There were multiple attempts on the life of Napoleon Bonaparte historically, all of which failed, but each of which might have had interesting consequences. Which attempt was the most plausible and/or the most consequential, and why?
 

Alcsentre Calanice

Gone Fishin'
There were multiple attempts on the life of Napoleon Bonaparte historically, all of which failed, but each of which might have had interesting consequences. Which attempt was the most plausible and/or the most consequential, and why?

The later ons would result in more chaos. In the early years of the Napoleonic regime, you still had a dominating republican/brumairien elite which would take back control and manage Napoléon's succession. However, Napoléon had an habit to weaken all institutions that could become a threat to him, and thus to prevent the development of real traditions of legitimacy. The constitution was a scam, and everybody knew it. If Napoléon had died in 1809, I doubt anyone would have tried to proclaim one of Napoléon's legitimate successors, Joseph or Louis, emperor.

What you get in those later scenarios is a three-way competition between the old revolutionary elites (which dominate the Senate), the new Napoléonic elites (the bureaucracy) and the army.
 
The later ons would result in more chaos. In the early years of the Napoleonic regime, you still had a dominating republican/brumairien elite which would take back control and manage Napoléon's succession. However, Napoléon had an habit to weaken all institutions that could become a threat to him, and thus to prevent the development of real traditions of legitimacy. The constitution was a scam, and everybody knew it. If Napoléon had died in 1809, I doubt anyone would have tried to proclaim one of Napoléon's legitimate successors, Joseph or Louis, emperor.

What you get in those later scenarios is a three-way competition between the old revolutionary elites (which dominate the Senate), the new Napoléonic elites (the bureaucracy) and the army.
Personally, I think the Christmas Eve 1800 bomb blast killing Napoleon would instigate the most chaos, as the country was by then only really just stabilizing, was at war, and could descend into paranoia, show trials, and bloodshed.
 
Staps killing Napoleon in 1809 is by far the most interesting of these; I would actually go so far to say as it's the best way to achieve a "Napoleonic" Victory in Europe.
 

Alcsentre Calanice

Gone Fishin'
Personally, I think the Christmas Eve 1800 bomb blast killing Napoleon would instigate the most chaos, as the country was by then only really just stabilizing, was at war, and could descend into paranoia, show trials, and bloodshed.

Paranoia? Show trials? I don't think so. Honestly, I think that the soldiers would mourn, but the elites would rejoice. They had used Napoléon to overthrow the Directorate and to assume direct power, and now Napoléon is gone, too.

Remember that this is before Napoléon was able to distance himself from the Brumairiens and build is own powerbase. The cabinet, parliament, the conseil d'État and the senate are still dominated by this group of moderate Republicans, having served in various revolutionary assemblies, often regicides, and committed to keep both the Jacobins and Royalists out of power.

They will choose a successor of their liking.
 

Alcsentre Calanice

Gone Fishin'
Staps killing Napoleon in 1809 is by far the most interesting of these; I would actually go so far to say as it's the best way to achieve a "Napoleonic" Victory in Europe.

Well, only if the succession crisis doesn't lead to a new European Coalition, and only if Napoléon's successor has the military, diplomatic and political talent to keep the Grand Empire and the Bonaparte family (essentially the same thing) together.
 
Well, only if the succession crisis doesn't lead to a new European Coalition, and only if Napoléon's successor has the military, diplomatic and political talent to keep the Grand Empire and the Bonaparte family (essentially the same thing) together.
That's why killing him in 1809 is such a big deal, because this is pretty much the Empire's high water mark, geopolitically speaking - if there's such a thing as an ideal time to have a succession crisis (or just succession, all other things being equal), to play things safe and focus on internal stability and whatnot, it would be at a peak like this - after a power has already established itself, but before hubris starts getting the better of it. And in the case of Napoleonic France, just after the War of the Fifth Coalition, and before the Russian Invasion, is about as perfect as you get.
 
Paranoia? Show trials? I don't think so. Honestly, I think that the soldiers would mourn, but the elites would rejoice. They had used Napoléon to overthrow the Directorate and to assume direct power, and now Napoléon is gone, too.

Remember that this is before Napoléon was able to distance himself from the Brumairiens and build is own powerbase. The cabinet, parliament, the conseil d'État and the senate are still dominated by this group of moderate Republicans, having served in various revolutionary assemblies, often regicides, and committed to keep both the Jacobins and Royalists out of power.

They will choose a successor of their liking.
Moderates nay then be ascendant, but by 1800, the fledgling republic is only about a year or two removed from chaos, and Napoleon managed to hold together and manipulate disparate factions and egos. What contemporary enjoys such an ability as well as the capacity to not lose the War of the Second Coalition?
Well, only if the succession crisis doesn't lead to a new European Coalition, and only if Napoléon's successor has the military, diplomatic and political talent to keep the Grand Empire and the Bonaparte family (essentially the same thing) together.
This is a key point. There is no clear successor at this stage. It seems entirely possible to me that Eugene de Beauhamais or Murat could end up with the Italian portion of the Empire while someone else ends up with Greater France, and perhaps neither ending up as leader of the Confederation. Could Bavaria end up leading he Confederation of the Rhine? Also, 1809 is during the Peninsular war, right? If so, then there could be a coalition set to go against whoever succeeds the late French emperor.
That's why killing him in 1809 is such a big deal, because this is pretty much the Empire's high water mark, geopolitically speaking - if there's such a thing as an ideal time to have a succession crisis (or just succession, all other things being equal), to play things safe and focus on internal stability and whatnot, it would be at a peak like this - after a power has already established itself, but before hubris starts getting the better of it. And in the case of Napoleonic France, just after the War of the Fifth Coalition, and before the Russian Invasion, is about as perfect as you get.

I personally think that the Pichegru Conspiracy is somewhat more interesting. It seems to me that one of their bigger issues was trying to involve Moreau instead of someone with monarchist leanings, but who that would be I know not.
 

Alcsentre Calanice

Gone Fishin'
Moderates nay then be ascendant, but by 1800, the fledgling republic is only about a year or two removed from chaos, and Napoleon managed to hold together and manipulate disparate factions and egos. What contemporary enjoys such an ability as well as the capacity to not lose the War of the Second Coalition?

First of all, there is no reason to worry too much about the War of the Second Coalition. France got the situation under control in 1799 by beating the Russians, and was back on the offensive by 1800, decisively beating the Austrians at Marengo and Hohenlinden. Would Napoléon's death have encouraged Emperor Francis to prolong a lost war? Probably. But was Napoléon the only competent French commander? Certainly not. France had triumphed over the First Coalition while experiencing several waves of internal turmoil, and she would have fought off the Second one too, even without Napoléon.

Then there's the internal situation. And the truth is that it was much more stable, much quieter than you make it out to to be. The clubs are dissolved, the press is muzzled, the internal enemies are defeated (the situation in the Vendée is an exception, but the revolts there are no threat to the government in Paris).

As to the various political faction... Yes, they exist, but they have no way to fight the existing government. France in 1800 is no democracy, there are no elections by which the royalist and jacobin opposition could try to win seats in parliament like in 1797, 1798 and 1799; the structures that allowed radical politicians to foment public unrest were destroyed, mainly by the jacobins themselves: the sans-culottes aren't coming back soon.

These are the main reasons why the Brumairiens regime could very well have survived Napoléon's assassination in December 1800 and become the new order ruling France for the next decades.
 
First of all, there is no reason to worry too much about the War of the Second Coalition. France got the situation under control in 1799 by beating the Russians, and was back on the offensive by 1800, decisively beating the Austrians at Marengo and Hohenlinden. Would Napoléon's death have encouraged Emperor Francis to prolong a lost war? Probably. But was Napoléon the only competent French commander? Certainly not. France had triumphed over the First Coalition while experiencing several waves of internal turmoil, and she would have fought off the Second one too, even without Napoléon.

Then there's the internal situation. And the truth is that it was much more stable, much quieter than you make it out to to be. The clubs are dissolved, the press is muzzled, the internal enemies are defeated (the situation in the Vendée is an exception, but the revolts there are no threat to the government in Paris).

As to the various political faction... Yes, they exist, but they have no way to fight the existing government. France in 1800 is no democracy, there are no elections by which the royalist and jacobin opposition could try to win seats in parliament like in 1797, 1798 and 1799; the structures that allowed radical politicians to foment public unrest were destroyed, mainly by the jacobins themselves: the sans-culottes aren't coming back soon.

These are the main reasons why the Brumairiens regime could very well have survived Napoléon's assassination in December 1800 and become the new order ruling France for the next decades.
Who do you see assuming the leadership under these circumstances?
 
Beyond the scope of your post but I'm a fan of "Napoleon dies in Egypt" of something, probably disease. Figuring out who runs France and what he does once he takes over is an interesting thought exercise.
 

Alcsentre Calanice

Gone Fishin'
Who do you see assuming the leadership under these circumstances?

That's probably the hardest question to answer. Napoléon being dead, the Second Consul Cambacérès should constitutionally replace him until the Senate has chosen a successor, but Cambacérès had no following that could place him in the most important position, and the constitution would probably become a worthless fiction within hours of Bonaparte's death.

It says a lot about Napoléon's position in 1800 that large parts of his cabinet and many of his allies of Brumaire were already planning to replace him. So while the French government had the country under control, Napoléon's control of the elites was limited. This opposition within the ruling group had two main branches: The military opposition with jacobin sympathies, represented by men like Augerau, Bernadotte and Jourdan, and allegedly supported by Fouché, minister of the police; and, on the other hand, the brumairiens opposition, unhappy with the growing power of Napoléon, which tempered their general satisfaction about the course French politics had taken after the 18th Brumaire. They met in a restaurant in Auteil every month and would often discuss possible successor to Bonaparte if he happened to die, which many thought to be a possibility during his second campaign in Italy. The news of the victory at Marengo silenced this portion of the opposition for the most part, and Napoléon would get rid of them progressively by firing idéologues like Carnot or Chaptal from his cabinet.

In many ways, the year 1800 was a period of crisis – neither because France was at risk to fall into the hands of royalists, nor due to the remote possibility of renewed jacobin unrest (although both factions fantasized extensively about assassinating Bonaparte and taking over), but because, as I would argue, Napoléon was not predestined to neutralize the entire internal opposition and establish a solid popularity for himself. There were alternatives to the Napoleonic dictatorship, but the weakness of his opponents, his luck and his personal talent made sure that those would never come into play, at least not until 1814 under very different circumstances.

These alternatives were, of course, not very concrete. There were no parties allowed to formulate competing programs, and no newspapers with the latitude to organize the opposition. There were names, and there were obscure concepts. There was the hope for a French Washington (already embodied by Bonaparte for quite some time), hope which was projected upon the generals Augereau, Jourdan, Bernadette, Masséna and Moreau (who also passed for a potential French Monck – just to emphasize how vague and confused the opinions of the opposition were); there was the civilian option, incarnated by La Fayette and Carnot, both of whom had military experience but didn't have a military clientele; and then there was the orléanist option, which may have had the support of the old leader of the brumairiens, Sieyès, who had already proposed a thinly veiled republican monarchy in 1799.

Behind these great names, mutually exchangeable according to circumstances and personal opinions, there was the more concrete hope of the brumairiens, moderate revolutionaries who had benefited from the Revolution in many ways and whose main concern was stability, to find the perfect form of government which would allow them to perpetuate their rule indefinitely. After having made bad experiences with the rule of a single assembly (the convention), after having tried out a system of Checks and Balances (the directorate), they now realized that the concentration of power in one hand can have dangerous results – so, maybe, a parliamentary monarchy would have been their next move.

For further information, I would redirect you to Thierry Lentz, Le Grand Consulat. 1799–1804, Paris 1999, and Jean Tulard, Napoléon ou le mythe du sauveur, Paris 1987; I don't know if these books have been translated into English, but you might find similar information in any extensive biography of the grand homme.

Beyond the scope of your post but I'm a fan of "Napoleon dies in Egypt" of something, probably disease. Figuring out who runs France and what he does once he takes over is an interesting thought exercise.

This option (what would have happened if Napoléon didn't take power on 1799?) has already been pretty thoroughly discussed in previous threads – just like Napoléon's death in 1809, for that matter.






 
Last edited:
This option (what would have happened if Napoléon didn't take power on 1799?) has already been pretty thoroughly discussed in previous threads – just like Napoléon's death in 1809, for that matter.

Oh yeah, I myself have started a thread or two about the subject. Thanks for the links, gives me something to read.
 
Who do you see assuming the leadership under these circumstances?
That's probably the hardest question to answer. Napoléon being dead, the Second Consul Cambacérès should constitutionally replace him until the Senate has chosen a successor, but Cambacérès had no following that could place him in the most important position, and the constitution would probably become a worthless fiction within hours of Bonaparte's death.
That's another part where an 1809 assassination differs from every other one on the Wikipedia page - the rest come before Napoleon crowns himself Emperor, meaning the question of succession would be considerably different than if he had died as "First Consul".
 
That's another part where an 1809 assassination differs from every other one on the Wikipedia page - the rest come before Napoleon crowns himself Emperor, meaning the question of succession would be considerably different than if he had died as "First Consul".
On the other hand, the Pichegru conspiracy leaves us with Napoleon's greatest achievements, but without his formal turn to monarchism.
 
Top