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The Punic War: the Italian Theatre.
Years 6 to 12 of Alexandros Eupatōr Theos.
(244 B.C – 238 B.C.)
“He who gives himself airs of importance exhibits the credentials of impotence.” [/FONT]-- Latin proverb.
Meanwhile, the war in the western theatre has reached an essential stalemate. The weakened Argead navy has been attempting to regroup at Syrakousai under the command of its new satrapēs and navarkhos, Mithridatēs, a noblemen of both Persian and Greek blood. Between the years 244 B.C. and 242 B.C. Mithridatēs has spent most of his time rebuilding the fleet in Sikilia, aided mostly by Carthaginian ships sent on loan from King Lysimakhos II, his own position in on the western seas temporarily secure since the Roman defeat at Emporion in 246 B.C. The loss of Hellas to revolt, however, has greatly crippled the navarkhos’ efforts, forcing him to rely all the more on both supplies and sailors sent from Syria.
The losses sustained at Kerkyra have further necessitated a temporary shift of Argead focus to the Tyrrhenian and Iōnian seas in order to prevent any Roman invasion of Sikilia. This has only contributed greatly to Lepidus’ successes in the Balkans, as it has meant abandoning their ambitions in the Adriatic Sea. However, Mithridatēs own foresight has been instrumental in the preservation of Argead control of Sikilia. After only receiving meager reinforcements in 243 B.C., due to Queen Berenikē’s preoccupation with the Balkan war, the satrapēs has instead managed to ally himself closer with the Carthaginians, securing over 25,000 troops from King Lysimakhos, mostly consisting of Iberian and Berber mercenaries, all sent on loan to protect the king’s own personal interests there. The defeat of the Roman fleet off the coast of Locri in late September, 243 B.C. manages to recapture much of the Argead navy’s former glory and prevent any future attempts at a Roman invasion of Sikilia for the time being. Mithridatēs has proven himself a competent admiral and a force to be reckoned with.
In January, 242 B.C., the King of Karkhēdōn himself arrives in Sikilia with a force of some 60,000, including over sixty war elephants. Mithridatēs and King Lysimakhos then begin preparing for the long awaited Italian campaign. In April, 242 B.C., the allied forces, now amounting to over 80,000 soldiers, cross the straight of Calabria, landing at Rhegium.
The invasion of the Carthaginians and their Argead allies from Sikilia sends waves of panic throughout Italia. All at once, the constant stream of good news being sent from the warfront in Makedonia becomes of little consequence. The Senate, however, has been worrying about the possibility of such an invasion for some time now, having perceived the growing threat of Sikilia to Roman security in Italia. Now faced with a crisis, the Senate confirms the former consul L. Valerius Flaccus as dictator, placing him in command of nine legions and over 20,000 auxiliaries, mostly sent by those Gallic, Pannonian, and Veneti tribes allied with the Republic, along with Rome’s new Greek allies.
Flaccus confronts the invading Carthaginians near Thurii in July. Despite King Lysimakhos’ own youth and inexperience as a military commander, Mithridatēs manages to take charge and prove himself an able general on the battlefield, emerging as the de facto commander of the Argead-Lysimachead army. Using the king’s war elephants to a devastating effect against the unprepared Roman infantry, scattering their advance and throwing the Romans into disarray. Flaccus is forced to retreat north or risk heavy losses, allowing Mithridatēs to occupy the whole of Megalē Hellas, where he and King Lysimakhos opt to winter.
In Roma, the defeat has been received with great unease by both the Senate and people. Upon the expiration of his term as dictator in October, Flaccus is not nominated by the consuls for a second term. Meanwhile, the superstitious senate orders the Sibylline Books to be consulted, hoping to appease the gods of Roma. The college of priests who oversee the interpretation and the preservation of the sacred books announce that great sacrifice must take place. Thus, in November, in the middle of the Forum Romanus, four men are buried alive in offering—two Gauls and two Greeks. It is in the aftermath of this grim spectacle of hope that the people elect as consuls P. Cornelius Scipio and C. Caecilius Metellus, both of whom are given joint command of the legions formerly assigned to Flaccus. In the spring, the consuls march south, hoping to block the enemy advance in the Oscan country of the south.
Engaging the enemy at Luceria in August, 241 B.C. Scipio at first begins to gain the upper hand, even when faced with the advancing African elephants of King Lysimakhos. However while the consul desires to hold his ground with his adequate force of legionaries, his less capable partner, Metellus, insists on breaking the Carthaginian lines with his cavalry when it appears that the enemy has begun to fall back, ordering a series of direct attacks. Mithridatēs, however, has no intention of retreating, and has instead managed to lure the Romans into attacking, in order to more effectively wear down their infantry, mimicking the tactics of the late Artabazos in Thrakē to startling success. In the end, Metellus’ mistake costs him not only his own life, but those of 22,000 of his men in one of the worst defeats in Roman history.
Instead of retreating west to Roma, however, Scipio instead moves north, into the eastern reaches of Sabinium, hoping to lure Mithridatēs away from Roma and keeping his position east of the Apennines for the winter. His ploy manages to work, and, engaging in series of light skirmishes with the Carthaginian-Argead army, he is able to win a series of quick, indecisive victories in the fall of 241 B.C., using the element of surprise and his familiarity with the Italian terrain against his foes. The success which Scipio enjoys using his guerrilla tactics, though minor, is nevertheless seen as the first real victory in the Italian theatre since the war’s commencement. Indeed, it is enough to ensure Scipio’s appointment after the expiration of his consular term in January, 240 B.C.
Meanwhile, King Lysimakhos is determined to pursue Scipio and defeat him upon the battlefield, his recent antagonism and its success having greatly infuriated the king. King Lysimakhos himself, young and restless, desires glory on the battlefield, and sees final defeat of Scipio as a way to achieve this. For the first time in the entire campaign, the king ignores the advice of Mithridatēs, opting to winter at Hadria in pursuit of Scipio, instead of crossing the Apennines, taking Capua and invading Latium in the spring, now left mostly undefended.
Scipio’s position, now anchored in Umbria for the winter, is further strengthened in April, 240 B.C., when four legions sent by Lepidus arrive from Thessaly via Ancona. In May, he is informed by his scouts that King Lysimakhos and Mithridatēs are marching northeast. Knowing that King Lysimakhos is making to cross the Apennines—a perilous decision considering the fact that he is risking many of his war elephants by doing so—Scipio moves north, ready to block their crossing and head them off before they can even enter the western reaches of the peninsula.
At the Futa pass, near Arretium, on May 30, 240 B.C. Scipio and his forces meet the Lysimachead and Argead forces, taking the defensive and blocking their crossing. Using the narrow pass to his advantage, Scipio forces Mithridatēs to attempt to smash through the tight defensive lines of the Roman infantry, an almost impossible task. Further, location of the battle ensure that the Carthaginian’s war elephants cannot be used. Having managed to destroy a great deal of Mithridatēs’ cavalry and heavy infantry, Scipio then advances, cutting down the Carthaginians where they stand and smashing through their narrow lines. His own advance blocked, Mithridatēs advises King Lysimakhos to retreat east, or face annihilation. The king promptly agrees, attempting to flee the battle with most of his remaining forces intact.
Scipio and his men, however, do not intend to allow a clean retreat. Instead, they continue their assault as King Lysimakhos and his soldiers attempt to lead a retreat, causing mass chaos. The result is a disaster for the Carthaginians and a clear Roman victory. In all, nearly 48,000 Carthaginians die in both the battle and orchestrated retreat over the Apennines, many falling to their deaths in an attempt to evade being killed by Scipio’s men. The defeat is one of the most devastating in Carthaginian history.
Their retreat south cut off by Scipio in the summer, King Lysimakhos and Mithridatēs are forced to winter with their forces at Ariminium. With only a little over 33,000 remaining soldiers and twenty war elephants, the prospects open to the two men and their armies are slim. The only remaining options open to them are a retreat south to Sikilia or taking the long road north over the Alps, to the city-state of Massalia, a Carthaginian ally since the Iberian Wars in 258 B.C. While both are equally dangerous, the trek south is seen as one of certain death, and thus, with little other options available, the remains of the Lysimachead-Argead allied force are thus compelled to march north, into the wilds of Gallia Cisalpina.
Thus, while Scipio, hailed as imperator by his troops after the battle of Futa Pass, is granted a triumph upon his return to Roma, the battle weary Carthaginians make the dangerous march across the Alps in the spring of 239 B.C., having wintered at Cremona. The venture is difficult, and by the time they reach the Greek city of Massalia in November, they have lost over 7,000 men and nearly all their remaining war elephants. In the spring of 238 B.C., Mithridatēs returns to Sikilia with what remains of his forces, while King Lysimakhos sails for Aphrikē, hoping to muster further mercenaries and regroup.
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