Most plausible WW1 German Victory?

[raharris1973]

The OTL outcome of the war was incredebly unique and nobody, nobody could foresee it. The fact that somehow both Germany and Russia will loose the war was a practically incomprehensible idea at the start.

Agreed.

At the start there was 2 resonable expectation of outcome:
1. CP wins resulting in German hegemony - this is what supposedly London had to avoid at all cost
2. Entente wins - including Russia.

Probably two leading contenders for 'most expected', but I think some sort of:
3. Stalemate, or minor victory - would have been pretty conceivable to people at time- where the overall campaigns are inconclusive, and neither Russia nor Germany remove each other as a contender for hegemony or even manage to impose territorial confiscations or indemnities on each other. Maybe smaller proxy states, like Serbia, suffer or gain some losses, or maybe even that remains status quo antebellum after inconclusive fighting. Or, even if Russia or Germany get a minor edge on each other and grab some land - Germany getting west Poland, or Russia getting Memel or East Prussia, neither combatant's 'weight-class' is changed fundamentally.

 

[Keb]

Interesting... So Britain thought it was so important to support France, to avoid French defeat, that it accepted unfavorable Russian hegemony as a consequence. That means that if France doesn't need support (because Germany opts for 'east first'), Britain is unlikely to join the war.

More that given the choice between a dominant Germany or Russia, Britain (or, rather, Grey and the Foreign Office who were, much like other foreign affairs ministries, effectively rogue in the period leading up to WW1) chose Russia as the lesser evil. Well, that and rampant Germanophobia not helped by Wilhelm II's foot in mouth disease. The position is not necessarily universal in the British establishment, but it is relevant for 1914. It comes down to India, really.

A friendly Russia ensures the safety of India and Russia has trouble projecting naval power (by virtue of needing effectively four navies, all four of which can be bottled up somewhat easily at the time). A friendly Germany ... doesn't really add anything - it certainly doesn't help secure India or British interests in China. It can threaten Russia, but the belief is that Russia will be invincible, a belief that Germany shared (however much hindsight proves that belief flawed). Oh, the German Navy might threaten Britain itself, but only if Britain allows it and the generally accepted belief was that the Royal Navy must remain dominant on the seas regardless of which power is dominant on land. Hence the Naval Arms race.

 

[Riain]

The beauty of this topic is that despite it's enormity with hundreds of divisions at play, a right wing, a left wing, sieges behind the front and the Eastern front handfuls of Corps still matter. Every time I do a deep dive I learn something new.

This time is that France started moving troops away from the A-L frontier on August 28 to the general Paris area and by 10 Sepember had moved 23 divisions which gave the Entente a 56 to 44 superiority in divisions over the CP in that area. Yet despite this the French still managed to hold the German offensive on the left wing that started on the night of 3/4 September and was broken off on 8 September. The Germans can't match this move, if they start at the same time they have less troops to move, 6th and 7th armies have 16 divisions and only moved 14 IOTL and their moves took about 15-20 days.

That said the Germans also had some other divisions to call on, they bought in a Corps from the North Army, force marched Corps of 4th and 5th Armies for the Race to the Sea. But they got off to a late start and had a bigger task with their move, so the left wing offensive was a major blunder.

 

[RedSword12]

The Germans would have not just have to be better but much better effectively moving enough troops across 40 kilometres before the French reacted in order to trap the entire Fifth French army.

I am not saying it is ASB just improbable

And the Germans doing better does not mean the entire 5th French army goes into the bag

I mean let’s not forget this battle was seen as a great victory for the German army at the time

Extricating the embattled French Fifth Army from a rapidly forming kessel would have been a very difficult task. Even if not every man in the Fifth Army was pocketed, the army would effectively cease to exist as a serious formation to oppose the Germans as they move on Paris and engage the remaining French armies. You don't have to kill or capture every man in a formation to render it combat ineffective.

In comparison to what is often proposed that the Germans can do - at the end of long lines of supply over chewed up ground, the probabilities of success are clearer.

Likely? I'm not enough of an expert to know the chances. But the opening is clearly there. Far more so than for the German option.

The Battle of Charleroi was not at the end of a tenuous logistical tether, with the German troops utterly exhausted. They were fresher then than the French and British were in the Race to the Sea after the Long Retreat. I don't see why the chances of success are particularly lesser.

 

[Helmuth48]

More that given the choice between a dominant Germany or Russia, Britain (or, rather, Grey and the Foreign Office who were, much like other foreign affairs ministries, effectively rogue in the period leading up to WW1) chose Russia as the lesser evil. Well, that and rampant Germanophobia not helped by Wilhelm II's foot in mouth disease. The position is not necessarily universal in the British establishment, but it is relevant for 1914. It comes down to India, really.

A friendly Russia ensures the safety of India and Russia has trouble projecting naval power (by virtue of needing effectively four navies, all four of which can be bottled up somewhat easily at the time). A friendly Germany ... doesn't really add anything - it certainly doesn't help secure India or British interests in China. It can threaten Russia, but the belief is that Russia will be invincible, a belief that Germany shared (however much hindsight proves that belief flawed). Oh, the German Navy might threaten Britain itself, but only if Britain allows it and the generally accepted belief was that the Royal Navy must remain dominant on the seas regardless of which power is dominant on land. Hence the Naval Arms race.

I agree that German diplomacy was not very tactful, to put it mildly. But if not for France, will Britain still declare war on Germany to please Russia? I don't know, sounds like Britain is resigned to being dependent on Russia already...

 

[Riain]

Extricating the embattled French Fifth Army from a rapidly forming kessel would have been a very difficult task. Even if not every man in the Fifth Army was pocketed, the army would effectively cease to exist as a serious formation to oppose the Germans as they move on Paris and engage the remaining French armies. You don't have to kill or capture every man in a formation to render it combat ineffective

The problem with encircling the 5th French army is that it would have required the coordination of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies , both to see the big picture opportunity and to act on it. However German command system wasn't set up like that, although some tentative steps were taken in that direction by giving 'operational control' of 1st and 3rd Armies to Von Bulow of 2nd Army.

In any case even if the command structure was correct, the opportunity identified and acted upon it would require the Germans to march faster on the offensive than the French could on the retreat which is a big ask.

 

[RedSword12]

In any case even if the command structure was correct, the opportunity identified and acted upon it would require the Germans to march faster on the offensive than the French could on the retreat which is a big ask.

The situation didn't require them to outrun the French. The German Third Army was on the flank, not the front. To cause the Fifth Army to collapse would only have required partly closing the pocket and assailing it while the French attempted to extricate themselves. A grand encirclement is nice but not necessary to break an army's ability to fight. Mauling the Fifth Army into shreds, while not as great a victory as encircling it, would have achieved more or less the same as far as consequences go. Same reason why the Hundred Days' Offensive was so effective, even though no grand encirclements were made. Breaking down the foe's ability to fight was enough to achieve strategic victory.

 

[wietze]

What would be the worst circumstances for Germany in which Britain enters the war?

Please be realistic, no landings of the entire BEF on the Baltic Sea coast or anything crazy.

mumbles 'Frisian Islands'

Certainly Britain has the power to threaten Indonesia and Belgian Congo, even can do some good cop bad cop, gee I don't know if we could stop the Japanese if they wanted to take over Indonesia kind of thing.

If the Germans were winning in the east and it would be obvious by early September, I could see the British cabinet worrying about what happens if Germany wins in the East, maybe the Germans march through Belgium and Holland in 1915, so a preemptive move makes sense.

the moment japan tries that i suspect the us entering on the central side, japan was seen as a threat by the us

 

[Riain]

The situation didn't require them to outrun the French. The German Third Army was on the flank, not the front. To cause the Fifth Army to collapse would only have required partly closing the pocket and assailing it while the French attempted to extricate themselves. A grand encirclement is nice but not necessary to break an army's ability to fight. Mauling the Fifth Army into shreds, while not as great a victory as encircling it, would have achieved more or less the same as far as consequences go. Same reason why the Hundred Days' Offensive was so effective, even though no grand encirclements were made. Breaking down the foe's ability to fight was enough to achieve strategic victory.

Not exactly, the 5th F Army was deployed in a tipped over L shape, with 2nd G Army on the long axis, 3rd G Army on the short axis and there was a bit of a gap between 5th and 4th F armies that 3rd G Army might have pushed into.

Make no mistake 5th F Army was in a bad position, but IOTL got itself into a far better position pretty quickly. I think the task of destroying it was possible, but it would take a hard charging leader to grab the opportunity by the scruff of the neck and shake it hard. Half measures aren't going to cut it.

 

[NoMommsen]

... , but it would take a hard charging leader to grab the opportunity by the scruff of the neck and shake it hard. Half measures aren't going to cut it.

Can one help me?

Exactly when was v.Bülow made ... 'supreme commander' of the left wing? ... aka 'most senior' to 1st and 3rd german army (in addition to also being further responsible for commanding 2nd german army)?​

 

[Riain]

Can one help me?

Exactly when was v.Bülow made ... 'supreme commander' of the left wing? ... aka 'most senior' to 1st and 3rd german army (in addition to also being further responsible for commanding 2nd german army)?​

The only date I can remember off the top of my head is that on 28 August 1st Army began receiving orders directly from OHL again, rather than from V.Bulow. IIUC it was most of August and it wasn't really a thrashed out concept, V.Bulow didn't designate part or all of 2nd Army to a subordinate to lessen his span of control for example.

 

[Catspoke]

As more of reducing German navy and spending money on the army, 2 extra army corps are created, with the two new extra corps deployed east in the 8th army at the beginning of the war, also means the two corps withdrawn later from the west OTL don't have to be.

With 2 extra corps in the east from the get go, maybe the Germans can afford to try diplomacy for a few more days before triggering all their DOWs. The extra corps offsetting the extra Russian mobilization time. Really no war being the best possible German victory really, as narrow and tricky as these German victory PODs seem to be.

At the very least, 4 extra days of pre war gets some more merchants home, a couple more raiders fitted out, maybe some supplies shipped out to the colonies before the blockade is setup. And maybe the Germans look less like aggressors.

 

[Belisarius II]

Persist in the unrestricted U-Boat campaign. Even if the Americans rage against them, the Germans could avoid attacking passenger ships after the Lusitanian. Before the invention of ASDIC, hydrophones, and depth charges there was no effective way to fight U-Boats. By the end of 1915 Britain could be in the state she was in the OTL 1917 crisis. Britain could go to a convoy system 2 years early, but without the detection, and weapons to fight back with the situation could get desperate.

 

[David Flin]

The Battle of Charleroi was not at the end of a tenuous logistical tether, with the German troops utterly exhausted. They were fresher then than the French and British were in the Race to the Sea after the Long Retreat. I don't see why the chances of success are particularly lesser.

Taken from Wikipedia. More detailed sources are available.

Firstly, logistics. I know, logistics is boring and all the rest. The main Entente logistic hub is circled in blue, and - as we can see - it is very close to the French and British forces. Moving supplies - bullets and artillery shells and so forth - from the hub to the troops is comparatively simple.

In the German case, however, those logistical hubs are way, way back from the 1st to 5th armies, and those same supplies have to be moved from these hubs some 250 miles to the German troops at the sharp end, a lot of it through Belgium and northern France. Germany, at this time, was executing civilians in order to quell francs tireurs, who were - according to the Germans - responsible for disruption of these supplies.

Now, either there were such francs tireurs and hence there was disruption to the lines of supply, and the Germans had a reason (of sorts) for committing war crimes (and regarded as such by the standards of the time), or there wasn't such actions, and the executions were simply war crimes being committed because there was no-one to stop such activity.

Myself, I rather think it was a little from column A, a little from column B, but it is a very simple choice. Either there was disruption to the supply lines or the German forces were behaving as proto-Nazis, or both.

Now, we see the position on 9th September, just at the start of the race to the sea. Between the German First Army and the German Second Army is a gap. A very large gap, some 40 miles wide, in which only scattered detachments were positioned. Right in front of that gap is the BEF and the French 5th Army, with nothing much in front of them.

A move forward by these two, and the German 2nd to 5th Armies have no more ability to race to the sea than they have to race to the Moon. They are in danger of being flanked, with the very real prospect of having Entente forces breaking through to the rear areas. Most military strategists would regard this as a Bad Thing for the German forces.

Meanwhile, the German First Army is isolated. It has both flanks hanging, there's a French Army in front of it, and two French armies being gathered in Paris and in a position to get around.

Anyone who can look at that map and say that the Germans have the advantage in the Race to the Sea is - misguided.

 

[raharris1973]

the moment japan tries that i suspect the us entering on the central side, japan was seen as a threat by the us

....and this US involvement starts to matter in the Pacific tactically at best a year later, or more likely, 18 months or 24 months later.

If the imbroglio shakes Netherlands out of neutrality and onto the CP side in Europe, it could matter sooner there.

And as Japanaphobe as the US is in 1914, the political process of convincing the US that a Japanese invasion of the DEI then is a casus belli for the USA is at a minimum, non-trivial, and not instant. It would require even more salesmanship than would be the case than if Japan had launched an all out war on China around the same time.

 

[marathag]

....and this US involvement starts to matter in the Pacific tactically at best a year later, or more likely, 18 months or 24 months later.

If the imbroglio shakes Netherlands out of neutrality and onto the CP side in Europe, it could matter sooner there.

And as Japanaphobe as the US is in 1914, the political process of convincing the US that a Japanese invasion of the DEI then is a casus belli for the USA is at a minimum, non-trivial, and not instant. It would require even more salesmanship than would be the case than if Japan had launched an all out war on China around the same time.

I would agree no insta-join with the CP, but would see US relations get very frosty with the UK, given the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in force at the time.
Would it be enough for the US Government to limit munitions and arms, along with loans, very possibly.

In 1914 though, the US was probably closer to France. Without the German Troops in Belgium and France doing both the British created Propaganda as well as the very real atrocities committed on civilians, not as much urge to assist when they French troops are being slaughtered on German territory, heading towards the Saar.

 

[Catspoke]

View attachment 821827
Taken from Wikipedia. More detailed sources are available.

Firstly, logistics. I know, logistics is boring and all the rest. The main Entente logistic hub is circled in blue, and - as we can see - it is very close to the French and British forces. Moving supplies - bullets and artillery shells and so forth - from the hub to the troops is comparatively simple.

In the German case, however, those logistical hubs are way, way back from the 1st to 5th armies, and those same supplies have to be moved from these hubs some 250 miles to the German troops at the sharp end, a lot of it through Belgium and northern France. Germany, at this time, was executing civilians in order to quell francs tireurs, who were - according to the Germans - responsible for disruption of these supplies.

Now, either there were such francs tireurs and hence there was disruption to the lines of supply, and the Germans had a reason (of sorts) for committing war crimes (and regarded as such by the standards of the time), or there wasn't such actions, and the executions were simply war crimes being committed because there was no-one to stop such activity.

Myself, I rather think it was a little from column A, a little from column B, but it is a very simple choice. Either there was disruption to the supply lines or the German forces were behaving as proto-Nazis, or both.

Now, we see the position on 9th September, just at the start of the race to the sea. Between the German First Army and the German Second Army is a gap. A very large gap, some 40 miles wide, in which only scattered detachments were positioned. Right in front of that gap is the BEF and the French 5th Army, with nothing much in front of them.

A move forward by these two, and the German 2nd to 5th Armies have no more ability to race to the sea than they have to race to the Moon. They are in danger of being flanked, with the very real prospect of having Entente forces breaking through to the rear areas. Most military strategists would regard this as a Bad Thing for the German forces.

Meanwhile, the German First Army is isolated. It has both flanks hanging, there's a French Army in front of it, and two French armies being gathered in Paris and in a position to get around.

Anyone who can look at that map and say that the Germans have the advantage in the Race to the Sea is - misguided.

I think it was Rian early, that was presenting the POD that could have moved some corps from the German Left to the right late August, just one corps facing the BEF then makes the Germans a whole lot less nervous, if the front line at least stagnates on the Marne in this TL, the race to the sea is 15 to 20 miles further west which puts a whole extra strip of French mining and industry under occupation. Its extra to supply, but not everybody is fighting all the time at that point, even the soldiers the marching up behind the front might provide some distant security to supply.

Regardless agree it is a narrow path to victory for the Germans at this point and in WW1, the Germans needed legendary leadership right then, but that doesn't often happen historically.

 

[Catspoke]

Persist in the unrestricted U-Boat campaign. Even if the Americans rage against them, the Germans could avoid attacking passenger ships after the Lusitanian. Before the invention of ASDIC, hydrophones, and depth charges there was no effective way to fight U-Boats. By the end of 1915 Britain could be in the state she was in the OTL 1917 crisis. Britain could go to a convoy system 2 years early, but without the detection, and weapons to fight back with the situation could get desperate.

With only a handful of uboats in play in early 1915, the Germans might have just put the unrestricted campaign in the southern North sea, or the Thames estuary, and maybe certain areas of the med, avoiding neutral entanglements and getting them used to the idea gradually, and then increasing the unrestricted area over time, as uboat numbers appear, without all the stopping and restarting.

 

[raharris1973]

I would agree no insta-join with the CP, but would see US relations get very frosty with the UK, given the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in force at the time.
Would it be enough for the US Government to limit munitions and arms, along with loans, very possibly.

In 1914 though, the US was probably closer to France. Without the German Troops in Belgium and France doing both the British created Propaganda as well as the very real atrocities committed on civilians, not as much urge to assist when they French troops are being slaughtered on German territory, heading towards the Saar.

Cannot disagree with you on any of these points.

 

[RedSword12]

View attachment 821827
Taken from Wikipedia. More detailed sources are available.

Firstly, logistics. I know, logistics is boring and all the rest. The main Entente logistic hub is circled in blue, and - as we can see - it is very close to the French and British forces. Moving supplies - bullets and artillery shells and so forth - from the hub to the troops is comparatively simple.

In the German case, however, those logistical hubs are way, way back from the 1st to 5th armies, and those same supplies have to be moved from these hubs some 250 miles to the German troops at the sharp end, a lot of it through Belgium and northern France. Germany, at this time, was executing civilians in order to quell francs tireurs, who were - according to the Germans - responsible for disruption of these supplies.

Now, either there were such francs tireurs and hence there was disruption to the lines of supply, and the Germans had a reason (of sorts) for committing war crimes (and regarded as such by the standards of the time), or there wasn't such actions, and the executions were simply war crimes being committed because there was no-one to stop such activity.

Myself, I rather think it was a little from column A, a little from column B, but it is a very simple choice. Either there was disruption to the supply lines or the German forces were behaving as proto-Nazis, or both.

Now, we see the position on 9th September, just at the start of the race to the sea. Between the German First Army and the German Second Army is a gap. A very large gap, some 40 miles wide, in which only scattered detachments were positioned. Right in front of that gap is the BEF and the French 5th Army, with nothing much in front of them.

A move forward by these two, and the German 2nd to 5th Armies have no more ability to race to the sea than they have to race to the Moon. They are in danger of being flanked, with the very real prospect of having Entente forces breaking through to the rear areas. Most military strategists would regard this as a Bad Thing for the German forces.

Meanwhile, the German First Army is isolated. It has both flanks hanging, there's a French Army in front of it, and two French armies being gathered in Paris and in a position to get around.

Anyone who can look at that map and say that the Germans have the advantage in the Race to the Sea is - misguided.

You didn't even bother reading my post. The Battle of Charleroi was on the 21-23 of August in Belgium, not 9 September deep in France. You're just acting all condescending, and you've not bothered to do even the modicum of the courtesy that is paying attention to what other people are saying. None of your points are valid in discussing Charleroi because you're saying nothing that remotely addresses it. If you'd actually bothered reading my post, you'd realize that I have said nothing about the Germans being in an advantageous position in the Race to the Sea. I never claimed any such thing. I guess we can chalk this up to a misunderstanding, but it would've been better if you'd just read before replying.