Lines in the Sand: A History of the Gulf War
- Thread starter NeoDesperado
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Okay, big new installment for you all! Today we're taking a look at how some of the other countries in the Middle East are reacting and then getting back to the action.
Lines in the Sand: A History of the Gulf War
IV
“The world today stands at a crossroads just as it did in 1938. In that year Adolf Hitler and his Nazi regime were appeased to preserve global peace, but it only fueled their greed for more land and power. We see a new Hitler in the President of Iraq, as well as new Mussolini in President Saleh of Yemen. These dictators wish for nothing less than total hegemony over the Middle East, and to hold the rest of the world hostage to their whim. America will not allow their blatant, unprovoked aggression against the peaceful nations of the Persian Gulf. - President George Bush
“I say to you, the President of the United States, you have lied to your people…you are going to be defeated. You are involving yourself in affairs that are not your concern and your people will pay the price for your arrogance. Thousands of Americans whom you have pushed into this dark tunnel will go home shrouded in sad coffins.” - President Saddam Hussein
“Once people start shooting at each other, it is never easy to remain just a little bit at war.” - General Norman Schwarzkopf
Transcript from meeting between King Fahd Al-Saud and Osama bin Laden
March 5 1990 - Saudi Royal Palace - Riyadh
Osama bin Laden – I greet you, great King, and wish God’s blessings upon you and your house in this time of darkness.
King Fahd – I thank you for your good tidings, and hope for His similar blessings upon you and your family. I trust that they remain safe at this time?
Osama bin Laden – That they do, your Eminence. Praise be to God and his great mercy and compassion, they have so far remained out of harm’s way from this terrible crisis.
King Fahd – I am most pleased to hear this good news, dear Osama. In times such as these we must keep our families close. They are the truest of allies; indeed, there is nothing on this earth more powerful than the bond of blood.
Osama bin Laden – There is true wisdom in your words, your Eminence. If I may be so bold however, in these times perhaps we must look to gather our friends closely as well. We have been betrayed by our treacherous brothers in Iraq and Yemen, and the faithful must join hands if they are to survive this stab in the back.
King Fahd – You speak words of wisdom as well, Osama, but I have taken measures to counter the treachery by our misguided brothers. Already our forces mobilize to meet the invaders and throw them back into their dens.
Osama bin Laden – I do not doubt your words oh great King, nor do I doubt the final victory of Saudi Arabia in this great war, but I must speak of something that weighs at me greatly.
King Fahd – And that would be?
Osama bin Laden – I offer my apologies for questioning your great wisdom, but if I may interject that your decision to allow the Westerners to use our sacred land for their purposes may have been perhaps too hasty? Surely the use of Arab soldiers pure of faith would be sufficient to drive out the backstabbers?
King Fahd – Ah, I see. Surely you do not agree that we as a people face a grave threat from these invaders?
Osama bin Laden – There is no doubt of that, my King. But this is an Arab matter, and must be resolved by Arabs in turn. We cannot hold our children with pride if we must turn to the Western imperialists to solve our problems for us.
King Fahd – Be careful that you do not forget yourself, Osama. We face a combined foe advancing in waves of steel tanks and planes. We will ultimately prevail, but the kingdom is in need of help beyond that which can be fulfilled through Arab means. The American Secretary Cheney has personally assured me that their troops will leave when we ask them to.
Osama bin Laden – My apologies, your Eminence. But surely my forces could help just as well as the Westerners? We have fought the tanks and planes of the Communist infidels in Afghanistan for ten long years, while the Americans grew fat in German bases waiting for Soviet troops that never arrived. We have fought and bled while they paid others to fight for them in the jungles of Central America. The Americans have lied about their intentions before and they can just as easily lie now. We cannot allow their decadent, immoral boots to poison our sacred land.
King Fahd – The decision has been made and my word is final in this matter, Osama. Saudi Arabia will use the forces of the Americans to achieve victory over Saddam and his den of murderers. We have no need of you and your mountain nomads. I suggest that you leave, for my patience in dealing with you has reached its end. Were it not for the high regard in which my family holds your father Mohammed I would have you thrown out for your impertinence.
Osama bin Laden – I shall trouble your presence no further, oh King. Heed my words though: you are making a grave mistake in allowing the Americans into our nation. The unbelievers will desecrate all that we hold dear, and you will smile while they do so.
King Fahd – Get out, get out at once! How dare you? Begone this instant and do not think to show your face in this house again!
Excerpt from Mother of all Battles: A New History of the Arabian War
By Simon Anderson Naval Institute Press 1995
Speed Bumps
The American buildup in Saudi Arabia began to notice two problems emerging as their jets and soldiers started arriving in force. First, while it was relatively easy to arrange for the transfer of Air Force fighters to the growing hub of air power at Al Kharj, the necessary support structure to keep the jets armed and flying was trickling in at a slower rate. For each fighter squadron deployed to the region, some 1,500 support personnel were required for arming, fueling and general maintenance. These personnel and their accompanying equipment were fighting for the same space in the transports as the ground troops and their necessary gear. Infighting between the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps became a frequent occurrence as each branch sought to get their personnel priority billing on the transport flights. As a result, though the US had 7 squadrons of F-15s from Langley AFB and Bitburg, Germany on the scene by March 5, there were only enough support staff available for two of them to successfully conduct operations, leaving the remainder to yell all the more loudly for more transports. Until then, the majority of planes arriving were merely serving as a visual show of force, showcasing America’s potential power in arrayed rows of advanced military hardware gleaming in the hot desert sun.
The matter of transferring American military units, their fighting equipment and the supplies needed to keep them fighting had been handled through complex computer programs in recent years, dealing with the immense complexities of arranging for proper shipping timetables and availability. For the modern military commander, deploying units into the needed theater of operations had literally reached the point of selecting from a pre-prepared list of battle plans and letting the computers work their magic. In the case of the crisis in Saudi Arabia however, CENTCOM was facing a threat they weren’t fully prepared for. Until recently, their battle plans focused solely on a threat from the Soviet Union, and it wasn’t until late 1990 that General Schwarzkopf and his staff began work on Plan 1002-90, the first document to consider a potential threat from Iraq’s military. Work on the new plan had forced CENTCOM to reprogram their deployment plan into the computers, a process that was still underway when the first Republican Guard tanks rolled into Kuwait on March 1. Consequently, the process of organizing and directing the required units for the defense of Saudi Arabia had to be performed by hand, with multiple scheduling errors occurring in the first week of the crisis as various activated units found themselves arriving at a rail station to discover that the train reserved for their use had been instead ordered to another station miles away. It was an immense headache for the campaign planners, and the hourly updates of Iraqi and Yemeni advances created a situation rife with stress and anxiety.
Though the West was scrambling to get troops into the region with mixed results, they were having better success with obtaining permission from Arab leaders to use their military bases and ports for use in the coming days and weeks as their forces arrived on the scene. Outside of Saudi Arabia and the primary American buildup at Al Kharj and Dhahran, the United States needed additional locations to operate from and reduce the risk of an enemy strike crippling their defensive abilities. B-1 and B-52 heavy bombers were starting to arrive at the Diego Garcia airbase well to the southeast in the Indian Ocean from bases in the Pacific region, and negotiations with President Mubarak had opened the military facilities of Alexandria for American use, including the potential to base heavy bombers as well in the future. It was a huge coup for planners, and they immediately set about moving B-52 units to the Nile region, with the first planes set to arrive on March 7.
To the east of Yemen lay the Sultanate of Oman, ruled by Sultan Qaboos Al Said. A well traveled man educated by military academies in the West, Al Said had gained the throne in 1970 and immediately set about modernizing a nation that served as the southern half of the Strait of Hormuz across from Iran. Oman’s strategic position was vital to the region’s security and had been courted heavily by the West, particularly Britain and the United States. The Sultan retained a unique position among the Arab leaders prior to the crisis by adopting a stance of neutrality from the affairs of the Gulf states while maintaining close ties to the U.S. and British militaries. This position had allowed them to retain ties with Iran during the war in the 80s, and they continued to keep diplomatic relations with Iraq and Yemen open throughout the crisis. Following the renewal of a ‘facilities access’ agreement in 1990, USAF and RAF forces were allowed use of the large airbase at Masirah Island, as well as several more air and naval bases throughout the country. Oman for its part would contribute two reinforced brigades to the defense effort in Saudi Arabia, but the majority of the Sultan’s forces would be deployed along the border with Yemen. Oman’s forces had fought an insurgency from the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the province of Dhofar from 1965-75, and there had been clashes on the Oman-Yemen border as recently as 1987. While Oman would be unable to conduct significant operations into Yemen without extensive outside assistance, their deployment would force the repositioning of Yemeni troops to counter the potential threat. More importantly, March 6-7 saw the arrival of American and British special forces within the country, though news of their insertion and exact mission were kept from the press and general public.
Though President Hafez Al-Assad of Syria was a leader of the Ba’ath party just like Saddam Hussein, there was a great deal of animosity between the two leaders. Both figures saw themselves as the potential head of a pan-Arabism movement, and by 1991 were serving in an arch-rival capacity to the other. Al-Assad was opposed to the invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on the sheer principle of taking a stance against Hussein, but the crisis produced the added bonus of allying with the West and the enormous economic and diplomatic advantages it carried. Syria could finally receive U.S. approval in its occupation of Lebanon and regain a significant amount of regional prestige by helping the West, though the political reversal from the traditional hatred of the West and all it stood for would have to be carefully presented to the Syrian people. No Western troops would be allowed into the country, but Syria would send a contribution force south the assist the Saudis against the aggression. Al-Assad presented the turnaround as a necessary move, downplaying the Western effort and emphasizing the Arab efforts in televised speeches to the public. The Syrian military immediately mobilized, flying several commando teams into Saudi Arabia by March 6 and making preparations for the deployment of two divisions, one armored and one mechanized, in the coming weeks.
President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt saw the invasion as a massive betrayal and humiliation. Saddam Hussein had personally assured him at length throughout late 1990 and early 1991 that he had no aggressive intentions against the people of Kuwait, much less those of Saudi Arabia. He had supported Iraq in its war against Iran, as well as trying to work with Hussein throughout the 1990 OPEC meetings to resolve the over-production issue. The actions of Yemen were just as shocking, as Egypt had fought in support of the republic’s forces during their civil war against the royalists in the late 60s. For Egypt’s pride, and his own, the conduct of Iraq and Yemen was unacceptable and must be set right. Egypt would naturally take the lead in any Arab response effort, and after negotiations with the Saudis for approval to operate within their territory, began mobilizing his forces and gathering shipping for their transport across the Red Sea. The first Egyptian airborne brigades crossed by plane on March 5 to assemble in the coastal city of Jeddah while the first elements of one armored and two mechanized divisions began arriving at the city of Suez for loading onto transports by March 7. The Egyptian navy sortied on March 5 with a task force escorting eight minesweeper vessels south, but these units halted just north of Jeddah and maintained position throughout March 6-7, waiting for word from the United States Navy before proceeding any further. The same invisible barrier was upheld with patrols of F-16s and E-2Cs keeping close watch but refusing for the moment to venture further south than Jeddah.
In the Persian Gulf, the nations of Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates found themselves staring down the barrel of the Iraqi war machine. Republican Guard forces were just up the Saudi coast, and it was only a short trip by causeway to the island of Bahrain, with Qatar and the UAE lying not much farther south. The Gulf states needed little convincing that Iraq could just as easily swallow them next, and pledged their immediate support to help the West defend Saudi Arabia. Each country had little in the way of a standing armed force, but could contribute to financing the defense effort, and each agreed to send a reinforced brigade north to help defend the coastal region north of Dhahran. Finally, in addition to the established American and British naval bases at Al Manama and Doha, UAE President Zayed Al Nahyan agreed to open the facilities of Abu Dhabi for use by the Western forces.
To the north, the Republic of Turkey sought to take advantage of the crisis, though its position was somewhat risky. Much like Syria, President Turgut Ozal saw the invasion and Western response effort as an opportunity to showcase his country’s usefulness and regional influence. With the winding down of the Cold War, Turkey found its traditional status as the strategically vital southern linchpin of NATO reduced to a proverbial backwater largely ignored in the wake of the revolutions throughout Eastern Europe. Ozal felt that building close ties with the West was of absolute importance in the survival of his country in the new post-Cold war era, and taking a stand against the Iraqi/Yemeni aggression would greatly help Turkey attain membership into the European Community. However, Turkey had usually kept itself separate from the affairs of the Gulf states, and there were fears among the legislature and military that they too would be pulled into the bloodshed. Though Turkey maintained a respectable military, a significant portion of its armed forces were equipped with Korean War-era weaponry, and there was a general fear among the Turkish top brass of Iraq’s considerable arsenal of missiles and unconventional weaponry such as poison gas. In addition, a major oil pipeline from Iraq ran through central Turkey, handling some 50% of the output from the Kirkuk region. Exports through this pipeline were a major source of income for the Turkish government, and their loss would be a significant blow to the Turkish economy. After taking these points into consideration, President Ozal announced that Turkey was allowing the U.S. forces use of the Incirlik air base in southeastern Turkey, then proceeded to shut down the Kirkuk pipelines on March 5 and ordered the Turkish military to deploy 100,000 troops along Iraq’s northern border. Turkey had no desire for the war to spill over into their nation, but the deployment provided a public show of force to prevent any Iraqi counter-moves and forcing a mirrored deployment of Iraqi troops across the border.
Saudi Arabia for its part had to look to its immediate defense from its 40,000 strong Army divided into nine brigades and five artillery battalions and the Saudi National Guard’s 55,000 soldiers commanded directly by the King. Though it had purchased a modern air force of 175 Tornados, F-5s and F-15s, they had no combat experience and their training was seen as less than satisfactory in relation to their seasoned counterparts in the Iraqi Air Force. The kingdom had traditionally solved its modern disputes through diplomatic and financial means, and the crisis was sending its armed forces into an involuntary baptism of fire. On the morning of March 4, as Yemen was announcing the shutdown of the Bab el Mendab Strait, the Saudis had mobilized sufficiently to deploy six of its Army brigades with three battalions of artillery support and two of the National Guard brigades in blocking positions to the Iraqi and Yemeni thrusts. Dividing their theaters of operations into Group North and Group South, the King and Minister of Defense had to decide which part of the country needed reinforcements the most urgently. Concluding that while there were equally credible threats to the eastern oil fields of the Ash Sharqiyah (literally Eastern Province) and the Holy Cities in the west, the shortly expected arrival of Egyptian forces from across the Red Sea would help stabilize the southern front. Therefore, the primary Saudi defense effort was to be focused to the north against Iraq. The Army would deploy two armored brigades and three mechanized infantry brigades to defend the coastal city of Al Jubayl and its airbase and farther inland at the city of Hafar Al Batin to cover the northern approach to King Khalid Military City, with support from three artillery battalions and a mechanized infantry brigade of the National Guard. This left a single brigade each of armor and mechanized infantry, two artillery brigades, and the remaining National Guard mechanized infantry brigade for defensive operations along the southern front. The three infantry brigades were still in the process of organizing and would be used to reinforce the fronts as needed, with the Army airborne brigade serving as a rapid reaction force to help contain enemy breakthroughs.
The invasions had served as a massive embarrassment to King Fahd and the Saudi royal family. In a culture that obsessed over the concept of saving face, the constant retreat of Saudi forces in the face of the Iraqi and Yemeni columns could not be allowed to continue lest the family appear weak and incompetent in the eyes of the Arab world. A stand had to be made, and the King declared that the armed forces of Saudi Arabia would hold fast to defend Hafar Al Batin and Al Jubayl in the north, and a defensive line stretching along Highway 10 anchored on the cities of Abha and Khamis Mushayt in the south. In addition to air support provided by the Saudi Air Force, several American forward air controllers were assigned to the Saudi Army to call in further assistance from the available pool of USAF F-15Es at Al Kharj.
As the nations of the Middle East and the outside world conducted their negotiations and pledged their commitments to defend the Gulf, Iraq and Yemen had hardly been anything but idle. The element of surprise was quickly wearing off, and before long they would begin to see increasingly organized defenses from the opposition. The Saudi’s declaration to stand fast and retreat no further appeared to have no visible effect in the advance of the invading columns, but it was a clear sign of things to come.
After a brief pause to regroup on the night of March 3/4, the Yemeni Army continued its advance northward with its western column splitting to assault the towns of Jazan and Abu Arish. Both fell with a minimum of resistance, with the primary holdup to the Yemeni advance being the line of refugees fleeing north and clogging the highways with traffic. Hoping to break the deadlock, before long T-62s were firing indiscriminately into the packed vehicles, sending panicked drivers to the roadside trying to avoid the carnage. The column continued north through the burning wreckage of the refugee exodus, but at a greatly reduced pace and only managing to reach the town of Sabya by nightfall. The Yemenis continued the advance throughout the night and was halfway to the town of Baish by the morning of March 5. After driving relatively unhindered throughout the morning, scouting units began reporting numerous radar contacts inbound from their immediate north. A flight of Su-20s providing local air cover was directed to intercept and discovered six Saudi F-15s intent on conducting air strikes against the Yemeni forces. In a brief engagement, three of the F-15s were shot down at the cost of one Su-20, though two of the surviving Saudi jets broke through to make a single bombing run on the column before fleeing for home. The air strike caused the first significant Yemeni casualties of the war, but only brought about a brief halt to the advance. Baish was captured in the late afternoon, and troops were passing through Al Matah by midnight March 6.
To the east, scattered Saudi forces opposing the enemy column advancing through the Asir Mountains received yet another surprise during the early hours of March 4 when elements of a Yemeni airborne brigade leapfrogged forward to seize control of the airports at Najran and Ash Sharawrah. After repelling a brief and haphazard assault from the local police forces, they were able to maintain their defensive perimeters until relieved around 1600 hours by two mechanized infantry brigades arriving from Dhahran Al Janub and Marib. As the sun set on March 4, Yemen had wrested de facto control of the Najran province from Saudi Arabia, a victory that caused spontaneous celebrations to break out in the capital of Sanaa. To the north, the primary eastern column of the Yemeni force moved north from Dhahran Al Janub to continue their trek through the mountain roads, emerging into more open territory to the southeast of Sarat Abidah. Noting their immensely good fortune at seeing no sign of the enemy’s planes, the small town fell without a shot fired during the night of March 4/5. Their nearly bloodless streak came to an end by the evening of March 5 as their forces reached the southern outskirts of Ahad Rafidah, just 5 miles south of the main Saudi defensive line in Khamis Mushayt. Forward Saudi scout units dug in as an advance warning screen took advance elements of the Yemeni armored brigade by surprise with a short skirmish before retiring north to the larger city. Having encountered their first significant hostile force since crossing the border, the local Yemeni commander General Hayyan ordered his forces to halt just short of Ahad Rafidah and sent scouts to investigate the Saudi defense lines while awaiting the arrival of additional units from the south. Saudi forces took slight advantage of the stalled Yemeni advance, launching sporadic artillery and air strikes but causing ultimately little damage as the arrival of night shrouded the battlefield. During the hours of darkness Yemeni troops continued to trickle into position while Hayyan weighed his options. Reports estimated that a brigade of Saudi mechanized infantry was dug in at Khamis Mushayt and at hastily erected defensive strongpoints along the highway to Abha. He had the majority of an armored and a mechanized infantry brigade on the scene with another scheduled to arrive over the course of the next morning. He could call upon three battalions of artillery and two squadrons of Mig-17s for fire support. The western column under the command of General Attas was supposed to be in possession of Ab Darb and the southern terminus of Highway 10 and threatening the Saudi deployment around Abha, but contact between that column and his had been ultimately lacking. The latest communications from Attas had put his forces still south of Baish, but that had been nearly 24 hours ago. Whatever progress the western column had made since then, it was apparent that they were lagging behind in the Yemeni timetable and could not be counted on for support in the coming attack even in a distracting role. After conferring with his staff, Hayyan decided to proceed alone against the Saudi positions. News of the fall of Najran had reached him earlier in the day, and he was eager to prove his own skill by accomplishing the seizure of the Asir province.
Miles to the southwest, as of March 4 the Bab el Mendab Strait had suddenly become the most famous geographic location on earth and the immediate center of attention in the international community. Calling the closure “an act of economic war upon the international community” President Bush declared that U.S. forces would take immediate action to clear the Bab el Mendab by all available means necessary in order to restore its use to global shipping traffic. Despite the President’s fiery rhetoric and the sudden and immense pressure to secure the strait as quickly as possible, CENTCOM planners were still unsure of Yemen’s ultimate capacity to maintain the closure. Yemen had no navy to speak of beyond a few patrol boats and transport craft, and the Yemeni Air Force had no experience with anti-ship operations. The matter of surface-to-surface missiles was more vague, with reports of at least 20 SS-21 Scarab missiles in their arsenal, but nothing was known beyond that. Some analysts believed that Yemen would pull a Falklands and try to bomb or strafe ships in the passage, while others concluded that the Yemeni blockade was merely a hollow threat. Extensive reconnaissance of the area was urgently needed before a serious effort could be mounted to secure the Bab el Mendab for allied use.
Despite clear skepticism among the Western governments, the seriousness of the Yemeni declaration was made all too apparent at 1535 hours local time as the Norwegian oil tanker Hilda Knutsen decided to run the strait instead of attempting the journey south around the Cape of Good Hope. Despite the immense risk involved, the captain had hoped to take advantage of the sudden spike in oil prices and the tremendous profit involved. The tanker had been sailing slowly to spot and avoid any mines as it progressed north and sailing as close to the African shore as possible when lookouts reported a series of flashes along the Yemeni coast. Four contacts appeared on the ship’s radar, and despite evasive maneuvers by the captain three Silkworm anti-ship missiles impacted into the bridge and main body of the tanker at 1537, with one Silkworm missing and instead landing in the Red Sea. The detonation of the missiles utterly destroyed the bridge and broke the ship’s keel, sending millions of barrels of crude oil pouring into the waters of the Strait. At 1541, fires caused by the explosions ignited the storage tanks, causing a massive explosion that ripped through the forward section of the ship and was clearly heard by French personnel at the Djibouti military facility some 80 miles south. The two halves of the tanker settled into the Red Sea shortly afterwards, with burning oil slicks continuing to spread across the region throughout the night and the following days. It was the first major oil spill the region had ever witnessed, and as the days progressed would become a major environmental disaster severely impacting the local ecology.
The attack on the Hilda Knutsen sent CENTCOM planners into overdrive with their efforts. While the government of Norway agreed that ultimate responsibility for blame lay with the captain’s decision to run the strait despite the clear danger, there was only additional pressure to locate and neutralize all Yemeni threats to the Bab el Mendab. A series of reconnaissance flights from Diego Garcia identified twenty-one potential enemy positions along the southwest Yemeni coast that appeared to contain launchers for anti-ship missiles, and well-defended by SAM and AA emplacements. Planners felt confident enough to pass along the list of targets to the USS Independence carrier battle group, arriving on station in the North Arabian Sea early March 5. Despite the intense international pressure, the Independence spent the day planning and preparing a strike mission against the Yemeni sites. At 2300 hours, F/A-18 Hornets from the 147th and 154th Strike Fighter Squadrons launched east, preceded by E-2C Sentry early warning craft and EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare fighters to jam enemy radar posts. Skirting south around the port of Aden, the fighters began hitting the coastal sites at 0014 local time on March 6, dropping cluster and laser guided munitions on the launcher emplacements and SAM defenses. Aside from wildly inaccurate return fire from the AA guns, the strike force finished their runs successfully and returned to the Independence without suffering any damage. Secondary explosions continued for at least two more hours, illuminating the eastern shore of the Bab el Mendab in a grim mirror image to the glowing wreck of the Hilda Knutsen still billowing smoke and fire miles across the Strait.
On the northern front, Iraq had started the day of March 4 with a continued push south along the coastline, with several battalions breaking off from the main group that morning to seize the town of Nairyah. Republican Guard units reached the junction of Highways 85 and 95 by midday and several hours later had arrived at the primary turnoff that would take them to the coastal port of Jubayl, its refinery complex and its major airfield. Taking Jubayl was a vital part of the Iraqi battle plan, just as defending it had become a manner of honor among the Saudi defense forces. As additional forces arrived in front of the city and deployed for assault, they took note of fighter jets dueling far above. Saudi Air Force Tornados and F-15s were throwing themselves into the fight but made little headway against defending Iraqi Mig-29s shielding the armored column from above. By the end of the day 3 Saudi Tornados and 4 F-15s had been lost compared with Iraqi losses of 2 Mig-29s. Iraq still had local control of the air and took full advantage as they launched their assault into Jubayl at 0200 hours March 5. Jubayl Airport was swiftly overrun and the refinery complex was fully in Iraqi control by sunrise after taking minor damage. Saudi forces, particularly the National Guard units, were completely untrained in intensive urban combat operations, though the narrow city streets helped somewhat negate the advantages the T-72 battle tanks enjoyed over the V-150 armored cars facing them. The battle increased in intensity as Iraqi forces reached a canal running parallel to Road 272 with half a mile of open ground separating the refinery complex from the city. It was a natural defensive barrier, and Iraqi forces spent several hours throughout the morning of March 5 sending tank, artillery and machine gun fire pouring into Jubayl but making no real progress until an armored division bypassed the stalemate using Expressway 613 to attack into the city from the southwest. Saudi forces that had been growing more confident in their ability to repel the Iraqis suddenly panicked and broke, attempting to flee south to Dhahran in whatever vehicles they could find, with the local National Guard commander commandeering a private luxury yacht from the harbor to make his escape, abandoning most of his staff in the process. The roads leading south became a killing ground as the lines of retreating vehicles were caught in the open by fighter-bombers and artillery. Within the city itself, isolated and vicious skirmishes took place throughout the rest of the day as enemy units discovered each other in the labyrinthine maze of streets. Over the night of March 5/6, Iraqi units continued to clear and secure the city, with the last isolated pockets of Saudi resistance surrendering shortly after midnight.
To the west, CENTCOM’s prediction of a second front opening along the Wadi Al-Batin proved depressingly accurate as two armored and one mechanized infantry divisions crossed the Kuwaiti border towards the city of Hafar Al Batin on the night of March 4/5. As a dried out riverbed, the Al-Batin valley was a natural invasion route for the area, funneling armies along a path that could eventually arrive at Riyadh 300 miles to the south. All too aware of the strategic importance of this route, Saudi Army and National Guard units had been frantically preparing a defensive line over the last few days, but none of the defending brigades were at full strength thanks to the confusion of the speedy mobilization and most were unsure of a set battle plan beyond simply shooting at the Iraqis when they arrived. As the Iraqis were making their attack into Jubayl to the east, Saudi recon scouts reported a great deal of noise emanating from the north and rapidly pulled back into the city. Initial Saudi hopes to catch the Iraqis in an ambush failed due to poor fire discipline, and the only real advantage for the defenders was the inclusion of the USAF forward air controllers, who directed strike missions on the masses of Iraqi armor deployed to the city’s north throughout the night and into the early hours of morning. Bombing runs by F-15Es flying out of Al Kharj inflicted significant losses on the attacking forces, but by morning Iraqi troops had penetrated into the city, making further attack runs more difficult as the day progressed. Some Saudi troops held their ground until the end, but most opted to throw everything they could into vehicles and flee south towards King Khalid Military City, leaving Hafar Al Batin and victory to the Iraqis.
The battles for Jubayl and Hafar Al Batin had satisfied the Saudi sense of honor at the cost of one Army armored brigade and two mechanized infantry brigades destroyed, as well as the annihilation of the northern National Guard mechanized force. Iraq was in full control of a swath of Saudi territory stretching 60 miles south along the Kuwaiti border and 100 miles along the Gulf coastline. For the 2,300 troops of the 82nd Airborne’s Deployment Readiness Force currently tasked with guarding Dhahran, the enemy was now only 30 miles away. Saudi forces in the north had ceased to exist as a viable fighting force for the near future, and the Americans huddling behind their sand embankments were feeling all too exposed. Members of the 82nd had darkly joked during the flight in about their official job description being ‘Iraqi speed bumps’, but in the wake of the Battles of Jubayl and Hafar Al Batin they were truly the only thing still standing in the way of the opposing force. As they braced themselves for more bad news on the morning of March 6, the latest recon photos revealed that the lead Iraqi columns remained halted within the conquered cities and were showing signs of digging in.
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The Sandman
Banned
And that might well be enough to bring Jordan into the war.
Although I expect the Jordanians would scrupulously limit their invasion to the Hedjaz, framing it as merely a restoration of the rightful Hashemite monarchy, one made necessary by the Saudis proving themselves obviously incapable of defending the Holy Cities. Probably with some additional announcement that they would make no attacks against Western forces so long as they were not themselves attacked.
Vaguely surprised that the Iraqis aren't trying to mine the Persian Gulf yet. If they're doing a better job of planning things, that seems a logical step to take.
Although I expect the Jordanians would scrupulously limit their invasion to the Hedjaz, framing it as merely a restoration of the rightful Hashemite monarchy, one made necessary by the Saudis proving themselves obviously incapable of defending the Holy Cities. Probably with some additional announcement that they would make no attacks against Western forces so long as they were not themselves attacked.
Vaguely surprised that the Iraqis aren't trying to mine the Persian Gulf yet. If they're doing a better job of planning things, that seems a logical step to take.
The Iraqis are digging in, huh... they've outrun their supply lines, then, I assume? How long till they're able to resume advance (if they opt to do so)?
Marc A
Marc A
I just sigh at the losses taken by the RSAF. An exchange of four F-15s for two Su-20s?
Orville_third
Banned
Would the US authorize a callup of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet? (NOT to be confused with CAP.) Would they activate the National Defense Reserve Fleet or Military Sealift Command?
Given that they did for Desert Shield OTL, almost certainly yes.
Probably at least partially and, again, they did so OTL, so almost certainly.
The Sandman
Banned
From some stories I've heard about Saudi competence, I'd say the Saudis got off lightly in that exchange.
James G
Gone Fishin'
I'd have to agree - like Libya once had, Saudi Arabia has an air force full of shiny toys, not combat capable aircraft. Those aircraft look pretty and sound great on paper, but they have no back-up maintenance, logistics or proper flight training.
We'll have to wait and see what Jordan does in light of all this.
The Iraqis can certainly mine the coastal area along Kuwait and the part of Saudi Arabia they're occupying, but until now they've been focusing their efforts on land. Now that the northern front is starting to finally stabilize, they can take steps to defend the area, but they won't be able to do anything like seal off the Strait of Hormuz.
Yep, the Iraqis were operating on shoestring logistics to begin with; the only thing that got them this far was the added months of prep time. They may have been able to get a little bit farther if the Saudis hadn't tried to save Jubayl and Hafar Al Batin, but the fights there ate through enough fuel and supplies to seal the deal. As for when/if they'll be attacking again...
Exactly. While they may have the material, knowing how to use it effectively through proper training is another matter entirely. The only locals with a decent amount of combat veteran pilots is the Iraqi Air Force, and as we'll be seeing they still won't be faring so well against Western pilots.
Hey, could be worse. At least they weren't shot down by Yemeni Mig-17s.
Oh, the humiliation...Yep, with the collapse of Saudi forces in the north, the U.S. needs to double time forces in to prop up the front before the Iraqis get their second wind.
I agree...a very captivating story; subscribed!
Thanks very much, super glad you all are enjoying it!
Oh no, just to be clear it's not horribly unexpected. I'm just disappointed in them given the, uh, disparity in capabilities between the two types.
Well we are talking about the Saudis here. The best gear money can buy, but they're not experienced and training is, to my knowledge, not good.
About the Western pilots, were any Americans involved in the aerial attacks on the oncoming Iraqis or was it just Saudis using American gear? Although there've been logistics and interservice rivalry issues, I get the impression there were at least some functioning units (five squadrons but support for only two) present.
If the Western pilots haven't been blooded yet, it seems like they will soon.
On the other hand, I fear for the success of the Yemeni attack. Some ambitious general thinking he can do something by himself and wanting to outdo another general who's won a victory often ends very poorly.
On the other other hand, the Saudis haven't exactly covered themselves in glory thus far and I'm sure once word of this gets out, morale is not going to go well.
And just how badly has that raid damaged the Yemeni anti-ship capability in the Red Sea?
If the Western pilots haven't been blooded yet, it seems like they will soon.
On the other hand, I fear for the success of the Yemeni attack. Some ambitious general thinking he can do something by himself and wanting to outdo another general who's won a victory often ends very poorly.
On the other other hand, the Saudis haven't exactly covered themselves in glory thus far and I'm sure once word of this gets out, morale is not going to go well.
And just how badly has that raid damaged the Yemeni anti-ship capability in the Red Sea?
I'm reading the first post... I've subscribed.
BTW, I first thought the title said LIES in the sand, but then I saw it wasn't about the 2003 Gulf War... ha ha! ha.
It could end up as a back-handed best-case scenario, with hard-core secularists overthrowing the Wahhabi theocracy, liberating the female half of the population in terms of socio-economic opportunity (politically, everyone gets treated the same, like sheep suspected of rabies) and with no use for Al Qaeda folks.
I look forward to reading this.
BTW, I first thought the title said LIES in the sand, but then I saw it wasn't about the 2003 Gulf War... ha ha! ha.
It could end up as a back-handed best-case scenario, with hard-core secularists overthrowing the Wahhabi theocracy, liberating the female half of the population in terms of socio-economic opportunity (politically, everyone gets treated the same, like sheep suspected of rabies) and with no use for Al Qaeda folks.
I look forward to reading this.
NeoDesperado
Fascinating update. Looking grim at the moment but the Iraqis have stopped, at least for the moment, short of Dhahran, which I think is the most important centre. This could be fatal for them as it allows a bit more time to get reinforcements there. Although they can still launch air attacks to destroy installations and all those F-15's that can't be flown worry me. [Especially since knowing this the USAF probably want to keep some CAP over them].
It sounds like relations between the Saudi monarchy and bin-Laden are going to prevent the OTL close links. Which could however be dangerous down the line. No doubt as OTL he will do what he can to prevent western forces leaving Muslim lands by making things as unstable as possible.
I also noticed the poor performance of the Saudi forces, not just in the air.
Saddam has a very large force but he also has a lot of enemies. If Syria and Turkey are assembling sizeable forces on his borders he will have to take some precautions, even without his paranoia.
One nation missing from the list was Iran, who are probably less than happy with the idea of him getting the Saudi oilfields under his control. I wonder if they might also station a lot of forces on their border, either from their own efforts or someone with some brains and diplomatic nonce elsewhere dropping a hint. Even Khomani may have doubts about another bloodbath but the Iranians could probably achieve a lot without actual fighting.
The awkward bit for the allies might be if continued Saudi incompetence prompts serious unrest and division in the kingdom leading to a clear challenge to their rule. Which would make getting an alliance together a lot more difficult. Also one group asking for Jordanian protection is the one thing that might just, although even then it would probably be unlikely, get them dragged into the war.
Anyway, looking forward to seeing how things develop.
Steve
Fascinating update. Looking grim at the moment but the Iraqis have stopped, at least for the moment, short of Dhahran, which I think is the most important centre. This could be fatal for them as it allows a bit more time to get reinforcements there. Although they can still launch air attacks to destroy installations and all those F-15's that can't be flown worry me. [Especially since knowing this the USAF probably want to keep some CAP over them].
It sounds like relations between the Saudi monarchy and bin-Laden are going to prevent the OTL close links. Which could however be dangerous down the line.
No doubt as OTL he will do what he can to prevent western forces leaving Muslim lands by making things as unstable as possible.I also noticed the poor performance of the Saudi forces, not just in the air.
Saddam has a very large force but he also has a lot of enemies. If Syria and Turkey are assembling sizeable forces on his borders he will have to take some precautions, even without his paranoia.
One nation missing from the list was Iran, who are probably less than happy with the idea of him getting the Saudi oilfields under his control. I wonder if they might also station a lot of forces on their border, either from their own efforts or someone with some brains and diplomatic nonce elsewhere dropping a hint. Even Khomani may have doubts about another bloodbath but the Iranians could probably achieve a lot without actual fighting.
The awkward bit for the allies might be if continued Saudi incompetence prompts serious unrest and division in the kingdom leading to a clear challenge to their rule. Which would make getting an alliance together a lot more difficult. Also one group asking for Jordanian protection is the one thing that might just, although even then it would probably be unlikely, get them dragged into the war.
Anyway, looking forward to seeing how things develop.
Steve
It sounds like relations between the Saudi monarchy and bin-Laden are going to prevent the OTL close links. Which could however be dangerous down the line.
bin Laden was pretty upset OTL about Allied forces being deployed to the Kingdom, and he got himself exiled there, too, so I don't see any significant changes from OTL thus far there.