BISMARCK & TIRPITZ cause Germany to lose the Battle of the Atlantic

[NOMISYRRUC]

None of these are of any relevance for U-Boats; one doesn't build a U-Boat or two U-Boats on a Class A/Battleship and Aircraft Carrier slip. Military shipbuilding isn't Tetris. I would also go so far as to say that anything in Class B/Large Cruisers and Light Carrier Slips is also not really what would be used. For a 220ft Type VII or 251ft Type IX, a 300ft-400ft long slip is ideal.

Except an important reason why so many large warships (light cruisers and above) were cancelled at the outbreak of World War II and why others took so long to complete or were never completed was that priority was given to the U-boat programme. So there must have been at least some overlap between the resources required to build U-boats and the resources used to build large warships.

That includes slipways. You've been given photographic evidence by @Dorknought. Another example is that the U-boat that had Ark Royal in its sights when it launched the air strike that sealed Bismarck's fate was built alongside Bismarck.

 

[Elfwine]

According to Kennedy in "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers" Japan built about 1,500 more aircraft than Great Britain (28,180 v 26,461) although GB built many more four-engine aircraft.

Looking at the table for the entire war:

In 1939 Britain built 7,940 aircraft to Japan's 4,467.
In 1940 Britain built 15,049 to Japan's 4,668.
In 1941 Britain built 20,094 to Japan's 5,088.
In 1942 Britain built 23,672 to Japan's 8,861.
In 1943 Britain built 26,263 to Japan's 16,693.
In 1944 Britain built 26,841 to Japan's 28,180.
In 1945 Britain built 12,070 to Japan's 11,066.

So in all but 1944 we see Britain (not counting the British Commonwealth) ahead of Japan, and in 1939-1943 by a pretty large margin.

I wouldn't say Japan and Britain weren't at all similar on any level, but I think the overall picture suggests more "different" than "similar".

 

[El Pip]

IIRC (and I'm confident that I do) Japan & Great Britain had similar steel making capacities.

Perhaps technically correct, but in a meaningless way. Japan built a lot of steel works that it had neither the ore, scrap or coal to run and so almost all of them sat idle. In terms of actual production of steel they were broadly flat across the entire period. If you built a steel works but it never produces any steel, was it ever actually 'capacity'?

In contrast the UK steel industry consistently actually produced twice as much steel as Japan despite losing access to some of it's pre-war iron ore supplies and having to replace imported ore with imported finished steel to economise on shipping.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

@ Japanese WW2 Production (or their mobilised capacity)

In the voice of Phillip Madoc "We will examine the list".

- 2 battleships, begun well before the war, so at best they get a Clayton's/Steve Bradbury level pass mark; no one apart from the US and British successfully built a battleship from go to woe after declaring war.

Great Britain 5 also begun well before the war. Japan only managed to lay down two 1937-38 and complete them 1941-42 which is only 40% of Britain's number, but the building times are about the same. Great Britain laid down 3 more 1939-41 of which 2 were scrapped on the slipway and one was completed in 1946. Japan laid down 2 more in 1940 of which one was scrapped on the slipway and another reached the launching stage albeit she was being converted as an aircraft carrier.

Therefore, 5:2 in Great Britain's favour 1937-42 and honours even 1942-45 because neither side completed a battleship in the second half of the war.

- ~6 escort carrier conversions.

Great Britain also had 6 escort carrier conversions. Therefore, honours even.

- 3-4 light carrier conversions

No British conversion but 6 Colossus class were completed before VJ-Day. That's 2:1 or 3:2 in Great Britain's favour.

- 5 aircraft carriers (Taiho, Shinano and 3 Unryus)

That's better than the 3 aircraft carriers (Implacable, Indefatigable & Unicorn) that Britain completed between Pearl Harbour and VJ-Day. This is 5:3 in Japan's favour.

- 5 cruisers

You got me on this one because Great Britain completed 16 cruisers between Pearl Harbour and VJ Day.

- 32 destroyers

It's a fair cop guv, you've got me banged to rights on this one too, because 108 fleet destroyers were completed by Great Britain between Pearl Harbour & VJ Day.

- 32 child-size destroyers/de facto DEs or frigates.

However, Japan wasn't anywhere near as far behind in destroyer escorts because Great Britain completed 46 between Pearl Harbour and VJ-Day.

- 174 kaibokan/corvettes.

184 corvettes, frigates & sloops were completed by Great Britain between 01.01.42 and 30.09.45. Virtually one-to-one.

- 43 first class submarines, 57 second class submarines.

Total 100 submarines. Great Britain completed 124 submarines between Pearl Harbour and VJ-Day. So the ratio's 4:5.

Now, this could well count as 'industry' or 'industrial capacity', no doubt.

Which compares rather favourably to Great Britain's output.

Japan can't count as comparable to Britain, either on the level of shipbuilding alone, or military industrial production (arms, armoured vehicles, aircraft and warships combined) or general industrial production. On that last category, Great Britain produced 224.3 million tons of coal, 17.7 million tonnes of iron ore, and 13 million tonnes of steel in 1940 compared to 56,587,000 tons of coal, 3,417,000 tons of pig iron and 6,855,000 tons of steel for Japan, before factoring in their respective empires.

Here we come to Japan's actual inferiority, which was even fewer domestic raw materials in the "Mother Country" than Great Britain. Japan began a 5-year expansion programme of its iron & steel industry in 1937 which gave it more pig iron and steel manufacturing capacity to use it, but they couldn't import enough high grade iron ore from Malaya & the Philippines to run it at full capacity.

This would suggest that apart from them both being generally categorised as industrialised island nations, they can't be readily viewed as equal or equivalent.

As far as warship construction goes it's closer than you think.

 

[Simon Darkshade]

Except an important reason why so many large warships (light cruisers and above) were cancelled at the outbreak of World War II and why others took so long to complete or were never completed was that priority was given to the U-boat programme.

Two M class were cancelled in 1939 after being laid down in 1938, as was Flugzeugträger B.

The two H class battlewagons were barely laid down before the war began.

Seydlitz had been launched and was 95% complete. Lutzow was flogged off to the Soviets.

Graf Zeppelin is what we could call a special case, stopping and starting.

The O class were not laid down. The P class were not laid down.

I wouldn’t say 5 is a lot.

So there must have been at least some overlap between the resources required to build U-boats and the resources used to build large warships.

I’ve never claimed that there is not. What the crux of this thread comes down to is that an overlap in resources doesn’t make for an easy interchange of resources and components.

That includes slipways. You've been given photographic evidence by @Dorknought.

One picture from WW1. My response to that, written before your post here, didn’t deny it was possible. I explicitly made a distinction between what could and should be done.

To employ another analogy, one can land a plane on some highways in some circumstances. That doesn’t mean that it is an advisable and consistent substitute for a real airfield.

Another example is that the U-boat that had Ark Royal in its sights when it launched the air strike that sealed Bismarck's fate was built alongside Bismarck.

I would assume you are talking about U-556? Laid down January 2 1940 at B&V, some time after Bismarck was launched in February 1939. That doesn’t suggest joint building time.

If it is another U-Boat, I’m sorry for the mistake; I’m not sure how the circumstance of U-556 serves as a branding reproach.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Perhaps technically correct, but in a meaningless way. Japan built a lot of steel works that it had neither the ore, scrap or coal to run and so almost all of them sat idle. In terms of actual production of steel they were broadly flat across the entire period. If you built a steel works but it never produces any steel, ...

Categorically factually correct and in a meaningful way. No Japanese steel works sat ide. Japan had the ore & coal to run them and increased its pig iron making capacity to compensate for the loss of imported scrap iron. What they didn't have was easy access to high grade iron ore so they had to use the low grade ore that was within easy reach. They didn't build steel works that never produced any steel, they built steel works that produced less steel than they could have, ...

... was it ever actually 'capacity'?

... it was ever actually "capacity"!

In contrast the UK steel industry consistently actually produced twice as much steel as Japan despite losing access to some of it's pre-war iron ore supplies and having to replace imported ore with imported finished steel to economise on shipping.

True and it shows what Japan could have achieved if it had taken adequate measures to protect its merchant shipping.

 

[Simon Darkshade]

In the voice of Phillip Madoc "We will examine the list".

A.) I have no idea who Phillip Madoc is. I also don’t know why you’ve chosen to take time out of your day to push this particular barrow in this thread/topic.

Great Britain 5 also begun well before the war. Japan only managed to lay down two 1937-38 and complete them 1941-42 which is only 40% of Britain's number, but the building times are about the same. Great Britain laid down 3 more 1939-41 of which 2 were scrapped on the slipway and one was completed in 1946. Japan laid down 2 more in 1940 of which one was scrapped on the slipway and another reached the launching stage albeit she was being converted as an aircraft carrier.

B.) That much is known and on the historical record

Great Britain also had 6 escort carrier conversions. Therefore, honours even.

C.) Here is where the nitpicking starts to come undone a bit. Britain didn’t build more because it absolutely couldn’t, but because it had the USA to build for them.

No British conversion but 6 Colossus class were completed before VJ-Day. That's 2:1 or 3:2 in Great Britain's favour.

That's better than the 3 aircraft carriers (Implacable, Indefatigable & Unicorn) that Britain completed between Pearl Harbour and VJ-Day. This is 5:3 in Japan's favour.

D.) Limiting the British ‘wartime period’ to between December 8 1941 and September 1945 isn’t the best comparison, as it cuts out all of 1940 and 1941 and the 1939 WEP. The same thing applies right down the list that you’ve chosen to make.

You got me on this one because Great Britain completed 16 cruisers between Pearl Harbour and VJ Day.

It's a fair cop guv, you've got me banged to rights on this one too, because 108 fleet destroyers were completed by Great Britain between Pearl Harbour & VJ Day.

E.) That’s the historical record; I’d refer to the issue of limited comparison times in D above.

With respect, I don’t have you bang to rights. You hadn’t said a single thing about Japanese shipbuilding in your previous contribution, nor was I in any way answering that post.

However, Japan wasn't anywhere near as far behind in destroyer escorts because Great Britain completed 46 between Pearl Harbour and VJ-Day.

F.) See D above, with the factor of another source of DEs (US) being available driving the lesser RN programme

184 corvettes, frigates & sloops were completed by Great Britain between 01.01.42 and 30.09.45. Virtually one-to-one.

G.) See F above, with the extra bonus of Canadian production.

Total 100 submarines. Great Britain completed 124 submarines between Pearl Harbour and VJ-Day. So the ratio's 4:5.

H.) Again, D

Which compares rather favourably to Great Britain's output.

I.) After we’ve put the figurative thumb on the scales to cut off 2.25 years of Britain’s war and set aside the reason for production choices

Here we come to Japan's actual inferiority, which was even fewer domestic raw materials in the "Mother Country" than Great Britain. Japan began a 5-year expansion programme of its iron & steel industry in 1937 which gave it more pig iron and steel manufacturing capacity to use it, but they couldn't import enough high grade iron ore from Malaya & the Philippines to run it at full capacity.

J.) As said, general industrial production isn’t comparable. The Japanese may have improved their capacity, but they were coming from a dashed way back.

As far as warship construction goes it's closer than you think.

K.) With respect, the closeness only comes from a very ‘literal’ comparison that sails in the same sea as pedantry and sets aside certain reasons for British production numbers, such as having already built certain ships or not having to shoulder the whole burden solo.

 

[Simon Darkshade]

They certainly had more in common than you appear to think.

I would note that the two quotes were from the OP/other fellow. What I think is that they have much in common, but commonality does not mean the same thing as being directly comparable.

IIRC (and I'm confident that I do) Japan & Great Britain had similar steel making capacities. The problem was that Japan couldn't produce at full capacity due to a shortage of iron ore.

I can dig out the relevant article on JSTOR that I referred to earlier for the original stats, but I believe that it was distinctly different, not similar.

Despite that Japan still built about 50% more merchant ships than Great Britain in 1944, IIRC about 1.6 million tons v about a million.

Why did Britain only build that much in that year? As said in the other replies, by excluding the context, you create an inaccurate level of similarity.

Japan also built more aircraft than Great Britain in 1944.

As the other chap has shown, it isn’t just about peak years; even if it were, there is a reason why Britain wound down its tank, aircraft and other arms production from 1943. That doesn’t mean the same thing as maximum or peak capacity.

Is the aim to be *technically* correct or to understand the context in which a point is made?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Looking at the table for the entire war:

In 1939 Britain built 7,940 aircraft to Japan's 4,467.
In 1940 Britain built 15,049 to Japan's 4,668.
In 1941 Britain built 20,094 to Japan's 5,088.
In 1942 Britain built 23,672 to Japan's 8,861.
In 1943 Britain built 26,263 to Japan's 16,693.
In 1944 Britain built 26,841 to Japan's 28,180.
In 1945 Britain built 12,070 to Japan's 11,066.

So in all but 1944 we see Britain (not counting the British Commonwealth) ahead of Japan, and in 1939-1943 by a pretty large margin.

Japan's production in 1945 wasn't that far behind Britain's, 1944's production shows what Japan was capable of when it's government put its mind to it and I think it's unfair to compare 1939-41 because Great Britain was fighting a world war & Japan wasn't.

I think it's fairer to split the production between 1939-41 when Japan wasn't fighting a world war and 1942-45 when it was. It shows that the UK took two or three years to get it's aircraft production up to speed and so did Japan.

I wouldn't say Japan and Britain weren't at all similar on any level, but I think the overall picture suggests more "different" than "similar".

Maybe we need to invent a word that means between different and similar.

 

[Simon Darkshade]

The word you are looking for is ‘analogous’.

In broad number terms, and by limiting the time spans to the most favourable for Japan, we can achieve some analogous statistics of solo Japanese and solo British production.

Japan’s 1944 wasn’t just a matter of its government putting its mind to it, although political will is one of many factors, but rather a function of many different issues, such as mobilisation, the types produced and more. Britain’s numbers weren’t a matter of will or absolute ceilings of capacities, but what was built out of many competing priorities.

1945 for Britain saw the process of demobilisation begin well before VE Day and this went fully into the realm of production.

It is a case of apples and oranges, ultimately. For everything they have in common, there is something that is different. For every factor that is subjective, there is one that is quite plain and objective. Of course, apples and oranges are broadly analogous - after all, they are both fruit, but as a generalisation, the Japanese orange is about 60% the size of the British apple.

Comparisons, like much in history, are rarely fair, but fairness is rarely the stuff of the world’s story. If a state has an ‘off the board’ advantage, that will influence what it builds for itself.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

D.) Limiting the British ‘wartime period’ to between December 8 1941 and September 1945 isn’t the best comparison, as it cuts out all of 1940 and 1941 and the 1939 WEP. The same thing applies right down the list that you’ve chosen to make.

The statistics you quoted for Japan's warship production were for the period between Pearl Harbour & VJ-Day so I did the same for Great Britain.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

A.) I have no idea who Phillip Madoc is. I also don’t know why you’ve chosen to take time out of your day to push this particular barrow in this thread/topic.

Philip Madoc (1934-2012) was an actor who specialised in playing villains including the U-boat captain in "Dad's Army" who said "When we get to France we will examine the list".

 

[Simon Darkshade]

Philip Madoc (1934-2012) was an actor who specialised in playing villains including the U-boat captain in "Dad's Army" who said "When we get to France we will examine the list".

I know that role and think I’ve seen him in some other stuff as well, but never knew the name. I’ve learnt something new today.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I.) After we’ve put the figurative thumb on the scales to cut off 2.25 years of Britain’s war and set aside the reason for production choices.

Again your figures for Japan didn't include 1939-41 for Japan so I didn't include them for Great Britain.

 

[Simon Darkshade]

The statistics you quoted for Japan's warship production were for the period between Pearl Harbour & VJ-Day so I did the same for Great Britain.

That is fair, although I’d note that the same post contained their 1930s production as well. I never chased down their 1940 production, which gives me something to do. The use of the term ‘mobilised capacity’ could be interpreted in a different fashion, which for Britain would include Sep 39-Dec 41.

I’d further note that Japan’s late 1930s naval programmes can’t really be classified as ‘peacetime’ in the same way as, for example, the German or British 1937 or 1938 programmes can be; Tokyo was in a shooting war at the time.

 

[Simon Darkshade]

Japanese Construction: The Middle Bits

Preface: Shokaku and Zuikaku were launched in 1939, not completed or commissioned, which properly shifts them to 1941. Mea culpa.

Amended 1939: Chikuma CA, 4 DD
1940: Katori CL, Kashima CL, 12 DD
1941: Shokaku CV, Zuikaku CV, Kashii CL, 5 DD

I’ll have to add the submarines when on my computer. This part was short, sharp and shiny enough, as the IJN didn’t have the same plethora of light surface combatants as other ‘analogous’ () fleets

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Japanese Construction: The Middle Bits

Preface: Shokaku and Zuikaku were launched in 1939, not completed or commissioned, which properly shifts them to 1941. Mea culpa.

FWIW.

• Shōkaku & Zuikaku were built under the 1937 Fleet Replenishment Programme, laid down 1937-38 and completed in 1941.
• Britain built Illustrious, Victorious, Formidable & Indomitable under its 1936-37 & 1937-38 Navy Estimates, laid them down in 1937 and completed them 1940-41. That's 4:2 in favour of Great Britain for the period when it was in World War II and Japan wasn't.

Add the 3 completed by Great Britain 1942-45 and the 5 completed by Japan 1942-45 and the totals are 7 for Great Britain & 8 for Japan in the period 03.09.39 to 15.08.45.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

E.) That’s the historical record; I’d refer to the issue of limited comparison times in D above.

With respect, I don’t have you bang to rights. You hadn’t said a single thing about Japanese shipbuilding in your previous contribution, nor was I in any way answering that post.

FWIW on that occasion "banged to rights" meant that on this type of warship Great Britain out built Japan considerably. It's even larger if 03.09.39 to Pearl Harbour is added because Japan didn't complete any cruisers in that period and Great Britain completed 13. Therefore, for the whole of World War II Great Britain completed 29 cruisers and Japan only 5 which is nearly 6:1 more. I'm not counting the Katori class training ships.

 

[Simon Darkshade]

The devil is in the detail, or in this case, holidaying in the context.

On the surface level, we have as you suggest
Britain: Illustrious, Victorious, Formidable, Indomitable, Implacable, Indefatigable and Unicorn (7)
Japan: Shokaku and Zuikaku, Taiho, Shinano, Unryu, Amagi, Katsuragi

Shinano: Chopped, changed and then sunk whilst pressed into service as an Ohka transport without ever completing her fitting out
Unryu: Worked up, did some training, served as a flagship for 8 days, then sunk transporting Ohkas/Baka bombs
Amagi and Katsuragi: Never had an air group directly assigned, nor did they go to sea in active service/'in anger'. Sunk in the Attack on Kure without ever entering service in more than a nominal way

Edit: Sorry for the edit here, but there is a decent point to make that the British also had a number of carriers, fleet and light, that were suspended and completed more sedately postwar, laid up or scrapped wholesale. This is a different paradigm to Japan, which had but 3 'aviation ships' in the same category

Now, there is no presumption that a carrier has to 'effectively' enter service, but it might be fair to say that the final 4 Japanese carriers were only completed in name only. The raw numbers paint one picture; the context another.

 

[Simon Darkshade]

FWIW on that occasion "banged to rights" meant that on this type of warship Great Britain out built Japan considerably. It's even larger if 03.09.39 to Pearl Harbour is added because Japan didn't complete any cruisers in that period and Great Britain completed 13. Therefore, for the whole of World War II Great Britain completed 29 cruisers and Japan only 5 which is nearly 6:1 more. I'm not counting the Katori class training ships.

My meaning was that I would have had you bang to rights if the original point had been addressed in your general direction, or indeed just plopped out there in the thread for open slather; it just seemed a post facto assumption of the mantle of challenge, as it were, when none was offered.

We could go on like this all night on the individual elements of my reply or your reply, so how about this as heading it off at the pass:

In some particular areas, Japanese naval construction in a nominal sense is analogous to that of Britain. However, as a whole and as a generalised statement, they aren't really comparable. They peaked at different times, in different circumstances and operated under different limitations and reasoning.

It might just save us some time, rather than rehashing things point by point to reach the conclusion that Britain between 1939 and 1945 outbuilt Japan in battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, escorts, fleet submarines, minesweepers, landing craft and tea cosies.