Were tactical nukes the only way for NATO to stop the Red Army?

[Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy]

So I wonder would Poles, Romanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, etc. turn their weapons on their communist governments and soviet forces in order to gain indepedence?

The Romanians under Ceausescu are unlikely to join the attack to begin with. Even before him there had been secret negotiations with the US to avoid nuclear strikes on Romania in case of war. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, his predecessor, didn't have a much better opinion of the Soviets than Ceausescu, but he knew how to keep his mouth shut and negotiate with Moscow for support (against Ana Pauker and her supporters) or concessions (the evacuation of Soviet forces from the country in '58).

The Hungarians are pro-Western. The Poles are pro-Western but anti-German, so it depends on how they're put to use. The Czechoslovaks would react similarly after the Prague Spring, but before that they can be considered more reliable than the Poles. The Bulgarians were the Soviets' most reliable European allies, but if the war has a southern front they'll be more likely to be put to use there.

How does NATO's southern flank figure into this, BTW? The Soviets would obviously try to keep Turkey and Greece neutral. Besides threats, they'd try to use the 2 countries grievances against the United States and each other. They'll manage to keep at least one of them neutral, probably both. There's also Asia to consider, and a lot depends here on the period when this is supposed to happen.

France under Mitterand would switch sides or remain neutral.

Under Mitterrand of all people? Give me a break.

As for Italy, the Soviet offensive would have to be performed through Austria and/or Yugoslavia, through Alps. No way for it for succeed.

No way for it to happen. Austria and Yugoslavia were neutral and an attack through them would only make the situation worse for the Warsaw Pact.

Remember that most nato armies were - at that time - conscript armies

As were all Warsaw Pact armies. What's your point?

and that pacifism as very popular in western europe

Not when defending their own countries it isn't.

Anyway, just how realistic is the Red Storm Rising scenario of the Soviets seizing Iceland by surprise? What about the naval aspect of the war? Could NATO naval forces pull a Copenhagen on one or more of the Soviet fleets? Is the escalation resulting from an attack on Soviet territory worth it?

 

[67th Tigers]

On the topic of technology, during the 1970's the US and WP were roughly in parity, but in fact behind slightly Europe. This is largely due to the effect of the Vietnam War diverting resources, and the US launched a deliberate catchup programme in the late 70's (with the products including the M-1 Tank, M-2 IFV, AH-64 etc.).

However, the WP would have some major dramas invading western Europe. The scaling for maps and compasses, for example, was 1 per battalion, and they were entirely dependent on traffic directors to signpost their advance. Knowing this, a Sqn of 22 was detail to kill all the traffic directors.

 

[Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy]

You know, as ridiculous as it may seem to the Americans on the board, the Soviet leadership by the early '80s was seriously afraid that the US would start a war against them. Part of it was due to their own ideological bias and Reagan's behavior, but I suspect that part of it was also their own conclusion that they couldn't win a war against NATO.

 

[Oddball]

As were all Warsaw Pact armies. What's your point?

And probably better trained and most likely in defence of home territory

Anyway, just how realistic is the Red Storm Rising scenario of the Soviets seizing Iceland by surprise? What about the naval aspect of the war? Could NATO naval forces pull a Copenhagen on one or more of the Soviet fleets? Is the escalation resulting from an attack on Soviet territory worth it?

The Icelandic scenario is in best case bollocks. But another scenario hinted about in the book with Soviet occupation of Andøya, a strategic important Norwegian airbase is not. And would give situations somehow similar to the Icelandic scenario. NATO sealines were extremely sensitive to Soviet controll of norther waters.

Regarding the escalation, I would say yes. If the Soviets so much as starts to make progress in the Atlantic, NATO would do anything to contend them. Else rest of Europe is toast. No matter if it is the 60thies, 70thies or 80thies.

 

[Oddball]

On the topic of technology, during the 1970's the US and WP were roughly in parity, but in fact behind slightly Europe.

Yes probably. But the slight tech advantage is not enough to make NATO secure. In fact early 70thies WP attack would IMHO spell doom to NATO

Not until early/mid 80thies did the tech disparity start to make NATO prospects looking good.

 

[Homer]

I once saw a AH-scenario on TV about exactly that. One part of that scenario which is largely forgotten so far is that economically, the Soviets are in no way able to compete with the west. Within a rather short timespan of a conventional war, the Soviets should fall short of fuel, supplies, even food. Given the ressources the Soviets had for their Elite unions in the GDR (these units for example regularly helped in potato harvests to have, well, potatoes...), I give the Soviets only weeks.

And then we'd have the psychological effect. Imagine a Russian unit "liberating" a German supermarket...

 

[Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy]

I think the most logical place for the Soviets to invade during the Cold War would have been the Persian Gulf. This way they strike at a US interest without getting NATO involved. I'm not saying it would have been smart, mind you. Iran is just as dangerous as Afghanistan in terms of guerrilla warfare, maybe more, but the Soviets wouldn't know what that means until the '80s.

 

[Gryphon]

Again, Red Storm Rising.

My favorite years for a war are 1983, 1984, 1985. Those are the years I have the best information for. So, 1983 is closest to the 1980 limit, and shouldn't be too different. A few programs have started to come on-line, that's about it.

So, to keep in line with previous posts, the Sovjets start the war. The French are NOT going to stay neutral. Sorry, NATO is going to get that ally. So. The Russkiyes should, in my opinion, use the WarPac forces to occupy the territory they gain, while putting their own forces at the head. The NATO allies have the barest chance to stop the Soviets if they play their cards right. I read something about the Soviet fuel supplies, to the effect that most of their fuel went through a small number of depots, and the US targeted those depots. Fuel would not have been short immediately, but a Soviet commander is not going to keep going when he hears he's only got a few days' fuel left. From that point, all the NATO forces have to do is hit the Russkiyes without getting hit, something they do well. Air power will also be in Western favor by this point, meaning that the Sovjets are getting pounded from several directions.

BARRING NUCLEAR WEAPON USAGE, the NATO allies have a chance to defeat the Soviets in battle, but only if they keep the Soviets in that position. When reinforcements arrive from America, the Russkiyes will be in for a tough time.

In the Pacific, the Soviets are greatly outnumbered in naval forces. The two to five PACFLT CBGs will make quick work of the Russian naval assets. China may spy the opportunity to attack her northern enemy (after Nixon's visits), so suddenly Siberia is getting hit bad.

In the Atlantic, Norway is probably bad off, with parts of the country being quickly occupied. It is possible, however, with certain provocations, Sweden could join the war on NATO's side (definitely not the Soviets, though). In the ocean, the USN, RN, and friends are going to be doing their best to keep the Soviets bottled up in their home ports. Since NATO will likely be fully invoked quickly, Greece and Turkey (who now have a bigger problem to the north to worry about than each other) will be effective at this (Dardanelles and Bosporus). Denmark will help block off the Baltic, and the battle for the Atlantic will be in favour of the NATO allies.

Phew. On Christmas Day, no less.

 

[Oddball]

Again, Red Storm Rising.

My favorite years for a war are 1983, 1984, 1985. Those are the years I have the best information for. So, 1983 is closest to the 1980 limit, and shouldn't be too different. A few programs have started to come on-line, that's about it.

You are not alone

RSR was probably my entry into AH

In the Atlantic, Norway is probably bad off, with parts of the country being quickly occupied.

Northern parts yes. Perhaps as far south as Tromsø. After that it gets very much hardder for the Soviets to push on. But like I said in my previous post, NATO realy cant afford this, so we are definetly looking at a highly contested area.

It is possible, however, with certain provocations, Sweden could join the war on NATO's side (definitely not the Soviets, though).

In the short run, no. As long as WP is satisfied with northern parts on Norway and the Baltic entrance remains calm, Sweden will be left alone.

But if WP makes a run for southern Norway and/or Baltic entrance, all bets are off

 

[Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy]

Since NATO will likely be fully invoked quickly, Greece and Turkey (who now have a bigger problem to the north to worry about than each other) will be effective at this (Dardanelles and Bosporus).

Greece and Turkey are some of the most vulnerable NATO allies when it comes to resistance from local communists as well as the least useful for the Warsaw Pact to attack. Greece in particular experienced the nadir of its relations with the US in the first decade or so after the fall of the Regime of the Colonels. There'll be a lot of domestic pressure for them to remain neutral and the Soviets will keep that in mind; I'd be surprised if this pressure failed in both Athens and Ankara. Alliances are not automated things.

Edit: As for Sweden, this is happening while Olof Palme was premier, so those provocations better amount to an all-out attack. Which they won't if the Kremlin has any sense.

 

[Gryphon]

You are not alone

RSR was probably my entry into AH

I greatly enjoyed the book. It inspired me, a bit.

Northern parts yes. Perhaps as far south as Tromsø. After that it gets very much hardder for the Soviets to push on. But like I said in my previous post, NATO realy cant afford this, so we are definetly looking at a highly contested area.

Yes, but NATO can't afford to lose Germany. They'd probably try to halt the advance, not turn it around.

In the short run, no. As long as WP is satisfied with northern parts on Norway and the Baltic entrance remains calm, Sweden will be left alone.

But if WP makes a run for southern Norway and/or Baltic entrance, all bets are off

I know that the Swedes would not join in initially, but I think that events could conspire to force them to join the war, and there's no wy they're joining the Soviets. See below.

Greece and Turkey are some of the most vulnerable NATO allies when it comes to resistance from local communists as well as the least useful for the Warsaw Pact to attack. Greece in particular experienced the nadir of its relations with the US in the first decade or so after the fall of the Regime of the Colonels. There'll be a lot of domestic pressure for them to remain neutral and the Soviets will keep that in mind; I'd be surprised if this pressure failed in both Athens and Ankara. Alliances are not automated things.

I'm a bit concerned in the southern theatre, but if either nation starts with NATO, there's going to be a minor problem for the Soviets. Even if neither join the war, the Soviets are still going to be concerned.

Edit: As for Sweden, this is happening while Olof Palme was premier, so those provocations better amount to an all-out attack. Which they won't if the Kremlin has any sense.

Who knows? The Kremlin might decide on a bad course of action.
IIRC, the TP-140 project was completed so Sweden could have the ability to intercept and turn back any foreign warplanes flying over Sweden. If some of those events escalate into a shootout, then it would probably be with the Russkiyes. The West usually has better sense then that. Again, Sweden would not side with WarPac.

 

[Oddball]

Yes, but NATO can't afford to lose Germany. They'd probably try to halt the advance, not turn it around.

Sure, but without an open communication across the Atlantic, Germany is lost anyhow.

And with WP air assets based out of Norway, the Atlantic is severly threatened.

The Norwegian theater of operation is seriousley underestimated in many "amateur" (dont get that statement wrong, please ) WW3 scenarioes. Trust me, NATO during the Cold War did not underestimate it

 

[Boydfish]

You'd have to better define what constitutes a win for either side(If we're talking in the early 80's).

As well, judging the results of the US coalition tackling the Iraqis in 90/91 is not an accurate way of judging the combat capabilities of the WARPAC v. NATO. Yes, the Iraqis were using Soviet pattern kit and doctrine, but they were using the second line stuff, essentially cast offs from the Soviets.

I'd suggest that if we're talking about a rising escalation that leads to an exchange of hostilities, then I'd put my money on NATO. That spin up time means that they can not only solidify response options, they can muster the political will towards a unified response. Unlike the WARPAC, which is unified politically for all intents and purposes under Moscow, NATO needs to get it's membership on board and willing to support war.

Now, if the WARPAC just throws a bolt from the blue punch at NATO, I'd put the money on the WARPAC. I'd see the most likely reason for this to be a combination of misunderstanding western positions and simply feeling threatened as a result of NATO.

First, they can probably swallow West Germany before NATO even figures out among itself that it is at war. The Low Countries would disappear shortly after that.

Second, the "24 hour war" objective for the Soviets is actually fairly rational, assuming you feel comfortable describing any war as rational. They advance hard for 24 hours, dig in, get on the hotline and basically offer NATO two choices: Ceasefire and acceptance of the new borders or keep slugging. The second choice, which would be offered when things are looking darkest for NATO, with the only possible "salvation" being a nuclear exchange. This would mean NATO trading it's 200 most important cities for the 500 most important cities in the Soviet Union. I'd bet that NATO would lose their bottle and accept the ceasefire.

 

[Flocculencio]

No matter if it is the 60thies, 70thies or 80thies.

If you're just using the numbers you just need to use 's' i.e. 60's, 70's, 80's. If you're spelling it out it's just 'ies' not 'hies' i.e. Sixties, Seventies, Eighties.

 

[Gryphon]

Sure, but without an open communication across the Atlantic, Germany is lost anyhow.

And with WP air assets based out of Norway, the Atlantic is severly threatened.

The Norwegian theater of operation is seriousley underestimated in many "amateur" (dont get that statement wrong, please ) WW3 scenarioes. Trust me, NATO during the Cold War did not underestimate it

Ahh, I was a bit tired earlier. Now that I am fully awake and aware, the posts make a little more sense than they did some hours ago. Yes, you are right; Norway is more important than I previously stated. And I take no offense at the use of 'ameteur.' In fact, I relish it.
It is my opinion that NATO could have won most situations if they played all their cards right. However, just one bit out of line, and they could lose.

snipped stuff that I agree with

I'd suggest that if we're talking about a rising escalation that leads to an exchange of hostilities, then I'd put my money on NATO. That spin up time means that they can not only solidify response options, they can muster the political will towards a unified response. Unlike the WARPAC, which is unified politically for all intents and purposes under Moscow, NATO needs to get it's membership on board and willing to support war.

Now, if the WARPAC just throws a bolt from the blue punch at NATO, I'd put the money on the WARPAC. I'd see the most likely reason for this to be a combination of misunderstanding western positions and simply feeling threatened as a result of NATO.

First, they can probably swallow West Germany before NATO even figures out among itself that it is at war. The Low Countries would disappear shortly after that.

Second, the "24 hour war" objective for the Soviets is actually fairly rational, assuming you feel comfortable describing any war as rational. They advance hard for 24 hours, dig in, get on the hotline and basically offer NATO two choices: Ceasefire and acceptance of the new borders or keep slugging. The second choice, which would be offered when things are looking darkest for NATO, with the only possible "salvation" being a nuclear exchange. This would mean NATO trading it's 200 most important cities for the 500 most important cities in the Soviet Union. I'd bet that NATO would lose their bottle and accept the ceasefire.

If the Soviets play every card correctly, there's no way they could lose outright short of nukes, given the right opening. If NATO has warning, however, things become greatly harder for CCCP/WP. And I could see NATO continuing the fight if they still had most of their force intact; those guerillan networks in WWII sprang up in a short time and were mostly effective. If the same thing didn't happen again, I'd be surprised. Again, NATO has to play their hand perfectly to win in this scenario.


To go right to the first post in the thread, NATO can win a completely conventional war against WarPac, but they need a bit of luck on their side in most circumstances. (say, the Soviets attacking just after a REFORGER exercise is completed and the forces are still there.)

 

[Oddball]

If you're just using the numbers you just need to use 's' i.e. 60's, 70's, 80's. If you're spelling it out it's just 'ies' not 'hies' i.e. Sixties, Seventies, Eighties.

Oh, I obviousley had missed that part of grammar

I stand corrected

 

[gathart]

Some interesting links:
http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/documents/ZB79_000.pdf
bit academic, but gives a good view about the military thinking in those days
http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/conferences/previous/documents/BodoeReport.pdf
about norwegian planning
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/09/20/wwthree120.xml
general newspaper article about nuclear strke of wp
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=13653
about a polish document

 

[Jukra]

Yes probably. But the slight tech advantage is not enough to make NATO secure. In fact early 70thies WP attack would IMHO spell doom to NATO

Not until early/mid 80thies did the tech disparity start to make NATO prospects looking good.

But where was the gap?

 

[Oddball]

But where was the gap?

Eh, what

I think I might have missed something

 

[Jukra]

Eh, what

I think I might have missed something

Sorry, it was not well paraphrased

To formulate better, why would NATO have more advantage against Soviets in mid-80's compared to early-70's?