What if the Japanese overthrew the Vichy French administration in Indochina shortly after occupying it?

[raharris1973]

What if the Japanese overthrew the Vichy French administration in Indochina shortly after occupying it? I'm counting the occupation as the occupation of the whole, from July 1941, not the earlier, partial occupation, because acting in the earlier period would have made the Japanese peaceful occupation of the south impossible.

In OTL, the Japanese did not actually depose the Vichy French regime until March 1945, by which point they did it mercilessly, quickly, and efficiently.

What if they initiate the change in late August 1941, in a burst of radical anti-western enthusiasm, disarming, dispossessing, and imprisoning the French population at that time, and ensuring an ever stricter hold as they built up their forces in the territory then and through September and October 1941, and raised a puppet Vietnamese government, with auxiliary puppet Vietnamese troops, much like in Manchukuo, Mengjiang, and occupied China?

The Japanese approach here would be to support a puppet/client Vietnamese nationalism at French expense and at the expense of the local Chinese, Lao, and possibly Cambodian populations, promoting Japanese regional leadership above all, but Vietnamese supremacy above these other groups locally, to coopt Vietnamese cooperation and support for the occupation order.

Japan would still be extractive of the Vietnamese/Indochinese economy. Part of the purpose would be reducing "overhead" of French consumption - the Viets "expect less" to begin with , and ending threat of Vichy forces flipping to Free French or alignment with British or Americans, or the even more hypothetical threat of the Vichy French collaborating against Japan with an over-mighty globally victorious Nazi Germany. Pursuing this approach, also a builds a minor asset for pan-Asian, anti-colonial, disruptive, anti-western propaganda, and raising auxiliary puppet Vietnamese troops (as Japan had done in Manchukuo, Mengjiang, and China) to help with garrison duty, possible further campaigns against the western powers, and the southern front against KMT China and any local Communists that might spring up.

What impact does this have on the Indochinese, Sino-Japanese War, and regional Southeast Asian situation in the remaining months before Pearl Harbor? Western colonialists, including Americans not quite liking to be included in that category will be shocked and dismayed at the brutal treatment of the French population. I imagine the French would be imprisoned, with many killed and subject to abuses but largely put to labor under different forms of captive labor, or work-release under Japanese supervision depending on which of their particular skills the Japanese had use for. Also, the Japanese could try to charge Vichy France some 'ransoms' basically for return of some detained French people to other French possessions. Vichy France would be outraged, but would be militarily helpless to respond. Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and their other European allies would feel obligated to make diplomatic complaints, publicly and privately, and not be entirely insincere. But they would not cancel the Tripartite Pact over it, nor cease trying to persuade the Japanese from entering the war with the USSR or any other Axis enemies.

Does the outrage cause the British or Dutch to do anything more effective with their defensive preparations? At the same time, does Japanese propaganda and pro-independence rhetoric, despite its hollowness, hypocrisy, and contradictions, inspire any additional native independence or anti-colonial agitation by Burmese, Indonesians, or Malays? Before anybody says "Of course not, they know what the Japanese did to Nanjing" - Please don't, Many didn't know, or didn't care, because they weren't Chinese. For all that people talk about preferring the devil they know, they often really do hate the devil they know more, and need to get to know the new devil in person or have people in *their* national group experience the new devil before they start to hate that one too.

I imagine many Vietnamese would sign up with the pro-collaboration Vietnamese government and forces for pay, the limited amount of situational power they get, and to not be a target. But the situation in no way dims the appeal of the Viet Minh movement with already established patriotic and class struggle bona fides, and leadership and fighting cadre hanging out in the Viet Bac and cross-border bases in South China. Vietnamese puppet troops can man local garrisons and, in some numbers, can accompany Japanese forces in their Thailand, Burma, and Malaya ops during the war, or in manning static defenses, sort of like the Hungarians did for the Germans. This won't make the Vietnamese a beloved people among the Allies or the Vietnamese independence cause very popular.

However, the Vichy French won't be there as intelligence contacts for the Allies either [they followed a two-faced policy of covert dealing with the Allies, assisting downed pilots when possible, alongside overt compliance/collaboration with the Japanese, while planning for eventual anti-Japanese uprising]. So, the only game in town for the Allies, the only people in Indochina they can assume won't turn in downed pilots or infiltrated agents, are Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh guys.

How does this all play out through the end of the war and after? If puppet Vietnam has been assigned huge chunks of Laos and Cambodia by the Japanese, is Vietnam obliged by France, or just the UN in general, to yield back those territories postwar? Would Ho Chi Minh be cool with that? What about other flavors of postwar Vietnamese nationalists or monarchists?

 

[Garrison]

What if the Japanese overthrew the Vichy French administration in Indochina shortly after occupying it? I'm counting the occupation as the occupation of the whole, from July 1941, not the earlier, partial occupation, because acting in the earlier period would have made the Japanese peaceful occupation of the south impossible.

In OTL, the Japanese did not actually depose the Vichy French regime until March 1945, by which point they did it mercilessly, quickly, and efficiently.

What if they initiate the change in late August 1941, in a burst of radical anti-western enthusiasm, disarming, dispossessing, and imprisoning the French population at that time, and ensuring an ever stricter hold as they built up their forces in the territory then and through September and October 1941, and raised a puppet Vietnamese government, with auxiliary puppet Vietnamese troops, much like in Manchukuo, Mengjiang, and occupied China?

Zero difference. Such auxiliaries won't have any more impact than those Ukrainians foolish enough to fight for the Nazis on the Eastern Front. The Japanese aren't about to abandon their racist policies, no one was fooled by Manchukuo and they won't be fooled by this puppet Vietnam. Nor are the Colonial Powers going to modify their own racism, they will be appalled but still dismissive of Japanese military capabilities.

 

[Intosh]

What if the Japanese overthrew the Vichy French administration in Indochina shortly after occupying it? I'm counting the occupation as the occupation of the whole, from July 1941, not the earlier, partial occupation, because acting in the earlier period would have made the Japanese peaceful occupation of the south impossible.

In OTL, the Japanese did not actually depose the Vichy French regime until March 1945, by which point they did it mercilessly, quickly, and efficiently.

What if they initiate the change in late August 1941, in a burst of radical anti-western enthusiasm, disarming, dispossessing, and imprisoning the French population at that time, and ensuring an ever stricter hold as they built up their forces in the territory then and through September and October 1941, and raised a puppet Vietnamese government, with auxiliary puppet Vietnamese troops, much like in Manchukuo, Mengjiang, and occupied China?

The Japanese approach here would be to support a puppet/client Vietnamese nationalism at French expense and at the expense of the local Chinese, Lao, and possibly Cambodian populations, promoting Japanese regional leadership above all, but Vietnamese supremacy above these other groups locally, to coopt Vietnamese cooperation and support for the occupation order.

Japan would still be extractive of the Vietnamese/Indochinese economy. Part of the purpose would be reducing "overhead" of French consumption - the Viets "expect less" to begin with , and ending threat of Vichy forces flipping to Free French or alignment with British or Americans, or the even more hypothetical threat of the Vichy French collaborating against Japan with an over-mighty globally victorious Nazi Germany. Pursuing this approach, also a builds a minor asset for pan-Asian, anti-colonial, disruptive, anti-western propaganda, and raising auxiliary puppet Vietnamese troops (as Japan had done in Manchukuo, Mengjiang, and China) to help with garrison duty, possible further campaigns against the western powers, and the southern front against KMT China and any local Communists that might spring up.

What impact does this have on the Indochinese, Sino-Japanese War, and regional Southeast Asian situation in the remaining months before Pearl Harbor? Western colonialists, including Americans not quite liking to be included in that category will be shocked and dismayed at the brutal treatment of the French population. I imagine the French would be imprisoned, with many killed and subject to abuses but largely put to labor under different forms of captive labor, or work-release under Japanese supervision depending on which of their particular skills the Japanese had use for. Also, the Japanese could try to charge Vichy France some 'ransoms' basically for return of some detained French people to other French possessions. Vichy France would be outraged, but would be militarily helpless to respond. Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and their other European allies would feel obligated to make diplomatic complaints, publicly and privately, and not be entirely insincere. But they would not cancel the Tripartite Pact over it, nor cease trying to persuade the Japanese from entering the war with the USSR or any other Axis enemies.

Does the outrage cause the British or Dutch to do anything more effective with their defensive preparations? At the same time, does Japanese propaganda and pro-independence rhetoric, despite its hollowness, hypocrisy, and contradictions, inspire any additional native independence or anti-colonial agitation by Burmese, Indonesians, or Malays? Before anybody says "Of course not, they know what the Japanese did to Nanjing" - Please don't, Many didn't know, or didn't care, because they weren't Chinese. For all that people talk about preferring the devil they know, they often really do hate the devil they know more, and need to get to know the new devil in person or have people in *their* national group experience the new devil before they start to hate that one too.

I imagine many Vietnamese would sign up with the pro-collaboration Vietnamese government and forces for pay, the limited amount of situational power they get, and to not be a target. But the situation in no way dims the appeal of the Viet Minh movement with already established patriotic and class struggle bona fides, and leadership and fighting cadre hanging out in the Viet Bac and cross-border bases in South China. Vietnamese puppet troops can man local garrisons and, in some numbers, can accompany Japanese forces in their Thailand, Burma, and Malaya ops during the war, or in manning static defenses, sort of like the Hungarians did for the Germans. This won't make the Vietnamese a beloved people among the Allies or the Vietnamese independence cause very popular.

However, the Vichy French won't be there as intelligence contacts for the Allies either [they followed a two-faced policy of covert dealing with the Allies, assisting downed pilots when possible, alongside overt compliance/collaboration with the Japanese, while planning for eventual anti-Japanese uprising]. So, the only game in town for the Allies, the only people in Indochina they can assume won't turn in downed pilots or infiltrated agents, are Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh guys.

How does this all play out through the end of the war and after? If puppet Vietnam has been assigned huge chunks of Laos and Cambodia by the Japanese, is Vietnam obliged by France, or just the UN in general, to yield back those territories postwar? Would Ho Chi Minh be cool with that? What about other flavors of postwar Vietnamese nationalists or monarchists?

The Vietnamese will quickly learn that the Japaneses as colonial masters are one hundred time more awful, it was the words of an Indonesian Independantist leader when he compared the Dutch and the Japanese.

And they will quickly began to rebel and the Japanese will pacify the rebels and the neighbouring civilian population with the same bloody methods they used in China, that will make proud a Waffen SS of the Eastern Front,and the Vietnamese will rebel more.

And etc and etc until the Japanese had the entire peninsula to add as a place hostile to them.

 

[raharris1973]

it was the words of an Indonesian Independantist leader when he compared the Dutch and the Japanese.

Name him.

Also, I would note that in Southeast Asia, occupied Asia, working with Japanese puppet forces or administrations was *not* a death knell for postwar political careers. Examples include many figures in Thailand, Aung San in Burma, and Sukarno in Indonesia. There's also Park Chung-hee in South Korea. Some politicians credibly or arguably accused of collaboration also served in elected office in the postwar Philippines, including Ferdinand Marcos, pulling off the the "I tried to use my position to protect the people" excuse.

 

[HJ Tulp]

If Japan does this it puts itself very clearly outside the international order at a much earlier point in time. OTL the Japanese didn't declare war on the Netherlands until the end of December '41, this because they had the hope that they could 'Indochina' the DEI. If Japan decapitates (literally and figuratively speaking) the Indochinese leadership in August one can expect cooperation between the Dutch, the Commonwealth and maybe even the US to intensify. It would probably mean the end of DEI pseudo-neutrality, so Australian forces maybe deployed in the archipelago before the war starts, meaning they are much better situated than OTL. Maybe even something like ABDACOM being formed at an earlier stage?

 

[raharris1973]

If Japan does this it puts itself very clearly outside the international order at a much earlier point in time. OTL the Japanese didn't declare war on the Netherlands until the end of December '41, this because they had the hope that they could 'Indochina' the DEI. If Japan decapitates (literally and figuratively speaking) the Indochinese leadership in August one can expect cooperation between the Dutch, the Commonwealth and maybe even the US to intensify. It would probably mean the end of DEI pseudo-neutrality, so Australian forces maybe deployed in the archipelago before the war starts, meaning they are much better situated than OTL. Maybe even something like ABDACOM being formed at an earlier stage?

Maybe, yeah. This kind of thing may shock the fence-sitters into closer cooperation. I still don't see the USA abandoning its official unilateralism however. The US could intensity naval meetings and staff talks, but FDR would still feel constrained in making any signed commitments to defense of Dutch or British territories or agreements to base US troops or ships at Dutch or British facilities or vice versa. Officers could hypothetically plan to their hearts content though.

If the Dutch and Australians and other British Empire forces are moved to direct cooperation across territorial lines, which visibly shows a beefing up of defenses of DEI oil installations and airfields and ports by the late summer and fall months of 1941, that might convince Japan to launch its overall Strike South and Pearl Harbor assaults several months early, before defenses in DEI and Malaya can be improved too much. Japan would prefer to preempt negative trends indicating better preparedness in the DEI, and may cut short diplomacy with the Americans, which was a long shot anyway, to do it. The only showstoppers for the Japanese would be weather or technical naval factors that might make their all out assaults impractical in September, October, or November 1941.

 

[HJ Tulp]

Maybe, yeah. This kind of thing may shock the fence-sitters into closer cooperation. I still don't see the USA abandoning its official unilateralism however. The US could intensity naval meetings and staff talks, but FDR would still feel constrained in making any signed commitments to defense of Dutch or British territories or agreements to base US troops or ships at Dutch or British facilities or vice versa. Officers could hypothetically plan to their hearts content though.

If the Dutch and Australians and other British Empire forces are moved to direct cooperation across territorial lines, which visibly shows a beefing up of defenses of DEI oil installations and airfields and ports by the late summer and fall months of 1941, that might convince Japan to launch its overall Strike South and Pearl Harbor assaults several months early, before defenses in DEI and Malaya can be improved too much. Japan would prefer to preempt negative trends indicating better preparedness in the DEI, and may cut short diplomacy with the Americans, which was a long shot anyway, to do it. The only showstoppers for the Japanese would be weather or technical naval factors that might make their all out assaults impractical in September, October, or November 1941.

Was an earlier PH-attack technically possible in September?

Basically for this to happen though, you need to get the Greater-Asian faction to gain the upper hand. Not sure yet what political machinations need to happen in Tokyo for that situation to exist though.

 

[GarethC]

Was an earlier PH-attack technically possible in September?

Basically for this to happen though, you need to get the Greater-Asian faction to gain the upper hand. Not sure yet what political machinations need to happen in Tokyo for that situation to exist though.

Not with all six carriers of OTL. Zuikaku doesn't commission until 25th September 1941. Even Shokaku is doubtful, commissioning 8th August, and needing to work up its airgroups.

 

[kham_coc]

As others have said, if this was a part of a strategy that involves being less racist arseholes, this might matter, since it wasn't it's doubtful - One difference though, if there is a 'Vietnamese' government in 1941, a bunch of countries are going to recognize that on the basis of it not being a colony among them the US as US policy at this time was not to further French colonization. And since Vietnam never was invaded the government might simply survive 1945 - OTL, the Japanese surrendered but if the Vietnamese government have troops loyal to it they might simply say no we are not surrendering. Now that might seem to be crazy, but it wouldn't be, they would have thousands of PoWs and their only demand would be for the Allies to recognize them as the Republic of Vietnam (I.E not a French colony). It's not that the Allies couldn't invade it's that no one (but the French) would find that a palatable idea.
That's going to have impacts, otl the US eventually switched over to France due to Cold war concerns, if there already is a pliable Vietnamese government they might very will simply prop up that instead - A government that would have a lot easier to combat communist propaganda as it would never have been associated with the French (and their Japanese ties could simply be dismissed as the only way to achieve independence).
It's also worth noting that the anti French insurgency was rather poorly armed in OTL - ITTL, there should be a lot more weapons for them and probably trained men too. Even if this puppet government never got the best weapons and had the best motivated or trained troops 3-4 years of training and drilling along with arms taken from surrendering Japanese soldiers should ensure that France is going to have a lot more problems in re-imposing control.

 

[raharris1973]

One difference though, if there is a 'Vietnamese' government in 1941, a bunch of countries are going to recognize that on the basis of it not being a colony among them the US as US policy at this time was not to further French colonization.

This is tricky, because in the fall of 1941, US policy was not to further French colonization, but it also was to not further Japanese faits accompli. The Vietnamese independent state set up at this time would be declaring itself under Japanese occupation, with leaders only the Japanese approved, so the Americans and British and Free French and Dutch, as much as the Vichy French and Fascist Italians and Nazis, would regard it as another "Manchukuo" and about as genuine. Also the US still had diplomatic relations with Vichy, and persisted in trying to maintain them till about Operation Torch, certainly keeping the De Gaulle movement at arms length. I'm not sure how early vocal ant-French colonial statements started to come out of FDR's mouth or pen. Quite possibly as early as the November 1942 timeframe of Torch, or earlier, but quite likely not before Pearl Harbor.

I'm sure in OTL FDR had a sense of bitterness against the French in general (and he did) and in Indochina specifically, not just because of how they treated locals, but because of a feeling when the Japanese were rampaging through Southeast Asia/West Pacific that it was easier for the Japanese to do this, because the French in Indochina hadn't fought back against the Japanese. That would still exist here, because the French would still acquiesce in the initial occupation. But it might not be compounded like it was in OTL by the additional three years of the Vichy regime in Indochina collaborating with the Japanese while the Americans and British Empire forces endured hard fighting. [As a larger observation, I think much of the wartime and post-war US and UK resentment of France went beyond irritation at France for daring to disagree on policy matters, but a feeling of, this war is harder, with harder fighting for us, because you did not win your part of the fight and ultimately surrendered. Of course that simple view doesn't properly balance with introspection that the British and Americans left France and other continental neighbors of Germany totally unsupported and undermined in their pre-war attempts at containment policy against Germany, but when are people properly introspective or likely to take responsibility for their own crap? To ask is to answer, in that type of rhetorical question].

And since Vietnam never was invaded the government might simply survive 1945 - OTL, the Japanese surrendered but if the Vietnamese government have troops loyal to it they might simply say no we are not surrendering. Now that might seem to be crazy, but it wouldn't be, they would have thousands of PoWs and their only demand would be for the Allies to recognize them as the Republic of Vietnam (I.E not a French colony). It's not that the Allies couldn't invade it's that no one (but the French) would find that a palatable idea.

Theoretically possible. However, the Japanese did set up puppet states of Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia, in Vietnam with civilian ministers and Emperor Bao Dai, in March-April 1945, and so that government had 4-5 months to establish itself before surrender, but did not parlay that into maintaining a postwar existence.

Conceivably, if it is set up in September 1941, it exists for 47 months, nearly four years, before surrender, and that gives it more time to have men serve it as police and puppet troops and administrators. Of course hate can stick to it too for wartime collaboration. Wartime dynamics between it and Viet Minh insurgency and any other insurgency could be interesting and varied also. Puppet collaborator troops would be the easiest "targets" for Viet Minh, easier than Japanese garrisons themselves, and the Viet Minh could try to terrorize them. That could set up some nasty cycles of reprisals and feuds that that polarizes many parts of Viet Nam, growing the Viet Minh base faster, but also building a determined anti-communist base of people in blood feuds with Communists. But there could also be areas where puppet troops have "live and let live" arrangements with Viet Minh, and each focus on maintaining themselves, and the puppets are permissive of the Viet Minh spreading and building themselves up as long as they don't draw too much Japanese attention bringing Japanese discipline, and the puppets "lose" or "lend" their weapons to Viet Minh, putting on a better show of fighting the Communists when they see the Japanese overseers are visiting, and becoming relatively inactive when the Japanese are away. This kind of thing really marked Communist-Puppet Troop relations in parts of Northern China during the Sino-Japanese War.

A sticking point in avoiding Allied occupation at the end of the war, and that leading to some form of attempt at French reinfiltration and reclamation of the land, is that the Vietnamese Puppet government will have a possibly impossible task convincing the Allied United Nations powers it is up to the task of disarming its former Japanese masters, and certainly repatriating them. Allied ships and planes at a minimum will have to come to all Vietnamese and Cambodian ports to pick up surrendering Japanese. The Allies are going to demand well-armed and self-protected liaison officers on the ground. And the Allies will demand to send in teams to recover their own liberated PoWs and civilian internees.

That's going to have impacts, otl the US eventually switched over to France due to Cold war concerns, if there already is a pliable Vietnamese government they might very will simply prop up that instead - A government that would have a lot easier to combat communist propaganda as it would never have been associated with the French (and their Japanese ties could simply be dismissed as the only way to achieve independence).
It's also worth noting that the anti French insurgency was rather poorly armed in OTL - ITTL, there should be a lot more weapons for them and probably trained men too. Even if this puppet government never got the best weapons and had the best motivated or trained troops 3-4 years of training and drilling along with arms taken from surrendering Japanese soldiers should ensure that France is going to have a lot more problems in re-imposing control.

Also interesting points.