CGNs (DLGNs) for CVN America and JFK?

Riain

Banned
So as not to hijack this thread on USN Kirovs.

It's possible to align USN CGNs with the nuclear carrier they were meant to escort, for the most part. The Long Beach and Bainbridge for Enterprise, California's with the Nimitz and the Virginia's with the Ike and Vinson. The Truxton doesn't neatly fit into this category, commissioning in 1967, but was basically sent to work the Enterprise's nuclear group.

What if, as per earlier plans the USS America made her a repeat of the Enterprise commissioning in 1965 and the JFK a CVN with A3W reactors commissioning in 1968; what CGNs would be built to escort them?

Obviously the Truxtun fits the bill in terms of time, but like Bainbridge she was a nuclear adaptation of a conventional (Belknap) DLG class. Would the USN build another Truxtun, or 2 or 3?

Or perhaps with CVNs looking to be the way of the future they start along the California/Virginia route of mass produced nuclear powered surface ships 5 or 6 years sooner than OTL. But what would such ships be armed with?
 
The problem is that, at the time, the continuation of CGN and DLGN production was tied at the hip to the Typhon Combat System, and the justified demise of Typhon is what led to the major gap in surface combatant production between Truxtun and the Sprucans and California/Virginia DLGNs.

Making JFK and America nuclear doesn't solve this problem. Typhon was just too damn expensive and completely beyond the technology of the time.
 
Just between the America and the JFK the USN would be adding 12 more reactor plants. The Californias and the Virginias each had 2 reactors. That’s a crap ton of nuclear operators. For the carriers about 250 per plant. About half that for each cruiser. A SSN has about 45, SSBN 90 (2 crews). That’s 1500 more nukes, 12-? more cores, depending on number of CGNs. I don’t think the nuclear system in the US could have handled the extra manning, fuel, construction, extra cost (isn’t cost why the JFK was made conventional?), repair facilities (only certain shipyards can work on nuclear plants), etc. Interesting idea, but nuclear ships are just crazy expensive. Navy nukes are impossible to keep in. They always have the highest reenlistment bonuses in the military.
 

Riain

Banned
The problem is that, at the time, the continuation of CGN and DLGN production was tied at the hip to the Typhon Combat System, and the justified demise of Typhon is what led to the major gap in surface combatant production between Truxtun and the Sprucans and California/Virginia DLGNs.

Making JFK and America nuclear doesn't solve this problem. Typhon was just too damn expensive and completely beyond the technology of the time.

The Belknap/Truxtun was the last 3T ship class, ordered in 1961/22 and laid down in 1962/63.
The Typhoon was cancelled in November 1963 and the Standard MR SM1 entered service in Tartar Fire Control ships from 1968.
The California was ordered in June 1968 laid down in 1970 as the first Standard warship.

Given the close time-frame between ordering the Truxtun/Belknap, cancelling the Typhoon and the entry into service of the Standard there shouldn't be a significant technical reason why a new ship class could be designed with Standards for entry into service by the late 60s for the nuclear JFK. I'd imagine a 2nd Truxtun be built to provide nuclear America.

Just for interest sake were there any ships designed around the Typhoon?
 
Given the close time-frame between ordering the Truxtun/Belknap, cancelling the Typhoon and the entry into service of the Standard there shouldn't be a significant technical reason why a new ship class could be designed with Standards for entry into service by the late 60s for the nuclear JFK. I'd imagine a 2nd Truxtun be built to provide nuclear America.
Those were the Californias. But not only did the ships suffer a somewhat torturous design cycle due to being initially designed as Mark 13-armed DDGs but winding up so big they were redone as nuclear DLGNs, but McNamara was vehemently opposed to them and though Congress was willing to fund the two ships it still took two years to wrangle authorization for their construction out of him.

Just for interest sake were there any ships designed around the Typhoon?
Plenty! A variety of nuclear and conventionally-powered CGs and DLGs were drawn up, as well as some conventional DDGs.
 

Riain

Banned
Just between the America and the JFK the USN would be adding 12 more reactor plants. The Californias and the Virginias each had 2 reactors. That’s a crap ton of nuclear operators. For the carriers about 250 per plant. About half that for each cruiser. A SSN has about 45, SSBN 90 (2 crews). That’s 1500 more nukes, 12-? more cores, depending on number of CGNs. I don’t think the nuclear system in the US could have handled the extra manning, fuel, construction, extra cost (isn’t cost why the JFK was made conventional?), repair facilities (only certain shipyards can work on nuclear plants), etc. Interesting idea, but nuclear ships are just crazy expensive. Navy nukes are impossible to keep in. They always have the highest reenlistment bonuses in the military.

In the mid-late 60s there were 8 carrier, 2 cruiser and 4 destroyer naval reactors and some 70 submarine reactors, some 84 in total. ITTL there would be an extra 18 reactors for 102 in total, a touch over a 20% increase. This is a jump for sure but surely not beyond the reach of the USN if it was deemed to be important enough.
 

Riain

Banned
Those were the Californias. But not only did the ships suffer a somewhat torturous design cycle due to being initially designed as Mark 13-armed DDGs but winding up so big they were redone as nuclear DLGNs, but McNamara was vehemently opposed to them and though Congress was willing to fund the two ships it still took two years to wrangle authorization for their construction out of him.


Plenty! A variety of nuclear and conventionally-powered CGs and DLGs were drawn up, as well as some conventional DDGs.

So if the America and JFK were nuclear and pollies agreed needed nuclear escorts could the California's enter service by 1970?

Edit: IOTL the California's were the start of 'series production' of nuclear powered surface escorts, if they were built 5 or 6 years earlier could series production gather enough momentum to keep the nuclear power cruiser programme continue past 1975?
 
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. I don’t think the nuclear system in the US could have handled the extra manning, fuel, construction, extra cost (isn’t cost why the JFK was made conventional?), repair facilities (only certain shipyards can work on nuclear plants), etc. Interesting idea, but nuclear ships are just crazy expensive. Navy nukes are impossible to keep in. They always have the highest reenlistment bonuses in the military.
Then maybe the USN would do what more recent entrants into Naval nuclear propulsion fields have done, like France, China, India, which is to use the infrastucture of the civilian nuclear industry to undertake most of the basic training of the "Nuke" and only do advanced type specific training in hojuse.
 
Then maybe the USN would do what more recent entrants into Naval nuclear propulsion fields have done, like France, China, India, which is to use the infrastucture of the civilian nuclear industry to undertake most of the basic training of the "Nuke" and only do advanced type specific training in hojuse.
I don't think the training is the difficult bit. I mean, it is expensive, but it's cheap compared to the cost of NOT having trained nuclear plant operators! The problem is keeping them once they've been trained, because they can earn much more, in much more pleasant environments, if they leave the navy and take their highly-valuable skills to a civilian employer.
 

Riain

Banned
Then maybe the USN would do what more recent entrants into Naval nuclear propulsion fields have done, like France, China, India, which is to use the infrastucture of the civilian nuclear industry to undertake most of the basic training of the "Nuke" and only do advanced type specific training in hojuse.

I don't know about China and India but France's naval reactors use low enriched uranium, unlike US, Soviet and British naval reactors which use highly enriched uranium. However I don't know if that makes it more compatible with civilian nuclear industry because these naval reactors used curved 'caramel' reactor plates more suitable for naval use.
 
A reactor is a reactor (well not really), and civilians will be able to get a lot more people through the basics (and screen out those unsuitable) than their Naval counterparts, who can then concentrate on more advanced and type dependant training.
 
So if the America and JFK were nuclear and pollies agreed needed nuclear escorts could the California's enter service by 1970?

Edit: IOTL the California's were the start of 'series production' of nuclear powered surface escorts, if they were built 5 or 6 years earlier could series production gather enough momentum to keep the nuclear power cruiser programme continue past 1975?
Not with Vietnam raging at the time.
 
In the mid-late 60s there were 8 carrier, 2 cruiser and 4 destroyer naval reactors and some 70 submarine reactors, some 84 in total. ITTL there would be an extra 18 reactors for 102 in total, a touch over a 20% increase. This is a jump for sure but surely not beyond the reach of the USN if it was deemed to be important enough.
20% would be a huge increase. The land based training reactors (NPTU) are built and manned to handle exactly what the USN needs. There is only a very slight buffer built in for unplanned outages. I was also discussing infrastructure. Only so many people can build Navy reactors. There is only one company that makes fuel assemblies for the Navy. It’s not easy manufacturing more highly enriched uranium for them.
A reactor is a reactor (well not really), and civilians will be able to get a lot more people through the basics (and screen out those unsuitable) than their Naval counterparts, who can then concentrate on more advanced and type dependant training.
As someone who has done both, this is not correct. They are vastly different. Civilian reactors are designed to be thermally efficient. Navy ones are not. Navy reactors are simple compared to civilian ones. Then there is Rickover. He would have told Congress to go f themselves. Only his people, trained by his methods, could operate his reactors.
 
20% would be a huge increase. The land based training reactors (NPTU) are built and manned to handle exactly what the USN needs. There is only a very slight buffer built in for unplanned outages. I was also discussing infrastructure. Only so many people can build Navy reactors. There is only one company that makes fuel assemblies for the Navy. It’s not easy manufacturing more highly enriched uranium for them.
That gives away the game, doesn't it, though? If the Navy's training regime is right-sized for its needs -- as you state -- then it's a (relatively) simple matter to enlarge the training establishment to accommodate a 20% increase. It'll take time and money, and likely buckets full of the latter if we're talking about needing to expand the capabilities of single-source, limited-volume producers, but it's organizationally and technically doable.

Then there is Rickover. He would have told Congress to go f themselves. Only his people, trained by his methods, could operate his reactors.
This is, I think, going to be the real bottleneck. Especially in the context of Vietnam. The Navy can certainly find the necessary bodies who are physically and intellectually capable of filling the additional reactor-related billets. Whether it can find enough to also pass Rickover's muster amidst the manpower pressures of Vietnam is another question entirely.
 
20% would be a huge increase. The land based training reactors (NPTU) are built and manned to handle exactly what the USN needs. There is only a very slight buffer built in for unplanned outages. I was also discussing infrastructure. Only so many people can build Navy reactors. There is only one company that makes fuel assemblies for the Navy. It’s not easy manufacturing more highly enriched uranium for them.
Well you do have the timeframe to consider, this decision has to be made no later than 1960, at this time there is explosive growth in naval nuclear power, considering there were no naval nuclear reactors afloat before 1955, the growth in infrastructure to support the creation of the nuclear fleet is still ongoing. So the infrastructure is still under construction, if not still in planning, so building it to a larger capacity is easier now than later
 
That gives away the game, doesn't it, though? If the Navy's training regime is right-sized for its needs -- as you state -- then it's a (relatively) simple matter to enlarge the training establishment to accommodate a 20% increase. It'll take time and money, and likely buckets full of the latter if we're talking about needing to expand the capabilities of single-source, limited-volume producers, but it's organizationally and technically doable.


This is, I think, going to be the real bottleneck. Especially in the context of Vietnam. The Navy can certainly find the necessary bodies who are physically and intellectually capable of filling the additional reactor-related billets. Whether it can find enough to also pass Rickover's muster amidst the manpower pressures of Vietnam is another question entirely.
It’s not easy at all. At the time Nuclear Power School was a small thing in Bainbridge, Maryland and Mare Island. NPTUs were limited to Idaho, Ballston Spa, NY, and Windsor, CT. You would have to add more land based reactors to get more students through. This would be in addition to the new reactors you’re trying to put in the new ships. Then you would need more instructors. Instructors are qualified people from the fleet. Instructors are further limited by having to have been in the upper half of their classes at Nuke School and NPTU. Since the USN started nuclear power manning has been one of their biggest issues. It’s not that easy to find the people motivated and intelligent enough to pass the program and then stay in for a while. It’s not an easy job.
 
It’s not easy at all. At the time Nuclear Power School was a small thing in Bainbridge, Maryland and Mare Island. NPTUs were limited to Idaho, Ballston Spa, NY, and Windsor, CT. You would have to add more land based reactors to get more students through. This would be in addition to the new reactors you’re trying to put in the new ships. Then you would need more instructors. Instructors are qualified people from the fleet. Instructors are further limited by having to have been in the upper half of their classes at Nuke School and NPTU. Since the USN started nuclear power manning has been one of their biggest issues. It’s not that easy to find the people motivated and intelligent enough to pass the program and then stay in for a while. It’s not an easy job.
I didn't say it would be easy. Merely (relatively) simple. It's going to require significant expansions of the training pipeline and the creation of scads of new facilities and billets, which will reverberate around the fleet as pressures are faced to either pull folks to fill them on-shore or you loosen instructor and/or operator qualifications. But, for an organization as big and complicated as the U.S. Navy -- to say nothing of the wider Pentagon -- it's a problem that can be solved by throwing money and administrators at the problem. Getting the money required is a different question entirely. As is, for that matter, whether it's a good idea.
 
This is, I think, going to be the real bottleneck. Especially in the context of Vietnam. The Navy can certainly find the necessary bodies who are physically and intellectually capable of filling the additional reactor-related billets. Whether it can find enough to also pass Rickover's muster amidst the manpower pressures of Vietnam is another question entirely.
Would the Vietnam War era/draft not make finding people willing to sign on for navy reactor qualifications not be if anything easier? Even if it screws the rest of the services, getting good officer material.....?
 
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