP things finally broke down. All the pursuit flights landed & there was a assumption the operations were standing down. A short version would be everyone went to lunch.

This was the situation when the much delayed Japanese bomber force finally arrived midday. The radar operators reported the new contacts, but the Pursuit group had lost it is command and control. The climb rate of the US pursuit plane models present meant they needed to launch the instant the radar station warning came. Unfortunately most of the groups leaders and pilots never even knew the warning had been given until far too late.

Had the pursuit group, the air control station on the ground, the commanders and the radar operators even a few more weeks training. A half dozen exercises would have done it. Then some credible opposition could have been mounted. Even if just the breakdown in operations late morning had not occurred it would have not been a complete fiasco,

Costellos 'The Pacific War' has a brief but concise description of the actions and confusion within Beretons command that day. Including the best information on what time key decisions were made. Aside from the deterioration of the air defense after 10:00 there was the timing of the decision to bring the B17s & other bombers back from their orbit over Del Monte, the delay in obtaining air reconnaissance of Formosa, waiting on MacArthurs authorization to execute the existing plans.

The original alert went out much later. The first notification of the Pear Harbor attack was when Cavite Radio interecpted the 16th Naval District Message" Air Raid Pearl Harbor. This is No Drill" was at 0300 hours It was 0400 that General Brereton commander of the Far East AAC, was notified. 0430 Fighter squadrons were notified and in plane awaiting orders. Also the USAAC's standard patrol altitude was 15,000 feet, Japanese attack altitude from the 8th through the 10th was 20,000 feet.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

Radar of this era doesn't pick up non-metallic objects. A large signature can only be a flight of aircraft.

After Pearl Harbor, future RADM Dan Gallery became commander of the US Navy air station in Iceland. He had this relevant experience, recounted in his memoir Clear the Decks!

Though the war at sea was deadly, we had only one big air raid while I was in Iceland. On an Easter Sunday morning the sirens wailed their ominous warning, the fighters scrambled, and we rushed to our air defense stations. Word soon flashed over the command circuits from the Air Force H.Q.: "Estimate thirteen JU-88's crossing the coast headed for Reykjavik airdrome." For the next five minutes the radar warning net tracked the as yet unseen menace, keeping us constantly informed of developments.

We crouched outside my command post and scanned the eastern sky. Suddenly my orderly yelled, "Here they come!" pointing to a perfect V formation of tiny specks outlined against the blue.

...


However, as the specks drew closer it became apparent that something was happening which wasn't in the script. Those JU-88's were all flapping their wings very briskly. On a radar scope a flock of ducks at one thousand feet looks the same as a squadron of bombers at ten thousand.

NOTE: the original warning was not absurd. Not long after this event, a real Ju-88 was shot down over Iceland. The crew parachuted safely, and there was a heated dispute among the various bases and services over who got to capture the first Germans taken prisoner by US forces.

 

[MattII]

Huh, okay.

 

[Butchpfd]

Or a Thunderstorm cell. On Luzon on the 8th the radars operators interpreted a consistent return as a possible group of aircraft. They reported it to the Pursuit plane CP, which launched a large number of planes to reinforce the CAP. About a hour earlier the radar station/s had detected a small group of bombers that attacked auxiliary airfields over northern Luzon and there had been a large scramble of pursuit planes to reinforce the CAP then. Since the CAP was first stood up at dawn there had been repeated launches of fresh planes to rotate the CAP for refueling. Then two hasty scrambles to reinforce it, at 09:30 & again after 10:30 (times approximate here). Since the original alert around 02:00 the pursuit group pilots had been awake, flown at least one sortie, and some flown two, missed breakfast, and been subject to much confusion. The group had to little training in sustained CAP operations, and the other actions that morning, the commanders aloft and on the ground were strained, tired, hungry, and dealing with a complex ongoing operations. They'd also had in effect three false alarms, at dawn, 09:30, and 10:30. When orders came to land the reinforcements and rotate the CAP things finally broke down. All the pursuit flights landed & there was a assumption the operations were standing down. A short version would be everyone went to lunch.

This was the situation when the much delayed Japanese bomber force finally arrived midday. The radar operators reported the new contacts, but the Pursuit group had lost it is command and control. The climb rate of the US pursuit plane models present meant they needed to launch the instant the radar station warning came. Unfortunately most of the groups leaders and pilots never even knew the warning had been given until far too late.

Had the pursuit group, the air control station on the ground, the commanders and the radar operators even a few more weeks training. A half dozen exercises would have done it. Then some credible opposition could have been mounted. Even if just the breakdown in operations late morning had not occurred it would have not been a complete fiasco,

Costellos 'The Pacific War' has a brief but concise description of the actions and confusion within Beretons command that day. Including the best information on what time key decisions were made. Aside from the deterioration of the air defense after 10:00 there was the timing of the decision to bring the B17s & other bombers back from their orbit over Del Monte, the delay in obtaining air reconnaissance of Formosa, waiting on MacArthur's authorization to execute the existing plans.

Perhaps if MacArthur, had not sent General Brereton on a 12 day trip to check out bases in Mindanao, DEI, Malaya ,and Burma for 12 days after his Early November arrival. Brereton returned late on the 26th. Leaving him 13 days, to reorganize, train, plan operations, before war breaks out. As Army he was under Mac Arthur, who insisted that no matter the war warning, war would not come before April 1942.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

That was a common belief among the senior US leaders. Secretary of War Stimson had the same belief through October. It was not understood until late November that the negotiations were completely stalled. Hence the War Warning messages. The shipments to the Philippines were accelerated, and escorted convoys organized in November, because the possibility of war with Japan had ceased to be a distant abstract when the Japanese broke off negotiations.

 

[Butchpfd]

That was a common belief among the senior US leaders. Secretary of War Stimson had the same belief through October. It was not understood until late November that the negotiations were completely stalled. Hence the War Warning messages. The shipments to the Philippines were accelerated, and escorted convoys organized in November, because the possibility of war with Japan had ceased to be a distant abstract when the Japanese broke off negotiations.

The Navy had been planning on war sooner rather then later, since the Pannay sinking. Both Admirals Yarnell, CinC AF 1936-1939, and Admiral Hart, CinC AF 1939-1942 had been paying attention to Japanese actions, as well as reccomendations from their gunboats Captains, and the commander of the 4th Marines. Case in point. During the sumer and fall of 1940 all USN and USMC dependents were returned to Hawaii or the continental U.S. the U.S. Army sent their first batch of dependents to Hawaii on two transports on the 30th of November, escorted by the cruiser Louisville.

 

[muskeg13]

Perhaps if MacArthur, had not sent General Brereton on a 12 day trip to check out bases in Mindanao, DEI, Malaya ,and Burma for 12 days after his Early November arrival. Brereton returned late on the 26th. Leaving him 13 days, to reorganize, train, plan operations, before war breaks out. As Army he was under Mac Arthur, who insisted that no matter the war warning, war would not come before April 1942.

Part of Brereton's junket was to also visit Australia.
Marshall and the Army Planning Staff (and probably Stark and the USN war planners too) also played a role in the early Pacific debacle. Supposedly Marshall had doubts of both Short's and MacArthur's adherence to their assigned WP Orange directives and their preparations for looming hostilities. Army planners questioned both commanders' priorities, Marshall went as far as to have Brereton hand deliver a personal note from him to MacArthur, but there was no follow-up to ensure either was doing, or was going to do, what Washington required of them.

 

[prester.john208]

The Navy had been planning on war sooner rather then later, since the Pannay sinking. Both Admirals Yarnell, CinC AF 1936-1939, and Admiral Hart, CinC AF 1939-1942 had been paying attention to Japanese actions, as well as reccomendations from their gunboats Captains, and the commander of the 4th Marines. Case in point. During the sumer and fall of 1940 all USN and USMC dependents were returned to Hawaii or the continental U.S. the U.S. Army sent their first batch of dependents to Hawaii on two transports on the 30th of November, escorted by the cruiser Louisville.

In late 1941 they also moved the 4th Marines from China to the Philippines. The 15th infantry was moved in 1938 from China to Fort Lewis, Washington.

 

[Butchpfd]

In late 1941 they also moved the 4th Marines from China to the Philippines. The 15th infantry was moved in 1938 from China to Fort Lewis, Washington.

Yes ,the Marines and the 3 largest gunboats evacuated China, at the last minute. The Marines left by transport the last week in November arriving at Olonpogo(Subic Bay) on the 4th of December. the Gunboats left on the 1st of December and arrived between the 4th and 6th.
It is too bad that the 15th was sent stateside instead of being transferred to the Philippines.