Could Yamamoto have pulled off an even more devastating PH attack?

[steel_captain]

ships could not mix oil grades in their storage tanks, and oil stored in barrels might not have been the same as the fuel oil aboard a ship. Thus, 2nd Division poured the oil directly from the barrels into the furnaces so that the barreled oil was not mixed in with the ship's regular fuel.

I don't know if this is entirely accurate. As long as we are discussing residual (bunker) fuel oil, mixing it would not prove problematic even if there were differences in the fractions remaining in it. It was when the IJN was bunkering their ships with unrefined crude in Borneo when they had big problems.

I am also highly sceptical of pouring fuel into a boiler's furnace. It must be atomized through burners to get any heat out of it because that combustion chamber is pressuring by force draft air. Take out the burners and you must shut down the blowers which makes for a very cold fire. Possibly they rigged pumps to take oil straight from the drums to the burners?

 

[Alien and Sedition Bat]

If course it is but it is just a hypothetical scenario put forth to be discussed and debated. Why have an ATL history forum if you aren't going to propose "alternative" histories?

Let's deconstruct this message. The OP received devastating counter arguments about his earlier scenario in which Nazi u-boats force the Brits to surrender.. He dropped that debate, for the most part, acknowledging that he couldn't win people over. A couple of fans tried to press his argument but were also refuted. Now the OP is back with a new scenario in which the Japanese crush the U.S. with an exaggerated version of Pearl Harbor. In my opinion this all represents a politicizing of the history of World War Two that goes way beyond good faith discussion and debate of alternatives. "Why have an ATL history forum if you aren't going to propose 'alternative' history? " the OP asks. Read his question twice. He is trying to put the focus on his own rigid and absurd scenarios as if, without them, alternate history shouldn't exist.

The issue isn't that a particular scenario provides some advantages to the Axis. There are many legitimate scenarios in which the OP presents a POD that gives strong advantages to the Axis (and even allows them to win and thus make a cautionary tale about strategy) but is open to counteraction by the Allies so that the Axis victory is not preordained. But this OP has tried to devise things so that the POD is a disguised ASB intervention (the Allies are incapable of effective counteraction). He can then have an answer for any objection and the heroic super-clever Axis ultimately wins.

This is very different from the many AH novels in which the Nazis, Communists and other villains win so that the author can highlight the defects of such systems (as in Nineteen Eighty-Four) and portray people as being horrifyingly victimized and desperately fighting back. That is art. What happens sometimes on this forum, especially in relationship to World War Two strategy, is a cynical attempt to impose fantasies about Axis victory. This was done sometimes, but not always, with Sea Lion scenarios. Now we have elaborate new scenarios that wisely sidestep the absurdity of hundreds of canal barges crossing the Channel without being sunk by the wakes created by British destroyers. These new scenarios are not better; they are just newer.

 

[CV12Hornet]

The Japanese battleships were all rebuilt in the 1930's and had modern machinery. Wiki credits the Nagatos at 8650nm @ 16kt on about 6,000 tons, and Yamashiro at over 11,000nm on 5,200 tons. These numbers are in the ball park of 'unrefueled' mission, especially if an additional 1,500 tons of barreled oil could be carried. There were fears on the lighter built warships that doing this might stress their hulls, but I'm assuming the battleships had strong hulls.

I would be skeptical of the figure for Yamashiro. Parshall and Tully are, for the sensible reason that that would make the ships with the oldest and most worn-out machinery (the Fusos started reconstruction years before the rest of Japan’s battle fleet) the most fuel-efficient, which doesn’t pass the smell test.

 

[steel_captain]

He is trying to put the focus on his own rigid and absurd scenarios as if, without them, alternate history shouldn't exist.

Cry me a river...both threads you complain so bitterly about have gotten many responses and that to me means they resonate and the responses aren't just hate mail attacking me personally like you are. If I get it wrong as I did in the B&T thread I quit hammering my scenario down the throats of others. Maybe not with the grovelling mea culpa you want from me but I do know when to let it go, however I am not at that point yet in this thread so I am not sorry to make you feel so upset

 

[Elfwine]

This issue isn't that a particular scenario provides some advantages to the Axis. There are many legitimate scenarios in which the OP presents a POD that gives strong advantages to the Axis (and even allows them to win and thus make a cautionary tale about strategy) but is open to counteraction by the Allies so that the Axis victory is not preordained. But this OP has tried to devise things so that the POD is a disguised ASB intervention (the Allies are incapable of effective counteraction). He can then have an answer for any objection and the heroic super-clever Axis inevitably wins.

I do want to say here as me that an ASB intervention - past issues on what subforum to use - is not inherently wrong. But alternate history discussion involves discussing the scenarios put forward, however fanciful or grounded they may be, and waving aside objections to if say it would actually produce the "utter destruction of the US Pacific fleet" to do X instead of Y gets in the way of that.

 

[Blue cat]

No way as it ends up 4 16" on Oahu vs. 16 16" offshore and 2 14" on Oahu vs. 32 14" offshore plus aircraft to divebomb these coastal batteries. Also, which guns can be elevated the highest and have the highest sustained rates of fire? I believe the IJN BBs win on this one as well so should be able to outrange any shore battery counterfire. Regarding any USN BBs in PH trying to lob shells at the Japanese, most all can only use their forward turrets and with many they will have ships directly ahead of them they need to fire over. Anyway, who will be spotting because their gun directors won't be able to be used?

I’m thinking the IJN would likely want to close the range to stretch their available ammo supplies as far as they can ?

 

[YYJ]

I’m thinking the IJN would likely want to close the range to stretch their available ammo supplies as far as they can ?

I would think so too. Which puts the Kongos in particular in danger.

 

[Glenn239]

I would be skeptical of the figure for Yamashiro. Parshall and Tully are, for the sensible reason that that would make the ships with the oldest and most worn-out machinery (the Fusos started reconstruction years before the rest of Japan’s battle fleet) the most fuel-efficient, which doesn’t pass the smell test.

The figures given for the Japanese battleships are not out of line for US battleships with even older machinery. Here,

HyperWar: War Service Fuel Consumption of US Naval Surface Vessels [BB]

Take for example the BB45 Class. They could carry 5,300 tons of oil and this was good for 40 days steaming at 14kt. So the USS Maryland could have performed the mission unrefueled with about as much fuel as the Yamashiro carried.

 

[YYJ]

Now the OP is back with a new scenario in which the Japanese crush the U.S. with an exaggerated version of Pearl Harbor.

I don't get that sense at all. If anything this scenario is a way for the Japanese to get the same outcome as OTL Pearl Harbour, at a much greater cost to themselves. The more I think about the "Why?" of this scenario, the more it seems like the POD would come from the Battleship admirals threatening to block the mission unless they get to have a Kantai Kessen. If the US Pacific fleet battle line was sunk in deep water, which is no way certain the way the variables of this thread are going, there might be more dead US sailors, but the Standard battleships involved would still be unavailable for the first part of the war, just like OTL. Which was the Japanese motive OTL in my reading. To give them freedom of action in the South Seas. Same Same.

 

[Glenn239]

From a previous thread you were involved in.

"How the Japanese Might Have Easily Improved Their Pearl Harbor Attacks on Dec.7'41"

If you think people are giving you a hard time with this idea, you should have seen what happened to me a few years ago when I suggested the Japanese should've invaded Ceylon in April 1942. That was a true fire storm. First off it was hard to come up with a definitive Order of Battle, (What I...

www.alternatehistory.com

You stated that Zimm had said Red Hill had some tanks filled at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. This was news to me. Since you did not respond to the request to provide citation from Zimm, I have Zimm and looked into it. It say say on page 317

In addition to the surface tanks, a tremendous underground fuel storage project was begun in late December 1940. Called the Red Hill Underground Fuel Storage Facility, this secret installation eventually had 20 vaults with a total capacity of 5,400,000 barrels of fuel oil and 600,000 barrels of diesel for a total of 818,200 metric tons of fuel, over doubling the fuel storage at Pearl Harbor. The first of the vaults came on line on (sic) ten months after the attack, and the project was completed in September of 1943."

On page 321 it is stated,

"Indeed, while most documents indicate that the first of 20 tanks was officially placed into service in September of 1942, tour guides at the facility state that on 7 December 1941 there were three completed tanks, one full of fuel."

Assuming that tour guides are a credible source of information, then the full tank in Red Hill would be about 1/20th of the total capacity of 818,000 tons, or about 41,000 tons. In comparison, the regular tank farm was about 560,000 tons.

 

[CV12Hornet]

The figures given for the Japanese battleships are not out of line for US battleships with even older machinery. Here,

HyperWar: War Service Fuel Consumption of US Naval Surface Vessels [BB]

Take for example the BB45 Class. They could carry 5,300 tons of oil and this was good for 40 days steaming at 14kt. So the USS Maryland could have performed the mission unrefueled with about as much fuel as the Yamashiro carried.

Yeah, I'm not denying that part, just saying the "11,000nm @ 16 knots" figure for Yamashiro is sus.

 

[Glenn239]

Yeah, I'm not denying that part, just saying the "11,000nm @ 16 knots" figure for Yamashiro is sus.

I don't disagree, but it's not out of line for the BB45 Class, and this had older machinery than the Japanese battleships at the time those tables were tabulated. For the purposes of the thread though, I think the OP can get away with the assumption that the battleships can fight without having to be refuelled.

 

[nbcman]

You stated that Zimm had said Red Hill had some tanks filled at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. This was news to me. Since you did not respond to the request to provide citation from Zimm, I have Zimm and looked into it. It say say on page 317

In addition to the surface tanks, a tremendous underground fuel storage project was begun in late December 1940. Called the Red Hill Underground Fuel Storage Facility, this secret installation eventually had 20 vaults with a total capacity of 5,400,000 barrels of fuel oil and 600,000 barrels of diesel for a total of 818,200 metric tons of fuel, over doubling the fuel storage at Pearl Harbor. The first of the vaults came on line on (sic) ten months after the attack, and the project was completed in September of 1943."

On page 321 it is stated,

"Indeed, while most documents indicate that the first of 20 tanks was officially placed into service in September of 1942, tour guides at the facility state that on 7 December 1941 there were three completed tanks, one full of fuel."

Assuming that tour guides are a credible source of information, then the full tank in Red Hill would be about 1/20th of the total capacity of 818,000 tons, or about 41,000 tons. In comparison, the regular tank farm was about 560,000 tons.

In one of the threads on PH attacks, there was a discussion of this claim of underground storage as well as the difficulties on attacking the above ground tanks where the poster included images from Zimm from pages 316 through 321:

"How the Japanese Might Have Easily Improved Their Pearl Harbor Attacks on Dec.7'41"

If you think people are giving you a hard time with this idea, you should have seen what happened to me a few years ago when I suggested the Japanese should've invaded Ceylon in April 1942. That was a true fire storm. First off it was hard to come up with a definitive Order of Battle, (What I...

www.alternatehistory.com

 

[e of pi]

I don't get that sense at all. If anything this scenario is a way for the Japanese to get the same outcome as OTL Pearl Harbour, at a much greater cost to themselves. The more I think about the "Why?" of this scenario, the more it seems like the POD would come from the Battleship admirals threatening to block the mission unless they get to have a Kantai Kessen. If the US Pacific fleet battle line was sunk in deep water, which is no way certain the way the variables of this thread are going, there might be more dead US sailors, but the Standard battleships involved would still be unavailable for the first part of the war, just like OTL. Which was the Japanese motive OTL in my reading. To give them freedom of action in the South Seas. Same Same.

And worse, while it might result in some sunk US battleships, there's a higher risk of a few sunk Japanese battleships to be counted in the reverse, and survivors to be picked up and advertised. "Japan bombed and sank the fleet at Pearl and lost a few dozen pilots" is different from "they sailed their whole fleet to Pearl, we met them in combat, and while there were terrible losses, we sank two or three of theirs, too, and we have a PoW camp of a thousand or so Japanese sailors."

 

[Alien and Sedition Bat]

I do want to say here as me that an ASB intervention - past issues on what subforum to use - is not inherently wrong. But alternate history discussion involves discussing the scenarios put forward, however fanciful or grounded they may be, and waving aside objections to if say it would actually produce the "utter destruction of the US Pacific fleet" to do X instead of Y gets in the way of that.

One could argue that ASB "intervention" is basically an outgrowth of authorial intervention, as when an author assumes past events that frame a dystopia or utopia. But alternate history discussion scenarios, including those in the ASB forum, are based on the selection of PODs and the working out of butterflies therefrom. This site, alternatehistory.com, is one of several that generate a "collective" literature that could be regarded as a unique genre in an expanded definition of literature. As with other genres, some of it is impressive, some of it is not.

 

[steel_captain]

So if you take it that Yamamoto believed the destruction of the US carriers to have been so important to the chances of Japan succeeding in the Pacific War that after a relatively simple (albeit limited) strike on PH made him followup with the monstrosity that was his Midway operation that he wouldn't have devised PH in a way to make it more destructive to the American forces and where the carriers would be forced into making an appearance?

The only thing he really got from PH as it ended up was the US "filled with a terrible resolve" and I am one who believes he knew that very well at the moment

 

[CV12Hornet]

So if you take it that Yamamoto believed the destruction of the US carriers to have been so important to the chances of Japan succeeding in the Pacific War that after a relatively simple (albeit limited) strike on PH made him followup with the monstrosity that was his Midway operation that he wouldn't have devised PH in a way to make it more destructive to the American forces and where the carriers would be forced into making an appearance?

The only thing he really got from PH as it ended up was the US "filled with a terrible resolve" and I am one who believes he knew that very well at the moment

Correction: Midway was not about Yamamoto believing the carriers were important. Midway was about Yamamoto trying to bait out and destroy the entire Pacific Fleet, battleships included.

 

[Elfwine]

I'm not entirely sure what you mean there, but Pearl Harbor seems to have been designed assuming that it as planned and launched would be massively destructive and that something leading to being fired on by US coastal artillery was neither necessary nor helpful in pursuing that.

 

[Questerr]

My scenario is that he use 4 carriers of the KB to only hit all the airfields around Oahu on the morning of Dec. 7th, with the intention of destroying as many aircraft as possible on the ground. Then bring the other pair of the KB plus NAGATO, MUTSU and the 4 KONGOs to just south of PH that evening and begin lobbing shells onto Battleship Row and everything else in Pearl.

With all USN and USAAC planes destroyed on the ground (or a vast majority of them) only the airwings on the two carriers can stand in the way if the IJN shelling every ship in PH until it sinks alongside or blows up!

In this scenario what does ENTERPRISE and LEXINGTON do? It would be 2 on 1 as far as carriers go until LEXINGTON made it from Midway and expect the IJN pilots to manhandle ENTERPRISE pretty severely on the 8th and likely sink her.

Or do our two carriers realize they are dead if they try to fight their way into PH and decline to even try? Have plenty of subs between Hawaíi and the West Coast in case they do try to escape the trap.

Now that would have been the utter destruction of the US Pacific fleet and how many years before there would be any chance the USN to be able to get any licks back at the IJN?

At most, he buys Japan another year, and that in turn means more atomic bombs.

 

[YYJ]

In this scenario what does ENTERPRISE and LEXINGTON do? It would be 2 on 1 as far as carriers go until LEXINGTON made it from Midway and expect the IJN pilots to manhandle ENTERPRISE pretty severely on the 8th and likely sink her.

Wait a minute. Is this scenario just a ruse to draw the US carriers into a trap? That is a pretty elaborate trap. The thing is, the IJN expected the US carriers to be at Pearl Harbour. OTL, the first wave of torpedo bombers began runs against the anchorage where the aircraft carriers were supposed to be, but then turned away to choose different targets when they saw the CVs were absent. The timeline does not add up. The Japanese can't make such a complicated plan to catch the carriers, when they thought the carriers would be tied up at Pearl Harbour.