Effects on WW1 on Cilicia instead of Gallipoli

[Beefhammer]

I've seen it laid out that a better use of the same resources than the Gallipoli campaign would have been landings at Alexandretta and Mersin and a subsequent takeover and fortification of Cilicia: complicating Ottoman resupply of Mesopotamia by cutting the Berlin-Baghdad Railway at Adana, cutting off the Levant and the Hejaz from Anatolia, providing a safe zone for nearby Christians, gaining the region's agricultural output for the Entente at the Central Powers' expense, and creating an easily defended ulcer in the middle of Turkish lines that they would force them to redirect resources to guarding against an Entente breakout from Cilicia. Supposedly, securing all the necessary mountain passes and the Cilician lowlands would require fewer divisions than were ultimately committed to Gallipoli, so those extra divisions could be used for whatever.
Question is: what would the knock-on effects of this blow against the Turks be? To what extent does this weaken their positions in Mesopotamia and against the Russians? How many men would this make the Germans and Austrians redirect to shoring up the Turks? How many more Armenians, Assyrians, and Anatolian Greeks survive as a result of this safe zone and its effects on Turkish forces? Since no Gallipoli landings means the Entente isn't right next door, does Bulgaria join the Central Powers sooner, and what effect does this have on Serbia and Greece? How feasible and effective would it be, if the British can drive deep enough into Mesopotamia in a timely fashion (presumably with those extra divisions), to resupply Russian and pro-Russian forces in the Armenian Highlands overland from the Persian Gulf? How does the Cilician occupation, and its far greater damage to the Turks' military position compared to the Gallipoli campaign, affect the course of the war and the immediate post-war?

 

[Beefhammer]

Bump

 

[Memoriam Damnatio]

Gallipoli was planned with the dual aim of, knocking the ottomans out of the war and opening the Dardanelles for entente shipping by seizing Constantinople. By landing at Cillicia the French and British have to settle in for a long war in the Levant and not being able to link up with the Russians though the Mediterranean. At that point, the forces would probably just be redirected to either the western front or Egypt.

 

[Karelian]

The British prewar plans from the Suez war scare of 1906 would be available, as well as better maps and the obvious fact that the landing would not be preceded by a purely naval affair.
But as mentioned before, this approach requires the Entente powers to take the Ottomans seriously as an opponent from the outset. This is highly difficult to achieve, considering the previous string of Ottoman defeats at the hands of the Balkan League and the Italians.

 

[Dorknought]

If the CUP are about a pan-Turk entity - ie southern Russia instead of the 'multinational rabble' ie. to the south then chopping the empire in half at Alexandretta probably wont have the desired outcome but it would make the best use of minimal troops but with complete sea control.

Gallipoli wasn't all that far from failure.

• Greek assistance would be invaluable.
• Not alerting the Ottomans in Nov 1914 to the weakness would be invaluable
• Minesweepers with naval crews would be invaluable
• Bribing Ottoman officers for maps would be invaluable

 

[Beefhammer]

Gallipoli was planned with the dual aim of, knocking the ottomans out of the war and opening the Dardanelles for entente shipping by seizing Constantinople. By landing at Cillicia the French and British have to settle in for a long war in the Levant and not being able to link up with the Russians though the Mediterranean. At that point, the forces would probably just be redirected to either the western front or Egypt.

If the CUP are about a pan-Turk entity - ie southern Russia instead of the 'multinational rabble' ie. to the south then chopping the empire in half at Alexandretta probably wont have the desired outcome but it would make the best use of minimal troops but with complete sea control.

Gallipoli wasn't all that far from failure.

• Greek assistance would be invaluable.
• Not alerting the Ottomans in Nov 1914 to the weakness would be invaluable
• Minesweepers with naval crews would be invaluable
• Bribing Ottoman officers for maps would be invaluable

But what would result from taking Cilicia?

The British prewar plans from the Suez war scare of 1906 would be available, as well as better maps and the obvious fact that the landing would not be preceded by a purely naval affair.
But as mentioned before, this approach requires the Entente powers to take the Ottomans seriously as an opponent from the outset. This is highly difficult to achieve, considering the previous string of Ottoman defeats at the hands of the Balkan League and the Italians.

What would happen if, not would they.

 

[raharris1973]

The British prewar plans from the Suez war scare of 1906 would be available, as well as better maps

The Aqaba crisis, or Sinai border dispute of 1906, was actually a full-blown Suez war scare? And the British had war plans prepared for it, that including mapping and landing plans, specifically for the Cilicia/Alexandretta region? I never knew any of that.

But what would result from taking Cilicia?

The Ottomans could put up a staunch fight for awhile there. But, once the rail junction is taken, their forces in the Levant and Hijaz are out of supply. Those forces would not just disintegrate on their own, but they could then be ground down with smaller effort. And it makes Ottoman forces in Mesopotamia harder to support - no rail supply line - just animal caravan marching and cross-country capable motor vehicles (the few they have). That probably saves the British from the disaster at Kut. While not opening the straits, this all probably enables not only a battering down of Ottoman forces in general and serious discussions on their part of seeking terms (in which the Allies could and would demand passage through the straits), but probable junction, by no later than some point in 1916, of British and Russian forces somewhere in eastern Anatolia, in mixed lands largely Armenian or Kurdish inhabited.

So, more territory denied the Ottomans and CPs sooner, and fewer Allied defeats and embarrassments, and some rough and ugly supply tracks to Russia's Caucasus through Syria, Iraq, Persia by 1916, even if Turkey west of the Taurus mountains and west of Pontus and in Thrace holds on as a CP Power to the end, and Russia goes down, because Turkey refuses to give way on the last territories it has left and that's what the Entente is demanding.

So it is net beneficial. Not as net beneficial as the straits op in 1915 working. But net beneficial compared with OTL, and possibly compared to an aalternate pproach that just marched in from Mesopotamia, Palestine and Caucasus from the beginning, without trying anything on the Ottomans' interior sea lines.

 

[Karelian]

The Aqaba crisis, or Sinai border dispute of 1906, was actually a full-blown Suez war scare? And the British had war plans prepared for it, that including mapping and landing plans, specifically for the Cilicia/Alexandretta region? I never knew any of that.

Yigal Sheffy has made an excellent study about this matter in the British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign, 1914-1918:

...Planning focused on both naval and combined operations, including raids on the islands of Lemnos and Mytilene (Lesbos) in the Aegean Sea off the Anatolian coastline; a landing in Gallipoli to force open the Dardanelles Straits; landings in Aqaba or along the beaces of Palestine and Syria; conquering Basra in Iraq; and blocading maritime commerce along the Red Sea coast and Yemen. After weighting each option, only landings in Syria and Palestine remained a serious consideration, with the bays of Alexandretta (Iskanderun), Beirut and Haifa the leading contenders, since landings there would directly threaten the Ottoman flank as well as the Hijaz railway. In late 1906, the General Staff settled on Haifa as the optimal location for such operations, since it offered the best landing conditions and was well situated to expedite British progress inside Palestine...By late 1909, the Alexandretta region re-emerged as a major landing site.
...The General Staff recommended that comprehensive maritime and land surveys be made of the area. The surveys were devoted primarily to mapping and to examination of the railways, landing beaches and routes of advance eastward. From 1906, the railway network was an explicit military objective. Until 1910 British diplomats, intelligence officers and informants were regularly sent to Syria to travel on the trains, tour the entire length of the railway lines, visit railway repair workshops and collect information on railway conditions and on plans of expansion. ..Francis Maunsell, the former military attaché in Istanbul was the main instigator of these surveys...The CID established a sub-committee under Lord Esher to study the issue in March 1910.
John French shelved and cancelled the planning in early 1914, but they were hastily redrawn at the outbreak of the war.

 

[raharris1973]

Yigal Sheffy has made an excellent study about this matter in the British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign, 1914-1918:

Wow! Was this a book, or an article?

 

[raharris1973]

Wow! Was this a book, or an article?

Oh gosh, it's a book - and waaay overpriced on amazon

 

[Beefhammer]

The Ottomans could put up a staunch fight for awhile there. But, once the rail junction is taken, their forces in the Levant and Hijaz are out of supply. Those forces would not just disintegrate on their own, but they could then be ground down with smaller effort. And it makes Ottoman forces in Mesopotamia harder to support - no rail supply line - just animal caravan marching and cross-country capable motor vehicles (the few they have). That probably saves the British from the disaster at Kut. While not opening the straits, this all probably enables not only a battering down of Ottoman forces in general and serious discussions on their part of seeking terms (in which the Allies could and would demand passage through the straits), but probable junction, by no later than some point in 1916, of British and Russian forces somewhere in eastern Anatolia, in mixed lands largely Armenian or Kurdish inhabited.

So, more territory denied the Ottomans and CPs sooner, and fewer Allied defeats and embarrassments, and some rough and ugly supply tracks to Russia's Caucasus through Syria, Iraq, Persia by 1916, even if Turkey west of the Taurus mountains and west of Pontus and in Thrace holds on as a CP Power to the end, and Russia goes down, because Turkey refuses to give way on the last territories it has left and that's what the Entente is demanding.

So how would this effect the other CPs? Would they need to shift troops and supplies to Anatolia, and if so how much would this hamper their own operations? Would Bulgaria and/or Greece join the war earlier? And if the Entente wins, either with or without Russia staying in the fight, what's the effect of more Ottoman Christians surviving?

 

[Disraeli's Ghost]

The advantage of Alexandretta is it's a potentially war changing blow, for the cost of not very much, with a high chance of success. In fact, I'm yet to see any academic that actually suggests problems with it. Comparatively, I'm increasingly convinced you could simulate Gallipoli a hundred times and it'd fail far more often than succeed.

The objection to Alexandretta is it doesn't immediately knock the Turks out the war. This is true, but is destroying the Ottoman Empire the Entente's overriding war aim? Sean McMeekin in his fall of the Ottomans book says the benefit of the plan is lopping off Mesopotamia in one go, then telling the Ottomans they can either keep what they have left, or continue fighting a war for an empire they have clearly lost for good.

The Straits agreement hasn't been signed yet, so the Entente divide Mesopotamia and Armenia, and the Ottomans open the straits in return for peace.

The impact on the wider war will noticeable. Bulgaria will probably remain neutral here, if it doesn't then Greece will be under extreme pressure to honour its alliance with Serbia this time.
Italy came to the table when it looked like Gallipoli was on the verge of success. I don't see why it wouldn't here with the Entente still advancing and dealing an obviously successful blow to the Turks (and it's hardly war changing even if the Italians dither for a few months more ITTL).
Gorlice-Tarnow will still occur, so the war wont end in 1915. Russia however will have far more trained men, especially officers, to feed into the Eastern Front.

The CP were very very nearly overwhelmed in 1916. It's really a remarkable tribute to the German military that they survived. I doubt that they will not be so lucky this time should Serbia have survived longer, and both Russia and Britain have more trained men and materiel.

 

[raharris1973]

This is true, but is destroying the Ottoman Empire the Entente's overriding war aim?

Not if they're in their rightly prioritized minds, IMHO. Containing them or getting them to quit as efficiently and effectively as possible in the service of larger aims of getting/forcing Germany to back off from Allied and neutral territories seems the more sensible aim to me.

 

[Beefhammer]

Mesopotamia

You mean the Levant and the Hejaz?

 

[ECavalier]

One disadvantage that’s missing here, which was an important factor otl, is that an an Alexandretta landing risks really antagonising France. Since Napoleon III the French right have considered Syria their exclusive area of interest and they were tremendously suspicious of British incursion into it. From what I’ve read British policy makers felt they would need to have a substantial contingent of French troops involved or undermine French support for the war effort at a critical time: since the French army was stretched thin this was essentially not an option, giving Gallipoli added appeal.

 

[raharris1973]

One disadvantage that’s missing here, which was an important factor otl, is that an an Alexandretta landing risks really antagonising France. Since Napoleon III the French right have considered Syria their exclusive area of interest and they were tremendously suspicious of British incursion into it. From what I’ve read British policy makers felt they would need to have a substantial contingent of French troops involved or undermine French support for the war effort at a critical time: since the French army was stretched thin this was essentially not an option, giving Gallipoli added appeal.

Weren't there some French troops in the Gallipoli beachhead while it lasted?

 

[Karelian]

Oh gosh, it's a book - and waaay overpriced on amazon

Google Books overview option is a fine and lawful system to take a closer look.

 

[Coulsdon Eagle]

Weren't there some French troops in the Gallipoli beachhead while it lasted?

Yes, originally landed on the Asiatic shore as a diversionary attack, then crossed to the Gallipoli bridgehead and held the right flank on Cape Helles. Very impressive French cemetery at Morto Bay. Less well known is that more French died at Gallipoli than Australians

 

[raharris1973]

Yes, originally landed on the Asiatic shore as a diversionary attack, then crossed to the Gallipoli bridgehead and held the right flank on Cape Helles. Very impressive French cemetery at Morto Bay. Less well known is that more French died at Gallipoli than Australians

So why couldn't this same troop mix have been used in Alexandretta instead, with the French assured that the French troop contribution ensures French political control of the immediate Alexandretta region and surrounding regions of Syria and Cilicia in the postwar? Hmm @ECavalier ?

an Alexandretta landing risks really antagonising France. Since Napoleon III the French right have considered Syria their exclusive area of interest and they were tremendously suspicious of British incursion into it.

And powers interested in territory did not always veto their allies operating on it. After all, didn't Russia want postwar control of Constantinople and the straits from the moment of Ottoman entry into WWI? But the Russians didn't veto, yell 'hell no!' or throw a wet blanket on the Gallipoli operation, which if successful, would have put Britain in control of the this desired territory and national windpipe. So powers' attitudes on these sorts of things seemed remarkably inconsistent.

 

[raharris1973]

You mean the Levant and the Hejaz?

I don't know what they mean, but the Cilicia area did indeed house the only *rail* link between Asia Minor/Istanbul and Mesopotamia. There were no rail lines connecting the two regions further inland or further east. So if they meant Mesopotamia as written, it was still an accurate statement, even if you found it geographically counterintuitive that a point so close to the Mediterranean coast would be a rail chokepoint to the latter region.