Well, of course, it's easier to discuss with somebody who doesn't provide a long list of reasons for which you are wrong.
Hell no. Many of the reasons I listed do not apply to Norway.
- The Kriegsmarine existed, at the time of Weserübung. That exactly happened to be the price the Germans paid for that stunt. Weserübung itself, for all its success, is a reason enough to say that Seelöwe would be different, because it is for Weserübung that in September 1940 there's no Kriegsmarine around – it was either in dry dock or lying on a Norwegian fjord's bottom. I'm sure you see the difference with Seelöwe.
- The Germans only landed their initial forces by sea and air. Most of the logistical train followed in the old-fashioned way, by rail up the Norwegian territory. Yes, the Germans had to ferry things across anyway from Denmark to Norway. They had functional, non-demolished ports on both sides for that job. I'm sure you see the difference with Seelöwe.
- the back and forth shuttle missions of British naval forces I mentioned could of course be done even in Norway, in and out of Stuka range from the Norwegian coast. With the little difference that once they had expended their ammo and fuel and moved out of Stuka range, they'd be somewhere in the North Sea, a couple of days at least away from friendly bases where to replenish. While in the case of the Channel, they'd be half an hour from Lowestoft or other ports. I'm sure you see the difference with Seelöwe.
- I have not discussed the land battle, because what I listed is more than enough, as you can see. But since we're at it, let's say that what the German infantry had to face in Norway doesn't hold a candle to what they'd face in Britain.
This is funny. "British given" reasons. It seems you don't know what the German admirals thought of this Seelöwe folly. Raeder said: "Even if the first wave crosses successfully under favourable weather conditions, there is no guarantee that the same favorable weather will carry through the second and third waves. As a matter of fact, we must realise that no traffic worth mentioning will be able to cross for several days until certain harbours can be utilised". Is this enough of a non-British given reason?
Quite the understatement. You are aware there are those who believe, given its level of unprecedented sloppiness, that it actually never was anything but a bluff?
Yes. What you apparently fail to see is that there was a reason if people did not believe those stunts could be carried out. It is the same reason why no person sane of mind plays Russian roulette. Not even if the prize for surviving is a lot of cash.
The invasions of Norway and France were something like that. High-yield enterprises – which carried along the obvious high-risk danger of failure. Plenty of people gawped at the time, and some are gawping even today, at the "genius" who accomplished those feats. They didn't and don't notice that the risk of failure was very high. Indeed, it can be posited that among the reasons of the successes was exactly that other decision makers and military men did not expect such risk-taking, not believing one would put at risk so much, and that is why they were caught flat-footed (this wouldn't apply for Seelöwe, of course, another difference with Weserübung, you know; the British fully expected the Germans to try).
So it's like for the Russian roulette player. Some onlookers, those less savvy probably, cheer him on when he's successful once. Then even more, when he's successful twice. Guess what's happening to his chances when he tries for the third time?
Sure, there is a possibility the madman survives the following attempts, even though it's less and less likely. But in the end, we know what will happen.
And indeed, that is what happened to the German habit at succeeding in the improbable. Probability always wins in the end.
My own opinion is that had the Germans tried with Seelöwe, _that_ would have been the end of the unlikely series. I think I've provided reasons enough to explain why is that. Norway, for all its unlikelihood, had on the other side of the scale several reasons why the Western Allies were at a disadvantage there; but as shown above, and unlike what you think, Seelöwe does not feature any of the reasons why Weserübung, albeit unlikely, did work.
I'm sure you'll remain of your opinion, but I'm satisfied enough that the German decision makers, to a man, agreed with me – they didn't try.
Well, no, wrong. _Often_ the events go in the direction of the higher likelihood. It's the very idea of "often". That's what gives the pundits, and the mathematicians, and the statisticians, and the economists, a living. Otherwise we wouldn't be interested in the very concept of probabilities, you know. Exceptions and rules, and all of that. Of course the player who calculates all the odds before putting down his chips is less fun as a show; it is more exciting and fun to look at the player who happily takes huge risks and calls a cross-Channel invasion a "river crossing on a wide front". Just don't bet on him.
That said, let's keep in mind the unlikely does happen, though not "often" but rather "seldom" (obviously). How many unlikelihoods are necessary here?
- One we've already taken into account; for the sake of this thread, I have not discussed the virtually non-existing chances of the RAF being utterly destroyed. I have given the Germans that unlikelihood.
Then the Germans need:
- the weather to stay good, in the Channel, in September-October, for at least a month. Short, rare spells of bad weather could be acceptable, but on the whole the weather has to be consistently good. Highly unlikely.
- The Royal Navy somehow fails at the obvious, just like we've done away with the RAF. Extremely unlikely.
- The Germans capture at least one port, preferably too, basically intact, or so lightly damaged that they can repair it quickly. Fairly unlikely, though less outlandish than the above.
- The Army also botches it all. Possible, but not likely.
I could put up something more, but you dislike long lists showing you why you are wrong, so let's stop here. The Germans have to be lucky in all the above. I don't believe it.
Finally, I've put up a whole timeline explaining all of that and more with a concrete case study. You can go there if you want to know more; I'll be happy to reply to you there with a concrete example at hand.
