WI a Napoleonic unification of Europe?

[rfmcdonald]

The organization of a Europe unified under Napoleonic hegemony in 1820 is laid out in this r/imaginarymaps map.

Dark blue denotes areas directly included in the Napoleonic empire, while lighter shades identify client states. (Of note, I think, is the partition of France's rivals of Austria, Prussia, and even Spain, and the aggrandizement of allies Bavaria and Saxony, as well as the reestablishment of autonomous Polish and Hungarian states.) The creator notes that, though the Napoleonic empire eventually fell to revolution in the 1840s, it left a lasting imprint on Europe, with a preference for continental unification among later generations of Europeans.

This leads me to consider three different lines of attack with regards to this scenario.

1. How would this particular Napoleonic scenario evolve? Though the Bonapartes ended up losing control of Europe, they still changed the face of Europe permanently. France's Great Power rivals are gone, and unless someone reassembles something--German unification, maybe?--France will have no rivals in Europe, especially if France keeps the Rhine frontier.

2. How likely was the possibility of a Napoleonic conquest of Europe? Napoleon's temptation to overreach was his downfall, but the Napoleonic regime was sufficiently attractive in many respects, a synthesis of the pre- and post-Revolutionary orders, to find many followers across Europe. Was there a single POD?

3. What consequences would a 19th century unification of Europe have on the long-run development of the European continent? Especially if this unification was enduring, it could have huge consequences. At least some economic historians, for instance, have traced the lag in GDP per capita in northwestern Europe versus the United States to the division of Europe into protectionist nation-states. A unified Europe might well have seen accelerated economic transformation.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

1. How would this particular Napoleonic scenario evolve? Though the Bonapartes ended up losing control of Europe, they still changed the face of Europe permanently. France's Great Power rivals are gone, and unless someone reassembles something--German unification, maybe?--France will have no rivals in Europe, especially if France keeps the Rhine frontier.

Russia says hello, and given a unified "Carolingian Corridor"'s existential threats to Russian security if relations go sour (Which they have many chances to do over time, the more likely a rough patch is to emerge the longer we go) they'll be drawn into the influence game in Eastern Europe in order to undermine the position of France's Bloc. And France, in order to keep the Russians from encroaching to much on her own minor allies, will be obligated to try to counter these moves, so the divided Germany (especially with no clear hegemon around which German Nationalists can coalesce will just likely turn into the battleground for who is the master of Europe, becoming our timeline's equivilent of the Balkans.

 

[rfmcdonald]

Russia says hello, and given a unified "Carolingian Corridor"'s existential threats to Russian security if relations go sour (Which they have many chances to do over time, the more likely a rough patch is to emerge the longer we go) they'll be drawn into the influence game in Eastern Europe in order to undermine the position of France's Bloc. And France, in order to keep the Russians from encroaching to much on her own minor allies, will be obligated to try to counter these moves, so the divided Germany (especially with no clear hegemon around which German Nationalists can coalesce will just likely turn into the battleground for who is the master of Europe, becoming our timeline's equivilent of the Balkans.

The Polish state, I'd suggest, does seem to be positioned in such a way ("rampant of Europe" and all that) to make it an indispensable French ally. Depending on what happens with the borders of Poland with Silesia and Brandenburg-Pomerania, it might even have a chance to evolve into a great power in its own right. Whether Russia will let this happen, now, is another question.

German unification can proceed in any number of ways, too. Part of me wonders whether the French might favour one of their client-states, perhaps Bavaria, leading unification, by analogy with OTL's unification of Italy by Piedmont.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

The Polish state, I'd suggest, does seem to be positioned in such a way ("rampant of Europe" and all that) to make it an indispensable French ally. Depending on what happens with the borders of Poland with Silesia and Brandenburg-Pomerania, it might even have a chance to evolve into a great power in its own right. Whether Russia will let this happen, now, is another question.

German unification can proceed in any number of ways, too. Part of me wonders whether the French might favour one of their client-states, perhaps Bavaria, leading unification, by analogy with OTL's unification of Italy by Piedmont.

Russia will prioritize neutralizing Poland and keeping it weak above anything else: given its a straight flat waltz from there into the Volga heartland, a strong Poland with even mildly cool relations is intolerable to Russia and they'll put everything else on the back burner in order to get it. There's no breathing room for Poland to grow into a Great Power with the huge power discrepancy between them and Russia, unless they can put together a strong alliance that can put pressure on multiple Russian fronts at one (And Sweden can't fill that role anymore, not with the MASSIVE population discrepency) which leaves the question of just how well the Ottomans have gotten through all of this. Were they an alliance to this Napoleonic System and able to piggy-back develop and stability wise off its successes? Did Napoleon back or reject the Greek Rebels (And given Britain is nursing a deep grudge, how are they involved in all of this?) ect. A Strong Ottomans would go a long way to allowing the establishment of an anti-Russian corridor that could block its growth, especially if Hungary had good relations with both those powers in the mid 1800's as well.

Basically, we need to flesh out what Napoleon's geopolitical strategy was post-Unity.

 

[rfmcdonald]

Russia will prioritize neutralizing Poland and keeping it weak above anything else: given its a straight flat waltz from there into the Volga heartland, a strong Poland with even mildly cool relations is intolerable to Russia and they'll put everything else on the back burner in order to get it. There's no breathing room for Poland to grow into a Great Power with the huge power discrepancy between them and Russia, unless they can put together a strong alliance that can put pressure on multiple Russian fronts at one (And Sweden can't fill that role anymore, not with the MASSIVE population discrepency) which leaves the question of just how well the Ottomans have gotten through all of this. Were they an alliance to this Napoleonic System and able to piggy-back develop and stability wise off its successes? Did Napoleon back or reject the Greek Rebels (And given Britain is nursing a deep grudge, how are they involved in all of this?) ect. A Strong Ottomans would go a long way to allowing the establishment of an anti-Russian corridor that could block its growth, especially if Hungary had good relations with both those powers in the mid 1800's as well.

Basically, we need to flesh out what Napoleon's geopolitical strategy was post-Unity.

Looking at the scenario's map, there is no sign of the Napoleonic system being projected into Ottoman Europe, no Napoleonic Romanian or Greek kingdom. This does imply to me some sort of Ottoman survival; a Russian conquest of the Balkans seems improbable.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

Looking at the scenario's map, there is no sign of the Napoleonic system being projected into Ottoman Europe, no Napoleonic Romanian or Greek kingdom. This does imply to me some sort of Ottoman survival; a Russian conquest of the Balkans seems improbable.

It's liable to be a case where France is working to bring in the Ottomans as an ally/hedge against the Russian threat than; probably doing their best to get a stable,peaceful, permanent border in the Balkans and getting military modernization/cooperation with Hungary, Poland, and Turkey as the base of an "Ostwall". If they can reach accommodations with the British (who are the real wild card); likely by France foreswearing competition in the colonial arena where the Brits have their real power and cash generation, and conceding South America to pro-London independence movements (which in and of itself is a huge shakeup to the Western Hemisphere) than the most likely situation of late 19th century geopolitics is a looser, but still pro-French Western and Centeral Europe playing a "Great Game" with Russia to maintain as much of the Napoleonic Bloc together as possible against attempts to secure buffer space/strong deterrents to war in Eastern Europe, with Britain playing on the sidelines to try to balance the two factions so she can scoop up the rest of the world. The fate of Scandinavia is liable to be a big issue here; Russia, trying to break out of her prison and put pressure onto North Germany to convince them it's viable and in their interests to align with Russian interests, and so getting Denmark out of France's alliance by hook or crook will be vital to this. The cause of the Romanian people is also likely to get more attention, being Russia's best running horse into undermining the Magyars and opening up the gate into the Balkans.

 

[dandan_noodles]

-looks at the former Habsburg Monarchy-

 

[stevej713]

The creator notes that, though the Napoleonic empire eventually fell to revolution in the 1840s, it left a lasting imprint on Europe, with a preference for continental unification among later generations of Europeans.

That's more than a little optimistic. We're talking about the 19th century after all - the age of nationalism. A continental hegemon would exacerbate nationalism, not the other way around. Note that German nationalism saw one of its greatest increases in popularity between 1806 and 1815, but declined immediately after Napoleon's defeat. There's simply no way that the conquered German people along the Rhine (or the Italians for that matter) would suddenly wake up one morning and consider themselves loyal Frenchmen.

 

[Beacon]

That's more than a little optimistic. We're talking about the 19th century after all - the age of nationalism. A continental hegemon would exacerbate nationalism, not the other way around. Note that German nationalism saw one of its greatest increases in popularity between 1806 and 1815, but declined immediately after Napoleon's defeat. There's simply no way that the conquered German people along the Rhine (or the Italians for that matter) would suddenly wake up one morning and consider themselves loyal Frenchmen.

Honestly idk, like if Napoleon never tried to become Emperor and instead just focused on holding together the French Republic by becoming 'Lord Protector' or some other title/style, i.e - not emperor/king then maybe he could coax italians and germans into staying together with France by saying that they'd have representation in the parliament, which they wouldn't have if they were part of the German/Italian kingdoms. But even that would only be an incentive for the more enlightenment-oriented people. The ideal to aim for would be an EU-esque institution, which is financially & legally united but still gives a lot of leeway with regards to culture & other stuff.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

That's more than a little optimistic. We're talking about the 19th century after all - the age of nationalism. A continental hegemon would exacerbate nationalism, not the other way around. Note that German nationalism saw one of its greatest increases in popularity between 1806 and 1815, but declined immediately after Napoleon's defeat. There's simply no way that the conquered German people along the Rhine (or the Italians for that matter) would suddenly wake up one morning and consider themselves loyal Frenchmen.

I interpreted it a little differently, specifically with the reference towards the preference towards unification rising in future generations rather than the system staying together immediately. While Germans and Italians aren't liable to become Frenchman, their nations would share a common legal code and integrated economies with France, and lack a definitive hegemon in their own ranks to build into strong centeralized nation-states, suggesting the retention of less powerful "nations" with highly localized member parts used to cooperation within a larger framework. This seems better for the emergence of an EU type organization (At least like it was in the early 2000's) compared to otl's early 20th century of highly competative Great Powers

 

[Wendell]

It's more believable without Brandenburg-Pomerania and Austria-Styria annexed to France.