What if, immediately upon the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914, the US became interested in the fate of the German Pacific colonies, and decided that US interests would best be served by acquisition of a large part of the German Pacific as a link in the chain of US defenses between Hawaii, Guam, Samoa and the Philippines. The prospect of Japan acquiring the territory is distateful, both threatening supply lines to the Philippines and uncomfortably tangling US-Japanese security interests. The prospect a Germany that wins in Europe retaining those islands is also frightening, leaving it hypothetically with central Pacific bases along with West European and Atlantic bases. And American possession is still better than possession by the UK.
President Wilson therefore makes a bid to purchase German Pacific territories. (Interestingly during WWI Wilson purchased the Virgin Islands in the Caribbean from Denmark for security reasons). The maximum purchase would be for everything except Tsingtao. The minimum purchase would require the US to get the Palaus, the Carolines and the Marshalls, providing the island chain connector between Hawaii, Wake, Guam and the Philippines (and leaving the Marianas, New Guinea, Samoa and Nauru for the Germans to fight over with the Japanese, Australians and New Zealanders).
In the face of criticism, Wilson could definitely cite the Jeffersonian precedent of the Louisiana Purchase. Maybe the Kaiser is a bad guy, but Jefferson bought territory from Napoleon.
wison calls in the German ambasasador. He proposes that the US purchase
German possessions in the Pacific that are not yet occupied by Allied
forces. "You are in quite a fix in the Pacific, sir, just like Napoleon
was with an indefensible Louisiana in 1803, you will shortly lose your
Pacific Empire to the Japanese and Australians and New Zealanders, or
you can sell them to the US and at least get paid for them and deny them
to your enemies. Time is of the essence, you will soon be in no
position to get this deal. You may win the war in France next week, but
disgorging territory from the Japanese and Australians will, and I think
you and I are in agreement here, be very challenging."
The Germans mull it over and accept the offer. The details are then
worked out. The minimum purchase will be the Palaus, Carolines and
Marshalls, providing an uninterrupted chain of bases between Hawaii and
the Philippines. The Marianas, and German territories south of the
Equator may be left out because the Allies could occupy them within
days. The Japanese campaign in Micronesia in OTL did not start until
October, the Australian campaign in New Guinea started in September.
Alternatively, the purchase could include the Marianas, the Bismarcks
and Nauru if the deal is concluded early enough. The Germans are no
longer in any position to sell Samoa or Tsingtao of course, and the fate
of northern New Guinea is pretty predictably in Australia's hands, so Wilson
probably won't want to mess with it, although the Bismarck Archipelago may be an option.
Other details to be worked out include amount and form of US payment. What's a reasonable price?
How would payment be arranged and get around the British blockade?
Preparation of the US Navy for occupying the new acquisition, and
deadlines for all German forces to vacate the premises.
The deal goes through.
The press in Allied countries criticize Wilson for doing business with the
"Huns", some elements of the US press also denounce the deal. Some think we are acquiring worthless territory, other see merit to the purchase.
The Hearst Press, generally in favor of activisim in the Pacific and
isolationism in Europe, applauds the deal.
Australia and Japan are the most miffed, but they know they cannot
interfere with the implementation of the agreement without great risk.
What are the long-term effects?
Will it affect the likelihood of the US getting in to war with Germany?
Britain is displeased, but cannot do anything about it-----or at least would get more trouble than it wants if it tries. German ships in the Pacific may need
to skedaddle from the region faster.
Whether or not the US does get into the war, on the Allied side of
course, the Japanese will be more insistent on holding on to Tsingtao (which they agreed to relinquish in 1922 in OTL), and may even be more strident about the 21 demands on China.
Holding on to Tsingtao can affect the Japanese reaction to the rise of the Chinese Nationalists in the late 20s, or change the specifics of Japanese expansion in China in the 30s.
--Could we possibly get a "Tsingtao Army" playing a similar role to OTL's "Kwangtung Army"? With its center of interest in Shantung so much closer to the Yangtze delta, does this make fullscale Sino-Japanese warfare likely by the late 20s or early 30s (especially if the GMD's northern expedition is not butterflied away)? Hmm, voracious wartime demand for imports in Japan and China prevent the Depression from getting as deep?
The many actual and potential bases in US controlled Micronesia
will greatly complicate any Japanese planning for war with the United
States.
Japan will be both more threatened by the US but, lacking so many of its island bases as a buffer zone, would probably be more deterred.
Later historians, except for die-hard anti-colonialists, may praise wilson's
decision as a 20th Century version of the Louisiana Purchase.
----------------Does this concept founder upon anything you can think of? I'm wondering if there would be time for the deal.
In theory, the idea of a colonial power that will fight Britain, anticipating that development and selling off indefensible colonies sounds like a good one. Yet, as far as I know, Napoleon is the only guy who ever pulled that off, because he managed the Louisiana purchase before he was actually at war with Britain but when he anticipated it was inevitable.
Could we get other examples of the colonial sell-off? Could we get the Germans interested in selling their African empire or their Pacific empire, and get neutrals like the Dutch, Italians, Swedes, Danes, Americans, or Japanese (before their declaration of war) interested in buying? The Germans naturally wanted to expand but might figure their distant colonies are doomed to fall to the commonwealth while if victorious Germany could compensate itself with nearer colonies.
President Wilson therefore makes a bid to purchase German Pacific territories. (Interestingly during WWI Wilson purchased the Virgin Islands in the Caribbean from Denmark for security reasons). The maximum purchase would be for everything except Tsingtao. The minimum purchase would require the US to get the Palaus, the Carolines and the Marshalls, providing the island chain connector between Hawaii, Wake, Guam and the Philippines (and leaving the Marianas, New Guinea, Samoa and Nauru for the Germans to fight over with the Japanese, Australians and New Zealanders).
In the face of criticism, Wilson could definitely cite the Jeffersonian precedent of the Louisiana Purchase. Maybe the Kaiser is a bad guy, but Jefferson bought territory from Napoleon.
wison calls in the German ambasasador. He proposes that the US purchase
German possessions in the Pacific that are not yet occupied by Allied
forces. "You are in quite a fix in the Pacific, sir, just like Napoleon
was with an indefensible Louisiana in 1803, you will shortly lose your
Pacific Empire to the Japanese and Australians and New Zealanders, or
you can sell them to the US and at least get paid for them and deny them
to your enemies. Time is of the essence, you will soon be in no
position to get this deal. You may win the war in France next week, but
disgorging territory from the Japanese and Australians will, and I think
you and I are in agreement here, be very challenging."
The Germans mull it over and accept the offer. The details are then
worked out. The minimum purchase will be the Palaus, Carolines and
Marshalls, providing an uninterrupted chain of bases between Hawaii and
the Philippines. The Marianas, and German territories south of the
Equator may be left out because the Allies could occupy them within
days. The Japanese campaign in Micronesia in OTL did not start until
October, the Australian campaign in New Guinea started in September.
Alternatively, the purchase could include the Marianas, the Bismarcks
and Nauru if the deal is concluded early enough. The Germans are no
longer in any position to sell Samoa or Tsingtao of course, and the fate
of northern New Guinea is pretty predictably in Australia's hands, so Wilson
probably won't want to mess with it, although the Bismarck Archipelago may be an option.
Other details to be worked out include amount and form of US payment. What's a reasonable price?
How would payment be arranged and get around the British blockade?
Preparation of the US Navy for occupying the new acquisition, and
deadlines for all German forces to vacate the premises.
The deal goes through.
The press in Allied countries criticize Wilson for doing business with the
"Huns", some elements of the US press also denounce the deal. Some think we are acquiring worthless territory, other see merit to the purchase.
The Hearst Press, generally in favor of activisim in the Pacific and
isolationism in Europe, applauds the deal.
Australia and Japan are the most miffed, but they know they cannot
interfere with the implementation of the agreement without great risk.
What are the long-term effects?
Will it affect the likelihood of the US getting in to war with Germany?
Britain is displeased, but cannot do anything about it-----or at least would get more trouble than it wants if it tries. German ships in the Pacific may need
to skedaddle from the region faster.
Whether or not the US does get into the war, on the Allied side of
course, the Japanese will be more insistent on holding on to Tsingtao (which they agreed to relinquish in 1922 in OTL), and may even be more strident about the 21 demands on China.
Holding on to Tsingtao can affect the Japanese reaction to the rise of the Chinese Nationalists in the late 20s, or change the specifics of Japanese expansion in China in the 30s.
--Could we possibly get a "Tsingtao Army" playing a similar role to OTL's "Kwangtung Army"? With its center of interest in Shantung so much closer to the Yangtze delta, does this make fullscale Sino-Japanese warfare likely by the late 20s or early 30s (especially if the GMD's northern expedition is not butterflied away)? Hmm, voracious wartime demand for imports in Japan and China prevent the Depression from getting as deep?
The many actual and potential bases in US controlled Micronesia
will greatly complicate any Japanese planning for war with the United
States.
Japan will be both more threatened by the US but, lacking so many of its island bases as a buffer zone, would probably be more deterred.
Later historians, except for die-hard anti-colonialists, may praise wilson's
decision as a 20th Century version of the Louisiana Purchase.
----------------Does this concept founder upon anything you can think of? I'm wondering if there would be time for the deal.
In theory, the idea of a colonial power that will fight Britain, anticipating that development and selling off indefensible colonies sounds like a good one. Yet, as far as I know, Napoleon is the only guy who ever pulled that off, because he managed the Louisiana purchase before he was actually at war with Britain but when he anticipated it was inevitable.
Could we get other examples of the colonial sell-off? Could we get the Germans interested in selling their African empire or their Pacific empire, and get neutrals like the Dutch, Italians, Swedes, Danes, Americans, or Japanese (before their declaration of war) interested in buying? The Germans naturally wanted to expand but might figure their distant colonies are doomed to fall to the commonwealth while if victorious Germany could compensate itself with nearer colonies.
), everything the French and British possess would be open for German annexation, at least following the plans of the General staff. So why not sell some of the minor colonies to the US, avoid fighting, and lateron get something British or French in exchange for this?