I noticed that too. After the initial rearmament period of the 50s it seems that the Americans improved their conventionnal forces only in a very limited and slow manner. Nowhere near Soviet or occasionally European practice.
State of the Vietnam Era US Military
- Thread starter flasheart
- Start date
Truman saw strategic aircraft carrying nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent. Everything else was useless in the nuclear era hence plan to reduce the Army, scrap the Navy (and it's Marines though that would have been a bit of a fight as they were both authorized and arguably under the control of Congress not the executive branch in such matters) and most of the Air Force. Eisenhower, in looking for ways to reduce military spending bought into the idea of nuclear response to everything like a 'war' and using the CIA for anything short of war. (Hint: That didn't work
) Despite having a LOT of 'tactical' nuclear weapons spread out all over the place what they really wanted was ONLY strategic weapons, (Eisenhower hated IRBM's and other 'tactical' weapons as destabilizing and he wasn't wrong considering that's how we arrived at the Cuban Missile crisis, but was forced by Congressional and public pressure to deploy them. He actually understood how 'hemmed in' the Soviets would feel and threatened they would be by being surrounded by 'tactical' nuclear weapons)"Conventional" forces were meant to be 'police/peace-keeping ' forces and "tripwires" rather than any real deterrent force and that didn't significantly change till the 80s.
Randy
After Truman, Maxwell Taylor proposed a reorganization of divisions. The infantry division at that time had three regiments each of three battalions each with three rifle companies.
The Pentomic organization stirred the pot. A division would now have five Battle Groups, each with five rifle companies. The new organization did not solve any of the old problems and brought in new ones.
When it was discontinued, the army shifted to three brigades per division, each with three infantry battalions. This is more or less the current organization, with individual variations.
The problem of cohesion has been raised above. There was (and still is) a constant flux of transfers, as men are sent away for training, as officers strive to get in their command time so they can be on the promotion list,
The goal sometimes appears to be like that in Fred Pohl's "The Wizard of Pung's Corners" (Galaxy, October 1958) where a force of forty-six riflemen requires over 1200 support troops.
The Pentomic organization stirred the pot. A division would now have five Battle Groups, each with five rifle companies. The new organization did not solve any of the old problems and brought in new ones.
When it was discontinued, the army shifted to three brigades per division, each with three infantry battalions. This is more or less the current organization, with individual variations.
The problem of cohesion has been raised above. There was (and still is) a constant flux of transfers, as men are sent away for training, as officers strive to get in their command time so they can be on the promotion list,
The goal sometimes appears to be like that in Fred Pohl's "The Wizard of Pung's Corners" (Galaxy, October 1958) where a force of forty-six riflemen requires over 1200 support troops.
When the need for draftees dropped off enough that the army went all-volunteer in 1973, I'd say the problem of using men who didn't want to serve was becoming evident.
The Marines had a lot of problems too, they were just better able to control the bad press and keep issues 'in house'. Once the Marines got the drafted Marines from the Vietnam era out of the system things started to improve but especially in units deployed to SEA (which had a higher ratio of drafted Marines) drug use, insubordination, etc were pretty bad after all 'What are they going to do send me to Vietnam? I'm already here' was a common comment. The Air Force was the only service that didn't draft anyone.
The problem started getting better with the increased spending to contain 'the evil empire' of the Reagan years. (The Carter years of program cuts, Congressional sniping, and 3% raises with 19% inflation were pretty bad for troops, especially lower enlisted.) Public perception and public support of the military didn't really improve until Operation Desert Shield/Storm and the capabilities of the new professional military was put on display.
At the beginning of Vietnam (up to about '66) there were lots of volunteers from the career troops for duty in Vietnam. after all it was the place to get noticed and rewarded. As the forces built up the draft became the main source of troops for it with a good portion of the lower level NCOs being 'Shake and Bake' (run through a short NCO course straight out of Basic and AIT. Officers could be a mixed bag because of the numbers required OCS and ROTC were very well represented West Point was also represented well but some fell under the umbrella of 'The West Point Protective Society' which attempted to protect them from consequences of bad acts.
As time went on, especially in the enlisted ranks it became more a draftees war since there was little use to expend training dollars on specialized training for someone that would only be there for 2 years (or less). They were pumped through Basic and AIT and sent to Vietnam. Often if they finished that tour and had six months or less left on their active duty commitment they were released from active duty as soon as they were processed back stateside. It wasn't worth putting them in a stateside unit and 'infecting' that unit. (That was the actual term I heard used by an NCO at the time. He would not even attempt to put them into any of his platoons. When he got someone in from Vietnam that had no desire to re-enlist he would make a deal with them that if they stayed out of trouble and performed the duties assigned - Base beautification, KP, etc. he wouldn't bother them for the months they had left)
I enlisted in the Marines in 1974 & the fundamentals were well reversed by then. Recruit training had extended to 80 days of training & the DIs were retrained to try to get us to think a bit, vs rigid automatia. It wasn't perfect, but was a improvement over the earlier eight week express plan. I recall someone blaming that one of MacNamarra, pressured all the services into 'cutting the fat' from their training and making it more efficient. Also have to point out Neither Marines not Army were supposed to go to combat straight from recruit training. There was (& still is) a extended Infantry Traning School everyone assigned a Grunt MOS went to after recruit training. Initially the Marines rotated battalions out of Viet Nam to Okinawa for a couple months. There they took on the ITS graduates & NCOs returning from recruiting duty or other admin stations and gave the entire battalion a few more weeks of refresher training. Westmoreland relates in his autobiography how he saw the as a date of time & ordered the practice stopped. By 1968 the incoming individuals went straight into combat ops.
Getting back to 1975 I joined the 5th Marines in January. That regiment had been disbanded in 1973 on returning from Viet Nam, then gradually over the next three years reconstituted. That revolved around the USMC instituting a policy of expediting discharges for all disciplinary problems. A mass of early discharges circa 1972-73 led to the consolidation of the remaining personnel from the 5th Marines and a few other select units in other formation. That temporarily left the 5th Marines with only a HQ company. 3rd Battalion was almost imeadiatly stood up in 1974, 2d Battalion later that year, and 1st Battalion in latter 1975. All the companies were filled out & completed at least one training cycle when I left in 1976. Mass indiscipline was a thing of the past by then, tho drug and alcohol abuse were still common. A policy of expediting discharges was still in effect, tho drug treatment programs and extended counseling programs were common. The biggest problem was the upper ranks of the NCOs. The lowest two grades were filled with men who were relatively fresh and sharp. The upper grades suffered from the severe loss of NCOs during the war. Combat casualties and the 'F..k it I'm done with it' removed over a third of the lifer pool. Then the top 10% were eliminated through promotion to Warrant & Commissioned officers. This created a quality hole in the senior NCO ranks I had to contend with into the 1980s. The best available for promotion to 1st Sgt or Sgt Major were not always the best by the standards of earlier or later decades. In the 1990s there were still a few of those in the Reserves holding down the floor in odd corners.
Otherwise in the 1980s I was not seeing the same problems that threatened combat efficiency I'd seen 1975-76.
Getting back to 1975 I joined the 5th Marines in January. That regiment had been disbanded in 1973 on returning from Viet Nam, then gradually over the next three years reconstituted. That revolved around the USMC instituting a policy of expediting discharges for all disciplinary problems. A mass of early discharges circa 1972-73 led to the consolidation of the remaining personnel from the 5th Marines and a few other select units in other formation. That temporarily left the 5th Marines with only a HQ company. 3rd Battalion was almost imeadiatly stood up in 1974, 2d Battalion later that year, and 1st Battalion in latter 1975. All the companies were filled out & completed at least one training cycle when I left in 1976. Mass indiscipline was a thing of the past by then, tho drug and alcohol abuse were still common. A policy of expediting discharges was still in effect, tho drug treatment programs and extended counseling programs were common. The biggest problem was the upper ranks of the NCOs. The lowest two grades were filled with men who were relatively fresh and sharp. The upper grades suffered from the severe loss of NCOs during the war. Combat casualties and the 'F..k it I'm done with it' removed over a third of the lifer pool. Then the top 10% were eliminated through promotion to Warrant & Commissioned officers. This created a quality hole in the senior NCO ranks I had to contend with into the 1980s. The best available for promotion to 1st Sgt or Sgt Major were not always the best by the standards of earlier or later decades. In the 1990s there were still a few of those in the Reserves holding down the floor in odd corners.
Otherwise in the 1980s I was not seeing the same problems that threatened combat efficiency I'd seen 1975-76.
I never met a drafted Marine, or anyone else who had. Can you elaborate on this? I met some men who received draft notices & joined the Marines to avoid the Army, but that was more the case for the Air Force or Navy. That lot who came into the Marines were not exactly trying to avoid the tough stuff, but rather marching towards the guns. In my case I was boxed in, with the military alone of the very few good choices. I didn't opt for the Marines because I wanted the easy route.
From WWII recruiters for all service met their monthly quotas by appearing at the Examination Centers and sifting through the kids for those who met their needs. There was a common misconception that getting the Draft Notice meant you were in the military. that was actually not the case. Screening eliminated the initial batch of unsuitable & only after acceptance was the kid 'Drafted' . The savy recruiter could fill a large part of his quota by doing a day or two of his own screening of the 18 y/olds in line. Since there are strong penalties for enlisting obviously unsuitable men the recruiter had a incentive to only hit on the probably qualified and not grab the first five losers in line.
The more knowledgeable and proactive Inductees went straight to a recruiter rather than wait for induction screening & letting fate takes it different course.
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May have been closer to 200,000. Depending on how you count the Category IV group who were taken in. More than 150,000 in my view. Possibly over 200k. A larger effect would have been greater numbers of Cat. III, with fewer Cat II, & abysmal numbers of Cat I. The latter group is your best source for future cadres, the NCO and 'prior service' officers. By 1970 the Army was reduced to promoting men who had been Cat III on enlistment to the NCO ranks, and too many of those just a few years after initial enlistment. The effect of the Cat III predominating had a much deeper effect, tho yes taking in all those Cat IV did damage too.
David Flin
Gone Fishin'
Curious. We just missed each other - I spent the second half of 1976 training US Marine recruits as part of an attempt by the Powers That Be to get trainers who were able to give the impression they knew their stuff. Hence my East End accent could be heard at Parris Island for a couple of intakes.
As one who grew up with Royal Marine training which lasts eight months (32 weeks), I found the 80 days programme rather rushed, to put it mildly.
I also noticed a difference in styles, largely resulting from the different requirements and expectations from US and Royal Marines.
This matches up precisely with my experience. The senior NCOs I came into contact with were not all one might hope for.
I'm still amused by the fact that if two of my postings had been switched around, I may well have bumped into you when you were training.
I spent my initial years on the West Coast, SanDiego & Pendleton. Met a couple RM in the 1980s.
90% of the men you were training were going on to schools to be aircraft mechanics, supply clerks, cannon gunners. The grunts got some additional training, tho Id agree that should have been longer. & yes the requirements were different. One was the need to train 30,000 recruits a year vs what the RM needed to train. If we'd presented a budget for training RM style Congress would have thrown it in the waste can straightaway.
Out of all the young men who received draft notices in the Vietnam era what proportion were actually inducted into the military?
How common were draftees and draft related enlistments (people who would not have otherwise enlisted if they weren't eligible to be drafted) in relation to volunteer/career personnel?
Did people ever "wash out" (fail to meet the required standards leading to compulsory discharge) during training?
Was draft evasion ever an issue in the Soviet Union?
How common were draftees and draft related enlistments (people who would not have otherwise enlisted if they weren't eligible to be drafted) in relation to volunteer/career personnel?
Did people ever "wash out" (fail to meet the required standards leading to compulsory discharge) during training?
Was draft evasion ever an issue in the Soviet Union?
marathag
Banned
Medical was the big one, with Biden, Trump and Cheney with deferment that way.
Helped to have a friendly family doctor. Or the way Ted Nugent did on his own.
So, I started my career in 2000 almost as a bookend for guys of @Carl Schwamberger cohort.
Mostly we got story and they can be of dubious reliability. So there were plenty of stories of the cut to nothing budgets, the drug use, and officers wearing side arms in barracks. The first of the all volunteer force clearly left something to be desired and madea huge impression on those who would become the senior NCOs when I first enlisted.
By time I was an NCO, my first platoon Sergent in the Guard was a Grenada vet. He wore an 82nd ABN combat patch for Urgent Fury, so I was in a position to ask more focused and specific questions. The general gist was things were improving, but they had not filtered to the whole army and the training standards weren't there yet. He believed the training for our NG infantry battalion was more thorough than even the 1984 82nd Airborne and the officer and NCO quality blew it out of the water.
Mostly we got story and they can be of dubious reliability. So there were plenty of stories of the cut to nothing budgets, the drug use, and officers wearing side arms in barracks. The first of the all volunteer force clearly left something to be desired and madea huge impression on those who would become the senior NCOs when I first enlisted.
By time I was an NCO, my first platoon Sergent in the Guard was a Grenada vet. He wore an 82nd ABN combat patch for Urgent Fury, so I was in a position to ask more focused and specific questions. The general gist was things were improving, but they had not filtered to the whole army and the training standards weren't there yet. He believed the training for our NG infantry battalion was more thorough than even the 1984 82nd Airborne and the officer and NCO quality blew it out of the water.
Dear Lord I never thought that it was as bad as it was thank god the UK kept out of it.
The British Army was no great shakes, either. I remember reading about an exercise the Brits had with the Swedes in the 1970s. The Swedes were not impressed.
Possibly I know that in the 80s things were not great due to there being zero money the 90s got better I joined up in 1980 and did 26 long long years. Now the Army is being messed about some thing chronic change after change re equipment and how units are tasked and made up. I still work for the MOD and shake my head in despair every time the newest CGS has a good idea thank god Carter has just gone.
David Flin
Gone Fishin'
The British Armed forces in the 1970s were variable in quality. Some units were good, some less so.