Indeed it does, and thank you.
Watched
Thank you. Just be warned that RL dictates some space between the updates. So dont get to hooked.
The betrayal of the Kaiserliche Marine and the resurrection of the Reichsmarine
- Thread starter Gudestein
- Start date
-
- Tags
- reichsmarine ww1 ww2
Indeed it does, and thank you.
Thank you. Just be warned that RL dictates some space between the updates. So dont get to hooked.
Chapter 13: The first happy time
Chapter 13: The first happy time
In March 1917 2 parties of three German cruisers, the SMS Pillau, Frankfurt and Königsberg as well as Karlsruhe, Nürnberg and Emden once again fell upon the Northern patrol, in this case sinking two British cruisers before falling back against opposing battleships. Three German Colliers used the confusion to escape north, although one was apprehended and scuttled by the crew. Then once again on the 1st of April the raiders went North and this time they were undetected. Van der Tann and Hindenburg were the flagships and Königsberg, Karlsruhe, Nürnberg, Emden (all 8x15 cm guns), Magdeburg, Stralsund and Stralsburg (10x10.5 cm guns) as escorts and scouts. The ships passed through the Denmark Strait on the 10th of April and immediately created Havoc, even as the British were once again assembling their shipping into large convoys. The raiders split up in two task forces that were not far apart and they sunk 200000 tons of shipping for the reminder of April. In May, things become more dangerous because the convoys had formed and the US were contributing their sizeable fleet to the battles. On one occasion, the task forces left a convoy alone which were escorted by 3 British battleships, but directed U-boats to is position which sank 11 ships in the first factual if uncoordinated wolf-pack attack.
On another occasion, when an exceptionally large convoy was encountered sceened by 8 destroyers, 3 cruisers and the battleships Florida and Alabama (pre-dreadnought) it was decided to engage. The engagement would turn out to be a pivotal learning experience, if not bloody for both sides. The Germans dispatched the cruisers Magdeburg, Stralsund and Stralsburg (10x10.5 cm guns) to outflank the convoy and prevent the escape of scattering ships and then attacked in the late morning with the sun in their rear on a northern course with a North easterly angle to the American battleships. With optimal shooting conditions it was exploited that Hindenburg had been modified for increased range and could start shooting at 18 km’s of range and Van der Tann had been made capable of shooting at 20 km’s of range. Florida could in principle fire at the same range, and did so, but did not have equivalent range finding equipment. Consequently, a few salvo’s after the battle commenced, shells from first Van der Tann and then Hindenburg straddled US Florida. Not long after, a shell from Hindenburg, fired close to the maximum range penetrated the armored deck on Florida and entered the port side engine room. Splinter damage and vibration caused a flooding, a pronounced list and loss of electrical power for the starboard pumps. This penetrating hit and the ensuing list to starboard, was penetrating at the edge of what was possible even with the thin 45 mm armor, but it subsequently exposed the deck of Florida at an even more favorable angle for penetrating hits. Seven more hits were scored on Florida as the range closed to 14 km including 3 more deck penetrating hits hitting the boiler rooms, the steering equipment aft and close to the B turret jamming it. USS Florida was now clearly sinking and the Germans turned attention to Alabama. This might have been a minute too soon, as Florida next manage a hit on Van der Tann directly into the bridge, killing the captain and most officers on deck with splinter damage. That aside, the Germans wasted no time closing the range and sinking the Alabama, but took two large caliber hits in return, and they send in the cruisers to dispatch the smaller escorts.
After a whole day of fighting and hunting of fleeing merchants, the scale of the disaster could be estimated. The US had lost two battleships (one pre-dreadnought), 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers and 36 merchant of a total of ~50000 tons of warships and 175000 tons of merchant shipping. The Germans had lost Karlsruhe to a torpedo hit, and Van der Tann had lost most of its officers. Two preserve the fighting capability of the squadron, the German task force returned for home waters and would not be able to sortie before June of 1917.
Adding in the submarine campaign, the British suffered a disasterous loss of 1060000 tons of Merchant shipping in April and 775000 tons in May of 2017. However, the outcome, even off massive successes, highlighted the German problems with sustaining a surface raider campaign.
Edit:1917 for 2017.
Heavy deleted in heavy cruiser.
In March 1917 2 parties of three German cruisers, the SMS Pillau, Frankfurt and Königsberg as well as Karlsruhe, Nürnberg and Emden once again fell upon the Northern patrol, in this case sinking two British cruisers before falling back against opposing battleships. Three German Colliers used the confusion to escape north, although one was apprehended and scuttled by the crew. Then once again on the 1st of April the raiders went North and this time they were undetected. Van der Tann and Hindenburg were the flagships and Königsberg, Karlsruhe, Nürnberg, Emden (all 8x15 cm guns), Magdeburg, Stralsund and Stralsburg (10x10.5 cm guns) as escorts and scouts. The ships passed through the Denmark Strait on the 10th of April and immediately created Havoc, even as the British were once again assembling their shipping into large convoys. The raiders split up in two task forces that were not far apart and they sunk 200000 tons of shipping for the reminder of April. In May, things become more dangerous because the convoys had formed and the US were contributing their sizeable fleet to the battles. On one occasion, the task forces left a convoy alone which were escorted by 3 British battleships, but directed U-boats to is position which sank 11 ships in the first factual if uncoordinated wolf-pack attack.
On another occasion, when an exceptionally large convoy was encountered sceened by 8 destroyers, 3 cruisers and the battleships Florida and Alabama (pre-dreadnought) it was decided to engage. The engagement would turn out to be a pivotal learning experience, if not bloody for both sides. The Germans dispatched the cruisers Magdeburg, Stralsund and Stralsburg (10x10.5 cm guns) to outflank the convoy and prevent the escape of scattering ships and then attacked in the late morning with the sun in their rear on a northern course with a North easterly angle to the American battleships. With optimal shooting conditions it was exploited that Hindenburg had been modified for increased range and could start shooting at 18 km’s of range and Van der Tann had been made capable of shooting at 20 km’s of range. Florida could in principle fire at the same range, and did so, but did not have equivalent range finding equipment. Consequently, a few salvo’s after the battle commenced, shells from first Van der Tann and then Hindenburg straddled US Florida. Not long after, a shell from Hindenburg, fired close to the maximum range penetrated the armored deck on Florida and entered the port side engine room. Splinter damage and vibration caused a flooding, a pronounced list and loss of electrical power for the starboard pumps. This penetrating hit and the ensuing list to starboard, was penetrating at the edge of what was possible even with the thin 45 mm armor, but it subsequently exposed the deck of Florida at an even more favorable angle for penetrating hits. Seven more hits were scored on Florida as the range closed to 14 km including 3 more deck penetrating hits hitting the boiler rooms, the steering equipment aft and close to the B turret jamming it. USS Florida was now clearly sinking and the Germans turned attention to Alabama. This might have been a minute too soon, as Florida next manage a hit on Van der Tann directly into the bridge, killing the captain and most officers on deck with splinter damage. That aside, the Germans wasted no time closing the range and sinking the Alabama, but took two large caliber hits in return, and they send in the cruisers to dispatch the smaller escorts.
After a whole day of fighting and hunting of fleeing merchants, the scale of the disaster could be estimated. The US had lost two battleships (one pre-dreadnought), 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers and 36 merchant of a total of ~50000 tons of warships and 175000 tons of merchant shipping. The Germans had lost Karlsruhe to a torpedo hit, and Van der Tann had lost most of its officers. Two preserve the fighting capability of the squadron, the German task force returned for home waters and would not be able to sortie before June of 1917.
Adding in the submarine campaign, the British suffered a disasterous loss of 1060000 tons of Merchant shipping in April and 775000 tons in May of 2017. However, the outcome, even off massive successes, highlighted the German problems with sustaining a surface raider campaign.
Edit:1917 for 2017.
Heavy deleted in heavy cruiser.
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Light cruisers. Heavy cruisers don't exist just yet. Regardless, great chapter. The British Admiralty must be pulling their moustaches out.
And the US will no longer be neutral. They will send proper battlewagons to defend convoys, and if the Germans catch the US again, it will end badly all round.
That aside however, how come the RN could not blockade the passages home? They have the ships available to put up another screen in the GAPs, and have the fleet waiting in the North Sea for the Germans as they come South.
Good catch, I didn't notice that at first. Unless the "Another occasion" is a month later.
For the time the USS Florida was considered a proper battlewagon commissioned 1911 mounting ten 12inch guns, granted the Alabama was on the older side commissioned 1900.
Chapter 14: North Atlantic raids in the summer of 1917.
Chapter 14: North Atlantic raids in the summer of 1917.
The spectacular raids of the battlecruisers in the spring of 1917 would have profound repercussions in the distant future as it effected German strategy and ship design, and it was an enormous embarrassment to the Royal Navy and the US Navy that their combined might could not handle two German ships and their escorts.
However, despite the embarrassment, the effects were small compared to the profoundly successful submarine campaign, and while whinning, SMS Van der Tann now needed repairs and new officers to familiarize with the ship. Consequently, she would not go on a sortie again before the 10th of June 1917. Working conditions for the Battlecruiser squadron had then deteriorated with the influx of many American battleships and the full implementation of large convoys. This does not mean the battlecruisers were not effective as the need to assemble very large convoys that had to be escorted by at least 2 dreadnoughts, by itself diminished anglo-american shipping capacity. The raid in June lasted a total of thirty days, in large part a consequence of the poor range of Van der Tann (she was left behind for a period of 10 days), and did not result in spectacular battles. 3 lonely merchant ships were sunk and for a period two convoys were shadowed by the battlecruisers while they could vector in submarines. The submarines managed to bag 150000 tons of merchant shipping which was something, but not a war winning effect. The pattern repeated itself in August, except at this time only with 90000 tons of shipping sunk by the submarines.
The spectacular raids of the battlecruisers in the spring of 1917 would have profound repercussions in the distant future as it effected German strategy and ship design, and it was an enormous embarrassment to the Royal Navy and the US Navy that their combined might could not handle two German ships and their escorts.
However, despite the embarrassment, the effects were small compared to the profoundly successful submarine campaign, and while whinning, SMS Van der Tann now needed repairs and new officers to familiarize with the ship. Consequently, she would not go on a sortie again before the 10th of June 1917. Working conditions for the Battlecruiser squadron had then deteriorated with the influx of many American battleships and the full implementation of large convoys. This does not mean the battlecruisers were not effective as the need to assemble very large convoys that had to be escorted by at least 2 dreadnoughts, by itself diminished anglo-american shipping capacity. The raid in June lasted a total of thirty days, in large part a consequence of the poor range of Van der Tann (she was left behind for a period of 10 days), and did not result in spectacular battles. 3 lonely merchant ships were sunk and for a period two convoys were shadowed by the battlecruisers while they could vector in submarines. The submarines managed to bag 150000 tons of merchant shipping which was something, but not a war winning effect. The pattern repeated itself in August, except at this time only with 90000 tons of shipping sunk by the submarines.
Should be corrected now, thanks
Indeed, if I had more time I could have covered it. Use your imagination. Heads will be rolling.
First part should be covered in the next update. Not disagreeing, except the German battlecruisers are really well armored ships hence why they would go in two against 1.
The RN cant blockade them because they have a 5-7 knot speed disadvantage of ships that can fight them.
Indeed, not a "happy time" anymore
yes, this is true. The shot that crippled her came in what I estimate is a 17-19 km interval were the deck armor is insufficient. Really a golden BB if not as spectacular as the one that would sink Hood some 24 years later. Once it got a list, it was more exposedwhich explains the follow-on hits. So it is a spectaccular sinking and as I indicated it will influence future doctrine.
Ok, that should not be a problem.
You have the GAP patrols. They are slow, yes. They however radio the Grand Fleet that the Germans are inbound. This gives time for the RN to sail. They can then blockade across to Norway or somewhere in the North Sea. With air patrols (Blimps, planes) they can get a good guess on where the Germans should be and when. All they then need to do is block that route and any easy work arounds. They have the ship numbers for that.
Keep in mind that all they need to do is stall the Germans. They are at the end of a long voyage and low on fuel / shells most likely. If they can stall the German ships long enough then they will not make home port. They must flee for Norway and at that stage and will be impounded and the problem is solved (Because let's face it, Norway won't risk angering England by releasing the ships again).
Block the routes and the Germans have to find another. And another. And another. And oh no, not enough fuel to get home.....
Yes, the remainder of the German fleet can sortie to assist, but what good will it do? The job of wiping it out will be completed.
Just my view
This is a task the Germans succeeded in repeatedly in WW2. Without the speed advantage. Also, this is pre-radar time. During Jutland, a whole fleet at a speed disadvantage slipped through the whole grand fleet and made it home.Ok, that should not be a problem.
You have the GAP patrols. They are slow, yes. They however radio the Grand Fleet that the Germans are inbound. This gives time for the RN to sail. They can then blockade across to Norway or somewhere in the North Sea. With air patrols (Blimps, planes) they can get a good guess on where the Germans should be and when. All they then need to do is block that route and any easy work arounds. They have the ship numbers for that.
Keep in mind that all they need to do is stall the Germans. They are at the end of a long voyage and low on fuel / shells most likely. If they can stall the German ships long enough then they will not make home port. They must flee for Norway and at that stage and will be impounded and the problem is solved (Because let's face it, Norway won't risk angering England by releasing the ships again).
Block the routes and the Germans have to find another. And another. And another. And oh no, not enough fuel to get home.....
Yes, the remainder of the German fleet can sortie to assist, but what good will it do? The job of wiping it out will be completed.
Just my view
Well, German and British Dreadnought Battleships were all about the same speed.
I often wonder what it would have been like if the British were 30 mins late or the Germans 30 mins early to that particular part of ocean where they almost crossed at night.....
JAG88
Banned
Not even close, the QEs were 24kts at best, the Konigs were good for 23kts, or as Jellicoe put it:
Nope, I suggest you read on the matter, RN flash precautions were simply ineffective.
No, at middle range the 30,5cm shells of the KM would have gone through like butter, the QE's were not well protected. The only reason they survived was the weather, they were engulfed in fog when the HSF was still closing the range.
JAG88
Banned
Yes, but none save for one were on thick armor or near the vitals, but that single shell made a bit of a mess:
"
8 From port side. Angle of descent 5-10°. This shell pierced the upper tapered part of the belt just below the main deck and about 23ft, forward of the mainmast. The hit was at the top after corner of a plate, the angle being 5-10° to the plate normal, and a piece 2ft x 11/2ft was broken off, and a large chip taken out of the next plate. The actual thickness was 6in at the top of the hole and 9in at the bottom. The shell burst 12ft from impact in the upper part of the port feed-water tank, and a large hole was blown in the 3/8in main deck above, while the light floor of the feed tank was shattered, and the 1in middle deck badly distorted at and near the top of the slope above the port side of the wing engine-room and adjacent oil fuel tank. The 5/,bin bulkhead forming the outer side of the feed tank was wrecked, and the forward and inboard bulkheads of the feed tank were holed, and the latter let the sea into the port wing engine-room fan flat and from there it poured into the port wing engine-room through holes in the ventilating trunk, which were later plugged. The flow of water into the feed tank was eventually stopped by putting 400 hammocks into the tank, and shoring them down until they plugged the hole in the armour belt. Most of the fragments from this shell were large, and one passed through the 7/,,in inner bulkhead of the feed tank, and also 1-'/Bin and 2 other 7/,,in thicknesses of plating before coming to rest 40ft from the burst on the middle deck. The broken piece of the belt also went through the inner bulkhead of the feed tank, and lodged in the engine-room fan casing.
The results of this hit were a good illustration of the error in not carrying the 13in belt armour to the main deck in the Queen Elizabeth class.
...
The water inboard was estimated to have reduced the Warspite's metacentric height from about 61/2ft to about 41/2ft and until some temporary repairs had been made and bulkheads shored, it was inadvisable to exceed 16kts, owing to the risk of flooding the enginerooms, the principal danger being from hit No 8.
It was, however, the failure of the Warspite's steering, which caused her withdrawal from the action at about 1900. When the steering gear first gave trouble, the port steering engine was in use, and this slowed down due to the thrust shaft heating at the thrust bearings, and also where the free end of the thrust and worm shaft revolved in the bushed clutch of the starboard steering engine, which was not in use. When the Warspite did not respond to the helm, increased helm was given, but the slowing down of the engine prevented the differential valve gear responding to the movement of the steering wheel and the latter was thus hard to move. Very great force must have been used on the wheels in the upper and lower conning towers, and this led to the steering gear jamming temporarily, and also twisted the controlling shaft between the wheels in the upper and lower CTs, and bent the lever connecting the telemotor gear to the differential valve. A very moderate extemporised water supply cooled the steering engine thrust shaft, and the port engine then worked satisfactorily, but control from the steering wheels in the upper and lower conning towers was no longer possible, and as the steering compartment was partially flooded, the position at the steering engine was adopted after the Warspite withdrew from action."
Having to slow down mid battle is a very, very BAD thing since YOU CANT, to put it in perspective, Lutzow sank because of it, the damage wasnt that bad, but being under fire had to floor it to escape... and flooded as a consequence, so the Germans scuttled it.
Fog saved it, otherwise it would have been beaten to a pulp.
Chapter 14: North Atlantic raids in the Autumn of 1917.
Chapter 14: North Atlantic raids in the Autumn of 1917.
The August raids were repeated in late September when the battle cruisers put to sea, but this time the context would become gloomier. Submarine losses were climbing and submarine inflicted losses were declining and absent a stronger contribution by the surface raiders, the war of the Atlantic were tilting towards an Entente victory. More risk-taking and more commerce sinking were required and the Reichsmarine would do its part. Tactics were rehearsed for how to proceed against heavily defended convoys and on the 3rd of October the battlecruiser group fell upon a large convoy defended by two British battleships (HMS Resolution, HMS Audacious), the composition of which had been wrongly relayed by submarine wireless as including only one battleship. The moment chosen were at a time of very poor visibility and with darkness setting in and the tactics were to move in aggressively with close guards around the battlecruisers to prevent torpedo attacks.
The results were dramatic, and they were bloody. Two destroyers and a British cruiser were quickly dispatched when the convoy perimeter was breached and the 6 German cruiser started to pick up on the merchant shipping. Without visibility across the length and width of the convoy counterattacks were poorly coordinated and information flow was hard. The Germans on the other hand used simple codes and communicated freely on wireless, believing their codes to be breakable anyway. Panic ensued among the merchant captains and the convoy started to scatter.
Confusion aside which played heavily into the German hands, there was no escaping the underlying disparity in firepower, and the first German loss was Königsberg, disintegrating and sinking from multiple 15’’ inch hits from Resolution. Karlsruhe did however manage to explain the situation and many believe that this should have been the time to call of the attack, but that did not happen. Instead, Van Der Tann, Nürnberg, Stralsund and Strassburg moved directly in the direction of the Königsberg/Resolution shoot-out, soon leading to a knife fight between Van der Tann and resolution with Resolution being plastered with 6 and 4 inch shells in addition to the shells from Van der Tann. The fire control and situation awareness degraded aboard Resolution, but nothing the Germans could throw at it, except the heavy guns on Van der Tann had any effect on the main turrets. At this range of a few kilometers, both Van der Tann and Resolution saw their hits penetrating within their opponents armored shield, and on this instance, the British battleships did the most of the damage. While Resolution lost the B turret to a penetrating hit on the top of the Barbette, Van der Tann quickly lost it’s a turret and for the second consecutive sortie, had the bridge wiped out by a direct hit. Van der Tann accordingly did not maneuver after the initial mayhem due to the ensuing confusion and saw further hits to the bow, lost several casemate guns and soon the second forward main turret. Van der Tann’s moves directly on collision course with Resolution which had to break off shortly before Van der Tann’s officer in the aft conning tower assumed control.
Bereft of many secondary guns and under a heavy barrage from the German cruisers, and without destroyer screens as they had simply failed to locate the battle zone, Resolution was not powerless to prevent the torpedo attacks which ensued from Emden and Nürnberg. At a range off about 1000 m’s, all 4 fired torpedoes found their mark and inflicted catastrophic damage on resolution. Resolution would sink no more than 10 minutes later, but before additional 15’’ hits had taken out the aft conning tower on Van der Tann and one of the aft main gun turrets (1 remainng). Waterline hits were also causing a list on van der Tann and as she finally broke off the engagement, her speed had been reduced to 18 knots and she was a floating wreck with no fire-control systems in place except for local control of the few guns remaining.
The maiming of Van der Tann was not the end of it as Nürnberg, Stralsund and Strassburg soon were infighting with destroyers of which the british lost one and received a torpedo hit on Nürnberg. Nürnberg got of lightly and suffered flooding at the stern which were ultimately controlled allowing it to limp away with 16 knots.
At the other end of the convoy, Hindenburg briefly engaged HMS Audacious, but the attack was broken off after torpedoes were fired from the German cruisers, and Audacious had to turn and then quickly follow in pursuit to chase the aggressors away from the convoy.
Tactically, the engagement was a German win and the British lost a battleship and 10 merchant ships were lost, but strategically it was a British win as Van der Tann was a goner. After the attack had been broken off, Van der Tann and Nürnberg were dispatched to try and make it home, but this was not to be. They were later discovered by British cruisers of the Northern patrol and sunk by HMS Valiant. Valiant had been dispatched to the Northern patrol, exactly for this eventuality.
After the first dramatic engagement, which was indeed a huge morale boost and prestige win for the Reichmarine, Hindenburg continued its mission with more cautious tactics.
A second convoy was located, but only shadowed to call in submarines with 50000 tons of merchant ships sunk as a result.
Again, the surface fleet had acted with valour, but failed to inflict a strategically important wound to the entente. The surface fleet would not venture out again before in January, this time with Mackensen replacing Van der Tann.
The August raids were repeated in late September when the battle cruisers put to sea, but this time the context would become gloomier. Submarine losses were climbing and submarine inflicted losses were declining and absent a stronger contribution by the surface raiders, the war of the Atlantic were tilting towards an Entente victory. More risk-taking and more commerce sinking were required and the Reichsmarine would do its part. Tactics were rehearsed for how to proceed against heavily defended convoys and on the 3rd of October the battlecruiser group fell upon a large convoy defended by two British battleships (HMS Resolution, HMS Audacious), the composition of which had been wrongly relayed by submarine wireless as including only one battleship. The moment chosen were at a time of very poor visibility and with darkness setting in and the tactics were to move in aggressively with close guards around the battlecruisers to prevent torpedo attacks.
The results were dramatic, and they were bloody. Two destroyers and a British cruiser were quickly dispatched when the convoy perimeter was breached and the 6 German cruiser started to pick up on the merchant shipping. Without visibility across the length and width of the convoy counterattacks were poorly coordinated and information flow was hard. The Germans on the other hand used simple codes and communicated freely on wireless, believing their codes to be breakable anyway. Panic ensued among the merchant captains and the convoy started to scatter.
Confusion aside which played heavily into the German hands, there was no escaping the underlying disparity in firepower, and the first German loss was Königsberg, disintegrating and sinking from multiple 15’’ inch hits from Resolution. Karlsruhe did however manage to explain the situation and many believe that this should have been the time to call of the attack, but that did not happen. Instead, Van Der Tann, Nürnberg, Stralsund and Strassburg moved directly in the direction of the Königsberg/Resolution shoot-out, soon leading to a knife fight between Van der Tann and resolution with Resolution being plastered with 6 and 4 inch shells in addition to the shells from Van der Tann. The fire control and situation awareness degraded aboard Resolution, but nothing the Germans could throw at it, except the heavy guns on Van der Tann had any effect on the main turrets. At this range of a few kilometers, both Van der Tann and Resolution saw their hits penetrating within their opponents armored shield, and on this instance, the British battleships did the most of the damage. While Resolution lost the B turret to a penetrating hit on the top of the Barbette, Van der Tann quickly lost it’s a turret and for the second consecutive sortie, had the bridge wiped out by a direct hit. Van der Tann accordingly did not maneuver after the initial mayhem due to the ensuing confusion and saw further hits to the bow, lost several casemate guns and soon the second forward main turret. Van der Tann’s moves directly on collision course with Resolution which had to break off shortly before Van der Tann’s officer in the aft conning tower assumed control.
Bereft of many secondary guns and under a heavy barrage from the German cruisers, and without destroyer screens as they had simply failed to locate the battle zone, Resolution was not powerless to prevent the torpedo attacks which ensued from Emden and Nürnberg. At a range off about 1000 m’s, all 4 fired torpedoes found their mark and inflicted catastrophic damage on resolution. Resolution would sink no more than 10 minutes later, but before additional 15’’ hits had taken out the aft conning tower on Van der Tann and one of the aft main gun turrets (1 remainng). Waterline hits were also causing a list on van der Tann and as she finally broke off the engagement, her speed had been reduced to 18 knots and she was a floating wreck with no fire-control systems in place except for local control of the few guns remaining.
The maiming of Van der Tann was not the end of it as Nürnberg, Stralsund and Strassburg soon were infighting with destroyers of which the british lost one and received a torpedo hit on Nürnberg. Nürnberg got of lightly and suffered flooding at the stern which were ultimately controlled allowing it to limp away with 16 knots.
At the other end of the convoy, Hindenburg briefly engaged HMS Audacious, but the attack was broken off after torpedoes were fired from the German cruisers, and Audacious had to turn and then quickly follow in pursuit to chase the aggressors away from the convoy.
Tactically, the engagement was a German win and the British lost a battleship and 10 merchant ships were lost, but strategically it was a British win as Van der Tann was a goner. After the attack had been broken off, Van der Tann and Nürnberg were dispatched to try and make it home, but this was not to be. They were later discovered by British cruisers of the Northern patrol and sunk by HMS Valiant. Valiant had been dispatched to the Northern patrol, exactly for this eventuality.
After the first dramatic engagement, which was indeed a huge morale boost and prestige win for the Reichmarine, Hindenburg continued its mission with more cautious tactics.
A second convoy was located, but only shadowed to call in submarines with 50000 tons of merchant ships sunk as a result.
Again, the surface fleet had acted with valour, but failed to inflict a strategically important wound to the entente. The surface fleet would not venture out again before in January, this time with Mackensen replacing Van der Tann.
Audacious went down in the early days of the war. Good chapter, though. Valiant was sunk, in I think Chapter 3
If I'm right, here's the current list of available Grand Fleet dreadnoughts. Did Vanguard have her date with Destiny in July?
1. Dreadnought
2. Bellerophon
3. Superb
4. Temeraire
5. St Vincent
6. Collingwood
7. Orion
8. Conqueror
9. Monarch
10. King George V
11. Ajax
12. Iron Duke
13. Benbow
14. Marlborough
15. Emperor of India
16. Erin
17. Agincourt
18. Canada
19. Queen Elizabeth
20. Malaya
21. Revenge
22. Royal Sovereign
23. Ramillies – Not commissioned until September 1917. Will still need working up.
Updated to reflect Vanguard sinking
1. Dreadnought
2. Bellerophon
3. Superb
4. Temeraire
5. St Vincent
6. Collingwood
7. Orion
8. Conqueror
9. Monarch
10. King George V
11. Ajax
12. Iron Duke
13. Benbow
14. Marlborough
15. Emperor of India
16. Erin
17. Agincourt
18. Canada
19. Queen Elizabeth
20. Malaya
21. Revenge
22. Royal Sovereign
23. Ramillies – Not commissioned until September 1917. Will still need working up.
Updated to reflect Vanguard sinking
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