Cook
Banned
In 1902 Britain signed a security treaty with the Japanese Empire. This was a watershed moment for both nations; for the British it was their first peace time military alliance and spelt the end of Britain’s period of ‘Splendid Isolation’; for the Japanese, it was their first foreign treaty entered into voluntarily, their first military alliance and signalled that Japan was now a credible international power. The treaty was renewed in 1905 and again in 1911; in 1914 Japan invoked the treaty and declared war on Germany. Japanese forces attacked German territories in the Far East and Japanese ships escorted the convoys taking Australian troops to fight in the European theatre.
Altogether this was a mutually beneficial agreement, the terms of which made it clear that it was entirely defensive in nature; when in 1919 the League of Nations was founded, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was one of the first treaties to be registered with the new international organisation. Despite this, the British government, seeking closer ties with the United States, withdrew from the alliance in 1921; the treaty was seen in America as a potential barrier to access to the lucrative Chinese market and there was also deep public concern about a (wholly fictitious) secret anti-American clause in the alliance. There was at the time a great deal of back-bench opposition to the government decision, there was also strong support for maintaining the alliance in both Australia and New Zealand. The United States Congress for its part had not only refused to join the new League of Nations, but had also just abrogated a joint French, British and American defence alliance signed by President Wilson; its credibility as a reliable international partner therefore rather shaky.
What then, if Britain had preferred to maintain the existing alliance with their reliable Asian ally rather than abandon it in pursuit of closer ties with the fickle United States of America?
There is of course a significant economic factor in this; Britain owed an enormous financial debt to America, which was expected to take sixty years to pay off; the United States was also the world’s largest economy and had the second largest navy in the world.
Altogether this was a mutually beneficial agreement, the terms of which made it clear that it was entirely defensive in nature; when in 1919 the League of Nations was founded, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was one of the first treaties to be registered with the new international organisation. Despite this, the British government, seeking closer ties with the United States, withdrew from the alliance in 1921; the treaty was seen in America as a potential barrier to access to the lucrative Chinese market and there was also deep public concern about a (wholly fictitious) secret anti-American clause in the alliance. There was at the time a great deal of back-bench opposition to the government decision, there was also strong support for maintaining the alliance in both Australia and New Zealand. The United States Congress for its part had not only refused to join the new League of Nations, but had also just abrogated a joint French, British and American defence alliance signed by President Wilson; its credibility as a reliable international partner therefore rather shaky.
What then, if Britain had preferred to maintain the existing alliance with their reliable Asian ally rather than abandon it in pursuit of closer ties with the fickle United States of America?
There is of course a significant economic factor in this; Britain owed an enormous financial debt to America, which was expected to take sixty years to pay off; the United States was also the world’s largest economy and had the second largest navy in the world.