Why do people on this site unanimously agree that a Nazi European victory via defeating the USSR in Fall Blau and ceasefire with west is impossible?

Also the Nazi
Germany didnt have to declare war after PH. Press breaks story of FDRs extramarital affairs before 1940 election, no FDR. That results in no US embargoes = no PH. It's also likely there's no two ocean navy act.

Abomb project was based on bad intelligence, there was no notz program. Once AH was briefed on the chance of the atmosphere igniting in a chain reaction, he vetoed the project (Fermi took bets on it before the first test). Plus the Germans didn't have the resources to spare.
At that point in the war, the US could 100% intervene for the sake of “Restoring the Status Quo” especially after PH, and also if the OSS is competent enough, they could also get Germany on Crimes against Humanity.

Also I never said the Germans would get the bomb? I said the Feds as in the American Government.
 
I'd be curious to see the numbers on that. Central Europe has tons of old salt mines, some even have cathedrals and other such built down inside them. So how much does it cost for durable storage for a barrel of oil?

Having a lot more oil available during, say 1942-1944 would let you do things like train more pilots and sustain more of your air force in Germany. It's also an alternative to synthetic fuel plants, which ARE considerably more vulnerable to air attack.

What I'm getting at is that going big on stockpiling versus such a rapid build up in the early 1930s might be better value, and it probably won't twig a UK/France response quite as badly.
Except that Germany, along with every other European country, was suffering a major economic crisis throughout the 1930s. Sure an uncaring dictatorship can find money for things they want more easily than a less cynical government, but buying oil requires dollars or credit so it isn't easy, even if they thought of it.

Plus there's the point that the German army was set up to fight short intense wars. The military is going to find it hard persuading the government to create strategic reserves of fuel for a long war, even if it does somehow accept that planning for a long war is a serious proposition.
 
Also I never said the Germans would get the bomb? I said the Feds as in the American Government.
That's how I read it. Einstein and Co convinced the US government that Germany was working on building an ABomb, so naturally the US had to have one as well.

Ironically the British provided a lot of research materials, only to get kept out of the results. Uncle Joe and Beria got it hot off the presses along with US Supplied Uranium* and sample plans for the devices thanks to spies.

* The Soviet Union did not have natural uranium-ore mines at the start of the nuclear arms race but in early 1943 it began to acquire uranium metal, uranium oxide, and uranium nitrate through the Lend-Lease Agreement** with the U.S. - Gerard J. DeGroot (2004). The Bomb. Harvard Univ Press. p. 131.

** Harry Hopkins controlled the Lend-Lease program.
 
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That's how I read it. Einstein and Co convinced the US government that Germany was working on building an ABomb, so naturally the US had to have one as well.

Ironically the British provided a lot of research materials, only to get kept out of the results. Uncle Joe and Beria got it hot off the presses along with US Supplied Uranium* and sample plans for the devices thanks to spies.

* The Soviet Union did not have natural uranium-ore mines at the start of the nuclear arms race but in early 1943 it began to acquire uranium metal, uranium oxide, and uranium nitrate through the Lend-Lease Agreement** with the U.S. - Gerard J. DeGroot (2004). The Bomb. Harvard Univ Press. p. 131.

** Harry Hopkins controlled the Lend-Lease program.
Fair point, however, if it were to become a 2v1 with Germany vs British and America, and the Soviets went caput, it would take decades to get to Berlin, so all cards would be wanted on the table.
 
Banker wanted to know why most don’t think a ceasefire would occur, and the reason is just the Americans wouldn’t settle for that after getting disturbed out of their isolation, and already having supplied and lost men in the war.
 
Fair point, however, if it were to become a 2v1 with Germany vs British and America, and the Soviets went caput, it would take decades to get to Berlin, so all cards would be wanted on the table.
"I've seen war" FDR and his imitation tough guy act trying to copy US Grant ... "Unconditional Surrender"*. Extended the war in both theaters, along with the Morgenthau plan boosted German resistance and undermined dissent. Grant followed Lincolns guidance and gave out fair to easy terms to minimize bloodshed (Vicksburg, Spotsylvania Courthouse).

If FDR lived, likely no Marshall Plan and a more Carthaginian peace ** for Japan and Germany to make his Uncle Joe happy.
* Churchill was not happy about it.

** """ A Handbook for Military Government in Germany was ready in August 1944: it advocated a quick restoration of normal life for the German people and reconstruction of Germany. Henry Morgenthau Jr. brought it to the attention of President Franklin D. Roosevelt who, after reading it, rejected it with the words:

"Too many people here and in England hold the view that the German people as a whole are not responsible for what has taken place – that only a few Nazis are responsible. That unfortunately is not based on fact. The German people must have it driven home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization."

A new document was drafted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive JCS 1067. Here the US military government of occupation in Germany was ordered to "take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany [or] designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy" and it was also ordered that starvation, disease and civil unrest were to be kept below such levels where they would pose a danger to the troops of occupation.


The directive was formally issued to Eisenhower in the spring of 1945, and it applied only to the US zone (although attempts had been made to get the other Allies to accept it). The occupation directive remained secret until October 17, 1945. It was made known to the public two months after the US had succeeded in incorporating much of it into the Potsdam Agreement.

On May 10, 1945, Truman signed JCS 1067. Ignoring the amendments to JCS 1067 that had been inserted by John J. McCloy of the War Department, Morgenthau told his staff that it was a big day for the Treasury, and that he hoped that "someone doesn't recognize it as the Morgenthau Plan".

In occupied Germany Morgenthau left a direct legacy through what in OMGUS commonly were called "Morgenthau boys". These were US Treasury officials whom Dwight D. Eisenhower had "loaned" to the Army of occupation. These people ensured that JCS 1067 was interpreted as strictly as possible. They were most active in the first crucial months of the occupation but continued their activities for almost two years following the resignation of Morgenthau in mid-1945 and, sometime later, also of their leader Colonel Bernard Bernstein, who was "the repository of the Morgenthau spirit in the army of occupation".

Morgenthau had been able to wield considerable influence over JCS 1067, a basis for US occupation policy until July 1947, and, like the Morgenthau Plan, intended to reduce German living standards. The production of oil, rubber, merchant ships, and aircraft were prohibited. Occupation forces were not to assist with economic development apart from the agricultural sector.

In his 1950 book Decision in Germany, Gen. Lucius D. Clay, US High Commissioner, wrote, "It seemed obvious to us even then that Germany would starve unless it could produce for export and that immediate steps would have to be taken to revive industrial production." Lewis Douglas, chief adviser to General Clay, denounced JCS Directive 1067 saying, "This thing was assembled by economic idiots. It makes no sense to forbid the most skilled workers in Europe from producing as much as they can in a continent that is desperately short of everything." Douglas went to Washington in the hopes of having the directive revised but was unable to do so.

In 1947, JCS 1067 was replaced by JCS 1779, which instead stated that "An orderly, prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and productive Germany." It had taken over two months for General Clay to overcome continued resistance to the new directive JCS 1779, but on July 10, 1947, it was approved at a meeting of the SWNCC (State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee). The final version of the document "was purged of the most important elements of the Morgenthau plan".

In view of increased concerns by Gen. Clay and the Joint Chiefs of Staff over communist influence in Germany, as well as of the failure of the rest of the European economy to recover without the German industrial base on which it was dependent, in the summer of 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall, citing "national security grounds", convinced President Harry S. Truman to revoke JCS 1067, and replace it with JCS 1779. JCS 1067 had then been in effect for over two years.

The "Morgenthau boys" resigned en masse when JCS 1779 was approved, but before they went, the Morgenthau followers in the decartelization division of OMGUS accomplished one last task in the spring of 1947: the destruction of the old German banking system. By breaking the relationships between German banks, they cut off the flow of credit between them, limiting them to short-term financing only, thus preventing the rehabilitation of German industry and with immediate adverse effects on the economy in the US occupation zone.

With the change of occupation policy, most significantly thanks to the currency reform of 1948, Germany eventually made an impressive recovery, later known as the Wirtschaftswunder ("economic miracle").
 
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First of all I am not a Nazi
Secondly my question is that 'Why do people on this site unanimously agree that a Nazi European victory(and not total victory) via defeating the USSR in Fall Blau is impossible?'

Like if for any reason the USSR simply made a bunch of bad decisions and lost decisive battles in Fall Blau 1942 and the Germans did reach the Caucasus and some other victories. Then can't the Nazis somehow force the USA and UK to accept the inevitable and go for a ceasefire?
Why do people on this site unanimously agree that it is impossible and unrealistic?
I read a lot of threads on the topic and noticed this

I am not blaming you all for saying so
I just want to know the reasons for it

Like is a Nazi survival as a European power(and not a total victory) really THAT impossible to achieve?

I mean armies and commanders can make bad decisions at any point and any little factor can lead to a change in the outcome of a decisive battle which can potentially change the outcome of the war?
So can't this happen to the USSR. What if it just gets some bad luck?
I think wages of destruction is a great source material,also Nazis have zero defense against nuke anyway
 
I think wages of destruction is a great source material,also Nazis have zero defense against nuke anyway
Not necessarily. If the USSR is out of the war, the Luftwaffe is more of a threat than OTL.
The premise of this is that they defeat the URSS, meaning they're stronger at that point
True. But that something is possible in general, doesn't mean it's possible in every situation. For instance it's perfectly possible that someone wins the Tour de France next year (in fact it's pretty likely someone will). But barring ASB intervention I'm not going to win the Tour de France next year.

And if you really get down to it, it's extremely unlikely that nazi-Germany manages to defeat the USSR. They've just so much going against them. They're going to need the wishlist fulfilled that @alspug posted in post #78, and to get it fullfilled they're going to need an ASB.
 
I think wages of destruction is a great source material,also Nazis have zero defense against nuke anyway
it's still prudent to ensure air defence is about the same level that Japan could manage in July and August 1945 before dropping them. The 128 AA guns are probably going to remain a threat for a while after fighters are dealt with, and there is a residual risk from Komets and other very fast point interceptors (assuming they don't explode before take off).
 
it's still prudent to ensure air defence is about the same level that Japan could manage in July and August 1945 before dropping them. The 128 AA guns are probably going to remain a threat for a while after fighters are dealt with, and there is a residual risk from Komets and other very fast point interceptors (assuming they don't explode before take off).
If they take out the USSR in 1942-3, Japan gets help & oil.
If they capture Beria's files they know what the US is up to.
Lots of U Boats out there as well.

They could shoot down a b29 and capture the bombs for their own use.
 
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If they take out the USSR in 1942-3, Japan gets help & oil.
If they capture Beria's files they know what the US is up to.
Lots of U Boats out there as well.

They could shoot down a b29 and capture the bombs for their own use.
Err, how does this get Japan oil? The transiberian railroad would be hard put to run lots of tanker trains.

As for shooting down a B-29 and capturing a bomb, that would need another act of ASB. The bombs were unstable enough they were armed in flight. If a B-29 gets shot down, either the bomb detonates fully as a nuke, or the hundreds of pounds of conventional explosives explode and scatter the bomb bits over most of a square kilometer. At best, they would get some fissionable material, but the bomb is going o be scattered fragments or vapor.
 
As for shooting down a B-29 and capturing a bomb, that would need another act of ASB. The bombs were unstable enough they were armed in flight. If a B-29 gets shot down, either the bomb detonates fully as a nuke, or the hundreds of pounds of conventional explosives explode and scatter the bomb bits over most of a square kilometer. At best, they would get some fissionable material, but the bomb is going o be scattered fragments or vapor.
Could just see them gathering up material from a shot down B-29 adding it up and going "The fools they have seriously underestimated the amount needed something this small would never work!"
 
Like if for any reason the USSR simply made a bunch of bad decisions and lost decisive battles in Fall Blau 1942 and the Germans did reach the Caucasus and some other victories. Then can't the Nazis somehow force the USA and UK to accept the inevitable and go for a ceasefire?
Why do people on this site unanimously agree that it is impossible and unrealistic?
I read a lot of threads on the topic and noticed this
The US and UK simply have no reason to accept a ceasefire ever. It's high risk for low gain.

Low gain because by 1942, the Blitz has been defeated, the U-Boot wolfpacks have been defanged, and Sealion is a distant memory. The US and UK can afford to continue their strategic bombing campaign indefinitely while the Germans lack the means to hit the UK where it hurts.

High risk because, by definition, a ceasefire is a deal with Germany. While the 1942 UK did not yet know Hitler as a genocidal monster, they sure thought of him as a pathological backstabber. As far as 1942 British decision makers were concerned, a ceasefire would just set them up to be the next Czechoslovakia Poland Denmark Norway Netherlands Belgium Yugoslavia Greece.
I mean armies and commanders can make bad decisions at any point and any little factor can lead to a change in the outcome of a decisive battle which can potentially change the outcome of the war?
So can't this happen to the USSR. What if it just gets some bad luck?
Honestly, my interpretation of this site's beliefs on modern warfare is that there's no such thing as a "decisive battle".
 
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That's how I read it. Einstein and Co convinced the US government that Germany was working on building an ABomb, so naturally the US had to have one as well.

The Einstien/Szilard letter (Fermi wasn't involved) doesn't say that. At the time no one outside Germany knew whether the Germans were working on a bomb or not. The US government wasn't convinced that Germany was working on a bomb.
 
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The US and UK simply have no reason to accept a ceasefire ever. It's high risk for low gain.

Low gain because by 1942, the Blitz has been defeated, the U-Boot wolfpacks have been defanged, and Sealion is a distant memory. The US and UK can afford to continue their strategic bombing campaign indefinitely while the Germans lack the means to hit the UK where it hurts.

High risk because, by definition, a ceasefire is a deal with Germany. While the 1942 UK did not yet know Hitler as a genocidal monster, they sure thought of him as a pathological backstabber. As far as 1942 British decision makers were concerned, a ceasefire would just set them up to be the next Czechoslovakia Poland Denmark Norway Netherlands Belgium Yugoslavia Greece.

Honestly, my interpretation of this site's beliefs on modern warfare is that there's no such thing as a "decisive battle".
We might want to take Norway and Denmark off the list.

The Wallies wanted to provoke a German invasion of Norway (and Denmark) so they could occupy Narvick. See Plan R 4
 
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We might want to take Norway and Denmark off the list.

The Wallies wanted to provoke a German invasion of Norway (and Denmark) so they could occupy Narvick. See Plan R 4
That's kinda irrelevant to the topic at hand, since I'm talking about perception in the UK. British willingness to agree to a ceasefire depends on the facts on the ground as perceived by the UK leadership and public in 1942, not as perceived by historians in 2023.
 
The US and UK simply have no reason to accept a ceasefire ever. It's high risk for low gain.

Low gain because by 1942, the Blitz has been defeated, the U-Boot wolfpacks have been defanged, and Sealion is a distant memory. The US and UK can afford to continue their strategic bombing campaign indefinitely while the Germans lack the means to hit the UK where it hurts.

High risk because, by definition, a ceasefire is a deal with Germany. While the 1942 UK did not yet know Hitler as a genocidal monster, they sure thought of him as a pathological backstabber. As far as 1942 British decision makers were concerned, a ceasefire would just set them up to be the next Czechoslovakia Poland Denmark Norway Netherlands Belgium Yugoslavia Greece.

Honestly, my interpretation of this site's beliefs on modern warfare is that there's no such thing as a "decisive battle".
The problem with the idea of a decisive battle is that it requires opponents that are vulnerable to a decisive battle. For example, the battle of France in 1940 resulted in the defeat of France. It was certainly decisive in that it ended France as a really major player in the war. If the war was just between Germany and France, it would have decided the outcome.

The problem is that the war wasn't just between France and Germany and there were no reasonable means to win a decisive battle against the US and Britain. The only really decisive battle against Britain would have required a successful Sea Lion. Against the US it is even less likely, and given how unlikely a successful Sea Lion was, that is really saying some thing.

To try to rank them, I would put it like this. The countries are listed with their chances of losing the war in a decisive battle.

France (and smaller) - definitely, since the Germans managed to defeat them
USSR - very unlikely but possible
Britain - extremely unlikely but theoretically possible without massive ASB intervention.
US - not a chance without massive ASB intervention

Note, I am not saying the chances of the Germans defeating the USSR or the British in a decisive battle are likely. I think they ate both very unlikely, but the chances of a successful Sea Lion are much lower than the chances of a successful Barbarossa.
 
The problem with the idea of a decisive battle is that it requires opponents that are vulnerable to a decisive battle. For example, the battle of France in 1940 resulted in the defeat of France. It was certainly decisive in that it ended France as a really major player in the war. If the war was just between Germany and France, it would have decided the outcome.

The problem is that the war wasn't just between France and Germany and there were no reasonable means to win a decisive battle against the US and Britain. The only really decisive battle against Britain would have required a successful Sea Lion. Against the US it is even less likely, and given how unlikely a successful Sea Lion was, that is really saying some thing.

To try to rank them, I would put it like this. The countries are listed with their chances of losing the war in a decisive battle.

France (and smaller) - definitely, since the Germans managed to defeat them
USSR - very unlikely but possible
Britain - extremely unlikely but theoretically possible without massive ASB intervention.
US - not a chance without massive ASB intervention

Note, I am not saying the chances of the Germans defeating the USSR or the British in a decisive battle are likely. I think they ate both very unlikely, but the chances of a successful Sea Lion are much lower than the chances of a successful Barbarossa.
Molten the younger didn't believe in it either, which makes his plan for 1914 ???
 
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