What did the US plan for Korea before the Korean war broke out?

There is an opinion in Korea that, had the North Koreans not invaded and given the US a wake up call, they would not care much about Korea, thus little, if at all, monetary support, leading to Korea's economic growth being dramatically slowed, though not having the war would probably make things better initially.

What were US plans for Korea before the war anyway, did they ever plan on helping build the country like, say, Japan, or were there simply no such plans?
 
There is an opinion in Korea that, had the North Koreans not invaded and given the US a wake up call, they would not care much about Korea, thus little, if at all, monetary support, leading to Korea's economic growth being dramatically slowed, though not having the war would probably make things better initially.

Theres a fair amount of evidence all of Asia was on the ignore list for US policy. Part of the evidence was the US Army and Navy were being drawn down further & overseas forces to be withdrawn, or made cadres. ie: the formations of 8th Army in Korea had already been reduced in total strength below 70% of To/TE, and the artillery and infantry regiments to under 50%. Fast reaction forces in the US consisted only of the 82d Airborne Div, which was the only division at full strength. Sec Defense Louis Johnson was gaining Congressional support for: 1. Mothballing the US Navy other than some cruisers, s few destroyers, and some service auxiliaries. He wished to disband the Marine Corps. 2. The Army was to be further reduced to a training and planning service. Its combat capability to be reconstituted after a war was started. 3. Only the USAF was to be funded under Johnsons plans. It would revolve around a nuclear delivery force of VLR jet bombers (which did not yet exist in 1950). A jet fighter force would ensure defense of the US. The National Guard would have been defunded, but it was popular among the voters and reducing Federal expense there was deferred a few years.

The Korean War and Trumans refusal to use Atomic weapons there revealed the bankruptcy of L Johnsons military doctrine, and the problem in not having a robust regional reaction force overseas. Actually when the Korean war started the Air Force could not point to Atomic targets that might actually stop the NKPA. Not that they were not ready to send B29s that way with war shots aboard. Truman & the other military leaders quickly saw the NKPA was to dispersed and Korean industry too thin to be stopped by Atomic attack. Further the USAF admitted they could not guarantee stopping the tiny Soviet bomber force from dropping its tiny Atomic arsenal on the US.

So US strategy changed and building Allies in Asia became a priority.
 
Theres a fair amount of evidence all of Asia was on the ignore list for US policy.
I'd say it was not so much as "Asia was being ignored" as "US policy's means were getting seriously out of whack with the desired ends". The state department was showing tons of interest in Korea in the period between the end of the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War and having lots of discussions about remaking South Korea into a new bulwark against communism in the region which would - in concert with Japan - make up for the loss in China. The problem was that twofold: first, the conceived build-up was economic rather than military and failed to recognize the necessity of continued military protection against a potential northern assault. That then dovetails with the second problem, that the continued American military drawdown that you go onto illustrate threatened to open up a lethal gap between what the US wanted to do in Korea compared to what it could do, a contradiction that the Korean War forced out into the opening very blatantly... fortunately before the gap got too wide.
 
Theres a fair amount of evidence all of Asia was on the ignore list for US policy. Part of the evidence was the US Army and Navy were being drawn down further & overseas forces to be withdrawn, or made cadres. ie: the formations of 8th Army in Korea had already been reduced in total strength below 70% of To/TE, and the artillery and infantry regiments to under 50%. Fast reaction forces in the US consisted only of the 82d Airborne Div, which was the only division at full strength. Sec Defense Louis Johnson was gaining Congressional support for: 1. Mothballing the US Navy other than some cruisers, s few destroyers, and some service auxiliaries. He wished to disband the Marine Corps. 2. The Army was to be further reduced to a training and planning service. Its combat capability to be reconstituted after a war was started. 3. Only the USAF was to be funded under Johnsons plans. It would revolve around a nuclear delivery force of VLR jet bombers (which did not yet exist in 1950). A jet fighter force would ensure defense of the US. The National Guard would have been defunded, but it was popular among the voters and reducing Federal expense there was deferred a few years.

The Korean War and Trumans refusal to use Atomic weapons there revealed the bankruptcy of L Johnsons military doctrine, and the problem in not having a robust regional reaction force overseas. Actually when the Korean war started the Air Force could not point to Atomic targets that might actually stop the NKPA. Not that they were not ready to send B29s that way with war shots aboard. Truman & the other military leaders quickly saw the NKPA was to dispersed and Korean industry too thin to be stopped by Atomic attack. Further the USAF admitted they could not guarantee stopping the tiny Soviet bomber force from dropping its tiny Atomic arsenal on the US.

So US strategy changed and building Allies in Asia became a priority.
Even Japan? I thought plans to rebuild Japan were there even before China went communist... or were US plans for Japan mostly completed at that point?
 
Theres a fair amount of evidence all of Asia was on the ignore list for US policy. Part of the evidence was the US Army and Navy were being drawn down further & overseas forces to be withdrawn, or made cadres. ie: the formations of 8th Army in Korea had already been reduced in total strength below 70% of To/TE, and the artillery and infantry regiments to under 50%. Fast reaction forces in the US consisted only of the 82d Airborne Div, which was the only division at full strength. Sec Defense Louis Johnson was gaining Congressional support for: 1. Mothballing the US Navy other than some cruisers, s few destroyers, and some service auxiliaries. He wished to disband the Marine Corps. 2. The Army was to be further reduced to a training and planning service. Its combat capability to be reconstituted after a war was started. 3. Only the USAF was to be funded under Johnsons plans. It would revolve around a nuclear delivery force of VLR jet bombers (which did not yet exist in 1950). A jet fighter force would ensure defense of the US. The National Guard would have been defunded, but it was popular among the voters and reducing Federal expense there was deferred a few years.

The Korean War and Trumans refusal to use Atomic weapons there revealed the bankruptcy of L Johnsons military doctrine, and the problem in not having a robust regional reaction force overseas. Actually when the Korean war started the Air Force could not point to Atomic targets that might actually stop the NKPA. Not that they were not ready to send B29s that way with war shots aboard. Truman & the other military leaders quickly saw the NKPA was to dispersed and Korean industry too thin to be stopped by Atomic attack. Further the USAF admitted they could not guarantee stopping the tiny Soviet bomber force from dropping its tiny Atomic arsenal on the US.

So US strategy changed and building Allies in Asia became a priority.
Johnson was doing what Truman wanted.
 
Even Japan? I thought plans to rebuild Japan were there even before China went communist... or were US plans for Japan mostly completed at that point?

The plans were not yet well funded. The same people who supported isolationism and those who supported extreme fiscal conservatism a decade earlier were still around. In simplistic terms the US was split between those who saw the need to engage the world and those who thought otherwise. There was no clear line in this. Business men who sought the revival of trade with Asia lobbied for restoring Japan as a important trading partner. But many of those also opposed the expenditure of US funds to do so. Politics is never very logical.

The Korean War settled the debate. US contracts for Pierced Steel Plank for air fields and roads and structural steel for bridges accelerated the revival of the Japanese steel industry. Japanese Cement kilns were flooded with orders for concrete. Japanese airports were rebuilt and expanded as the USAF flew in to stay. Dock workers were hired daily as material to rebuild the 8th Army poured in. Ditto for the naval bases the USN needed. The Japanese shipyards revived building cargo ships contracted to the US Dept of Defense. The electronics industry had orders for ready and telephone components. The list was endless. the Korean War jumped up Japanese revival of the 1950s.
 
Last edited:
Johnson was doing what Truman wanted.
Truman was doing what the voters were favoring. Congress sniffed the wind and voted for rolling the US military back to the 1930s levels. Johnson promised a way to do that and still have low cost defense of US interests, at home and overseas. Truman let him have at it until it failed. the threat of Atomic weapons was supposed to deter wars like the NKPA had started. There had been plenty of warnings this was not so, but Johnson and his supporters in Congress looked at the B36 and the specs for XB47s and larger and faster bombers and held to that shiny vision.

Hardly three months after the NKPA opened fire Truman replaced Johnson as Sec Defense. Truman was good at triangulating the political trends and disabling the Army and Navy was no longer a option.
 
The plans were not yet well funded. The same people who supported isolationism and those who supported extreme fiscal conservatism a decade earlier were still around. In simplistic terms the US was split between those who saw the need to engage the world and those who thought otherwise. There was no clear line in this. Business men who sought the revival of trade with Asia lobbied for restoring Japan as a important trading partner. But many of those also opposed the expenditure of US funds to do so. Politics is never very logical.

The Korean War settled the debate. US contracts for Pierced Steel Plank for air fields and roads and structural steel for bridges accelerated the revival of the Japanese steel industry. Japanese Cement kilns were flooded with orders for concrete. Japanese airports were rebuilt and expanded as the USAF flew in to stay. Dock workers were hired daily as material to rebuild the 8th Army poured in. Ditto for the naval bases the USN needed. The Japanese shipyards revived building cargo ships contracted to the US Dept of Defense. The electronics industry had orders for ready and telephone components. The list was endless. the Korean War jumped up Japanese revival of the 1950s.
Interesting, perhaps from this viewpoint had China not gone communist somehow, would we have seen a much lesser drive to rebuild Japan and ally with Korea, with a potential massive trading partner (China) right there in Asia?
 
Even Japan? I thought plans to rebuild Japan were there even before China went communist... or were US plans for Japan mostly completed at that point?
There were plans to rebuild Japan before the Korean War, but only because the the US wanted to turn Japan into a regional ally like West Germany.
 
Last edited:
Theres a fair amount of evidence all of Asia was on the ignore list for US policy. Part of the evidence was the US Army and Navy were being drawn down further & overseas forces to be withdrawn, or made cadres. ie: the formations of 8th Army in Korea had already been reduced in total strength below 70% of To/TE, and the artillery and infantry regiments to under 50%.
Typo, US troops were in Japan, not Korea. Units were a mess. Typical McArthur.
 
Typo, US troops were in Japan, not Korea. Units were a mess. Typical McArthur.

Trigger automatic Congressional rant

Mac had his hand in this, but the primary culprit was the US Congress which was happily slashing the Army and Navy budgets, and forcing a defacto policy of global disengagement. Mac could have resolve problems like regional intelligence, training, and some equipment readiness. But, themishing third of each combat formation, and general lack of logistics support ran back to Capitol Hill. Exactly one US Army formation overseas was at full strength Triest US Army Troops. (TRUST) formed around the 351st Regimental Combat Team. The rest of the US Army formations in Europe varied from 75% to 50% strength. The war plan (DROP SHOT) at this time centered on a rush to the coast or Spain and evacuation. While the USAF sent its single wing of B36 on Atom bomb missions to Moscow.

The 8th Army formations arriving in Korean June and July were seldom even 2/3 strength. Task Force Smith, the first US Army formation to fight the NKPA arrived was on paper a infantry battalion. It lacked a complete rifle company. The other two companies were short a rifle platoon each, so the battalion had on hand four of its nine rifle platoons. The squads in those were understrength as well. Most of the support weapons were present, but the section strength for each was about 50%. Two 4.2: mortars were attached. Also a battery of 105mm Howitzers. The howitzers had all been condemned as unsafe for worn barrels, but had not been scheduled for rebuild and new barrels. No tanks were attached or present. The AT capability consisted of some old 2.75" caliber Bazookas and either two or four (I can't recall which) 75mm caliber recoiless rifles. This was typical of the 24th Inf Div that was the first sizable formation to move to Korea.
 
Last edited:

Cryostorm

Donor
Monthly Donor
It does make you wonder how the Cold War, particularly the East Asian front, would have gone if NK had held off for even another five or ten years.
 
I was told in other forums while the U.S. State Department had interests in Korea, others say it was a matter of less significance. Considering that Korea was a backwater region still recovering from the Japanese occupation. Even then, Japan didn't officially relinquish rights to Korea, Penghu, Formosa, and other places up until the San Francisco Treaty in 1952.

There was also hope in Washington that Mao Zedong would not ally with the USSR and pull-off a Tito. Especially since Truman on the advice of the NSC abandoned the KMT, seeing them as a waste of resources. I learned this yesterday from a similar thread:
Outside the sphere of US National Security, not U.S. Foreign Policy. There is a difference. This decision was made by the National Security Council (NSC) on the recommendation of The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS was realistically acting as a result of the massive cuts in budget since 1946. The Decision Papers are NSC 34, 37, 41 and 48. They can be summarized as Chiang Kai-Shek will be left to fend for himself.
The US Seventh Fleet was deployed to the Taiwan Straits on 27 June 1950, two days after the DRPK invasion of the ROK. Politically, the Truman Administration had no choice.

The Truman Administration hope at this timeframe was that Mao would follow the course of Tito in Yugoslavia, and break with Stalin. Diplomatic relations were perceived at the time as helpful to what the U.S. State Department referred to as "Chinese Titoism." This also shows how dramatically U.S. Policy fully reversed itself after the North Korean invasion of the South.
The China Lobby was not pleased.
 
Trigger automatic Congressional rant

Mac had his hand in this, but the primary culprit was the US Congress which was happily slashing the Army and Navy budgets, and forcing a defacto policy of global disengagement. Mac could have resolve problems like regional intelligence, training, and some equipment readiness. But, themishing third of each combat formation, and general lack of logistics support ran back to Capitol Hill. Exactly one US Army formation overseas was at full strength Triest US Army Troops. (TRUST) formed around the 351st Regimental Combat Team. The rest of the US Army formations in Europe varied from 75% to 50% strength. The war plan (DROP SHOT) at this time centered on a rush to the coast or Spain and evacuation. While the USAF sent its single wing of B36 on Atom bomb missions to Moscow.

The 8th Army formations arriving in Korean June and July were seldom even 2/3 strength. Task Force Smith, the first US Army formation to fight the NKPA arrived was on paper a infantry battalion. It lacked a complete rifle company. The other two companies were short a rifle platoon each, so the battalion had on hand four of its nine rifle platoons. The squads in those were understrength as well. Most of the support weapons were present, but the section strength for each was about 50%. Two 4.2: mortars were attached. Also a battery of 105mm Howitzers. The howitzers had all been condemned as unsafe for worn barrels, but had not been scheduled for rebuild and new barrels. No tanks were attached or present. The AT capability consisted of some old 2.75" caliber Bazookas and either two or four (I can't recall which) 75mm caliber recoiless rifles. This was typical of the 24th Inf Div that was the first sizable formation to move to Korea.
Truman was a big part of this.

"""After a series of conflicts with Defense Secretary James V. Forrestal over defense budget cutbacks, Truman asked for Forrestal's resignation, replacing him with Johnson early in 1949. (Johnson was his chief fundraiser, Truman had trouble finding money)*.

According to historian Walter LaFeber, Truman was known to approach defense budgetary requests in the abstract, without regard to defense response requirements in the event of conflicts with potential enemies. Truman would begin by subtracting from total receipts the amount needed for domestic needs and recurrent operating costs, with any surplus going to the defense budget for that year. From the beginning, Johnson and Truman assumed that the United States' monopoly on the atomic bomb was adequate protection against any and all external threats."""

*https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/oral-histories/larkin - See paragraph 39 & 40
"The curious thing, you'll remember, is that Truman had a very difficult time getting anybody to raise funds, to be his campaign treasurer, and he finally got Louis Johnson. And Louis Johnson did quite a good job under the most adverse circumstances. The money was just not forthcoming. Truman was deemed to have lost completely, So Louis Johnson by taking on that unpleasant and difficult job, became the great hero when Truman won.
Truman owed him quite a political debt and Mr. Johnson was not above trying to collect it either. I think I knew Louis Johnson well, and worked for him, and had a considerable amount of respect for him, but I dare say there was some element of push on his part to get the reward for the work he did in the campaign.

HESS: Had you ever heard anything about a possible agreement between Mr. Truman and Louis Johnson that if he took that job he would be rewarded?

LARKIN: No, I never heard that; but what I did hear, as a matter of fact, from a lot of my associates and people who worked with Forrestal, when he did in fact resign and when Louis Johnson was named Secretary of Defense right after him--and here is the circumstantial inference that is drawn all the time--was that this was the payoff. He forced the payoff, and Truman was cold blooded enough to bounce Forrestal and pay off Johnson for the work he did in raising the money for him. Quite a few people were, therefore, very annoyed at Mr. Johnson when he came in, and there was a certain amount of hostility to him among the staff, because they felt he had kind of gotten Forrestal, you s
"
 
Last edited:
It does make you wonder how the Cold War, particularly the East Asian front, would have gone if NK had held off for even another five or ten years.
Honestly a delayed Korean War only makes things more deadly to the Koreans. The war killed somewhere between 3million and 6 million. That's equal to the total casualties suffered by Japan in WW2. Delay the war, with both North and South Korea preparing for a potential war, I wouldn't be surprised if the casualty count outstripped 10 million. That's an unrecoverable damage to the Korean peninsula.
 
Honestly a delayed Korean War only makes things more deadly to the Koreans. The war killed somewhere between 3million and 6 million. That's equal to the total casualties suffered by Japan in WW2. Delay the war, with both North and South Korea preparing for a potential war, I wouldn't be surprised if the casualty count outstripped 10 million. That's an unrecoverable damage to the Korean peninsula.
That's like a similar outcome to post-war Japan if Operation Downfall commenced. A delayed Korean War would butterfly everything we know about South Korea today. Meaning no smartphones, computers, cars, and K-pop.
 

Beatriz

Gone Fishin'
Could an earlier Sino-Soviet split happen and the US being able to establish a working relationship earlier
 
Top