I know this has probably be done to death and it's unlikely to happen but in the case of a WW1 where Italy fights against the Entente with the other Central Powers, does that actually makes them capable of winning or would Italy just end on the losing side anyways?
Yes, the addition of Italy or a simple Italy that stays neutral greatly swings the balance of power in the Central Power direction. It has to be remembered the entry of Italy into the Great War was the greatest diplomatic coup of the Entente till the entry of the US.
Generally, every entry outside a direct involvement of Italy would've been incredibly unlikely to utterly impossible to accomplish. There was only one point when it was discussed if Italy would join Germany and A-H, and that was at the start of the war. Afterward, the discussion was always about neutrality or joining the Entente side. Therefore, without any great PoDs before WW1 and to keep things as realistic as possible, Italy has to join from the get-go.
First, I have to say I'm a strong proponent of the fact that an Italy actually standing with the Central Powers assures a victory for their side. To forego any questions of why I have this opinion, it is quite simple. Just Italy allows the redeployment of around 3 million troops that were engaged on CP side on the Italian front added to that are around 5 million Italians...that is a massive shift. Please don't misunderstand me, such a reduction towards a singular point is an extremely simplistic viewpoint, but I think such simplifications help to showcase the massive shift a CP Italy encompasses.
For a more detailed answer, you can look below.
Western Front:
The only difference is the possible involvement of Italy. Thankfully, we don't have to guess or talk about what would Italy do. We know, what the plan was.
In early February 1914, the Rome general staff sent Lieutnant Colonel Fiastri to Vienna to arrange for the transportation of the cavalry divisions through Habsburg territory. In this agreement it was specified that the two principal routes would be via Innsbruck and Villach and that Italian officers would be in charge ofthe mixed commissions at the railroad stations and transfer points. Shortly after, the Italian military attache notified the German government that the Rome cabinet had agreed to send three Italian army corps to Germany in case of war. The Italian army chief further promised to look into the possibility of even larger troop commitments in the near future. Similar notification was delivered at the same time to the Austrian general staff in Vienna. In March, General Zuccari, the designated commander of the 3rd (Rhine) Army, arrived in Berlin to work out the details of how the Italian force was to be utilized on the western front. On March 10-11, 1914, an agreement was reached which deserves careful attention. Significantly, in this document the Italians agreed to place their forces under direct German command. Upon reaching southern Germany they were to advance in the direction ofthe French for the upper Moselle. The Germans would supply eight batteries of 210 mm. mortars and possibly some heavy howitzers. The Germans indicated that they would count on the three Italian arm mobilization plans as of April 1, 1914.
- German-Italian Military Relations on the Eve of World War I, Michael Palumbo, p.351
According to the agreement made and the mobilization plans, the Italians would have sent 3 Italian corps to the Western Front. Such an act would free up a significantly number of German troops to be added to other parts of the Western Front like the right wing of the assault.
The battle of the Marne is generally considered a close thing. If we follow historians like John Keegan and Showalter, there are multiple events detrimental to the German side of the Marne battle. Be it the order to pursue the France in direction of Epinal, the one that send two corps and a cavalry division to the Eastern theatre or the capture of the German plans, there are many PoDs that could affect the outcome. In this case, the Italian participation adds to the German side while it withdraws from French.
Regardless of how much of an effect or what course the events would take, the fact is that in this scenario the German side was strengthened and the French side weakened. Therefore, a better result for Germany than OTL is the likely outcome of the Battle of the Marne or the following events.
Overall, the Germans should have an additional 100.000 troops, which they could have used to strenghten their front in the decisive areas thanks to the addition of the Italian corps. If this numbers sounds too little to make an impact, it's best to keep in mind that this is roughly 80% of the initial BEF (British Expeditionary Force).
Furthermore, the Italian involvement would bind troops in the South. In OTL, the Armee des Alpes or more correctly the „Inspection du Sud-Est” was disbanded on the 17th August and most of it incorporated into the Armée d’Alsace. Additionally, the first transfer of troops happened around the 14th of August wit the 44th divion d'infanterie being send to Grandvillars.
Italy planned to attack the French alongside their border with 5-8 corps. It is highly unlikely that this area would be capable to transfer troops if they came under attack or were threatened by one. Therefore, the reinforcements that were needed would have to come from somewhere else. Furthermore, the casualties and threat such an attack would inflict upon France would require further reinforcements in this place.
Quite frankly, the Austro-Hungarian border was near identical from a topographical perspective and there is little there to make me believe that France is somehow able to do more with less compared to A-H. Consequently, they would have to reinforce these positions and spend resources there.
It should be noted that Italy also planned a landing in Southern France, but such a scenario is too far out there and is on the level of the Mecklenburg landing “planned” by the British. I would ignore it.
The last contribution would be the hindrance the Italian entry would pose towards the transfer of the Armée d’Afrique to France. With the inclusion of Italy, the Mediterranean Sea would be a contested one(s.b.) and it is questionable that the troops would actually make it across the sea.
Altogether, it is clear that the addition of Italy would have a significant impact on the initial events of the war on the Western Front. There is no doubt that their participation has a positive effect for their side and a negative on the opposing side.
With the powers at play here, it isn't hard to see that an early end to the war would be in the cards. France would likely fall either in 1915 or 1916.
Balkan Front
Serbia alone never stood a chance against A-H. The only reason they prevailed for as long as they did in OTL was that A-H was distracted by the other theatres. Additionally, they were the Great Power which butchered their mobilization the most, by far. Including a general, who literally disobeyed his orders to achieve personal glory. It is hard to find a similar case of gross disobedience harming their own country in such a manner.
The Italian entry would free up A-H troops in the range of 800k -1 million in the first year of the war. For the Balkan front this means that the 5th Army is never withdrawn and remains there. I don't see any change on the strategic level, which means that the Serbian side of the conflict would be the first A-H would try to resolve. Compared to OTL, the front would be resolved a little bit earlier and under Austro-Hungarian leadership instead of German. While Mackensen and Seeckt can be counted among the best commanders of WW1 and not having them in command is a detriment, every other advantage was with A-H. Therefore, I can't see them not winning that one.
Furthermore, the addition of the Italian fleet would ensure that no convoys could as easily be transported to Bar(Antivari), further weakening the precarious supply situation of Serbia and Montenegro. Therefore, lowering the fighting potential these foes had.
Lastly, there was some oral agreement in regard to Italian troops being send to this or the Russian front. I sincerely doubt that promise would be kept in the initial month or year of the war. Depending on the circumstances, a minor force could fight in the same theater (Balkan) but not more.
I don't see Bulgaria acting differently. Meaning, they join up when Serbia seems to fall.
The OTL end of French and British troops landing in Saloniki is out in this scenario. As an end result, I see two possibilities. One, the Serbian army after an exhausting and strenuous retreat surrenders near dead on their feet. Two, the Serbian army withdraws into Greece and their actions kickstart the Greek civil war between Venizelos and the king.
There is simply no way that the OTL evacuation happens. Ignoring how most of the transport vessels were Italian and the supply lines now unsecured, the great powers would face enough problems on their own to risk their assets on a lost front.
Mediterranean Sea
*The text was written as an answer to another scenario and the numbers I call into question were from Naval History Net. I thought it fit as an explanation to the effect an Italian participation could have. Therefore, I posted it here. Tomorrow, I will look over it again and amend things if it has too many issues.*
The discussion for the Mediterranean Sea does something, I never quite like for a detailed discussion. It relies upon tables and statistics, ignoring the adage only to trust the statistics that you yourself manipulated. Furthermore, on principle, fleets should be compared and not all ships everywhere. Fleets or squadrons do battle, they are not all put in one stack and then pushed against one another.
I will go over the French fleet, because they are the most egregious examples among the ones in the Mediterranean Sea.
The quotes are universally from the work of Paul G. Hapern, 'The Naval War in the Mediterranean'.
In August 1914 the French would have had only two dreadnoughts to face an Austro-Italian combination, with another pair to follow within a few weeks. The backbone of the French battle squadrons were the six Danton class (18,400 tons, 19.25 knots) which, with their mixed armament of four 12-in. and twelve 9.4-in. guns, are generally considered as semi-dreadnoughts, equivalent to the British Lord Nelsons or the Austrian Radetzkys. They are rather a controversial class, the first large ships in the French navy with turbine engines which experienced considerable teething troubles and had a reputation for excessive coal consumption. Supplementing them were five older and smaller Patries (14,865 tons, 18 knots, four 12-in. guns), the Suffren (12,450 tons, 18 knots, four 12-in. guns) and three Charlemagnes (11,200 tons, 18 knots, four 12-in. guns). The French had five to six older battleships but their value in a fleet action was questionable, however useful they might have been for secondary operations. One of the problems in assessing the strength of the respective navies and trying to determine the balance of power is the question of how many of the older battleships each possessed might be used in a fleet action. The fleets the Mediterranean powers might employ were far more heterogeneous than those the British and Germans were likely to use in the North Sea where, for example, at the Battle of Jutland only one of the German and none of the British battle squadrons included pre-dreadnoughts.
Here we have the first discrepancy between the actual events and tables. France had only two dreadnoughts at the start of the war. Secondly, the quote mentions an important point, pre-dreadnought is not equal pre-dreadnought. Lastly, it is uncertain how many pre-dreadnoughts one side would use.
Following such a line of reasoning, we cannot simply compare table numbers with each other and declare one side automatically better.
Because I can already see someone raising the point about a few weeks not mattering, it was an expectation that battle would happen in the early days. Most statements went with 3 days for a major engagement between the two sides to happen or has happened. Therefore, the early numbers matter immensely and cannot be simply glossed over.
The French did have a relatively large number of armoured cruisers which were a dubious asset, and were one of the reasons why laying down of the scout cruisers in the programme had been deferred until 1917. They were big and to the uninitiated imposing looking, but employed correspondingly large crews. Unfortunately their maximum speed was only 23 knots at best, and their primary armament only 7.6-in. guns. They were therefore too slow to compete with new light cruisers, lacked the gun power or heavy armour protection to face battleships or battle cruisers, and were too slow to run away from the latter. The grevious losses suffered by similar British vessels at Jutland demonstrated their vulnerability in a major encounter. The French had nineteen armoured cruisers and nine older protected cruisers, of which six plus the Jurien de la Gravière, a protected cruiser used as a repeating ship, were allotted to the 1ère Armée navale, the French fleet in the Mediterranean.
Ignoring the limited fighting capabilities, I find it important to note that only part of them were allotted to the battle fleet.
Also, once more you have an important distinction ignored. The roles they should fulfill were similar, but the development circle is protected cruiser, armoured cruiser and then battle cruiser. A protected cruiser has no belt armour and would not be used in a similar fashion as an armoured cruiser. To simply categorize them into one group ignores their inherent differences.
The French had, at least on paper, a sizeable number of flotilla craft. There were approximately 81 to 84 destroyers, 17 high seas torpedo-boats, 170 small torpedo-boats (torpilleurs de défence mobile) and 67 to 75 submarines and submersibles. Many of these were of little value, suitable only for local defence and only about half of them were in the Mediterranean. On the whole French flotilla craft were less robust than their British and German contemporaries. There were approximately thirty-seven destroyers in the Mediterranean, about twenty-four of which were attached to the 1ère Armée navale. Only twelve were 750 to 800 tons, the remainder 350 to 550 tons. Shortly after the outbreak of war the French Commander-in-Chief complained that many of his destroyers were not serious instruments of war.
The French submarine service, both in numbers in service and boats under construction, was one of the largest in the world and Camille Pelletan and the Radicals had made much of this new and revolutionary weapon which was relatively cheap and ideal for the defensive. But despite their numbers, French submarines were a very mixed lot. Many were small and of little value and their torpedoes were inferior to foreign contemporaries. The experience of war would expose these defects, and despite the undoubted courage of the crews the results of French submarine operations were often frustrated by their technical limitations.
Once more we have a slight discrepancy between these numbers and the provided table. Important to note are that only a fraction of these numbers were attached to the fleet and even less were 'useful'. Later on the problems with machinery and designs led to a number of them living under the constant threat of fire in the boiler and engine room. Lapeyrère went so far to call the new 850-ton destroyers perhaps suitable for parade, but not as warships. According to him, only ten among them
were suitable for their designated duties.
Overall the actual French fleet provides are far worse picture than numbers would suggest. Ignoring the factual mistakes, likely happened through counting the ships at a later date instead of the start of the war, there is much speaking against the French fleet.
After we have established the lackluster state of the French fleet, we can turn towards the possibilities and likely turn of events for the early days of the conflict.
First, we need to establish the early goals and actions of the two sides. Thankfully, we know their plans.
The French and the British had a vaguely formulated agreement about acting together and granting the French nominal command. In reality this was worth little. There was no effective communication between the two fleets in the Mediterranean, no pre-arranged meeting place, no established understanding between the two commanders, declared strategic objective, clear orders or anything actually substantial.
With the initial set of orders for the British being, to not engage superior foes which by itself led to a misunderstanding in OTL and the French orders completely ignoring the British, it seems ridiculous and based on wishful thinking to say these two sides would cooperate perfectly or even attempt to in the early days.
For the French side the orders were far clearer. Lapeyrère was ordered to ensure the transport of troops from Africa according to the mobilization plans of the general staff. His own plans, ideas and contributions were disregarded and he had to follow strict orders to do things in the manner the non-naval experts proclaimed. A last attempt made to change the plan to make it more strategically sound as well as provide more protection for the transports was rejected on July 28 by the ministry. At the start of the war, in a somewhat typcial way this was changed once more and the clauses forbidding Lapeyrère from building convoys were lifted.
The French fleet departed Toulon on August 4 in three groups towards Algeria. The transports were to sail at pre-arranged times from Africa and head towards Cette at full speed. Lapeyrère intended to form convoys and protect them as best as he could.
Now, the question is if these orders or arrangements would have changed through the scenario the OP stated. The unsurprising answer is no. It is no secret that the cooperation in the Mediterranean was a story of conflict instead of harmony. There was conflict of interest, personalities, strategic goals, national pride and procedural issues. The final decisions made for war happened in a couple of days. It's utterly ludicrous to believe that the two great powers and navies would accomplish a close cooperation in this timeframe when they struggled to achieve the same in a matter of years. And even the steps below an actual close cooperation would be in the realm of fantasy. They wanted different objectives and the British were extremely unwilling to sign anything binding before they needed to.
On the other side you have the two rivals A-H and Italy. They had established a groundset of rules. The commanders had established a rapport, meeting place, logistical issues, strategic objective, chain of command, communication and information exchanges.
As an example of how much they planned and prepared for this, even in OTL coal supplies for the combined fleets were ready at Augusta along with colliers and lighters, prepared by the Italians(!!). Of course, there would issues and problems for such a combined fleet, but certainly less than for any hastly combined French-British one and far less than you would normally expect.
As for their strategic objectives, one chief objective would be to stop the transport of the 100.000 troops from Africa to France. This goal was established during the early talks for the convention and been stated on multiple occassions by Haus himself. Archduke Friedrich gave his express permission for Haus to act according to the convention as long as Italy doesn't shirk its alliance obligations. Therefore, no orders would stop the combined fleet from acting.
Haus expected the French fleet to do the strategically sound move and try to fix their fleet in the central mediterranean sea, instead of focusing completely on convoy duty. Lapeyrère wanted to do that, but his political leadership outright forbid him from doing that. This left them with the aforementioned three groups and convoys.
Between them stood the British fleet. There are three reasonable choices left to them in the face of a clearly superior force. First, they run with their tail between their legs, hide or in an attempt at a glorious death try to buy the French some time by throwing their lives away. I think we can discard the last option, in OTL just the Austrian fleet was enough for the Admirality to order the fleet to withdraw at the first sight of it. This leaves two valid option.
The British can either withdraw towards the Suez canal or try join the French. For the latter the obvious options are Bizerte and Toulon. Without an established way of communication they couldn't know the exact position of the French fleet and we know from the Russian example that open communication is a concept leading to disaster.
Of course, there is also the option to go to Gibraltar.
For the option to be valid to combine with the French, there is a need for the decision to have been made, the order has to be sent, the location has to be found and Britain has to have declared war on Italy and A-H. All of these points represents obstacles that need to be near instantly overcome for there to be a chance of the two fleets combining. The so-called human factor, which is so often ignored, cannot be ignored. In OTL, both France and Britain hesitated with a declaration of war towards A-H. The overall procedures were not designed for speed and in the early days uncertainty and fog of war did attribute for much. Under these circumstances I don't consider it reasonable to ascribe near supernatural capabilities to the British side to give the French fleet a fighting chance by having the British sail out en masse to find and join them.
This leaves the options for them to hide in their own harbor or go to a French one. I would say in the early days the official orders were more cautious and focused on safety than later on. Additionally, in OTL the British when faced with only the Austrian fleet commanded their squadron to not engage a superior foe...and that's it. They didn't order their ships to direclty go to French harbors and combine with them to stand against the superior Austro-Hungarian fleet. There is much that can be said about the British navy, but that they easily panicked is not something they are actually known for. Therefore, I find it that them following the course of OTL the most likely.
After we have established the circumstances, the only thing left is to describe the hypothetical outcome of this situation.
On the one hand we have the combined Austro-Hungarian-Italian fleet, with the likely addition of the German ships as either auxilaries or actual factors, and on the other hand we have a French fleet that is separated into multiple elements.
It is plain to see that the Central Power fleet is superior in nearly each measurable way. They have more dreadnoughts, better light elements and the overall quantitative edge. If there would be a battle between the two sides, there is little doubt in me that the Central Power side would come out victorious. Therefore, the only question remaining is, if there would be a battle.
And I have to say most certainly. The most likely starting harbors are known, their destination is known, ships using coal are easily spotted from a distance, the convoys were more concerned with speed than staying hidden and the convoys were split into multiple ones instead of one big one. Considering all these elements it stretches the realms of possibility for one such convoy to pass by without being sighted, but it could happen. Now, the same thing happening multiple times in an extremely short time frame needs ASB involvement.
One part will be found and engaged. The question follows, what would the French Fleet do? They could abandon the part of their fleet, try to combine and fight or change their plan. Considering the kind of man the admiral was, there is no reckless charge. The order would be for the fleet to disengage and withdraw, while the other elements of the fleet combine. Meanwhile older elements would be tasked with running protection for the last convoys as they battle fleet tries to buy them the time. With the convoys so close by they can't stop and their orders are clear, the transport has to be secured and there can be no delay. Such orders leave him no other option than to ensure it happens and the best way is to stop the hostile fleet from getting near them, which is best done through a game of cat and mouse. Even in the best case such an operation would endanger their ships to get the convoys through, which means losses.
As I see it, the realistic worst case would be for the CP fleet to hit the French when they were split in two and get the part with the commander. Best case is the French discover the hostile fleet early on and combine their main assets into one group and leave older vessels for the transport protection. In that case the CP fleet only gets some older elements including a convoy.
Personally, I lean towards a great blow to France. There are so many ways for things to go badly for them and far fewer for things to turn out well.
After any battle, there could be little doubt that this sea is a contested area and that France is in dire need of help. Britain doesn't send inferior elements to deal with an enemy. A simple look at how they dealt with Spee's suqadron reveals such an attitude. They send two battlecruisers, three armoured cruisers and two light cruisers against two armoured cruisers and three light cruisers. To suggest they would send pre-dreadnoughts into this area without equalizing the amount of dreadnoughts is ludicrous.
Economy:
This is one of the points that you would see raised again and again. It's about the dependcy of Italy on British coal. It's always used in only one direction as a direct example for why Italy would never ever join the CP. Such arguments are most often brought forward by amrchair generals or even worse, armchair economists.
There are a multitude of arguments that can be brought forward against such a simplistic view of reality, but I will simply point out that it took till the middle of 1915 for German firms to no longer be able to order goods from Great Britain. In their minds such things can be done by pushing a hidden button somewhere and then it's done. Reality is far more complex and WW1 has been overlooked far too often for the utterly amazing work the people at the time did to handle new circumstances.