To be fair, if you were talking about a structured growth, couldn't more of the Type IIs be laid down to increase training before any possible war? I mean that cuts into how many operational long range boats you have but could reduce the quality issue?
What if Germany went full tilt into U-boat production from 1936 on?
- Thread starter steel_captain
- Start date
I think the premise is that the focus on U boats would come from cancelling other surface investments (ie cruisers/Battleships/"Carrier") rather than taking it from the Army.
You still have to shift the basic industries, like steel production from this to that, and the finished production from this to that. Example of one is the BB's need boilers and turbines that are manufactured one way, the SS's need diesel engines, electric motors, specialized electrical system, and special batteries to be built. The industries cannot just stop building this and start building that.
Building u-boats ramped up pretty quickly after Sept. '39 so why couldn't they in Sept. '36 or even sooner? The industrial capacity was there and cost meant nothing to Hitler in this regard. If he wanted it, Germany simply created the capital to make it happen. The limitations besides the skilled manpower were the raw materials like ore and oil which had to be imported so could have Britain declared a blockade on Germany importing strategic materials long before Sept. '39 which might have sparked open war between the UK and the Reich much sooner than in the OTL? In this scenario Britain wins pretty quickly so that is my thought on how the UK would react.
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cardcarrier
Banned
No; hitlers modernization and expansion of the shipyards as part of his Great Depression public works took years to be completed
The yards could barely handle the order for 6 boats in 1934; the number of boats going on shakedown/training patrols pre war (especially the effective war conditions off Spain) could not be meaningfully increased
What boats they could make were made. They invoked the escalator clause on submarines the second they could hit it, and were ready to abrogate the treaty the minute they could build past the escalator clause
There was no financial or political restriction on uboat construction, it was raw materials, skilled workers and suitable crews which there simply was no speeding up starting from 15 years of nothing and shitty yards in 1934. Once they exceeded 100 boats in otl the crew
quality went into the dumpster and the reasons for that cannot be changed in any scenario we could recognize
How long are the subs taking up a slipway? And how many slipways is Germany using for this buildup?
Something that has not come up is what is the reaction to this in Germany, it is a complete reversal of foreign policy from Britain being a potential ally to a definite future enemy - there is no other use for a U-boat only navy apart from war with Britain. Eventually this switch would occur in OTL, but Plan Z only got approved in 1939 so this is several years early. This seriously changes the balance of power inside the Reich, does von Ribbentrop fall from influence as his UK connections and work on an Anglo-German alliance is now worthless? Does Goering start pushing heavy bombers more, because they will also be useful with a war with Britain which Hitler now wants? OP can't just make such a massive change in German policy and ignore the domestic changes.
cardcarrier
Banned
Building ramped up because
Raw materials were looted from Austria Czechoslovakia and poland; even then things like copper where in critically short supply and uboats where being put in the water that where not ready to fight
Skilled workers were dragooned from Austria and Czechoslovakia
Expansion of shipyard programs started in 1934 where complete
Those conditions simply don’t and can’t exist in 1936 and Germany got dick all out of those boats anyway it’s a stupid idea
Quite so. Which IF WW2 goes as OTL up to April 1940, would make it easier for the UK to bully Norway into ceasing to allow Swedish iron ore to be exported from Narvik in winter. And complicate (i.e. make almost impossible) any German attempts to conquer Norway as OTL. (It might be able to take control of the southern portion to shut the Baltic approaches
It would certainly alter the British establishment's attitude towards Germany. Which is, I think, what @steel_captain wants us to discuss as much as, or instead of, the changes to British rearmament choices we have already outlined.
My guess is that the British would be much less sympathetic in 1938 to German wishes. The UK might seek to work with Mussolini's Italy to prevent the Anschluss, making concessions over Abyssinia. Possibly fruitless of course, in which case I think cooperation with the French over a new BEF and united front to resist further German annexations. So, no unilateral offer of concessions at Munich. The War might occur then - or the German Army could conceivably overthrow Hitler. OPs choice of course.
On rearmament, my initial guess is that any changes would occur in 1937 - it would take six-nine months for the British to identify the threat and decide on a response. Significantly more escort vessels of all types would be ordered, maybe 20 instead of 10. And the same in 1938, with even more in 1939. To pay for this it's possible the last KGV would be pushed back a year and possibly ordered in 1938 as a Lion instead. (Or maybe they will order a pair of Vanguards, the UK needs to replace the 5 'R' class BBs a.s.a.p. - the turrets from the first one decommissioned after the KGV is operational could be transferred to the second Vanguard). The order for Lions then to be pushed back to 1939.) The UK still needs to modernise its battleship fleet but IF Germany had no battleships beyond "The Twins" then it doesn't really need so many as OTL.
On a broader scale, the decision to introduce conscription and prepare for war on the continent may be taken 6-12 months earlier than OTL. And the purse strings loosened accordingly.
Garrison
Donor
Well let's take this at face value as an attempt to start a realistic discussion of the consequences.
Well it obviously changes things because it means those on the British side who did take it at face value are going to be forced to accept a more aggressive rearmament policy. There were a number of things put in place after Prague that would have had a huge impact if they had been done even six months earlier.
The British wouldn't have needed threats as such, if this starts in 1936 there are a range of economic sanctions they could have taken that would have badly affected Germany. If the British are taking a harder line prior to 1938 expect the plotters in Heer to be far more aggressive, and the British far more receptive to their ideas, if Hitler pushes things over the Sudetenland.
Churchill is on the outs in 1396 and still would be in 1938, especially as his warnings about Germany would probably be echoed by other more mainstream politicians. Chamberlain doubtless gets the nod, but he will be under pressure to take a much harder line as time goes by.
The fallout would have been a requirement for more small escort vessels, the RN gets the nod on Escort carriers sooner and possibly the Military Training Act get passed sooner.
In short its a political and military own goal on the same scale as Imperial Germany insisting on building the High Seas Fleet.
To return to the question of what reaction might the British Government have, another bit from the Irish Foreign Affairs archive, this time from the 1938 Anglo-Irish conference:
So OTL they were well aware of the likely threat of Submarines (as everyone would expect), it seems unrealistic for them not to have a far greater concern if Germany was in the position of significantly increasing their U Boat fleet.
MR. CHAMBERLAIN did not doubt that the people of Éire, if they obtained the Treaty Ports, would do their best to defend them against all comers. So far as this country was concerned, he did not hesitate to say that (assuming that the ports had become the property of Éire) we should be ready and anxious to help in time of emergency, subject always to our other responsibilities at that time.
His anxiety, however, was not that the ports would not be defended. It was rather that the ports should be made available for the use of the United Kingdom forces. He was assured by the military experts that in the event of a major war (e.g. against Germany) it was most important that we should have their use for the assembly or the protection of convoys.
SIR THOMAS INSKIP said that Berehaven and Lough Swilly would, according to the best military opinion, be of special importance in the circumstances contemplated. As Mr. Chamberlain had said, the object was not so much to deny those ports to the enemy, but to use them for the purpose of protecting the vitally important shipping which brought us our supplies from Ireland itself, from the other Dominions, from the Far East, etc. For reasons of geography these ports were the best places from which anti-submarine operations could be carried out. This was the United Kingdom Government's primary use for the defended ports. A secondary use would be as assembly places for convoys.
Naturally if, for one reason or another, we were unable to use the defended ports, we should have to use United Kingdom ports for both the purposes which he had mentioned. They would, however, be only a second best.
The enemy submarine attack would obviously be directed against Éire as well as against the United Kingdom. It was, therefore, in the common interest for the forces of both countries to be able to use the ports.
The Éire Delegation would appreciate that what was expected from Germany, if that country became our opponent, was an attempt to force a decision by means of a short sharp war which would include an intensive attack against our shipping, food supplies and ports. The risk of actual invasion was not considered very great. So far as we were concerned, the submarine would remain one of Germany's chief weapons.
His anxiety, however, was not that the ports would not be defended. It was rather that the ports should be made available for the use of the United Kingdom forces. He was assured by the military experts that in the event of a major war (e.g. against Germany) it was most important that we should have their use for the assembly or the protection of convoys.
SIR THOMAS INSKIP said that Berehaven and Lough Swilly would, according to the best military opinion, be of special importance in the circumstances contemplated. As Mr. Chamberlain had said, the object was not so much to deny those ports to the enemy, but to use them for the purpose of protecting the vitally important shipping which brought us our supplies from Ireland itself, from the other Dominions, from the Far East, etc. For reasons of geography these ports were the best places from which anti-submarine operations could be carried out. This was the United Kingdom Government's primary use for the defended ports. A secondary use would be as assembly places for convoys.
Naturally if, for one reason or another, we were unable to use the defended ports, we should have to use United Kingdom ports for both the purposes which he had mentioned. They would, however, be only a second best.
The enemy submarine attack would obviously be directed against Éire as well as against the United Kingdom. It was, therefore, in the common interest for the forces of both countries to be able to use the ports.
The Éire Delegation would appreciate that what was expected from Germany, if that country became our opponent, was an attempt to force a decision by means of a short sharp war which would include an intensive attack against our shipping, food supplies and ports. The risk of actual invasion was not considered very great. So far as we were concerned, the submarine would remain one of Germany's chief weapons.
I wonder if there is a potential “cunning plan” that could delay, slightly, the British reaction.
In 1936 Hitler could lay down the Bismarck but have work proceed “very slowly” (dead stop) due to “technical issues”. With Tirpitz expected to be laid down “when these are resolved” (never). Money is in the budget for these ships and maybe also the Graf Zeppelin (equally vapourware in reality).
Other surface ships are proceeded with in lesser numbers than OTL (say 2 Bluchers with Prinz Eugen and Seydlitz “postponed” sine die
The money in the budget for these ships actually used to add to the infrastructure needed for U-boat construction. So by 1939 some extra boats are completed, mostly of the smaller types that are for an expanded training programme. With the number of oceanic boats that can be laid down that and subsequent years substantially higher than OTL and they will be operational from late 1940 onwards
Thoughts?
Edited for typo
In 1936 Hitler could lay down the Bismarck but have work proceed “very slowly” (dead stop) due to “technical issues”. With Tirpitz expected to be laid down “when these are resolved” (never). Money is in the budget for these ships and maybe also the Graf Zeppelin (equally vapourware in reality).
Other surface ships are proceeded with in lesser numbers than OTL (say 2 Bluchers with Prinz Eugen and Seydlitz “postponed” sine die
The money in the budget for these ships actually used to add to the infrastructure needed for U-boat construction. So by 1939 some extra boats are completed, mostly of the smaller types that are for an expanded training programme. With the number of oceanic boats that can be laid down that and subsequent years substantially higher than OTL and they will be operational from late 1940 onwards
Thoughts?
Edited for typo
cardcarrier
Banned
Again money and politics were not limiting factors in uboat construction; they went from nothing and, shit yards to 57ish commissioned war boats in 1939 with dozens under construction. That represented 5 years of pedal to the metal activity. 1936-39 uboat construction was not liesurly in any way. Inefficient yes, but that’s because the boats where bad designs and most institutional shipbuilding knowledge had been lost in the Weimar years
What this means is the effect of a attempt to increase the submarine fleet does not show results until 1941 at the earliest. Maybe not until 1942. My guess is its still not decisive. As folks point out, a visible effort at increasing the submarine fleet attacks the attention of the Brits, and they act in their best interest.
cardcarrier
Banned
Considering the first open breach of the treaty was the German ambassador telling the British ambassador in 1934 that they had laid down submarines
And that from the minute the agnt was signed Germany went in a strait line up to the limit
Invoked the escalator clause
Proceeded to immediately build to the escalator limit
Laid down way more hulls (and told the British they were doing so) above the escalator limit
It’s a pretty safe assumption the British political and military leadership knew Germany was building a war submarine fleet specifically targeted against them and that it was a high national priority
That’s why this British have a huge reaction more than they did in otl seems silly to me. They knew what the deal was but had to counter a balance of threats including Italy and Japan, they maybe overestimated the effectiveness of their sonar but the hull count was plenty
Garrison
Donor
Basic problem is that doesn't cover where all the other stuff you need comes from, because killing off the big ships only gets you so far.
So the increase kicks in at about the time the British(/allies) get the upper hand due to closing the Atlantic gap, better intelligence, more escorts and more effective use of the escorts. In 1943 the Germans had more U-boats than in 1941, but they were a lot less effective (and sunk more). So just as you I doubt it would be decisive.
IIRC the Royal Navy could tell that Gneisenau broke the AGNA when a RN officer looked at her in harbour (in Gibraltar I think, when she was on a goodwill tour) and calculated her displacement literally in his head - and realised that she was over what had been agreed.
I don't think either of the Scharnhorsts were in Gibraltar. This may be one of the Italian cruisers, Gorizia IIRC that was damaged and had to be docked in Gibraltar where it was confirmed that she was 17% over the declared tonnage. At the end of the war German and Italian naval constructors were held accountable for the deliberate deception of stated tonnage, ie Scharnhorst being 26,000tons.