That there were still Americans and Koreans fighting on the peninsula seems to have eluded inclusion in the statement. Those fighting in the Taegu Pocket were the recipients of whatever silver lining came out of the black cloud surrounding the Pusan Evacuation. The In Min Gun drive to capture Pusan and the Howitzer bombardment of the highways within the former Pusan Perimeter relieved pressure on the Pocket, allowing the 1st Cavalry Division, survivors of the 24th Infantry, and the Korean soldiers to set up strong defensive positions. UN aircraft had gained full control of the air war by this point, and regular supply missions flown from Japan using aircraft and pilots experienced from the Berlin Blockade ensured the soldiers in the Pocket didn’t lack for ammunition and food.
They fought on as the post-crisis political situation shook out in Washington. In what became known as the “Korean Massacre,” President Truman wholly reorganized the military structure behind the way the war was being fought. MacArthur, who had enjoyed almost total independence from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher military authority, suddenly found himself on a short leash. He might have been protected by his close ties with the Republican political establishment, which kept his position secure, but those of his staff and subordinates were much more exposed. Ned Almond was the first to go, replaced by Gen. Matthew Ridgway, widely considered to be the best general officer in the U.S. Army. Ridgway had fought in WWII, rising to command of an army composed of several U.S. parachute infantry divisions. He was much more independent than the sycophantic Almond, and answered to the Joint Chiefs, not MacArthur in Tokyo.
MacArthur also lost Charles Willoughby and other staff officers as the Joint Chiefs, in an unusual move, directly manipulated MacArthur’s staff. Truman, too, made moves to shield himself from accusations that he was responsible for the Pusan defeat. Secretary of Defense Johnson was unceremoniously shoved out the door, replaced by George Marshall, the WWII Army Chief of Staff, postwar Secretary of State, and creator of the Marshall Plan. Marshall was one of a handful of men who had greater military reknown than MacArthur, and he was placed in a position where he and Omar Bradley, one of the others, could ride herd on MacArthur. With these moves, Truman felt he had pulled MacArthur’s teeth without touching the man who still enjoyed enormous public acclaim and media attention.
As tricky as pulling off this reorganization was, it paled in comparison with the problems Truman faced with the failure of the Howitzers to prevent the fall of Pusan. That failure showed missile bombardment — at least as it existed in 1950 — could not stop a determined conventional military force from attaining its objectives. The immediate fear was that the Soviet Union might capitalize on this revelation by attacking Western Europe. If it did, there was very little the United States could do to respond, other than bombarding Soviet cities. As great as this fear was, it wasn’t borne out by events. As we now know, thanks to documents released from Soviet archives after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1984, Stalin fully intended to attack Western Europe — but only after he secured his political backing with a new purge. The orchestrated “Doctors’ Plot” of early 1951 was the spark for this, and the purge lasted until Stalin’s death in October 1952. At the time, his death was thought to be due to a stroke; subsequent revelations have cast doubt upon that, with alternate theories ranging from silent assassination to slow poisoning. Regardless of the means of his death, Stalin’s passing resulted in the cancellation of invasion planning as a new generation of Soviet leaders came to the fore.
His preoccupation with preparing and executing the purge didn’t prevent Stalin from pursuing a more confrontational attitude toward the United States and the West in the 25 months between the failure of the Howitzer bombardment and his death. Where he had deliberately delayed sending Soviet “volunteer” pilots to aid the North Koreans before the attack, he reversed course and sent more than 250 new Soviet aircraft south. Where he had restrained China from aggression toward the Matsu Islands, he now encouraged action against them. In Europe, he visibly bolstered the Warsaw Pact. And around the world, Soviet diplomats and agents supported anticolonial movements with money and weapons. These found fertile ground in places that viewed America’s missile attacks as nothing other than reckless escalation.
In addition to the threat of Soviet attack, there were political recriminations to deal with. Although the Howitzers were widely seen as “the weapon that won the war” in regards to WWII, their impotence in Korea caused at least a few voices to be raised about whether the $6 billion (1945 dollars) cost of the Manhattan Project and the $7 billion spent since 1945 on guided missiles had simply been thrown down the drain. These complaints were few, though they were notable for being among the first raised against the American missile program. Far more serious was the damage to the deterrence effect provided by America’s missile arsenal.
To cover the failure of the Howitzers near Pusan, Truman authorized a strike against Pyongyang to show the world that American missiles were as strong as ever — if used properly. It was a move Truman later agonized over, saying he had “signed an order resulting in the deaths of so many, just to prove a point.” It wasn’t as simple as that — he was pressured by dozens of Senators and Congressmen to launch such an attack, and MacArthur had formally requested it, giving Truman clear grounds for doing so. In his memoirs, Truman attempted to justify the enormously controversial move, stating that it was necessary to protect the soldiers fighting in Taegu and to prevent the further decay of deterrence.
Postwar historians seeking alternative explanations have embraced the idea that Truman was merely attempting to cover up his personal and political failures in conducting the war. They argue that the approach of the 1950 elections was a strong force pushing Truman toward decisive action in Korea. Others have pointed to the immense personal strain Truman was under as he agonized about the thousands of Americans killed in Korea and the bloody retreat from Pusan. In several memos issued in the final week of September, he also expressed concerns that the Taegu Pocket might turn into another, far bloodier Pusan.
Nevertheless, it was with extreme reluctance that he issued the order for a 400-missile strike on Sept. 27. Eighty-six percent of the Howitzers launched from Fort Goddard on that date — 344 in all — impacted in the city in late evening, bringing 3 kilotons of explosive power to bear on the capital of North Korea.
The effects were much as it was at Hiroshima and Kokura. Pyongyang is a port city, and though it contains some hills, they are low and rolling, not at all like those that blocked much of the damage from the Pusan bombardment. No great firestorm was triggered, as in the first two cities destroyed by missile bombardment, largely because the construction of Korean homes lent itself to conflagration much less. Still, 19,000 North Koreans were killed, and approximately 45,000 injured by the largest missile strike conducted to that point. North Korea’s largest city and capital was wrecked and its utility as a logistics hub was diminished for months. The reputation of strategic missile bombardment was partially restored, but at enormous cost, not only in lives, but also in the precedent it set for later use. It had one great effect on the political situation in Washington — Truman no longer had to worry about the charge that he was soft on communism.
They fought on as the post-crisis political situation shook out in Washington. In what became known as the “Korean Massacre,” President Truman wholly reorganized the military structure behind the way the war was being fought. MacArthur, who had enjoyed almost total independence from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher military authority, suddenly found himself on a short leash. He might have been protected by his close ties with the Republican political establishment, which kept his position secure, but those of his staff and subordinates were much more exposed. Ned Almond was the first to go, replaced by Gen. Matthew Ridgway, widely considered to be the best general officer in the U.S. Army. Ridgway had fought in WWII, rising to command of an army composed of several U.S. parachute infantry divisions. He was much more independent than the sycophantic Almond, and answered to the Joint Chiefs, not MacArthur in Tokyo.
MacArthur also lost Charles Willoughby and other staff officers as the Joint Chiefs, in an unusual move, directly manipulated MacArthur’s staff. Truman, too, made moves to shield himself from accusations that he was responsible for the Pusan defeat. Secretary of Defense Johnson was unceremoniously shoved out the door, replaced by George Marshall, the WWII Army Chief of Staff, postwar Secretary of State, and creator of the Marshall Plan. Marshall was one of a handful of men who had greater military reknown than MacArthur, and he was placed in a position where he and Omar Bradley, one of the others, could ride herd on MacArthur. With these moves, Truman felt he had pulled MacArthur’s teeth without touching the man who still enjoyed enormous public acclaim and media attention.
As tricky as pulling off this reorganization was, it paled in comparison with the problems Truman faced with the failure of the Howitzers to prevent the fall of Pusan. That failure showed missile bombardment — at least as it existed in 1950 — could not stop a determined conventional military force from attaining its objectives. The immediate fear was that the Soviet Union might capitalize on this revelation by attacking Western Europe. If it did, there was very little the United States could do to respond, other than bombarding Soviet cities. As great as this fear was, it wasn’t borne out by events. As we now know, thanks to documents released from Soviet archives after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1984, Stalin fully intended to attack Western Europe — but only after he secured his political backing with a new purge. The orchestrated “Doctors’ Plot” of early 1951 was the spark for this, and the purge lasted until Stalin’s death in October 1952. At the time, his death was thought to be due to a stroke; subsequent revelations have cast doubt upon that, with alternate theories ranging from silent assassination to slow poisoning. Regardless of the means of his death, Stalin’s passing resulted in the cancellation of invasion planning as a new generation of Soviet leaders came to the fore.
His preoccupation with preparing and executing the purge didn’t prevent Stalin from pursuing a more confrontational attitude toward the United States and the West in the 25 months between the failure of the Howitzer bombardment and his death. Where he had deliberately delayed sending Soviet “volunteer” pilots to aid the North Koreans before the attack, he reversed course and sent more than 250 new Soviet aircraft south. Where he had restrained China from aggression toward the Matsu Islands, he now encouraged action against them. In Europe, he visibly bolstered the Warsaw Pact. And around the world, Soviet diplomats and agents supported anticolonial movements with money and weapons. These found fertile ground in places that viewed America’s missile attacks as nothing other than reckless escalation.
In addition to the threat of Soviet attack, there were political recriminations to deal with. Although the Howitzers were widely seen as “the weapon that won the war” in regards to WWII, their impotence in Korea caused at least a few voices to be raised about whether the $6 billion (1945 dollars) cost of the Manhattan Project and the $7 billion spent since 1945 on guided missiles had simply been thrown down the drain. These complaints were few, though they were notable for being among the first raised against the American missile program. Far more serious was the damage to the deterrence effect provided by America’s missile arsenal.
To cover the failure of the Howitzers near Pusan, Truman authorized a strike against Pyongyang to show the world that American missiles were as strong as ever — if used properly. It was a move Truman later agonized over, saying he had “signed an order resulting in the deaths of so many, just to prove a point.” It wasn’t as simple as that — he was pressured by dozens of Senators and Congressmen to launch such an attack, and MacArthur had formally requested it, giving Truman clear grounds for doing so. In his memoirs, Truman attempted to justify the enormously controversial move, stating that it was necessary to protect the soldiers fighting in Taegu and to prevent the further decay of deterrence.
Postwar historians seeking alternative explanations have embraced the idea that Truman was merely attempting to cover up his personal and political failures in conducting the war. They argue that the approach of the 1950 elections was a strong force pushing Truman toward decisive action in Korea. Others have pointed to the immense personal strain Truman was under as he agonized about the thousands of Americans killed in Korea and the bloody retreat from Pusan. In several memos issued in the final week of September, he also expressed concerns that the Taegu Pocket might turn into another, far bloodier Pusan.
Nevertheless, it was with extreme reluctance that he issued the order for a 400-missile strike on Sept. 27. Eighty-six percent of the Howitzers launched from Fort Goddard on that date — 344 in all — impacted in the city in late evening, bringing 3 kilotons of explosive power to bear on the capital of North Korea.
The effects were much as it was at Hiroshima and Kokura. Pyongyang is a port city, and though it contains some hills, they are low and rolling, not at all like those that blocked much of the damage from the Pusan bombardment. No great firestorm was triggered, as in the first two cities destroyed by missile bombardment, largely because the construction of Korean homes lent itself to conflagration much less. Still, 19,000 North Koreans were killed, and approximately 45,000 injured by the largest missile strike conducted to that point. North Korea’s largest city and capital was wrecked and its utility as a logistics hub was diminished for months. The reputation of strategic missile bombardment was partially restored, but at enormous cost, not only in lives, but also in the precedent it set for later use. It had one great effect on the political situation in Washington — Truman no longer had to worry about the charge that he was soft on communism.
