What if there was no winter war.

[Slowpoke]

You must be joking.

As I've said, I don't care. At the time, everyone was lying to everyone else. To find the truth, all the reports, testimonies etc. must be confronted with each other, to find the discrepancies (of which there are an abundance), then compared with German accounts from the same period and operations area. Basically, what Mark Solonin did.

However your points about the T-34 being better than the equivalent German tanks are somewhat overblown, especially once the Germans got the L/43 75mm guns on the Pz IV.

For the longer 75mm German guns, the T-34 could be engaged and knocked out at over 1000 meters; with the L/70 it was even out to 2000 meters. The T-34 had to close with the Germans to shorter ranges to be reasonably sure of a hit. With the 1940-42 T-34 model's quality, the Germans had a more reliable and effective tank.

Plus the L/43 or 48 75mm could penetrate the KV1's frontal armor.

We are talking about summer-autumn 1941, y'know, right when the Red Army suffered its worst defeat ever.

The Soviet optics and gunnery were so bad before 1944 (even after to a degree) that they could only engage the German tanks under 500 meters,

Really? At Khalkhin-Gol Soviet tankers engaged Japanese tanks at long distances and tore them a new asshole. The same tanks and tankers (training wise) suddenly went full retard at Lviv, Brody, Przemysl etc. As I've mentioned previously, I'm not buying it.

 

[Julian]

As I've said, I don't care. At the time, everyone was lying to everyone else. To find the truth, all the reports, testimonies etc. must be confronted with each other, to find the discrepancies (of which there are an abundance), then compared with German accounts from the same period and operations area. Basically, what Mark Solonin did.[/I]

Except that the Soviet sources Glantz references were never for public consumption. They are either direct STAVKA/NKVD orders and records which until the 1990s were secret, or Soviet military studies that were only ever distributed among Soviet commanders and military historians. They're just as accurate as US or British military studies and records.

And as I said earlier, Glantz does compare German and Soviet sources. His books on Stalingrad include an abundance of German situation maps, records, etc.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

We are talking about summer-autumn 1941, y'know, right when the Red Army suffered its worst defeat ever.


Really? At Khalkhin-Gol Soviet tankers engaged Japanese tanks at long distances and tore them a new asshole. The same tanks and tankers (training wise) suddenly went full retard at Lviv, Brody, Przemysl etc. As I've mentioned previously, I'm not buying it.

Sourcing? What Soviet tanks were knocking Japanese tanks out at long range? Certainly not the T-34.


http://operationbarbarossa.net/Myth-Busters/MythBusters2.html#an_3

More informed commentaries relating to the T-34’s combat performance in 1941 consider factors such as: the T-34 tank crews had little time to train on their machines, they had major ammunition supply problems, and the support infrastructures were not in place to recover damaged machines.

The T-34’s Design Weaknesses

When one considers the apparent superiority of the T-34, the question has to be asked: why did the T-34 consistently suffer at least a two-three to one loss ratio against ‘inferior and obsolescent’ enemy tanks in tactical combat, i.e. when actually shooting at each other? Either the German’s combat proficiency was supernatural, the Soviet’s combat proficiency was unbelievably incompetent, or there were design flaws inherent in the T-34 as a complete weapon system which are not apparent in a cursory analysis of combat power based on armour and gun penetration. I believe the latter to be the case. The T-34/76’s one great weakness was its fire control efficiency. It suffered from the same two-man turret syndrome as other Soviet tanks in this period, namely that the tank’s commander, gun aimer, gun firer and platoon commander (if a platoon leader), were all the same person. Exacerbating this was the fact that the T-34/76 had relatively poor main gun optics quality, no turret basket, a very cramped and low turret (the gun could not depress more than three degrees severely restricting use on a reverse slope or at close range), poor turret drive reliability, no radios, and generally poor target observation and indicator devices (including no turret cupola and only one vision periscope for the tank’s commander). All these factors are considered in detail in calculating a tank’s Fire Control Effect (FCE) factor detailed in Part II-‘The Barbarossa Simulation’s Resource Database’. The T-34 is discussed here as a case history.(8) In summary, the T-34/76’s inherent fire control efficiency was so bad that even well trained and experienced tank crews were put at a severe disadvantage. For inexperienced tank crews, with no radios and probably no organised combined arms support, it was a disaster.

So what was the result of the T-34/76’s two man turret, weak optics and poor vision devices (that is a poor overall FCE factor)? German tankers noted “T34s operated in a disorganised fashion with little coordination, or else tended to clump together like a hen with its chicks. Individual tank commanders lacked situational awareness due to the poor provision of vision devices and preoccupation with gunnery duties. A tank platoon would seldom be capable of engaging three separate targets, but would tend to focus on a single target selected by the platoon leader. As a result T-34 platoons lost the greater firepower of three independently operating tanks”.(9) The Germans noted the T-34 was very slow to find and engage targets while the Panzers could typically get off three rounds for every one fired by the T-34.(10)

A combat account from Operation Barbarossa highlights the problem with the T-34/76’s fire control systems and also why its overall combat power is so overrated. “Remarkably enough, one determined 37mm gun crew reported firing 23 times against a single T-34 tank, only managing to jam the tank’s turret ring”.(11) In this engagement T-34 proponents will highlight the impunity of the T-34 to the 37mm Pak 36 AT gun. However this is hardly surprising against a gun that can only penetrate 29mm of 30 degree sloped armour at 500metres with ordinary AP ammunition. What is really important in this story is that the AT gun managed to get 23 shots off, and it turns out that the T-34 in this report didn’t even manage to hit the AT gun. Once better AT guns appeared, which they rapidly did, T-34s would be lucky to survive 2-3 rounds. Contemporary German tank crews would have been be appalled if they let enemy AT guns get more than two rounds off before they took defensive action. This example highlights the difference between tanks designed to optimise all their fire control related systems and hence maximise their firepower, and those that weren’t.

As to the Japanese being hit at long range by the Far East Front's T-34's:
Reading the Russian Wikipedia's article on Khalkhin Gol, I see no mention of the T-34 being present:
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Бои_на_Халхин-Голе

Also considering the T-34 didn't enter production until 1940, it would be very hard for it to have fought the Japanese, considering the battle happened in 1939.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T-34#Initial_production_.281940.29

he first production T-34s were completed in September 1940

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol

Date:11 May – 16 September 1939

Pretty interesting that a tank that was not even in production for over a year managed to knock out so many Japanese tanks at a battle in 1939.

Also:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T-34#Development

Lessons from Khalkhin Gol regarding armour protection, mobility, welding and main guns were incorporated into the new T-34 tank,[22] and Koshkin's team completed two prototype T-34s in January 1940. In April and May, they underwent a grueling 2,000-kilometre (1,200 mi) drive from Kharkiv to Moscow for a demonstration for the Kremlin leaders, to the Mannerheim Line in Finland, and back to Kharkiv via Minsk and Kiev.[21] Some drivetrain shortcomings were identified and corrected.[23]

So clearly you have no idea what you are talking about.

 

[Slowpoke]

^^^ Where precisely in my previous message did I infer that I was refering to T-34s at Khalkhin-Gol? I was talking about BTs.

They're just as accurate as US or British military studies and records.

Err, no. Soviet officers performed stupendous amounts of CYA regarding those days. Mainly because the truth would've had them end up in a Gulag or the cellars of Lubianka. And I doubt Glantz saw much of the NKVD's archives, given that they were (and still are) 'inaccessible' (that is to say, de jure open, de facto still classified).

 

[Julian]

Tank to tank fighting at Khalkin Gol was, as far as I am aware, limited to engagements at close range, and in any case very rarely occurred.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

^^^ Where precisely in my previous message did I infer that I was refering to T-34s at Khalkhin-Gol? I was talking about BTs.

Looking back, I see you didn't. My apologies. I made the inference apparently because you suggested that the Soviet optics at Khalkhin Gol were the same as in Ukraine 1941.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=79&t=119125
Apparently the Japanese were so impressed by the accuracy of the Soviets at 'long ranges' (500m), because their own AT weapons were short ranged and were either inaccurate/ineffective at that range or didn't have good enough optics to hit targets that far out.
So 'long range' against the Japanese when the armor of the BT-5 was too much for the Japanese AT weapons of the day, was actually short range against the Germans for whom 500 meters was the range at which their weapons could penetrate the T-34 in 1941.
Apparently gunnery training was pretty deficient with the Soviets too, though they could score hits regularly at 500m or less, which was pretty short range in tank combat for the day. I guess they weren't taught to fight at longer ranges than their optics gave them a shot to hit at.

Beyond that the other flaws in the 1941-42 design of the T-34 I cited above still hold. They looked so good against the Japanese, because the Japanese had no experience fighting a semi-modern/organized enemy with better equipment; fighting the Germans the Soviets were as weak as the Japanese were against the Soviets, because they weren't used to fighting an enemy of that quality and the Soviets had worse equipment in many ways and weren't used to their 'modern' weapons yet; their training was seriously deficient and they were in the middle of reorganizing/massively expanding. Plus when the Germans attacked the Soviets relied heavily on their land line communications, which the Luftwaffe knocked out extensively, so they had no idea what was going on and were constantly getting contradicting orders.

Err, no. Soviet officers performed stupendous amounts of CYA regarding those days. Mainly because the truth would've had them end up in a Gulag or the cellars of Lubianka. And I doubt Glantz saw much of the NKVD's archives, given that they were (and still are) 'inaccessible' (that is to say, de jure open, de facto still classified).

I think this is something Glantz has noted too, that the Russians have actually been pretty reluctant to open all of their archives to the Western historians and made a big show of only releasing certain approved documents, while keeping some records totally off limits, or 'off the record'.

 

[Julian]

Err, no. Soviet officers performed stupendous amounts of CYA regarding those days. Mainly because the truth would've had them end up in a Gulag or the cellars of Lubianka. And I doubt Glantz saw much of the NKVD's archives, given that they were (and still are) 'inaccessible' (that is to say, de jure open, de facto still classified).

During the Khruschev and Perestroika eras a large number of studies were written with a greater degree of political openness. Arrests of military writers was limited; it was the political writers and authors who were most often targatted. Further, numerous studies were written during and just after the Second World War, even under Stalin, for the purposes of military education. Naturally these were likewise extremely accurate. It's hard to educate an army to win the war with lies and propoganda.

And you refuse to address the fact that he uses direct STAVKA orders and records, which it used to plan and conduct the war.

I think this is something Glantz has noted too, that the Russians have actually been pretty reluctant to open all of their archives to the Western historians and made a big show of only releasing certain approved documents, while keeping some records totally off limits, or 'off the record'.

Well really there have been on and off periods of openess. During the Soviet era, except for certain periods under Khruschev and later Gorbachev, documents that were released were only the most highly politicized. However, once the Soviet Union fell, its WW2 archives were opened en masse. Basically all documents and studies related to 1941, 1942, and parts of 1943 were bound, copied, and released. Later in the 1990s however releases became much more limited, especially with 1944 and 1945 documents.

And in any case, Glantz checks his Soviet sources with German ones, particularly in regards to his later works; his writings on Stalingrad include just as many German documents, reports, and maps as Soviet sources.

 

[Slowpoke]

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=79&t=119125

Reading that thread, and the table linked within, it seems to me early Soviet optics were good to just about 1km away. Coincidentally that was also the maximum effective range of the 20-k gun, found on the majority of Soviet tanks (and a good deal of armoured cars) in 1941.

So 'long range' against the Japanese when the armor of the BT-5 was too much for the Japanese AT weapons of the day, was actually short range against the Germans for whom 500 meters was the range at which their weapons could penetrate the T-34 in 1941.

Not by the 37 (either KwK36 or Skoda A7), and definitely not by that pitiful door-knocker (KwK30). And 500 metres was medium range by their standards as well (penetration for the 37s dropped below 30 mm at 1000 m).

Plus when the Germans attacked the Soviets relied heavily on their land line communications, which the Luftwaffe knocked out extensively, so they had no idea what was going on and were constantly getting contradicting orders.

Actually, they had a decent amount of radios. Solonin even presents lists of the most common types and their ranges several times in his book.

fighting the Germans the Soviets were as weak as the Japanese were against the Soviets, because they weren't used to fighting an enemy of that quality and the Soviets had worse equipment in many ways and weren't used to their 'modern' weapons yet

The reason why the Red Army of mid-late 1941 sucked majorly against its German counterpart was because it wasn't an army. It was an amorphous blob of armed men. Soldiers weren't confident either in their fighting abilities, or in the leadership abilities of their commanders. The Great Terror had corroded the Red Army's cohesiveness. Today's polkovnik could end up 'unmasked' tomorrow as a 'Trotskyite agitator' and replaced as battalion commander by some random dick-swinger from bumfuck nowhere. Ukrainian and Byelorussian soldiers hated their Russian commanders and komissars. It was to nobody's suprise that, when the Germans charged forwards, whole regiments shot their komissars and surrendered en masse. Others chose to 'melt away', either returning to their homesteads (now behind German lines) or going to the nearest village/town and begging some widow take them in.

It's hard to educate an army to win the war with lies and propoganda.

Funny, 'cause that's pretty much what the Soviets did. Well, not so much lies, as 'creative omissions'.

And you refuse to address the fact that he uses direct STAVKA orders and records, which it used to plan and conduct the war.

I don't see how that's relevant. Stavka had no idea what the hell was going on at the frontlines until early July (10th), and it continued showing confusion regarding its objectives until the start (8th) of August (the two dates coincide with Stavka's successive reorganisations). And it still proved relatively ineffective (incompetent?) until circa November. By that time about 3 and a half million Soviet troops were in German captivity. Oh, and that shitbag Beria kept killing officers throughout the German assault.

 

[Julian]

Funny, 'cause that's pretty much what the Soviets did. Well, not so much lies, as 'creative omissions'.

I don't see how that's relevant. Stavka had no idea what the hell was going on at the frontlines until early July (10th), and it continued showing confusion regarding its objectives until the start (8th) of August (the two dates coincide with Stavka's successive reorganisations). And it still proved relatively ineffective (incompetent?) until circa November. By that time about 3 and a half million Soviet troops were in German captivity. Oh, and that shitbag Beria kept killing officers throughout the German assault.

No, it didn't. You obviously know nothing about the Red Army's theory, military education, and distribution of acquired experince. There's a reason for its improved performance between 1941 and 1943; Red Army organs were created for the specific purpose of distributing accurate information based off of prior combat experiences. This was used by commanders in future operations to achieve battlefield successes.

Since STAVKA records of unit movements, locations, etc after the initial border battles match with German records and maps I'd say you underestimate it's understanding of the location of the front line, and forces involved . Now it's strategic decisions were certainly poor, but that's not what I'm talking about.

 

[Cook]

As it says in the title. What if Finland caved in to the russian demands.

It seems to me that the most immediate consequences are that Daladier remains premier of France and Chamberlain prime minister of Britain. Daladier was brought down by his failure to effectively aid the Finns and by his refusal to declare war upon the Soviet Union; no Winter War eliminates any criticism of his conduct of the war. Chamberlain fell because of the multiple failures of British forces in Norway (the fault of which could more fairly be laid at Churchill’s feet rather than Chamberlain’s), but without the Winter War the invasion of Norway would have been far less likely to occur.

A continued Daladier premiership into May 1940 probably doesn’t make a great deal of difference; he remained as defence minister in Reynaud’s cabinet after losing the premiership and in that role he prevented Reynaud from introducing any effective reforms to France’s army in the short time available before the German’s invaded.

Chamberlain remaining as prime minister through 1940 however could have made an enormous difference to events, it could easily have tipped the scales.

 

[DrakonFin]

I started thinking about the actual timeline of the events if Finland caved in and then was gradually Sovietized. Going by the Estonian example, it might go something like this:


Early November 1939: Finnish government accepts moving border west on the Karelian isthmus, handing over parts of Kalastajansaarento in the north and several islands on the Gulf of Finland, as well as leasing the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for 30 years for military use. Flags are flown at half mast across the country. Protests in major towns by those opposed to the decision, left wing counter protests organised by the Finnish Communist Party lead to clashes with the police.

Mid-November 1939: Finnish troops are withdrawn from the areas to be ceded to the USSR and local civilians flee west to escape Soviet rule. A Soviet flotilla arrives at Hanko to take over the "lease area" and start preparations to build a military base. Moscow protests the recalcitrance of Finnish soldiers and officials, demands the Finnish armed forces stand down and that uncooperative elements are removed.

Prime Minister Cajander resigns under pressure and parts of the army are demobilized. The Soviet embassy delivers President Kallio a list of acceptable ministers for the new cabinet. Kallio appoints Risto Ryti (Progress Party) as Prime Minister of a wide-based coalition cabinet.

December 1939: The ceded areas have been emptied and are taken over by Soviet units. Upon seeing reports that farmhouses have been burned down and factories and military installations have been sabotaged, Moscow heavily chastises the Finnish government for not adhering to the letter of the recent agreement and the "spirit of Finno-Soviet cooperation". Large left wing demonstrations continue in major towns, leading to more violence between the protestors and the police, now supported by righ-wing members of the Civil Guard.

The new Ryti cabinet is under a constant barrage of demands and protests from the Soviet leadership. President Kallio has long been suffering from ill health, and just before Chrismas he suffers a stroke that leaves him incapacitated. Ryti takes over as acting President.

January 1940: The construction of the Soviet naval base in Hanko continues, though slowed down by the sea freezing. Coastal and sea area reserved for Soviet use extended after a Finnish armed icebreaker accidentally opens fire on a Soviet ship, causing yet another diplomatic row. Late in the month, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov demands that the recently founded Society for Finno-Soviet Friendship and Peace be allowed under the Finnish law, together with other Socialist and Communist organisations, and that the extreme right and "militarist organisations" be curbed.

February 1940: Soviet aircraft are breaching the Finnish airspace on a daily basis, while Moscow claims that the Finns show habitual disrespect for the new borders. Moscow is delivering the Finnish leadership lists of military officers that need to be removed from their posts in the interest of peace, including Mannerheim. Taking away the Petsamo nickel mine concession from the Canadian INCO-Mond and setting up a joint Finno-Soviet mining company instead demanded by Molotov. President Kallio suffers another stroke and resigns the presidency citing health reasons. Ryti voted President by the parliament in a special election.

March 1940: Ryti's offer of a neutrality-based, defensive alliance between Finland and Sweden shot down by Stockholm, Moscow and Berlin. The Swedish demand for an alliance would have included Finland forsaking the possiblity of the return of the territories so far relinquished to the Soviets "in perpetuity"; unacceptable by the Finns. Finnish officers and members of the Civil Guard begin preparations for guerrilla war against a possible Soviet occupation; weapon caches are built in forests and the countryside. General Airo is the primus motor of the secret plans.

April 1940: The Spring Crisis - the Soviet Embassy finds out about high-level contacts between the Finnish military and representatives of Göring; Molotov travels to Berlin to demand that Germany holds its part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop deal. Hitler assures Molotov that the USSR has "free hands" in Finland. Moscow keeps the Finnish government in a diplomatic vise also in other ways, for example claims acts of sabotage against trains carrying Soviet military personnel between Hanko and the border. Socialist and Communist organisations officially reallowed in Finland.

Most of the Finnish Army demobilized and several leading officers sacked. The spring sees a sharp increase of Finns leaving the homeland for Sweden as emigrants. Officers and military specialists start disappearing from garrisons for "personal leave of absense", finding their way alternately to secret forest "bases" or Sweden.

May 1940: Soviet aircraft start flying between a newly-built Hanko airstrip, the Estonian coast and Leningrad within nominally Finnish airspace. Finnish Air Force demanded to respect new "no-fly zones" after it tries to intercept these aircraft. Later in the month, entire FAF units grounded due to political pressure. Concentrations of Soviet troops reported on the Isthmus before the planes are grounded.

June 1940: A joint naval blockade of Finland and Estonia by the Red Navy started, Finnish navy ships ordered to stay in port. Two weeks into the month, Molotov delivers an ultimatum to the Ryti government, accusing it of conspiring with the Baltic states and Germany against the Soviet Union. Soviet units breach Finnish borders in southern and northern Karelia while Soviet bombers are daily seen flying low above Helsinki.

The Finnish cabinet mulls a declaration of war while large Communist demonstrations again rock the capital. Upon hearing that a Soviet military convoy has left Hanko unopposed and will arrive to the capital in hours, the cabinet decides not to declare war to avoid unnecessary bloodshed in the face of overwhelming force. Orders are given for the already diminished army to stand down - not always successfully. In North Karelia, a small border force holds back an entire Soviet division for hours before being forced to surrender.

The Ryti cabinet forced to resign at gunpoint in the quickly occupied capital. Sporadic resistance by members of police and Civil Guard quikcly overwhelmed. Parliament flees Helsinki, or those MPs that can. Emigrant Communist Otto Ville Kuusinen arrives at the capital on a special flight to start preparations for new elections for a parliament "more in tune with the will of the people".

Before the end of the month, southern Finland is occupied by Soviet troops and quick "elections" held in which only Communist candidates are allowed. Most of the "elected" are emigrants who just recently arrived back from the Soviet Union.

In the countryside and in the north, the Soviet control is more sporadic, and in several cases the "secret army" and irregular Civil Guard units have started engaging the occupier, scoring tactical victories in places.

July-August 1940: Kuusinen declares the "Finnish Democratic Republic" in Helsinki, signs a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Molotov. The Red Army continues operations to pacify the Finnish towns and the countryside. In the countryside the resistance just seems to stiffen, causing more and heavily armed units to be sent to help. Entire villages destroyed to root out the resistance. Newly-founded Finnish People's Police and the NKVD start a wave of arrests in major towns, cargo trains standing by to take those arrested east. Politicians, military officers, leading businessmen especially targeted.

Refugees are now leaving Western Finland in droves, going to Sweden by all available ships and and boats, by car, horse cart and on foot in the north. Some Finnish warships manage to leave port unannounced and head for the Swedish coast, sometimes getting caught by patrolling Red Navy vessels. By the end of the month, most major ports in Finland are in Soviet control and by the end of the summer the Soviet troops control the border crossings towards Sweden.

In Stockholm, Svinhufvud, Tanner and Mannerheim (or other similar figures) announce a Government of National Unity in Exile, promising for the Finnish people to keep up the fight against the occupier. More politicians and leading soldiers join the group if they manage to elude capture or have already left Finland in time.

The Swedish government protests the events in Finland. Swedish ships arrive at the Åland islands, but turn back after being greeted by warning shots across the bow by the Soviet warships outside Mariehamn, there to protect the "Finnish Democratic Republic's" claim to the islands. Sweden refrains from declaring war but dismisses the Soviet ambassador.

It will be a very cold autumn around the northern Baltic Sea.

Would this sound plausible?

 

[Geordie]

Chamberlain remaining as prime minister through 1940 however could have made an enormous difference to events, it could easily have tipped the scales.

In which direction?

 

[Cook]

In which direction?

You seriously need to ask?

 

[Henriksson]

You seriously need to ask?

This is actually not all that clear, do elaborate.

 

[Slowpoke]

There's a reason for its improved performance between 1941 and 1943

Yes, there is: circa spring 1942, Stalin finally accepted to refrain from being his regular ol' sociopathically bloodthirsty vile self and allow the soldiers to actually fight the damn war for a change (rather than continue to have them shot for the flimsiest reasons).

 

[Geordie]

You seriously need to ask?

Sorry, but yes. I don't know enough about Chamberlain to say that he'd definitely seek terms after the fall of France, especially without a Norwegian campaign first to demoralise people. At the same time, I thought that he was pretty ill, and may not have hung around too much longer anyway. Who knows Churchill isn't going to take over when the time comes? Even the shambles that was Norway didn't stop it happening OTL.

I don't know whether Winston really was the only person with the sheer bloody-minded stubbornness to keep going through 1940's Darkest Hours. If he was, then your statement is obvious. On the other hand, if the UK government kept going anyway, then a fair few of Churchill's costliest mistakes may never have happened. This doesn't mean those in power won't make their own fresh cock-ups. Some of them may be even more calamitous...

I'm not trying to be clever here, I honestly want to know your take on events. Sorry if this seems naive...

This is actually not all that clear, do elaborate.

 

[Julian]

Yes, there is: circa spring 1942, Stalin finally accepted to refrain from being his regular ol' sociopathically bloodthirsty vile self and allow the soldiers to actually fight the damn war for a change (rather than continue to have them shot for the flimsiest reasons).

Except, he didn't. Stalin continued to interfere with the war well into late 1942.

 

[Slowpoke]

Except, he didn't. Stalin continued to interfere with the war well into late 1942.

True, and it was when he finally went hands-off that the show really got on the road, but the decision to stop the monstrous charade of 'unmaskings', 'denunciations', show trials, forced confessions, mass executions was a key turning point in beginning to restore the Red Army's cohesiveness and willingness to fight.

 

[Julian]

True, and it was when he finally went hands-off that the show really got on the road, but the decision to stop the monstrous charade of 'unmaskings', 'denunciations', show trials, forced confessions, mass executions was a key turning point in beginning to restore the Red Army's cohesiveness and willingness to fight.

Except, not really. The Red Army defeated the Germans Moscow with Stalin still at the helm. It conducted Uranus under close supervision from Stalin, along with the winter counteroffensive. Arrests of dissidents commanders, mistrust, espionage, executions, imprisonments, etc continued throughout the war at the lower command levels. The NKVD grew even larger and more powerful as the war progressed.

Even in 1945 Stalin was still interfering in military operations. In February 1945 Berlin could have been taken, ending the war. But Stalin ordered operations to halt in order to secure Hungary, Austria, etc, putting political objectives above military reality.

 

[wkwillis]

If there is no Winter War, one million people don't starve to death in Leningrad from the Finnish blockade.