If the British stay out of the war in 1914 there may not be a war to join in 1916. France is on the ropes and nearly loses Paris in OTL, without the UK there is a strong chance they don't survive the year. Russia is likely to either negotiate in late 1914 after the fall of Paris or surrender by the end of 1915. Look for the German border to encompass the key iron mines at Briey, a general movement of the border 15-20 miles into France, annexation of Luxembourg, and immediate pressure on Belgium and the Netherlands to join the MittleEuropa trade union.
Most plausible WW1 German Victory?
- Thread starter Bomster
- Start date
If the British stay out of the war in 1914 there may not be a war to join in 1916. France is on the ropes and nearly loses Paris in OTL, without the UK there is a strong chance they don't survive the year. Russia is likely to either negotiate in late 1914 after the fall of Paris or surrender by the end of 1915. Look for the German border to encompass the key iron mines at Briey, a general movement of the border 15-20 miles into France, annexation of Luxembourg, and immediate pressure on Belgium and the Netherlands to join the MittleEuropa trade union.
I bet somebody has done a time line on that, but wasn't the German army conservative on stuff like that really and in practice how much could you motorize, a few batteries maybe, might be a good concept tester, waiting for diesel tech to get better.
marathag
Banned
The Telegraph and Railroad usage in the ACW influenced the European observers, the rest of the US&CSA military, not so much.
But nobody really picked up on the usefulness of the Steam Traction use to pull wagon in the Boer conflict for later use in WWI
Not even the British, and they started it
Back to 50 year old favoritism for the Horse and RR
All the stuff I previously posted about the Germans using more Steam prime movers in WWII, also applies with the first one.
Riain
Banned
Which were known quantities, unlike new tech which might ruin your offensive by breaking down en masse.
WW1 was a crucible that showed the need for so much that we take for granted, tactical transport being one of those things.
POD's don't begin and end at the Marne. The Germans missed an opportunity to encircle and destroy the French Fifth Army in the Battle of Charleroi. That's just under 300,000 French troops that could have been lost.
1) Don’t send the Zimmerman telegram and keep the Americans on their side of the ocean.
2) Maybe if the Luisitania sinking was seen as justified via proof of UK contraband being found inside the ship.
3) Keep sinking UK supply ships and starve the population out of the war
4: Let the French keep sending men through the Meat Grinder in the Somme and Pachendale and hope that the French population riots.
2) Maybe if the Luisitania sinking was seen as justified via proof of UK contraband being found inside the ship.
3) Keep sinking UK supply ships and starve the population out of the war
4: Let the French keep sending men through the Meat Grinder in the Somme and Pachendale and hope that the French population riots.
One of the commonly used arguments for the UK joining the war sooner or later is that they absolutely had to prevent Germany from becoming hegemon of Europe.
The problem with that assesment is that I think because of OTL outcome this blinds people to the alternate: Russian hegemony.
The OTL outcome of the war was incredebly unique and nobody, nobody could foresee it. The fact that somehow both Germany and Russia will loose the war was a practically incomprehensible idea at the start. At the start there was 2 resonable expectation of outcome:
1. CP wins resulting in German hegemony - this is what supposedly London had to avoid at all cost
2. Entente wins - including Russia.
Lets take a look at this second option - which the brits were actively fighting for.
1. It gives Russia Constantinople and the Straits.
2. It destroys Germany and Austria-Hungary as buffers to Russia in Europe
3. It also gives Russia East Prusssia, Galicia and who knows what more in Europe - fullfilling for the moment every dream the russians might have had about territorial expansion in Europe
4. It destroys the Ottoman Empire and another long standing hurdle in the path of Russian expansion
Basically we would end up with a Russia in an even stronger position than the Soviets were after WWII, with a still isolationist US and uncertainty about which side the french would take in a russo-british conflict.
Im not saying ze germans winning would be a better scenario for the british. Im saying that the Entente winning with an intact Russia would also be a really bad scenario for the british.
The problem with that assesment is that I think because of OTL outcome this blinds people to the alternate: Russian hegemony.
The OTL outcome of the war was incredebly unique and nobody, nobody could foresee it. The fact that somehow both Germany and Russia will loose the war was a practically incomprehensible idea at the start. At the start there was 2 resonable expectation of outcome:
1. CP wins resulting in German hegemony - this is what supposedly London had to avoid at all cost
2. Entente wins - including Russia.
Lets take a look at this second option - which the brits were actively fighting for.
1. It gives Russia Constantinople and the Straits.
2. It destroys Germany and Austria-Hungary as buffers to Russia in Europe
3. It also gives Russia East Prusssia, Galicia and who knows what more in Europe - fullfilling for the moment every dream the russians might have had about territorial expansion in Europe
4. It destroys the Ottoman Empire and another long standing hurdle in the path of Russian expansion
Basically we would end up with a Russia in an even stronger position than the Soviets were after WWII, with a still isolationist US and uncertainty about which side the french would take in a russo-british conflict.
Im not saying ze germans winning would be a better scenario for the british. Im saying that the Entente winning with an intact Russia would also be a really bad scenario for the british.
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Britain was aware of that - they weren't blind or deaf. The choice to join the Franco-Russian alliance was born of the same calculus that saw Germany's military leadership chomping at the bit to wage war on Russia before 1917. The least bad of a series of bad choices, so to speak.
The perception was that Russia was a hegemon in the making. Much like Germany estimated that any conflict with Russia was going to be unwinnable by 1917, the British estimated that, whichever choice they made, someone was going to be dominant in Europe and even if Germany were to win, Russia had the resources and population to bounce back (much like Germany did IOTL ... and the Soviets did after the reaming in both WWI and WWII).
When the British government chose to join France, they were calculating that Russia was going to be a superpower and, given the choice, it was better to be on Russia's side than risk its wrath sometime in the future even if they managed to win this war. Thus, Russian hegemony in Europe and/or parts of Asia was an accepted outcome, however unfavourable.
This requires the French army doing far worse and displaying an incompetence that they did not display during WW1.
The French were no slouches in WW1 they were able to react to the situation every bit as quickly as the Germans sought to exploit it.
But to your general point it is during this period of WW1 where the Germans have to up their game in order to ‘win’ the war the problem being is that they were already at 100% and were all in and otl it was not nearly enough.
I am not sure what else they could do and it’s likely that winning at this juncture was beyond their capabilities.
I would say if the Germans had better luck invading Belgium in 1914 or they were more successful at the Battle of the Marne. If that had occured, then WWI might have ended up becoming a Second Franco-Prussian War or Austro-Prussian War, a one to two year Continental war. The longer war goes, the more unpredictable it is the trajectory of that war ends up.
I also reckon that the East First approach is a bit implausible (was their even a strong East First approach faction within the German Army?).
I also reckon that the East First approach is a bit implausible (was their even a strong East First approach faction within the German Army?).
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It doesn't actually require that much. The Germans had overwhelming numerical superiority on the flank of the Fifth Army. It was a missed opportunity in a moment of caution, rather than something actually beyond their capabilities.
You're just saying that, but given that the Germans were quite capable of advancing and attacking until long after the Battle of Charleroi, there is no reason to believe this. It was not a case of exhausted troops being at the end of their tether. Again, the possibilities are endless. There is no such thing as an army operating at 100%; chance will always take a bit here and there. Sometimes it's decisive, sometimes not.
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Again though it relies on the French being incompetent.
They were not, they saw the danger just as much as the Germans saw the opportunity.
They were about to launch an attack of their own so they were hardly exhausted either.
It was certainly a danger but the French proved to be equal to the task.
Going east first give the Germans a chance to capture the grain-growing areas of the Russian empire and avoid the food shortage from the hunger blockade.
It was a close run. On the Fifth Army's overextended right flank a single reserve division faced the entire German Third Army, but it took a good while for General Lanrezac to order a retreat. It would not have taken a big POD for the Third Army to sweep into Lanrezac's rear and cause the Fifth Army to collapse. It was a genuine missed opportunity.
David Flin
Gone Fishin'
It was also a closer run thing in the other direction. During the Race to the Sea, the German First Army and Second Army became separated by some considerable distance.
The BEF was facing a big hole in the German line, and the French asked French to get the BEF to advance into that hole, cutting off the First Army, and blocking the route for the Second and subsequent armies from getting to the sea.
In and around the German First Armies were three French Armies.
It was a genuine missed opportunity to cause the First Army to collapse, get behind the Second to Fifth Armies inclusive and wreck their lines of supply, and pop five German Armies into the bag and end the war.
The Germans would have not just have to be better but much better effectively moving enough troops across 40 kilometres before the French reacted in order to trap the entire Fifth French army.
I am not saying it is ASB just improbable
And the Germans doing better does not mean the entire 5th French army goes into the bag
I mean let’s not forget this battle was seen as a great victory for the German army at the time
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
I tried to copy this as a PoD and a fair few folks doubted it could be so decisive as all that. Neat idea though.
David Flin
Gone Fishin'
In comparison to what is often proposed that the Germans can do - at the end of long lines of supply over chewed up ground, the probabilities of success are clearer.
Likely? I'm not enough of an expert to know the chances. But the opening is clearly there. Far more so than for the German option.
Interesting... So Britain thought it was so important to support France, to avoid French defeat, that it accepted unfavorable Russian hegemony as a consequence. That means that if France doesn't need support (because Germany opts for 'east first'), Britain is unlikely to join the war.
When Germany wins against Russia, France will have to make peace, but will still be intact. Germany will be stronger and Russia weakened in the short term. However, in the longer term none of them will become the hegemon.
When Russia wins against Germany, Russia will clearly become the hegemon. So basically Britain should support Germany, provided Germany leaves France alone.