France Fights On - What if Indochina resists?

Not specifically referring to the "La France continue la guerre" timeline that exists in a couple forms online, but a generic scenario where French colonial governments maintain a strong alliance with Britain after the fall of France.

One thing that hasn't really been picked over to my satisfaction in the various Anglo-French Union and France Fights On scenarios is what happens in Indochina. France is probably not capable of repelling a Japanese invasion on its own, but Indochina is obviously necessary to a Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia, so assisting with its defense should be Britain's first priority, even over Malaya. With no Japanese occupation in September 1940, Thailand likely won't attack Indochina.

So what does Japan do? Does the winter 1941 offensive include a full-scale attack on Indochina? I'm assuming for the sake of the scenario that the British-French alliance is basically a union, with a unified military command of some kind in Southeast Asia. Do Anglo-French forces fall back from Indochina to make a stand further south?

I haven't read all the AH scenarios about a Franco-British union, so I'm not sure if this is universally the case, but pretty much everything I can find just has Indochina fall with barely a fight. That doesn't seem terribly likely to me. Any thoughts?
 

Archibald

Banned
La France continue la guerre (not FFO - APOD). The government in Algiers recognizes from day 1 they just can't stop any Japanese onslaught on FIC. The Japanese attack in December 1941, and their advanced get stalled (guess where !) at Dien Bien Phu with the French and Vietnamese fighting together. The campaign is overall, bloody and a meat grinder.

Here is a map

image.php
 
I guess it makes sense that the force that struck Malaya OTL could strike Indochina and that Thailand would be neutral if not friendly, but man, that's a tough campaign they've got ahead in Southeast Asia. It seems very possible that the Allies could assemble a better defensive force in the East Indies and hold onto the oilfields longer.
 
I think any delay in the Japanese onslaught in December 1941 and early 1941 is greatly to the allied advantage. OTL the British where in the process of sending an infantry division to Malaya as Singapore fell and these troopes became prisoners without putting up much of a fight. Also other forces including an armoured brigade (if I'm remembering correctly as I'm not consulting my books on this) where diverted to Burma as Singapore had fallen before they arrived.

A delay of even a few weeks means British and Commonwealth reinforcements arrive and makes the Japanese conquest of southern Malaya much more bloody and difficult, even possibly unlikely. In such a scenario if even limited resistance is made against the Japanese in Indochina the delay this causes could result in a long drawn out campaign in Malaya.

Even if Malaya finally falls the loss wouldn't be such a blow to British prestige as OTL as the British could show they put up a decent fight which would have long term effects on the post war world especially with the British relationships with Australia and New Zealand. As was mentioned in the recent Valentines in Malaya TL (sorry I don't remember the proper TL name) if nothing else then Dug out Doug doesn't get the reception he got OTL in Australia and probably gets sent back states side as a failure with the criticsm of look what the Brish managed in Malaya and how little you accomplished in the Phillipeans ringing in his ears. So worth while as a time line for no other reason.

Also if Malaya and possibly then Burma become long bloody campaigns this radically effects the Japanese second phase of conquest. I suspect the forces used for some of these conquests would be diverted to these active fronts and others would need to wait until the lines of communications where cleared. This could move the allied position of summer of 1945 OTL to maybe summer 1944. As there would be less fighting to get closer to Japan before levelling Japanese cities form the air. Of course in such a senario what do the allies (chiefly the americans) do? There's no nukes and no prospect for them in the next year. The american public still very much wants revenge for Pearl Harbour, so do they try for an invasion of the Japanese home islands. In such a senario a better allied performance earlier on in the Pacific war could lead to significantly higher losses than OTL!

I have made my points on how this effects the Malayan campaign. Would the allies reinforce Indochina if possible, absolutely. How much difference this makes is hard to say. Is this a boon to the allies or a liability as these forces would need to be taken from in theatre which could reduce the fighting forces available for the defence of other areas including Malaya and Burma.

I feel there is plenty of scope for a first rate time line on this if anyone much more talented then myself wants to have a bash at it.
 
Keep in mind the embargos were triggered by the Japanese occupation of FIC. The March 1941 action being the event that tipped the balance for the US Congress. Without the embargo & failed negotiations Japan has no burning need to attack the European colonies and the US. The sanction and censure before the summer of 1941 were relatively weak and more message that substance. Absent the embargo Japan can focus on trying to defeat China & get favorable peace there.

So, if Japan does not execute its occupation of FIC as in OTL the Pacific war is very unlikely to occur as we know it 1941-42. Maybe some sort of war comes a few years later, but not as per OTL.
 
Keep in mind the embargos were triggered by the Japanese occupation of FIC. The March 1941 action being the event that tipped the balance for the US Congress. Without the embargo & failed negotiations Japan has no burning need to attack the European colonies and the US. The sanction and censure before the summer of 1941 were relatively weak and more message that substance. Absent the embargo Japan can focus on trying to defeat China & get favorable peace there.

So, if Japan does not execute its occupation of FIC as in OTL the Pacific war is very unlikely to occur as we know it 1941-42. Maybe some sort of war comes a few years later, but not as per OTL.

I think any delay in the Japanese onslaught in December 1941 and early 1941 is greatly to the allied advantage. OTL the British where in the process of sending an infantry division to Malaya as Singapore fell and these troopes became prisoners without putting up much of a fight. Also other forces including an armoured brigade (if I'm remembering correctly as I'm not consulting my books on this) where diverted to Burma as Singapore had fallen before they arrived.

A delay of even a few weeks means British and Commonwealth reinforcements arrive and makes the Japanese conquest of southern Malaya much more bloody and difficult, even possibly unlikely. In such a scenario if even limited resistance is made against the Japanese in Indochina the delay this causes could result in a long drawn out campaign in Malaya.

Even if Malaya finally falls the loss wouldn't be such a blow to British prestige as OTL as the British could show they put up a decent fight which would have long term effects on the post war world especially with the British relationships with Australia and New Zealand. As was mentioned in the recent Valentines in Malaya TL (sorry I don't remember the proper TL name) if nothing else then Dug out Doug doesn't get the reception he got OTL in Australia and probably gets sent back states side as a failure with the criticsm of look what the Brish managed in Malaya and how little you accomplished in the Phillipeans ringing in his ears. So worth while as a time line for no other reason.

Also if Malaya and possibly then Burma become long bloody campaigns this radically effects the Japanese second phase of conquest. I suspect the forces used for some of these conquests would be diverted to these active fronts and others would need to wait until the lines of communications where cleared. This could move the allied position of summer of 1945 OTL to maybe summer 1944. As there would be less fighting to get closer to Japan before levelling Japanese cities form the air. Of course in such a senario what do the allies (chiefly the americans) do? There's no nukes and no prospect for them in the next year. The american public still very much wants revenge for Pearl Harbour, so do they try for an invasion of the Japanese home islands. In such a senario a better allied performance earlier on in the Pacific war could lead to significantly higher losses than OTL!

I have made my points on how this effects the Malayan campaign. Would the allies reinforce Indochina if possible, absolutely. How much difference this makes is hard to say. Is this a boon to the allies or a liability as these forces would need to be taken from in theatre which could reduce the fighting forces available for the defence of other areas including Malaya and Burma.

I feel there is plenty of scope for a first rate time line on this if anyone much more talented then myself wants to have a bash at it.

Fantastic replies, thank you! So I'm correct in thinking that a British-backed Indochina is a Really Big Deal. A Franco-British union in 1940 means that the U.S. is very unlikely to enter the war, and also that the Nazi invasion of Russia is likely to be made complicated by an Allied-controlled Med. It seems pretty likely to me that the ultimate result would be a Europe that's red to the Rhine, with Greece and possibly Italy as exceptions. That further implies that the wartime emergency Union is likely to stay united in the face of Soviet divisions on the French border, and the U.S.-dominated Western Hemisphere is quite probably a third pole of the tripolar world. Not sure what the ultimate fate of Japan and China would be, though I suspect Russia would play a big part in whatever it is.

Am I missing anything with that set of assumptions?
 
Fantastic replies, thank you! So I'm correct in thinking that a British-backed Indochina is a Really Big Deal. A Franco-British union in 1940 means that the U.S. is very unlikely to enter the war,

No. Events oriented towards Europe would have had the US in within a few months. Hitler had been considering declaring war on the US for much of 1941. He was increasing angry over the aid to Britain, the US occupation of Iceland, US aid to the Soviet Union, US attacks on German submarines & the naval patrols in general. He had discussed several times the need to strike at the US to teach a lesson.

Within the US the Isolationist position was collapsing. The previous summer the left had ceased support of the isolationist position and now pressed for war with Germany. A increasing portion of Roosevelts enemies, conservatives, businessmen, & Congress saw war with Germany as inevitable. The America First argument had boxed it self into a corner... It was really a race to see which led to a DoW first: Hitlers impassiveness or the steady methodical strengthening of the Warhawks in the US.

and also that the Nazi invasion of Russia is likely to be made complicated by an Allied-controlled Med.

That bodes nothing good for the Axis in general, and the member states specifically. X4 if there is no Pacific war.
 
What is needed in this, is for the French to declare for De Gaulle. Some years ago (ok, decades actually) I was perusing a US State Dept. document, a small folio that examined and explained what had happened in FIC just prior to (and, before IIRC) the Japanese invasion. At the time of the fall of France, the Gov. Gen. of FIC was General Catroux, who opposed any agreements with the Japanese, and wanted to declare for the Allies. He was transferred out and Adm. Jean Decoux, took over. Catroux had previously sent a mission to the US to ask for military aid, and was rebuffed by the US Govt. The US had, either en route to France, or on order, a large number of warplanes. Additionally, we had not insubstantial stockpiles of 75 and 155mm guns of French design. IF Catroux refuses orders and decides to declare for De Gaulle, he may have gotten some of those arms. Had he done so, the Japanese either may have elected not to invade, or (depending upon when they move) the French and the Allies could have given them more of a fight.
The Japanese aren't ready to move against a Free French colony at this time. Doing so would trigger a DOW from the UK. It would also trigger the US embargo, and possibly more sanctions of some type. So, IMO, they have to wait. More aid gets into China. Phibun gravitates towards the Allies instead of the Japanese, no Franco Thai war of 1940. Now the Japanese don't have the bases they need to invade Malaya and Burma. Will they still attack in 1941? Not sure, but if they do, it'll be much harder for them, and the war would be appreciably shorter.

A link with corroborating information. https://ospreypublishing.com/forum/..._store=osprey_rst&p=1&___from_store=osprey_ca
 
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... Will they still attack in 1941? Not sure, but if they do, it'll be much harder for them, and the war would be appreciably shorter.

...

Absent the the FIC occupation there will be no embargo in 1941. Absent the embargo Japan can still purchase what it needs, obtain loans from the US banks, use US & London banks for their trade. In 1940 60% of Japans trade was in foreign flagged ships, so no embargo no cargo ship crisis.
 
It's worth noting that the Royal Navy will not be ambushed by land based naval air.

Secondly if the French fleet exists the balance of force in the Med changes. The Italian fleet will be dead in the water earlier. The German fleet will be contained more by adding a few fast balleships in the Atlantic.

There will be a spare Anglo French Pacific Fleet and the Japanese won't be able to Pearl Harbour it. If Japan can't run wild navally they will hit a brick wall shortly after the war breaks out.
 

Redbeard

Banned
Interesting thread. I would of course like to add a few comments. The option of Japan choosing not to "bully" FIC and therefore avoiding embargo and the motivation to enter a war with the westerners is very interesting, but it will of course not be any easier to perform later on.

But even if Japan attack FIC and succeed in gaining control in a war situation with Free France and the British Empire, the next and much more important step - seizing Singapore - will be much more difficult.

In OTL the Japanese control of FIC was a prerequisite for the IJN operating in strength in the South China Sea and thus for invading Malaya and Singapore. The British of course knew this, but as long as open war had not been started with Japan they hoped to avoid it and therefore the quite hopeless situation of the British commander in the Far East Brooke-Popham - he clearly had to defend the British possessions at all costs, but should also do anything not to provoke a war with Japan (meaning that he did not dare act on good intel on the Japanese attacking).

If the British Empire is at war with Japan by spring of 1941 that consideration of course is irrelevant and the British position in Malaya and Singapore will be much stronger by the time the Japanese are ready to move on. Slightly less ambitious plans to gain the initiative in the Mediterranean area and fightersweeps over France (which all were in vain anyway) will easily provide the needed resources and not at least there will be no special need to respect Thai neutrality which means that the Isthmus of Kra can be occupied before the Japanese are ready to move on to Malaya - that combined with the reinforcements in place in Malaya will make a succesful Japanese invasion of Malaya nigh on impossible.

Some years ago I made some quite comprehensive studies of the potential of the TL, incl. the British plan for the defence of Malaya - Operation Matador. My best judgement is that one or two extra Infantry Divisions, 2-300 fighters and a tank regiment would have been enough to almost guarantee allied victory in Malaya, but even with only the OTL forces present but a slightly larger determination due to the absence of the "do not provoke war" order - the chance of allied succes would have been significant.
 

Archibald

Banned
I did further research. In the French FFO it looks like Japan conquest most of FIC, minus Ho-chi-Minh ville at the bottom end.
 
Some years ago I made some quite comprehensive studies of the potential of the TL, incl. the British plan for the defence of Malaya - Operation Matador. My best judgement is that one or two extra Infantry Divisions, 2-300 fighters and a tank regiment would have been enough to almost guarantee allied victory in Malaya, but even with only the OTL forces present but a slightly larger determination due to the absence of the "do not provoke war" order - the chance of allied succes would have been significant.

I wonder what a realistic knowledge on Japanese way on treating prisoners would have done on motivation to fight till the end.
 
It's worth noting that the Royal Navy will not be ambushed by land based naval air.

Secondly if the French fleet exists the balance of force in the Med changes. The Italian fleet will be dead in the water earlier. The German fleet will be contained more by adding a few fast balleships in the Atlantic.

There will be a spare Anglo French Pacific Fleet and the Japanese won't be able to Pearl Harbour it. If Japan can't run wild navally they will hit a brick wall shortly after the war breaks out.

Please note that Richelieu Dunkquerke and Strassbourg doubles the allied fast capitalship fleet between the fall of France and the launching of the KGV.

There was a stage where the Germans had the British matched 3 vs 3 for fast battleships. Then remember battles in North Africa. The Italians will need troops in two directions splitting their forces. The extra French naval forces in theater will slash the supplies getting through.

If the Anglo French can bring the Italians to battle before Taranto then Taranto can be a knock out blow instead of stunning the fleet. Or else Force H won't need a carrier as western Med is French so the British can have an extra carrier at Taranto. Either way more damage can be done.

A few butterflies and maybe you can prevent the Raid on Alexandria (by not needing a British fleet in the Mediterranean) and Malta convoys won't need the Sicillian narrows.

Between the British and the French I would not be surprised to see an Anglo French fleet with 8 capital ships and 3 or 4 carriers based in Singapre. Let's say the British and French armies last a month in French Indochina and the fleet is at full readiness to dispute and invasion Malaya can only be invaded over a narrow land border and the infrastructure in Indochina will make supporting an invasion overland hell.
 
In @Dunois Anglo-French Union, the Union captures Sardinia, Libya, and the Dodecanese after the fall of France. The Axis invades Greece in spring of 1941 across a broad front, rather than the Italian invasion of OTL, and the Union is able to withdraw in good order, including a significant number of Greek troops, and holds Crete and the Dodecanese. The Germans launch a major airborne attack on Corsica and Sardinia in summer 1941 simultaneously with Barbarossa, which is ultimately successful.

The detailed outline of history kind of petered out after that, but I got to thinking about how radically different WWII would have looked. I don't know if want to get deep in the weeds of detail here, but it seems Germany would really struggle in Barbarossa with bombers in spitting distance of Ploesti and the threat of Anglo-French troops landing in Corsica/Sardinia, southern Italy, or Greece looming over them. The Pacific immediately struck me as potentially unrecognizable given what a linchpin the Japanese occupation of Indochina was.

I know that Hokushin-ron is right next to Sea Lion in terms of popularity on this forum, but with no Allied embargo, are the chances of a Japanese strike north better? Could the Imperial Navy be placated with a chance to capture Sakhalin, Vladivostok, and Magadan?
 
If Tunisia remains in Allied hands post June 1940 the Axis are out of Africa. The all weather airfields already established there allow air domination of Triploi & the sea routes to it to a level far above that of Malta. Once the Allies get a flow of material there & a decent air corps established its game over for the Axis at the OTL level of deployment to the region. The Germans can double down in sending air assets and elite ground forces, but that must be drawn off from some other battle.
 
In would imagine that any decision to invade Soviet Union would be delayed until China was over. After all the forces involved in Land operations against UK and USA were what could be spared (at least initially). A much bigger land commitment would be needed for the Soviet Union and that would have to wait for China to be finished with.
 
If Tunisia remains in Allied hands post June 1940 the Axis are out of Africa. The all weather airfields already established there allow air domination of Triploi & the sea routes to it to a level far above that of Malta. Once the Allies get a flow of material there & a decent air corps established its game over for the Axis at the OTL level of deployment to the region. The Germans can double down in sending air assets and elite ground forces, but that must be drawn off from some other battle.

My impression from the various France fights on threads I've read is that the real question is whether the Axis can take Corsica and hold Sardinia. Africa is clearly out of the question.
 

Archibald

Banned
Well, France and Great Britain can size or keep both Corsica and Sardinia in the fall of 1940 but they won't be able to hold them past spring 1941 - because of massive German and Italian airpower too close from the two islands (South East France and the entire italian coast).

FFO did a thorough analysis about FIC impacting the Pearl Harbour decision (for the reason Carl mentionned). They finally decided to stay with the same day as infamy as OTL, December 7 1941. I'll try to find the debate and reason why. It is not a case of "let's stay close from OTL despite butterflies": FTL Barbarossa was pushed by 11 months, to May 17, 1942. More like the inevitability of the U.S Japanese war since 1900.
 
I've followed arguments about the viability of a Axis effort in Africa, with Tunisia in operation. The short version is Germany must make Africa its main effort July 1940 & deep into 1941. My take is the Italians would sensibly write off, leaving the forces in place to fight to the end with honor. Translation is they'd not be able to evacuate much. Hitlers lack of strategic sense is another matter. That and his impulsiveness could see a rush to finish off the Allies in Africa. 'Defeat them there & the rest will case in as a house of cards.' might be his view. Or maybe not. So instead of the BoB we might see a massive air battle over the Med. & the Italians reluctantly risking large portions of their Navy.
 
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