US politics 1919-1920
  • Though the point has already been evoked, I'd like to explore it further. I'm actually looking for some idea of US TL in the 20th century, something in the vein of MaskedPickle Perot TL, and I found this period in the immediate aftermath of WWI to be fertile in opportunities.

    The POD here is Wilson dying from his strokes in september/october 1919, leaving for at least 17 months the presidency into Thomas Marshall hands.

    320px-Thomas_R._Marshall_in_his_Senate_office.jpg

    The two points discussed as I read it in a few threads are the League of Nations' ratification and the impact on the election of 1920.

    On the former, it was mentionned that a stronger leadership of a healthy Marshall instead of the incapacited Wilson IOTL could have improved the chances of a compromise getting through the Senate, though I don't know enough of the topic to argue on.
    The latter is indeed the most interesting point.

    Though a defeat to Republicans is practically assured, I a curious to see how the short presidency of Marshall could impact the process, and overall the political history of the following decade, for we have almost 13 months between the death of Wilson and the election, and another four (inauguration is still in March) for Marshall to lead the country.
    The first thing that comes to my mind is that we would have Robert Lansing not pushed out of the cabinet by Wilson clique and staying as Secretary of State. Now, could he have some influence in getting a compromise on the LoN to get it passed?
    There is also the replacement of Glass as Secretary of the Treasury, assuming Glass still goes to the US Senate. Would Marshall still pick Houston to fill the seat or someone else? Is there an opportunity for a more efficient, or less controversial, replacement to Glass?
    And we have the Irish issue. It happened that the defection of Irish electors to Republicans over Wilson's reneging his word to stay out of the war, and support the British, hit hard the prospects of Democrats in the cities of North. With Wilson dead and Lansing still in, could there be a reconciliation, even a partial one? I mean some earlier and stronger move towards a mediation by Marshall in the then escalating conflict in Ireland that could mitigate the distrust towards Democrats, albeit not to the point of improving their actual chances at winning in 1920.
    Coming to the election process, I don't doubt that as a sitting president, Marshall would be assured of being nominated, but I wonder about FDR chances at still getting onto the ticket and the consequences of this not happening for his future carreer.
    Coming the result, I mind about Marshall potentially carrying, beyond Cox's OTL score, Tennessee and Oklahoma, and perhaps even his home state of Indiana.

    What do you think?

    1920.PNG
     
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    US presidential election of 1924
  • Continuing into the President Marshall scenario, I've worked on the possible alternate 1924 election.

    The primary difference here is that Harding lives (I would have traded a President's life for another, idea inspired by Emperor Julian), so the atmosphere of corruption lasts longer (as an example of butterflies, Attorney General Harry Daugherty would stay longer in the cabinet).

    On the democratic nomination process, that impacts McAdoo candidacy as his ties to the oil tycoon Doheny are more a liability than IOTL due to Harding and the scandal lasting and eventually allows Smith to win the nomination. Other consequence of the weaker McAdoo candidacy is that Alabama US Senator Oscar Underwood is able to include in the platform an anti KKK resolution (which IOTL failed by a close margin). Ultimately, for a balanced ticket, I would consider Underwood as Smith's running mate.
    360px-AlfredSmith.png
    Oscar_W._Underwood.jpg

    Smith/Underwood 1924 Democratic ticket

    On the Republican side, I think of Coolidge still the natural candidate (Harding declining to run), though I hesitate at his running mate.
    I explored the Campbell Slemp option (with a divergence he is still representative by 1924) on ground of his OTL connection, with as an aim, an earlier Southern Strategy, but he was too much unknown and the situation that could boost his chances, the outcome of Democratic convention with KKK and anti catholic outburst against Smith/Underwood ticket, don't abide by the calendar (the Democratic Convention happened later and lasted longer so this outcome wouldn't be known until long after the Republican ticket is formed). I could take the OTL running mate, but I wanted to explore the possibility of the Hoover option. Hoover was in a good position for the VP spot (due to the importance of California outlined in the 1916 election and the need of a westerner to compete with the appeal that a dissident run by La Follette would have), but Republicans preferred Dawes, fearing Hoover could alienate Republicans significant share of farmers' vote. To justify this option, I could say the atmosphere of corruption of the Harding administration would help the Lorimer scandal breaking out earlier (I've not found details other than those provided on the wiki page of 1924 election) and dooming Dawes' prospect.

    Concerning La Follette independent run, I wouldn't change it. Though Smith appears as much more moderate as Davis was IOTL, I understand La Follette wanted by his run (not unlike Teddy Roosevelt in 1912) use this bid to retake control of GOP from the conservatives, so I keep this dissident run against the 'conservative' Coolidge candidacy happening. As well, I don't see reasons to change his running mate.

    There is my projection of the 1924 election with these tickets:

    1924.PNG
    Overall, Smith result is not much different from Davis IOTL in 1924 (136 EVs for Davis, here 137 for Smith), but that's still better than Smith's score in 1928 IOTL (87 EVs). The main difference is in the geographical repartition. Due to the anti Catholic reaction (as 1928 IOTL) plus a strong opposition from KKK (courtesy of Underwood stance), you have Smith performing worse than in OTL 1928 in the South; he even loses Alabama (won in OTL 28 only by a thin margin) due to harsh KKK opposition. Otherwise, there is a better performance in the North due to Smith's appeal among Easterners and Catholics, though all his wins, New York, Maryland, Illinois and even Nevada, are only due to the presence of La Follette that take votes away from Republicans and gives a plurality to Smith (though a short one). I've wondered about Massachussets and Rhode Island some time, but I ultimately awarded them to Coolidge on merit of his 'favorite son' status (and some reported presence/influence of KKK in Rhode Island during these years).

    La Follette also performs better due to Hoover effectively pushing away some farmers' vote to him, and because Coolidge has weaker position to start with : Harding impopularity is still hurting Republicans, and since Coolidge has not become president prior to the election, he is a more obscure candidate, though he still effectively plays the "Silent Cal" image to keep distance with Harding's administration. There is also less difficulties for an alliance of Progressives with Farmer-Labor and Socialists on account of the Communists relative absence (since Russia is ruled more "democratically" by SRs who won the civil war over Bolsheviks and Whites).
    Thus, outside his home state, La Follette takes Minnesota, the Dakotas and Montana, plus wins Idaho with a very thin margin and loses Iowa and perhaps Washington with similarly thin margins.

    How interesting do you find these developments?
     
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    1918 Battle of Kazan and a SR victory in Russia
  • My fault, I did miss the point. But the thing is that Marshall can't really go further than what the French and the British do.

    Anyway, my goal is more about the impact of a Marshall presidency on US politics. In the event I go for a Bolshevik defeat, I would use an earlier POD at the battle of Kazan in 1918 as explained above with the victory of SRs instead, since the battle involved a push by Czechoslovaks supported by an insurgent People's Army of Komuch under Kappel that claimed its legitimacy from the SR Constituent Assembly represented by a committee of SRs:
    I assumed that SRs would carry the momentum after a victory at Kazan (Siberia hasn't yet been taken over by Whites though two government rival, one SR in Vladivostok and another in Omsk, White it seems) with support of the Czechoslovak legion, a victory that would have involved Trotsky capture and Red Army subsequent collapse.
     
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    British politics with a SR Russia
  • Going through a brief recap of British elections of 1922, 1923 and 1924, I came to wonder about the chances of MacDonald's first government lasting longer with a non Bolshevik Russia.

    Instead of Bolsheviks in power, we have the SRs ruling what's looking like a democratic regime, with a multi party system authorized but dominated by SRs, and more keen to respect Russian previous engagements with its foreign partners and not put forward an international revolution policy. Baltic countries would also become independent as IOTL, and so would too Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan (in either cases, I don't see SR Russia invading at the risk of alienating the Allies, even though there is less motives for Allies to support these republics without Bolsheviks in power), but Turkestan is still reintegrated (there is to terminate the Tashkent Soviet, though I don't exclude there may be autonomy for regional entities such as Khiva, Bhukara or Turkmens). Also, Baron von Ungern-Sternberg is still chased out of Baikal region and expel Chineses from Mongolia to restore Bogd Khan.

    Given that the problem of relations with Russia isn't much one ITTL, would the Liberals still keep from supporting a censure motion against MacDonald? Or would there even be a Campbell Case for this motion to be introduced? Also, without a Zinoviev letter and without such an anti communist atmosphere, would the Liberals fare better in a future general election and avoid fading into darkness ?
     
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    No Soviet Russia after 1918 : Consequences on the UK, France, Iran, China and Mongolia
  • To return on British politics, I mind about a longer MacDonald First Ministry pushing Labor in position to better take advantage of the 1929 crisis due to a better schedule, assuming it still happens due to economic factors remaining roughly the same. I mean that by surviving the Campbell Case, the fall of MacDonald cabinet may be pushed by a couple years. Assuming Conservatives under Baldwin still win the next general election, they would be in power during the crisis and a good time after the crash so they can be blamed for mismanagement, and put the Labor in a position to win big in the early 30s. How that would affect the UK, not to mention we have potentially the Labor in charge when come the Abdication Crisis ?

    Continuing on butterflies, there may be some speculation over Clemenceau, and I still hesitate between having him mortally wounded during the assassination attempt and having him successfully elected President of the Republic. Since kung zog already begun an excellent TL on the premise of killing Clemenceau, and that I already killed Wilson, I would favor the latter option, but I shall wait until I finish reading Clemenceau biography to settle the choice. The perspective of having Clemenceau as President of the Republic from 1920 to 1927 is an interesting perspective, regarding his influence on the government.

    Still, the other main topic interesting on French politics in such a TL would be to see what effect would have the absence of Communists in power in Russia.
    The direct consequence is over Socialist party (SFIO)'s Congress of Tours that happened in 1920. IOTL, it was to discuss the proposed rallying of the Communist 3rd International, but though the majority of the base went to form the Communist party, a minority including most of the elected officials of the SFIO. Obviously here, we wouldn't have such a split. However, the main effect is that unlike IOTL, the most radical wing of the Socialists stays in SFIO, making it probably less moderate than it would become after the OTL split, and potentially less palatable for the electors.

    Another mention at the butterflies of a SR Russia is the situation in Iran (still called Persia at the time).
    The Soviet intervention in Gilan IOTL and the subsequent creation of a Soviet Republic of Gilan had done much to prepare the ground for Reza Shah coup in 1921. Here, it's doubtful this republic would ever happen though a longer lasting Jangali rebellion could be in orders. However, since in these years, situation was pretty much chaotic and anarchic, I imagine a coup is still unavoidable, and Reza Shah would still be the natural candidate (unless there is a high ranking officer of equivalent standing I didn't hear of).
    An interesting thing I read on Reza Shah is that he initially intended to replace the monarchy with a republic on the Turkish model but relented due to clerical opposition. I wonder if it's possible in this context a delayed takeover by Reza Shah ends into Iran becoming a secular republic. Any thought?


    Also, there is China, and Mongolia in a lesser extent.
    First are the consequences on the KMT and the Communists.
    We know the Soviets were instrumental in the birth of the Communist Party of China. But here, since there is no internationalist Soviet Russia, I wonder about the possibilities for the CPC to ever be created. I'm balancing between these proto-Communists joining the ranks of the KMT to bolster the Wang Jinwei left wing, or having them instead forming a Socialist Revolutionary Party of China, instead of Communist (I guess SR ideology could be as well if not more suited in an agrarian oriented China).
    There is also the influence of Soviet advisers in the training of KMT military branch and the overhaul of the KMT party structure in a more centralist, Communist-esque structure.
    Taking on the party structure, could a less centralized party apparatus mean less power for Chiang Kai-shek and more chances for Wang Jingwei to compete with him, or even take over KMT instead of him. On the military side, I imagine SR Russia would still be happy to help fellow revolutionaries in need if asked.

    Then, there is Mongolia.
    IOTL, von Ungern-Sternberg didn't intervene here until 1920/1921, when he was eventually forced out of Baikal region after Japanese withdrawal, but here, as we imagine a SR victory in autumn 1918 (victory at Kazan followed by a march on Moscow), and reunification under Allies mediation, that leaves both Ungern-Sternberg and Semyonov little room. During the civil war, them and their cossacks were widely seen as bandits, and it's likely SR government would eventually come to settle the issue, so they would left with the choices of submission or exile. The timing is important as we are at the eve of a Chinese invasion which itself had some serious consequences in Chinese warlord politics.
    Duan Qirui, one of the most influential warlords in China, had then to justify the War Participation Army, a personal army he had raised on Japanese loans on the pretext of participating to the Great War. He chose Mongolia, expecting an easy conquest, and after the death of Mongolian Prime Minister Mamnansüren, there was indeed not much resistance offered. Eventually, Chinese occupying forces pissed off the Mongolian, paving the way for von Ungern-Sternberg conquest. However, back in China, this conquest had for effect to upset Zhang Zuolin, a warlord controlling Manchuria, who didn't like to see a strong army close to his border and eventually joined a coalition against Duan Qirui, resulting in the Zhili-Anhui War during which Beiyang Army was decisively defeated and Duan Qirui forced to flee.
    Now, the question is how plays the new schedule. Looking at the bio of Mongolian Premier Namnansüren, his death is said to have possibly due to poisoning, though there is no evidence (but that leaves some room for an alternate history). Also, he is mentionned to have tried to get some assistance in Russia to defend against China but failed to get anything significant. However, in the perspective of von Ungern-Sternberg and Semyonov having to face assertion of SR government authority, they may want to seize the opportunity and offer their services to Mongolia, eventually butterflying the suspicious death of Premier Namnansüren.
    I mention Semyonov who IOTL didn't go to Mongolia with Ungern, but did have similar projects it seems. The difference however between the two is that Semyonov seems more likely to meddle in Mongolian internal affairs where Ungern left Bogd Khan and his government relatively undisturbed.
    Also, there is know if with SRs victorious, Duan will still go ahead with the invasion of Mongolia since Russia and China had signed an agreement in 1915 that forbade Chinese troops in Outer Mongolia (though aknowledged Chinese suzerainty under an autonomy regime). Assuming he still goes ahead, with Namnansüren still alive and Ungern at the head of Mongolian army, perspectives of success look less likely than IOTL. If the Chinese still win, I assume that this wouln't change much to the following Zhili-Anhui War, but if the fierce war leader that Ungern is succeed in driving them back, and I've no doubts he would be capable of such an exploit given what he did IOTL, that could change the situation back in China. Giving Chinese invasion a defeat in 1919, I could imagine that Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian clique would not feel as threatened as IOTL and wouldn't be driven to support the Zhili clique against the Anhui clique headed by Duan. If the conflict between Anhui and Zhilli cliques still breaks out in these conditions, we can think that Anhui clique has better chances in holding, extending Duan Qirui stay in power. But what would be the consequences for southern China ?
     
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    No Soviet Russia after 1918 : A different 1920s China ?
  • The more I read on early Chinese Communists, the more I think in this TL, they shall still form their own party, albeit under a Socialist Revolutionary Party of China (SRPC) label.
    Chinese_protestors_march_against_the_Treaty_of_Versailles_%28May_4%2C_1919%29.jpg

    May Fourth Movement demonstration

    As it appears the defining moment of CPC formation was the May Fourth Movement in 1919, to protest the concessions of Versailles to Japan in China, one that was violently suppressed by the Beiyang Government, since there is no more Communist Russia by this time, but a SR government in power, it looks all likely that Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu take on the SR interpretation of Marxism than the Leninist one.
    And if we assume that with Russian SRs in power, Chinese 'SRs' could be potentially less agressive in their cooperation with KMT within the First United Front, and butterfly such incident as the Zhongshan Incident which saw Chiang Kai-shek cement his hold over the KMT military apparatus and put him in position to challenge Wang Jingwei.
    More than the continuation of the First United Front, the SRPC could remain longer in the hands of Chen Duxiu who was more inclined towards a libertarian interpretation of socialism by opposition to Mao Zedong's Leninist interpretation (though the term itself would be less relevant in this TL, maybe to replace with Blanquist).
    Chen.jpg

    Chen Duxiu

    Also looking back at the Zhili-Anhui war, the conflict appears unavoidable, but without Fengtian support, Zhili chances seem less assured as I said. However, I looked more into the figure of Wu Peifu, a general of the Zhili clique and subordinate to Cao Kun. He appears as one of the greatest military genius of this time in China, winning against Anhui and Fengtian cliques seemingly hopeless battles against odds, only beaten because of the betrayal of Feng Yuxiang. Oddly enough for such a high profile general, he never sought political office and remained steadfastly loyal to Cao Kun even though the latter was weakened by the scandal of his 'purchase' of the presidency. Is there anyone with some experience of warlord China to say whether or not Wu Peifu would be still able to defeat the Anhui clique without Fengtian support ITTL ?
    Wu_Peifu_TIME_Cover.jpg

    General Wu Peifu​
     
    No Soviet Russia after 1918 : Greece and Turkey
  • Historically, the treaty of Sèvres signed in 1920 effectively dismantled the Ottoman Empire, and some even said it was worse than what Germany faced. The refusal of Turkish Nationalists to agree to it led to a continuation of the resistance, mainly in the form of a war with Greece which raged until Greek final defeat in 1922. The Turkish victory led to a complete abandonment of the Sèvres treaty replaced with a much more kind Treaty of Lausanne.
    In Greece, the backlash against the monarchy led to the establishment of a Second Hellenic Republic. This republic would barely last a decade, but unable to cope with the Great Depression, the monarchy was eventually restored.
    In Turkey, a prominent feature of the war was the material support of Bolshevik Russia to Turkish nationalists, though barely enough in the first stages, was certainly a factor in the survival of Turkish Nationalists, and their fortunes against Greece.

    Now, with Bolsheviks out, Turkey finds itself deprived of its Russian ally, could find it more difficult.
    I first thought of this subject about the Turkish-Armenian war in late 1920 which allowed Turkey to recapture major areas from Armenia. In this context, I thought it possible for Armenia and Georgia to keep the province of Kars which the Turks retook IOTL.
    The_First_Armenian_Republic_1918-1920.gif


    Speaking of the Greek offensives, though it can't be denied the meddling of King Constantine reflected into poor military leadership during the campaign, the Greeks came close in late 1921 to break the final lines of defense of Nationalists on Sakarya River, a few dozens of kilometers from Ankara, which marked the greatest extent of their progression. I could consider earlier opportunities to have the lack of Soviet supply and financial help tipping the war course, but seeing how much energy and determination the Turks put in resisting Greeks through 1920 and 1921, I find it more plausible to bring the breaking point of their resistance later, especially at such a crucial moment as the Battle of the Sakarya River.
    640px-Greco_Turkish_War_1919-1922.svg.png

    To speak of a peace treaty, it seems impossible to return to the treaty of Sèvres, given that even France and others put it in doubt and begun renegotiating it before even Greeks were defeated. In the event of a Turkish defeat on the Sakarya River and a following armistice, we could have reasonably Greece keeping the Smirna area, albeit extended to add strategic depth as per one of the Greek war aims, and also keeping Eastern Thrace. The straits would be neutral, Constantinople could be made a Free (or International) City as Tangier or Danzig, with the straits demilitarized. In the east, I would think of the Wilsonian borders of Armenia as not much possible for the political goodwill of Western Allies, though I think we could consider Kurdish autonomy in the worse case scenario (worse for the Turks).

    I don't know yet what political fallout to expect in Turkey from such a peace, but in Greece, the victory instead of a defeat would save the monarchy for the time being. But, that puts monarchists and Republicans in a reverse position when come the Great Depression. We could have the Second Hellenic Republic, born in a very different context, having better chances to stand, unless we end in a Spanish like situation with a civil war breaking out in the 1930s, and potentially Turkey coming back for a revenge.
     
    China 1920s : Warlord politics
  • To return on the Zhili-Anhui war, I now think that the Zhili clique can still win without Fengtian involvement, albeit with more difficulties.


    So, with the failure/setbacks in the invasion of Outer Mongolia, Zhang Zuolin doesn't feel threatened and compelled to join the anti Anhui coalition. But in the state of Chinese politics in late 1910s, it looks more or less unavoidable that war between Zhili and Anhui cliques is looming, and that there would be still a coalition to be built against Duan Qirui and the Anhui Clique.
    768px-Chine_de_1917_%C3%A0_1920.png


    Then, the absence of Fengtian involvement would free some troops, though some troops could be in fact stuck in Mongolia, fighting the Russo-Mongolian army of von Ungern-Sternberg, not counting that there would be a minimum screen to cover Beijing to avoid a surprise from Fengtian army. All in all, I'm saying that will the talented Wu Peifu, it's still possible for the Zhili to win the conflict.

    However, the main problem I have with imagining the ulterior developments.
    IOTL, the power sharing between Zhili and Fengtian Cliques that followed the Zhili-Anhui War led to the First Zhili-Fengtian War which ended into a serious defeat for the Fengtian Army. Eventually, Zhang Zuolin would expand and further modernize his army along the economic and industrial apparatus of Manchuria to support it with some Japanese help, and try a second time, succeeding through convincing Feng Yuxiang to switch sides.
    The obstacle in my reasoning is that by removing the power sharing between Zhili and Fengtian Cliques (and the due to no Fengtian involvement in the anti Anhui war, I remove the immediate cause for the Zhili-Fengtian wars. Then, I am wavering between considering that it's only a matter of time before Zhang Zuolin decides to contest Zhili hegemony (though the KMT government holds sway over some southern provinces), and for this point is the ambitions shown by Zhang Zuolin IOTL, and considering that he will continue to stay neutral like Yan Xishan in Shanxi.
    In both cases, that leaves the Fengtian Clique out of a war for a longer time, and leaves more time for Zhang Zuolin to build up Manchuria as an economic and industrial power instead of bringing it to collapse through the repeated burden of sustaining military campaigns, and that's even more true in the event of the neutrality/independence option.

    zhang zuolin.PNG

    Zhang Zuolin, leader of the Fengtian Clique and ruler of Manchuria​

    Regarding the prospects of the Northern Expedition, that situation potentially jeopardizes its chances of a KMT reunification.
    If Zhang Zuolin stays neutral, then the Zhili Clique is free to focus its forces against the KMT, and with Wu Peifu, to fend off any attempted invasion of central China, perhaps even to conquer Guangdong if instructed.
    If the Fengtian Clique eventually invades, then in the worst timing possible for KMT, it finds itself battling fresh and modern Fengtian army instead of what they fought IOTL (considering that then, Manchurian economy had been in deep troubles due to previous military campaigns), and in this context, Zhang Zuolin should be able to keep KMT at bay, pushing back the moment of unification by either side for a few years or even a decade (assuming Manchurian economy could barely cope with the cost of holding onto the new conquests to have Zhang Zuolin considering going south of the Yangtze River before consolidating, leaving time for KMT to prepare for another round). The best timetable for KMT would be Fengtian invasion happening well before the Northern Expedition happens for the OTL result to still happen.
    (You can find good maps, such as the one above, for warlord China during these wars in the French versions.)
     
    No Soviet Russia after 1918 : Poland's borders
  • It's a bit hard to evaluate what potential developments could be for the absence of a Polish-Soviet war as we know it.

    Reading through articles online, the primary factor for it occuring was the Bolsheviks' intent to export their revolution and link up with revolutionaries in Germany and Hungary. Here, though there would probably still be revolutionary agitation in Germany and Hungary as we knew it, there will be no Soviet help forthcoming.
    Still, that doesn't butterfly completely some of the causes of the conflict.

    The borders of the new Polish state are yet the main problem.
    In Russia, we have SRs who likely took Moscow and Petrograd, keeping on the momentum they didn't lose at Kazan. Still, you have the more right wing Volunteers Army in South Russia, North Caucasus and Ukraine mainly, which represents troubles if both sides don't find a way to go along instead of continuing the civil war.
    That is to say we can consider that for a few months into 1919, Poland may be left alone with her neighbors.

    Without Soviets in, Poles would still be up for a fight over Polish populated areas, which is here the regions of Wilno (Vilnius) and Lwow (Lviv).
    Poland1937linguistic.jpg


    IOTL, they occupied Vilnius for a short time after the withdrawal of German forces, only to be chased by Soviet forces and their local allies, and waged war upon the republic of Western Ukraine (Galicia) to keep Lwow. They eventually retook Vilnius and crushed the republic of Western Ukraine.
    Given that Allies would be pressuring for more compromise between a still allied Russia and Poland, I guess we could still have the border roughly following the Curzon line of 1919 (the one including Lwow/Lviv), plus the region of Vilnius which according to the German census of 1916 had a Polish majority.

    Curzon_line-fr.jpg



     
    Clemenceau as President of the Republic : A different Ruhr Crisis ?
  • I only searched superficially the occupation of the Ruhr, but it strikes me that Raymond Poincaré, as French prime minister, was one of those responsible for the occupation.

    As I understand Poincaré, the man was rather agressive and a hardliner on Germany. But, more important, he and Georges Clemenceau were famous political enemies (which set an odd relationship when Poincaré was compelled to call on Clemenceau in 1917, lacking alternatives). So, if I was to make Clemenceau elected President of the Republic in 1920, it's not likely that Poincaré be recalled to power.
    politique-union-nationale-2919291-jpg_2561265_660x281.JPG

    (Poincaré and Clemenceau side by side)

    I don't know yet the figures that would replace Poincaré at the time of the Ruhr Crisis given that the French legislative elections of 1919 delivered a strong right majority (the Blue Wave), but I tend to think they may be less prone to take such a unilateral move as occupying Rhineland. I think perhaps to another Briand government or close to it.

    Now, I can neither evaluate the potential consequences though I can give some ideas.
    Without the economic strain caused by the occupation of the Ruhr and the 'passive resistance' of its population, we can think that Germany could solve earlier the hyperinflation crisis, though I guess the potential agitation by France over delays would cost Cuno his post, though later than IOTL.
    1923 is also the year Hitler attempted a putsch in Munich, but he would have in this context less ground without French occupation. There is to think of the impact that the occupation of Rhineland and the subsequent 'passive resistance' had on the Nazi narrative and that their absence would have.
    ruhr_resistance_passive.jpg

    (No! You won't submit us!)
    Perhaps the absence of such an occupation, an earlier end of the hyperinflation crisis and the less brutal settlement of the reparations would deprive Nazis of some decisive electors, keeping in mind that their victory in 32 and 33 weren't a foregone conclusion (when we think of Bruning and Schleicher plans). In that case, we could end up with a military dictatorship instead of Nazis when it comes to the Great Depression.

     
    Socialist Revolutionary Russia : Political structures
  • Searching through the political reforms defended by Socialist Revolutionaries in matter of constitutional organization, I found this web page that alledgedly quotes the SR program of 1905: https://community.dur.ac.uk/a.k.harrington/srprog.html .
    That link also appears to be cited in the english page of the Socialist Revolutionary Party of Russia:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_Revolutionary_Party#External_links
    And the text sourced from "Source: V.V. Vodovozov (ed.), Sbornik programm partii v Rossii, 1st edition . St Petersburg, 1905 pp. 20-1." .

    The excerpt that interests us if that on political and legislative reforms :

    • In the Realm of Politics and Legislation The establishment of a democratic republic with broad autonomy for oblasts and communes, both urban and rural; increased acceptance of federal principles in relations between various nationalities; granting them unconditional right to self-determination; direct, secret, equal, and universal right to vote for every citizen above twenty years of age regardless of sex, religion, or national origin; proportional representation; direct popular legislation (referenda and initiatives); election, removability at all times, and accountability of all officials; complete freedom of conscience, speech, press, meetings, strikes, and unions; complete and general civil equality; inviolability of the individual and home; complete separation of the church from the state and declaration that religion is a private affair for every individual; introduction of a compulsory, general public education at government expense; equality of languages; free justice; abolition of permanent armies and their replacement by a people's militia.

    That fits more or less in the idea of a federal structure. So instead of USSR, I woud rather call it Federative Democratic Republic of Russia or FDRR.

    The point on removability makes me thinking to the concept of recall elections, such as in the United States or else.

    But that doesn't settle the uncertainty over exact form of government. For instance, the legislative organ: monocameral or bicameral?
    On the American model, if there SRs were to adopt a federal system, the Senate would be the instrument to represent krais, oblasts, especially when some are dominated by non Russians. Otherwise, we would have a lone Assembly.
    And to speak of the executive power, would there be a president and a prime minister, or would the functions be merged? Would he or they be responsible to the Parliament (then it's a parliamentarian system, not unlike France at the time) or an independent executive cabinet like in the USA with a president directly elected?
    Given the previous nature of Russia, I would think SRs would favor a parliamentarian approach like that of France where "democracy doesn't trust in the men (or women) of providence", with a Premier answerable to the Duma (which fits more in the principle of being removable at all time) and eventually a President of the Republic, relatively powerless like in France, who appoints the Premier and is elected by the Parliament, Senate or not.
     
    No Soviet Russia after 1918 : Hungary and Germany 1919-1920
  • Like with China, I wondered about Communists in Germany, but the more I looked, the more I find that the KPD and its spartakist predecessor had a much more local anchorage to have a split occuring from the USPD. So I guess that instead of calling itself communist the Spartacus League would create a SRPD ( Sozialrevolutionärer Partei Deutschlands , in an approximate German). Through I imagine a spontaneous uprising in the wake of Eichhorn's dismissal, but the reluctance of Rosa Luxemburg and failure of the Bolshevik Revolution to water down Liebknecht's revolutionary enthusiasm would possibly avert the drama that happened IOTL, instead allowing a negotiated end to the uprising, especially avoiding the entrance of Freikorps into Berlin and the consequences it had.


    Meanwhile, in Hungary, I expect the failure of the Bolshevik revolution to temper the zeal of local revolutionary and avert the apparition of the Hungarian Soviet Republic by allowing the government of Count Karolyi, President of the Hungarian People's Republic, to survive the Vix Note (exigeance by Allies Hungarians withdraw from even more territories) instead of having the rumor of a Karolyi's note handing power to the proletariat (which Karolyi denied ever writing, so I guess that's may be a forgery that wouldn't have a reason to exist ITTL) causing the revolutionaries, including Bela Kun, taking power.
    That might in turn avoid that Admiral Horthy takes power and ends the Republican regime.
    Also, I wonder if avoiding the conflicts caused by Hungarian Soviets with Czechoslovakia and Romania, and eventually the Romanian invasion, would help Hungary to get a better deal in the treaty of Trianon, especially when considering there is no such urging need as preventing any link up of Hungary with Russia ITTL due to Bolsheviks long gone.

    A consequence of no Hungarian Soviet Republic may be no Bavarian Soviet Republic, as I read the former's success inspired the latter's creation. So, instead of having revolutionaries proclaiming a Soviet Republic in the aftermath of Eisner's assassination, we have anarchy lasting longer before the government of Weimar eventually steps in to restore order, this time too without the direct intervention of Freikorps needed.

    So, coming back to the German national scene, we get the SRPD (alternate KPD) more powerful. However, though the role of the Freikorps was less important, I don't think this butterflies away the Kapp-Luttwitz coup in 1920. However, how the coup fails is another matter. IOTL, the opposition of bureaucracy and the general strike were key factors in the failure of the coup, but here we have the old Spartakists surviving the January 1919 uprising and in position to extract political gain from the general strike, especially by Liebknecht who seemed keen to take the least opportunity at hand for a revolution. I mean they are in a good position to take over the workers' mobilization against the coup while also presented with the opportunity to replace the discredited Weimar government, possibly through another putsch of their own, and that's considering that IOTL, there was another leftist uprising in the Ruhr, as a consequence of the Kapp Putsch, but where workers resisted the Weimar government afterwards.
    That would potentially put the Weimar government in a harder place than IOTL, but depending on the timetable of events, it might still have a chance.
    If the SRPD stays in line to support Ebert against the Putsch up to the time the Putsch collapses, Ebert may still turn back to conservatives and freikorps he just defeated to suppress the Spartakists, but maybe at the cost of a small civil war, kind of the Ruhr Uprising scenario at greater scale.
     
    US Presidential Election of 1928
  • As in OTL, the 1928 election would look a foregone conclusion due to the prosperity achieved under the Coolidge administration.

    We still have Coolidge not running for a second term, due to the loss of his son Calvin Jr in similar circumstances to OTL (Calvin Jr caught a blister while playing on White House grounds and it infected, leading to death by blood poisoning), though delayed from 1924 to 1925 (here Coolidge moves to the White House only in 1925).
    The only sensible difference is that Hoover begins his run as the sitting vice president. I don't think there is much reasons to change in the Republican ticket, being Hoover/Curtis like IOTL.

    On the Democratic side, this could look a bit like IOTL, if not for what happened in 1924.
    Let's recap 1924.
    Due to longer Harding presidency, the atmosphere of corruption scandal damages McAdoo's candidacy due to his links to oil tycoon Doheny. This allows Alabama Senator to include an anti KKK resolution in the Democratic platform and that Governor Smith catches the nomination and picks Underwood as running mate. In the general election, due to anti Catholic backlash and KKK increased anti Smith and anti Underwood agitation, Democrats suffer heavily. Smith loses much ground in the South, including Alabama, but due to the stronger La Follette Progressive run (Hoover being selected as VP instead of Dawes scares some farmer votes away from GOP and the absence of an anti communist scare make easier an alliance of Progressives, Farmer-Labor and Socialists), and their spoiler effect, Democrats carries several northern states.
    Come 1928, as IOTL, the Democratic nomination doesn't attract many politicians who feel this is going to be a Republican year due to popularity of Coolidge policies, so as IOTL, that leaves the way open to Smith.

    Now, let's see what happens to Franklin D Roosevelt as he would have a certain impact I guess.
    I wondered if I had to keep him on the Democratic ticket in 1920 as running mate to President Marshall, but I think I should settle for retired Major General Lawrence Tyson of Tennessee, who seems rather palatable to balance the ticket with a southern appeal (though I make this choice out of convenience as an alternative to FDR and justify Marshall better result in the region).
    When FDR returns into active politics in 1924 after being afflicted by paralytic illness, once Smith wins nomination, I guess Smith would do as in 1928 IOTL and supports him as his successor as Governor of New York, a race which would pit him against his cousin Theodore Roosevelt Jr: Roosevelt vs Roosevelt ...
    IOTL, Smith won against Roosevelt Jr by a bare 110,000 votes, but surely benefited from incumbent status, while all other offices were carried by Republicans. ITTL, FDR has not even the prestige of a previous vice presidential run and the uncertainty over his physical fitness would be even more a trouble, eventually causing Theodore Roosevelt Jr to win.
    No need to say, I just butterflied the chances of a FDR presidency.

    FDR1924.jpg
    203px-Theodore_Roosevelt_Jr._1921.jpg


    Let's return to Smith.
    IOTL, he hadn't the occasion to run a second time after his 1928 loss, but here he has it. The field is open as no serious contenders is running against him. With James Farley still his campaign manager (he begun as campaign manager for Smith before going over to FDR in 1928), Smith could learn on his failings in 1924 and improve his tactics and strategy for 1928. Note Farley's presence in 1924, though I didn't consider it previously, can be considered here to partially justify Smith good performances in the North and urban areas while doing damage control.
    Smith's comeback would begin by the reconquest of the governorship of New York in 1926. Though I hesitated to have Smith running for US Senator instead, given 1926 was a Democratic year in New York (in a reverse situation, Democrats' ticket carried almost all offices this year) and that Smith has too name recognition as previous governor and presidential candidate.

    Going into the general election, I don't think there is possible alternatives to Senator Robinson from Arkansas as running mate, due to the need of a southerner to anchor his numbers in the Solid South, Underwood being more or less a spent force after the loss of Alabama (though I guess Underwood would try to avenge this loss and stay in Alabama politics, either by running for reelection as US senator or running for governor, but in both case with anti KKK crackdown in mind).
    With improved campaigning, toning down the anti Catholic sentiment, blaming KKK for losses in 1924, etc, we could get Solid South back to Smith plus good results in New England and New York, overall confirming the inroads he made in urban areas IOTL in 1928 as ITTL in both 1924 and 1928 and the subsequent start of another political realignment.

    For the map after, I am just speculating on the base of OTL 1928 numbers as I can't effectively and properly evaluate the impacts of the 1924 election on this one, so that would be a rather minimal scenario for Smith.
    1928 essay 02.PNG


    Note this election doesn't take in consideration a possible third party run as I couldn't find plausible justification for the Progressive party to run another presidential ticket after La Follette's death.
    You might also wonder if I'm heading to a Smith presidency as a result of the Great Depression and the crisis of 1929, but honnestly, though that is to me an interesting perspective, I don't know. It could take this way if I take the 1932 OTL Democratic convention as a base, but ITTL, the political landscape within the Democratic has been deeply affected by the elections of 1924 and 1928, and it remains to see whether or not there would be someone to stand against Smith instead of FDR, a possibility I don't exclude though I have no names in mind for the moment. Feel free to advance your ideas.
     
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    USA 1924-1936 : the Progressive movement and Huey Long
  • I ended the last post with a question: with FDR out of the picture, who could contend with Al Smith ?

    I looked and though I searched alternatives to names already referred in the Democratic Convention, such as Harry Byrd (Virginia), Albert Ritchie (Maryland) and John Garner (Texas), or in the latter's case, any Democrat who would be holding the position of House Speaker, assuming Democrats take the House in 1930 (which is not ensured given OTL numbers if we take the spoiler effect of a possible stronger third party presence, which is not ensured), or even William Murray (Oklahoma).
    But in the end, we come to two people: Al Smith and Huey Long.

    HueyPLong.jpg
    I don't think there is ground for changing the pace of Huey Long accession to power in Louisiana, with his failed 1924 bid for governor which sets the way for his success in 1928 and his election as US senator in 1930 (though he didn't take his seat until 1932 IOTL and ITTL). Through his populist and economical interventionist stance, he will, with FDR absent, fill in as the candidate of the more left wing of the Democrats.

    Given Huey Long's colorful style, it's more or less unavoidable to see the convention being very tense. His presence on the radical left would probably scare moderates and conservatives and rally around the liberal candidacy of Smith who remains the candidate of the Northeastern establishment (and may actually save it). In this scenario, we would probably have a Smith/Garner ticket, and ultimately, more or less a rematch of 1928, if not for Long.
    Agressive as he is, he would probably launch an independent run after losing the nomination. That was more or less his plan IOTL for 1936, running as an independent after defying FDR in the primaries and losing, though here, he would begin without this being an intentional scheme. He could have thought having a chance though I guess he was smart enough to aknowledge the odds and do it more by conviction against the 'big business and Tammany Hall friend' he would see in Al Smith.


    However, Long's chances in the general election don't look good. He could very well capture a sizeable amount of the vote like did La Follette in 1924. And indeed the 1924 run by La Follette would be a likely model for Huey Long to follow. With his political machine, he is ensured to carry Louisiana by a good margin, but his national appeal remains underdevelopped. Actually, it's more or less the same pattern than for his first bid for governor in 1924 that happens.
    That's why he would need to seek allies.

    In the South, I think mostly of Oklahoma governor, William Murray: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_H._Murray
    The character is almost as colorful as Long is and has a record of controversial and authoritarian measures to deal with the crisis. He was the kind of people who could get along Huey Long and his agenda, and if I believe his wiki page, he was early supportive of a Long run. That gives Long a possible chance at getting Oklahoma.
    There is also a possibility in Arkansas. In 1932, he stepped in to help the campaign of Hattie Caraway for the Democratic nomination to the US Senate (paramount to an election in Deep South), partly to extend his influence in the home state of his rival, Senator Joseph Robinson, and his tactics were largely successful in bringing a landslide victory. That case is more indicative of the potential result Long can bring about as IOTL, Senator Caraway didn't outright become a Long supporter, pledging to keep independent judgement. That still leaves open the possibility in the general election that she either supports Smith out of party loyalty or Long on more social concerns (and presently, I'd favor the first hypothese).
    murray.PNG
    ar_1943_caraway_gavel.jpg



    In the North and West, the alliance with parties on the progressive spectrum is necessary.
    Out of the proximity between Huey Long platform and socialist agenda, it wouldn't be hard to conceive the Farmer-Labor and Socialists to endorse his candidacy.
    On the side of the La Follette brothers and the Wisconsin Progressives, it's far less sure given that Long agressive language and platform could scare them. But Long has proven to be a capable politician, capable of compromise when necessary if it allow him to get to his goal, so I take it not as a permanent obstacle, though that could take time to overcome it and might not produce results until after the election for the next in 1936.
    Phil-La-Follette2.jpg
    RMLaFolletteJr.jpg

    (La Follette, Phillip and Robert)

    Before going further, let's think of the alternate developments for the northern progressives from 1924 onwards.

    In 1922-1923, the Conference for Progressive Political Action called on by unions, was largely divided over the issue of transforming the conference into an organized party on the model of the British Labor party or staying as a political pressure group, but the motion was defeated. There was a separate attempt by the Farmer-Labor to enter electoral politics through the Federated Farmer-Labor Party, but it collapsed as, having been quietly taken over by communists, La Follette refused their support and their attempt at an independent ticket faltered. If the FFLP failed, its state level organization survived for some time but its national standing didn't recover. Instead ITTL, we have this collapse not happening, and they end up endorsing La Follette in 1924. In 1928, they can field a decent candidate though with not much impact in the overall election.
    Furthermore, another consequence of this better standing by the Farmer-Labor in 1924 could be to have Floyd Olson elected in his first attempt to run for Governor of Minnesota. IOTL, he came second to Republican nominee Theodore Christianson, barely 5 points behind. We could then find him in the US senate, running in 1930 against incumbent Republican, Thomas Schall. IOTL, this very duel was about to happen if not for the death of both opponent, Schall in a car accident in 35, Olson to cancer the year after. In this context, he would very well place to be the frontrunner for Farmer-Labor nomination in 1932, but also to be Long's running mate in the event the FFLP decides that they have better chances, like in 1924, by endorsing Long (having read Emperor Julian's excellent TL, you could find this an ironic twist of fate).
    USAolsonFD2.jpg


    In the end, though these alliances may be useful to improve Long's national standing, it would likely not be enough for someone who came out of nowhere to rise to national scene in less than a year, from his seating as Senator in Washington DC to the Democratic convention and the launch of his independent run, all of this during the year 1932. So, as I said above, Long could take a few states, a sizeable portion of the popular vote, but likely not enough to spoil the victory from Smith, though enough to narrow the electoral margin. I can't give an electoral college map here since that would require a long study of numbers and possibilities in each state, but I assume that will be a Smith victory.


    A Smith presidency regarding the alternate development for a New Deal is much unknown to me. So far, from what I could read and guess, I'd say that we would still have a New Deal, but a watered down version, for instance without the late OTL parts (said to have been proposed to counteract Long's appeal in the left and a possible challenge by him) and even a bit for the first part as it seems Smith would have been less willing than FDR to use federal powers as far as Roosevelt did IOTL.
    This would lead to significant frustration on the Left, as it did IOTL, and feed into Long's rhetoric.

    For Huey Long on the road to 1936, it remains to build a national infrastructure to support his campaign and his agenda. This last need would be especially clear as, ITTL like IOTL, Long would see all his initiatives in the Senate blocked by the majority.
    That strategy suggest a union of the main parties of the progressive spectrum, from Progressive Republicans to Farmer-Labor and perhaps Socialists, with Long Democrats defecting throughout South (mostly in Louisiana and Oklahoma at first I guess before he can build a regional base strong enough to expand, perhaps first to Arkansas (with regard of Long's incursion here in 1932) and Alabama (based on later rise of Wallace in this land and the previous difficulties of Democrats in 1924, though I may be wrong).
    Such a party would be likely a big tent party built primarily to support Long's candidacy in 1936, only meant to become a real party if Long wins the White House.
    As for the name, though it could have been easy to resort to the old Progressive brand, it is, I think, too much associated to the liberal wing of the La Follette brothers. A more federative name (I borrow from Emperor Julian TL) would be Commonwealth, a name which resonates with the Share Our Wealth program of Long (which because of Long's previous presidential campaign would have been made public in 1932 instead of 1934).

    The midterms of 1934 would be the occasion for Huey Long to campaign extensively throughout the country, in the South, but also in California.
    IOTL, Upton Sainclair, previously an unsuccessful Socialist candidate, run under Democratic label for governor and ended second, about 11 points behind incumbent Governor Merriam. Here, we could have instead Sainclair running under Commonwealth label instead of Democratic. That would put him against another Democrat in the race, but that removes from the election the Progressive candidate, Raymond Haight, who received almost 13% of votes. I understand there is still a danger Sainclair loses, but with Long on his side to campaign, he can have a serious bump like in Arkansas and achieve at best a plurality.
    Upton_Beall_Sinclair_Jr.jpg


    The question of knowing if Long would be able to carry the day in 1936 remains open. You shall wait until I compute proper numbers for the election of 1932 before I can precise the potential Long wins in 1936.
     
    1932 US presidential election map
  • 1932 Smith.PNG

    After lengthy research, I finally came out with this map. I analyzed the numbers in historical presidential elections from 1876 to 1932, seeking the strength of third and fringe parties during elections, notably Weaver, Debs, Roosevelt or La Follette, compared Democratic numbers in the 1920s as I did for TTL 1924 map to see how would fare Smith (he's still a Catholic northeasterner and establishment candidate while Long is a southerner and a Protestant). I tried to weigh in the impact and appeal of Long's populist and socialist accents in northern states, the fact he is relatively unknown on the national scene prior to 1932 while Smith has ran in 1924 and 1928.
    With that, before doing the math, I assumed Long would make a good performance, but not to the point of spoiling the victory from Smith, but looking at Hoover's numbers, I've realized this was a closer matter than I thought.

    For instance, in the map above, the result was so close that I had to tip Michigan and Georgia to Smith, states where there were good chance due to narrow margins (in Michigan indeed, for Georgia, it's due to Long southern appeal) that Hoover or Long wins.
    In other cases, states such as Oregon, Idaho and South Dakota where the race is very contested, almost a third to each candidate, I've given a small lead to Smith on ground of Long being a southern candidate which agressive rhetoric might be less appealing than Smith and the more reassuring mainstream Democrats who have yet to prove their worth (that would change if Smith was to disappoint them during his first term).
    Hoover fares better than IOTL due to Long spoiler effect, carrying his home state, California, along others such as Illinois, Ohio and New Jersey to cite the more important ones. I was not far from giving Massachussets and also Michigan, but I ultimately decided otherwise, in the first case, considering his appeal to Catholics as demonstrated IOTL in 1928 would allow him to keep a small lead, and in the latter case, considering the above factor mentioned, have Smith winning the electoral college.

    In fact, I could have well awarded Michigan to Hoover and Georgia to Long, but I would have no candidate having a majority and throwing the election to the House where, if I trust wiki numbers of the 1930 elections, Republican still control 27 delegations out of 48, against only 20 for Democrats, which would eventually make possible a second Hoover term.
    Given how I intend the TL to go by now, ie having Long in position to win in 1936, that scenario would have Long hurt by the blame of having spoiled the election.
    I'm still in the way of computing numbers of the House elections through the 1920s to see if it's possible to deny Republicans a majority of state delegations by 1930 and ensure that if the election is thrown at the House, it gives Smith a victory (and Long a 'corrupt bargain' to attack).
    As far as I am now, the aftermath of the 1924 House and senate elections, the only result I achieved is a barely stronger indepedent presence of Farmer Labor and Socialists.

    You have Wisconsin 4th and 5th districts going socialist (Melms in the 4th, instead of only the 5th under Berger), North Dakota 2nd going Non Partisan League in 1920 and staying so, Minnesota 7th and 9th still Farmer-Labor (though Kvale unseats Volstead in 1920 instead of 1922) as IOTL and gaining in 1924, not only the 8th (Carss) like IOTL, but also the 6th (SC Shipstead) and Magnus Johnson holding onto his seat in the US Senate against Schall, giving Farmer-Labor two US Senators instead of only one.
    The only other significant change I made to the Senate is Washington progressive Republican Miles Poindexter keeping his Senate seat in the 1922 election.

    I've not yet computed exact numbers as there is yet to consider altered turnout and adjust the previsions, but I made a list of rankings in each state, indicating toss ups and safe positions, mixing numbers of the spots if the said spot is contested, if the numbers are too close to pronounce, but with an indication of who it's leaning to.


    1 . ALABAMA
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Long vs Smith , 3.Hoover _ leaning Long

    2. ARIZONA
    TOSS UP _ 1/2/3. Smith vs Long vs Hoover _ leaning Smith

    3. ARKANSAS
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Long vs Smith , 3. Hoover _ leaning Long

    4. CALIFORNIA
    TOSS UP _ 1/2/3. Hoover vs Smith vs Long _ leaning Hoover

    5. COLORADO
    TOSS UP _ 1/2 Hoover vs Smith, 3. Long _ leaning Hoover

    6. CONNECTICUT
    SAFE HOOVER _ 1. Hoover, 2. smith , 3. Long

    7. DELAWARE
    SAFE HOOVER _ 1. Hoover 2. Smith 3. Long

    8. FLORIDA
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Smith vs Long , 3. Hoover _ leaning Long

    9. GEORGIA
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Smith vs Long , 3. Hoover _ leaning slightly Smith

    10. IDAHO
    TOSS UP _ 1/2/3. Hoover vs Long vs Smith _ leaning Smith

    11. ILLINOIS
    TOSS UP _ 1/2 Hoover vs Smith , 3. Long _ leaning Hoover

    12. INDIANA
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Smith vs Hoover, 3. Long _ leaning Smith

    13. IOWA
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Smith vs Hoover , 3. Long _ leaning Smith

    14. KANSAS
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Hoover vs Smith , 3. Long _ leaning Hoover

    15. KENTUCKY
    TOSS UP _ 1/2 . Smith vs Hoover , 3. Long _ leaning Smith

    16. LOUSIANA
    SAFE LONG _ 1. Long , 2. Smith , 3. Hoover

    17. MAINE
    SAFE HOOVER _ 1. Hoover , 2. Smith , 3. Long

    18. MARYLAND
    SAFE SMITH _ 1. Smith 2. Hoover 3. Long

    19. MASSACHUSSETTS
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Hoover vs Smith, 3. Long _ leaning Smith

    20. MICHIGAN
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Smith vs Hoover , 3. Long _ leaning slightly Smith

    21. MINNESOTA
    SAFE LONG _ 1. Long , 2/3. Hoover vs Smith

    22. MISSISSIPPI
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Long vs Smith , 3. Hoover _ leaning Long

    23. MISSOURI
    SAFE SMITH _ 1. Smith , 2/3. Hoover vs Long

    24. MONTANA
    SAFE LONG _ 1. Long , 2/3. Hoover vs Smith

    25. NEBRASKA
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Smith vs Hoover , 3. Long _ leaning Smith

    26. NEVADA
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Smith vs Long , 3. Hoover _ leaning Smith

    27. NEW HAMPSHIRE
    SAFE HOOVER _ 1. Hoover , 2. Smith , 3. Long

    28. NEW JERSEY
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Hoover vs Smith , 3. Long _ leaning Hoover

    29. NEW MEXICO
    SAFE SMITH _ 1. Smith , 2. Hoover , 3. Long

    30. NEW YORK
    SAFE SMITH _ 1. Smith, 2. Hoover , 3. Long

    31. NORTH CAROLINA
    SAFE SMITH _ 1. Smith , 2. Long , 3. Hoover

    32. NORTH DAKOTA
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Long vs Smith , 3. Hoover _ leaning Long

    33. OHIO
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Hoover vs Smith , 3. Long _ leaning Hoover

    34. OKLAHOMA
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Long vs Smith , 3. Hoover _ leaning Long

    35. OREGON
    TOSS UP _ 1/2/3. Smith vs Hoover vs Long _ leaning Smith

    36. PENNSYLVANIA
    SAFE HOOVER _ 1. Hoover , 2/3. Long vs Smith

    37. RHODE ISLAND
    SAFE SMITH _ 1. Smith , 2. Hoover , 3. Long

    38. SOUTH CAROLINA
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Long vs Smith , 3. Hoover _ leaning Long

    39. SOUTH DAKOTA
    TOSS UP _ 1/2/3. Smith vs Long vs Hoover _ leaning Smith

    40. TENNESSEE
    TOSS UP _ 1/2/3. Smith vs Long vs Hoover _ leaning Smith

    41. TEXAS
    SAFE SMITH _ 1. Smith 2. Long 3. Hoover

    42. UTAH
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Smith vs Hoover , 3. Long _ slightly leaning Smith

    43. VERMONT
    SAFE HOOVER _ 1. Hoover , 2. Smith , 3. Long

    44. VIRGINIA
    SAFE SMITH _ 1. Smith , 2. Long , 3. Hoover

    45. WASHINGTON
    TOSS UP _ 1/2/3. Long vs Hoover vs Smith _ slightly leaning Long

    46. WEST VIRGINIA
    SAFE SMITH _ 1. Smith , 2. Hoover , 3. Long

    47. WISCONSIN
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Smith vs Long , 3. Hoover _ leaning Smith

    48. WYOMING
    TOSS UP _ 1/2. Smith vs Hoover , 3. Long _ leaning Smith
     
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    1932 US presidential election numbers
  • I computed approximate numbers and adjusted the margins imagined above, taking also into account that some way, since Long embodies the radical left, Smith is perceived more moderate than FDR was IOTL and thus takes into Hoover OTL voters. Still, I used

    We end up with :

    200px-AlSmithWaves.jpg
    170px-HerbertClarkHoover.jpg
    images.jpg


    Smith/Garner [D] : 272 EVs, 41.6% of PV (~ 16.5 M votes)
    Hoover/Curtis [R] : 167 EVs, 37.1% of PV (~ 14.7 M votes)
    Long/Olson [Ind] : 92 EVs, 21.3% of PV (~ 8.5 M votes)


    EDIT : Here a map of Long's margins.

    1932 grades.png
     
    Last edited:
    Note on the TL form
  • I'm researching a bit on Latin America and Carribeans, Iberian peninsula, Greece and central Europe before I go to cover the 1936 US election.

    I see this form of TL, if I can call that a TL, doesn't attract many.

    At the beginning, this was intended as an hybrid between reflexion, exploration and TL, not to be constrained by the limits of a strict TL form, to show the evolutions in the formation of the TL and leave flexibility over the direction and the adjustment of elements discussed and possibly contradicted later.

    As such, I had no idea where I was heading when I begun with two main PODs, Czechoslovak and Komuch victory at Kazan in September 1918 and Wilson death in the fall of 1919 (along Harding survival to balance the death sheet). Nice surprises were the alternate political developments of the 1924 election, the alternate developments of warlord China and KMT, the rise of Huey Long and the progressive movement in 1930s, but also potential Greek civil war, not counting some developments I'm researching in South America concerning the Socialist Republic of Chile (OTL 1932) and the warmongering policies of Bolivia (OTL led to the Chaco war, ITTL could lead to a second Pacific War to retake coastal areas, or even both at same time) ...
    I've still to research developments in central Europe, especially given the possible continuation of the Hungarian Republic (TTL absence of a Soviet Republic) and the existence of a more open SR Russia.

    Eventually, when I would have achieved researching, exploring the 1918-1936 period, I would redact a proper TL on the world up to the 'possible' election of Huey Long in 1936.

    Still, I hope to receive suggestions and comments, ideas over developments I didn't think of.
     
    The 900 days of MacDonald : the UK , 1920-1931
  • With the help and participation of @pipisme , I developed the British part of the TL for the 1920s.

    So, when we left it, I suggested that due to a less anti socialist hostile environment, Russia being still allied to Western powers and relatively open and democratic under SRs with democratic socialism in government, we have the first Labour government lasting longer, not falling on the Campbell Case, making the Conservatives in power when happens the 1929 crisis and the Great Depression, with the possibility the Labour be in power through the 30s.
    I've more or less kept this frame, excepted for the outcome.

    First, coming to the fall of the Lloyd George, the circumstances change a bit, but we have kept the same schedule.
    Indeed, by giving the Greeks a victory against Turkey (link), we can think the Chanak crisis is butterflied. However, the atmosphere is such that Lloyd George government coalition was doomed and it came to finding another pretext.
    IOTL, the Tories were convinced to dissolve their coalition with National Liberals over the good result of a by election in the summer of 1922, followed by the Chanak crisis. ITTL, we would use the developments in Turkey happening first, with some event or crisis in the negotiations between Greece, Turkey, and other international powers trying to enforce a mediation and a modified version of the Sèvres Treaty. Thus, this event or crisis, whatever exact form it may take, would create the atmosphere where the good Tory performance at a by election would be the pretext to break the coalition and call an early general election.

    So, we come roughly on same schedule with an election that gives way to a Baldwin government. Another general election is called, still in late 1923, over the issue of Tarriff, and the Tories get severely beaten by reunited Liberals as IOTL, with Tories a plurality and the Labour second. With Baldwin unable to form a government, this task falls onto Ramsay MacDonald.

    With no Campbell Case to speak of, and the Liberals' reluctance to go too early into a general election given the weakened state of their finance (IOTL in 1924, they weren't even able to field candidates for all seats), we have a Labour government lasting till the summer of 1926, in a way I could call that "The 900 days of MacDonald ".
    A major accomplishment would be an early expansion of the franchise to all women, as done later IOTL by Tories, but that would be in 1925.

    Ultimately, due to the situation of minority of the MacDonald government, it would still fall, and the likely pretext comes with the General Strike of 1926.
    That general strike would still happen in 1926, since the underlying factors remain, but it would be delayed, because of two main factors: first, the sitting government isn't taking an hostile approach to trade unions as did the Tories under Baldwin, and second, there wouldn't have been yet a return to the Gold Standard done IOTL by the Conservatives.
    However, this wouldn't go well for the Labour. Because of a less hostile approach, the Labour government wouldn't have taken all these measures the Conservative government took to ensure a general strike would disrupt the country's activity, the supply of cities and else. This would make the atmosphere even more revolutionary than IOTL, even though there isn't agitation for a revolution (no Comintern agents to prop up radicals) but the circumstances would make for that lack.
    Still, since there is a Labour government, we can have in the end a negotiated settlement with one of main provisos, as proposed by the Sankay Commission, the nationalization of coal mines.
    It's on this that the Labour government would come to fall. The Liberals would oppose such a radical measure and the combined Tory-Liberal opposition would doom the proposed bill, leading MacDonald to call a general election and dissolve the Commons.

    1926 general strike.jpg



    Here, the exact details of MacDonald ministry's end are two possibilities.

    In a normal world, the election would then go on, and the Conservatives would come back a large majority. The Liberals would still lose, but less badly than in 1924 IOTL since the Labour would fare worse, and that, by a 'coincidence' of the calendar, we would have Asquith out of the picture (due to a stroke that happened IOTL roughly at the same time and forced his retirement from politics). Indeed, the disruption of order and supplies in the UK during the general strike would embitter urban voters that had recently shifted from Liberals to Labour against the latters, not counting that, to pressure the voters to go in their favor and protest against deputies torpedoing tht nationalization bill, the trade unions would resume the general strike, adding to the atmosphere of revolutionary tension. In this election, urban voters would likely come to Tories, but Liberals would be in position to get it back later, while the Labour experience would dissuade them to vote again for Labour.

    In the second, maximum, option, which I would follow for it adds to the narrative value and the dramatic tone, while staying in 'plausible' boundaries.
    That would be Conservatives launching a 'constitutional coup', constitutional meaning that it's not per se a coup, but that constitutional loopholes could allow it.
    First, I would have conservative leadership going from Baldwin, increasingly contested on his right by hardliners, to such a hardliner as William Joynson-Hicks, also called Jix. Given the revolutionary atmosphere of the time, a move to call onto the King to dismiss MacDonald, following a formal but useless (since the Commons are on their way to a dissolution and general election) motion of no confidence, on the ground that MacDonald is unable to ensure a regular election due to the resumed general strike that is paralyzing the country. Then, Jix would be appointed Prime Minister, and would possibly use drastic means to suppress the strike.
    1926 general strike militart.jpg


    Either way, the electoral result isn't going to change much with this extended scenario. It would however have deeper impact on the political positions of the Labour party.
    According to pipisme, the numbers of OTL elections in this period would make it likely to see most of Labour leaders, MacDonald himself, Henderson, Clyne, Snowden, etc., going down, in a way not seen until IOTL 1931 election, though in that case, Labour wouldn't fall so low. It's going to give way to more radical leaders such as John Wheatley, and bring the Labour back to radical positions, such as considering a more republican standing, so avoiding the OTL later break with the ILP.
    TUwheatley2.jpg

    (John Wheatley)
    Republicanism was once considered in a 1923 conference of the Labour party and eventually rejected, and here, we have a number of figures potentially amenable to the idea, counting Wheatley who was close to James Maxton who once proposed in the wake of Edward VIII's abdication a Republic, and even George Lansbury, Labour leader from 1932 to 1935 IOTL, who declared to be Republican (though pragmatic). That would even more contribute to take away social reformist vote back to Liberals in a future election.

    So, we come out of summer 1926 with a Tory government headed by Joynson-Hicks, a Liberal party back on tracks, and a Labour once again returning to obscurity.
    I and pipisme have not seen much difference between Baldwin OTL government and what would be a Jix one, except for a harder and more authoritarian stance on social issues, bordering on repressive action.
    Then coming to the Great Depression, still happening on schedule, we have the UK having taken the gold standard, albeit later than IOTL, and a fiscally orthodox government in all likeliness, as was MacDonald's ITTL, leading to a particularly afflicting economic and social crisis in the UK. With pipisme, we debated the possibility of a moderate challenge from the Austen Chamberlain wing against the mismanagement by Jix, and came to the conclusion that an early general election would likely be called in late 1930, late autumn or early winter, about 6 or 7 months ahead of schedule.

    Likely, it's going to be a devastating defeat for the Conservatives who are in the position MacDonald and the Labour were in IOTL.
    Out of different scenarios in the context developed above, we have come to the conclusion the most likly result would be a Liberal plurality, giving way to a minority government with Labour support, if not participation (a coalition is possible, but there may be some resent over the 1926 election).
    As a compromise leader in this configuration, we would have Herbert Samuel becoming Liberal Party leader and Prime Minister, with Lloyd George, still a big weight, in an important position.
    In terms of social and economic reforms, we would then have a government committed to state interventionism, monetary flexibility and deficit spending such as proposed by John Maynard Keynes, once close to the Liberals in the 1920s IOTL.
    keynes.jpg




    British prime minister ITTL, from 1916 to 1931:

    184px-David_Lloyd_George.jpg
    186px-Andrew_Bonar_Law_02.jpg
    166px-Stanley_Baldwin_ggbain.35233.jpg
    168px-Ramsay_MacDonald_ggbain_35734.jpg
    181px-1st_Viscount_Brentford_1923.jpg
    166px-Gws_samuel_01.jpg

    from left to right
    Lloyd George : Liberal 1916-1922 ;
    Bonar Law : Conservative 1922-1923 ;
    Baldwin : Conservative 1923-1924 ;
    MacDonald : Labour 1924-1926 ;
    Joynson-Hicks : Conservative 1926-1930 ;
    Samuel : Liberal 1930- .​


     
    France in the 1920s : the presidency of Clemenceau
  • I first wavered over having Clemenceau elected or killed, but having finally finished reading Winock's biography of Clemenceau, I finally came with a scenario that doesn't need to be itself a secondary pod (as were the death of Wilson and the survival of Harding). IOTL, as President Deschanel resigned in September 1920 over hints of mental problems, Millerand (president of the council of ministers) was elected. However, Millerand was a reluctant candidate, convinced by other high profile figures. As for Clemenceau, a coincidence of the calendar had him traveling during this time for a tour in South Asia. In his bio of Clemenceau, Winock suggested that prevented the name of Clemenceau being put into consideration, as a kind of revenge over the earlier election of January 1920.
    It's that venue I chose.
    Coincidentally, I had earlier in the thread suggested the possibility of a civil war in Germany over a delayed Spartakist uprising and butterflied Bavarian Soviet Republic, allowing extreme left forces relatively intact in the aftermath of the failed Kapp putsch. Even though the social-democrat government would be even more discredited, I still think they would win. But internationally, this could have some consequences over the question of war reparations and application of the treaty of Versailles, and as it matters the French presidential election, contribute to having Clemenceau staying longer in France. It does have an impact since, IOTL, after he was back from his South Asian tour, Clemenceau showed renewed interest in politics over the German question. This would lead to his name being put into consideration for the presidential election, and given the man's somewhat vindictive traits, I think he wouldn't refuse the occasion to take his revenge on Aristide Briand (the mastermind behind Deschanel candidacy on ground of personal feud between the two men). And given Millerand's OTL reluctance, we would have him refusing to stand up to the Tiger, especially as Briand's influence would be badly affected by the fall of Deschanel he had championned in the previous election.
    So, I have Clemenceau elected President of the Republic in September 1920, following Deschanel OTL resignation, and instead of Millerand elected IOTL.
    georges-clemenceau-peint-par-marcel-andre-baschet_bMXSghb.jpg

    Millerand would still go on as president of the council of ministers and when he would eventually fall some time into 1921, Clemenceau would appoint André Tardieu as 'prime minister' (I will use this term to avoid the other longer term) as he OTL thought of him as the ablest of his allies (up to the point they OTL broke later over Tardieu acceptance of a ministry in Poincaré government). On the point of the German question, Tardieu wouldn't change much from OTL Poincaré.

    In 1924, with a SFIO (socialists) not divided following the Communist split of 1920, the OTL victory of the Lefts Cartel would be even more important.
    Though Millerand was hostile to the Lefts Cartel and was pushed by it to resign, Clemenceau was rather unsympathetic to the Right and would likely welcome this victory, in spite of certain hate by socialists.
    We would have more or less the same prime ministers, Herriot and Painlevé in 1924 and 1925. Instead of Briand appointed following Painlevé's fall, Clemenceau would appoint Louis-Lucien Klotz, now a senator, several times minister of finances, including in Clemenceau's government, as he knows him, can trust him with restablishing French financial health that undid the Lefts Cartel (the financial crisis born out of the wartime debt question and the staunch opposition from finance circles to the Lefts Cartel policies). That would still mean for France a massive devaluation of the Franc (80%), as did Poincaré, to end the crisis. On the foreign affairs, though he doesn't become prime minister, Aristide Briand would still likely become Foreign Minister, so we would still have a version or another of the treaty of Locarno.
    I've not yet come with a choice over Clemenceau's successor in the presidential election of 1927, possibly Briand, Doumergue or even Poincaré, but I will keep about the same results in legislative elections of 1928, the Right still coming victorious.


    French Prime Ministers ITTL (not definitive) from 1920 to 1927, under Clemenceau
    200px-Alexandre_Millerand.jpg
    220px-Andr%C3%A9_Tardieu_1928.jpg
    220px-%C3%89douard_Herriot_-_Pr%C3%A9sident_du_Conseil_-_1924.jpeg
    220px-Paul_Painlev%C3%A9_1923.jpg
    lucien-klotz-harrisandewing-252x252.jpg

    from left to right:
    Alexandre Millerand : National Republican League 1920-1921
    André Tardieu : Democratic Alliance 1921-1924
    Edouard Herriot : Radical 1924-1925
    Paul Painlevé : Socialist-Republican 1925
    Louis-Lucien Klotz : Democratic Left 1925-1927
     
    A Very American Coup : Huey Long's first term
  • I may have not gotten a very detailed international background, but I have already an outline of the plot that should span Huey Long's first term as President of the United States.

    But let's take a look first at the election of 1936.

    We are nearing the end of Alfred Smith's first and potentially only term as POTUS. I'm taking that Smith's New Deal would be well more timorous and conservative than FDR's OTL one, basing on Smith criticism of FDR and FDR's own caution as the first significant left turn he led was in reaction to Long's increasing appeal, and in the end, this TTL New Deal wouldn't be much different from whatever reforms and programs Hoover was bringing about.
    The result would be an utter disappointment with Democrats after the elections of 1930 and 1932.
    The first sign of that would be the gains of Long's allies in the Congress, though not a formal party, more a loose coalition of left to far left interests such Socialists, Farmer Labor and Progressives along Long Democrats.
    To take the full measure of my take on that period, I'd be probably drawing lot of inspiration from what took place recently in France with François Hollande's election and the PS electoral disaster of 2017 to have a model or a reference to think of the Americans' disappointment over Al Smith policies, since that's for me the most relevant element of comparison I personally have and that I could try to transpose to the early 1930s US.

    So we arrive in 1936.

    Speaking of Republicans, I've not yet chosen who would be their candidate, but I have some leads.
    There is of course Alf Landon. But given the context, the liberal way being already under trial with Smith in the White House and nearly discredited, I thought odds wouldn't be as much as favorable to Landon as they were IOTL, escpecially if considering the presidency is up for grab, more big weight could throw their hat in the ring.
    Given his TTL performance in 1932 that was not that bad with 167 EVs and only 4.5 points behind Smith, former President Hoover could try his luck, but I can't decide whether or not he still has enough influence and control on the party machine to capture nomination as he did in 1932.
    A last possibility in my mind would be Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan but I'm not even sure he would be reelected to the US Senate in 1934 with a stronger third party presence.
    That's just to say the race is open on the Republican side, but that for the outline, I'd use a generic Republican for my first calculations of the 1936 election.

    On Democrats' side, since Long's objective would be first to take over the Democratic party and try capturing the nomination, a feat he could think possible with the high levels of impopularity of Smith, there would be first a challenge, but eventually, the obstinate opposition of the establishment with Smith liberals and Garner conservatives would still block the way forward. That would end like in 1932 wth an independent run and maybe even a walkout.

    Then, we get to chose the running mate of Long.
    Olson being dead of cancer, I could have chosen another Minnesotan to go on the ticket and secure the Plains for Long, but instead I would settle for giving Farmer-Labor and Progressives cabinet positions. The logic for Long would be seeking to broaden his geographical base and seek a wider appeal within the electoral vote rich Rust Belt, but mine is because the people I'm thinking of is perfectly filling into the frame and the overal direction of the TL: Smedley Butler.
    Being from Pennsylvania, a highly decorated war hero and high ranked officer, he has the potential to carry much electoral weight, and I think his political positions on foreign and domestic policies, both marked by far left ideals and anti imperialism, would be much coherent and in line with Long's.
    220px-SmedleyButler.jpeg


    All the ingredients are here for a Long landslide. So let's say it happens. We get Long elected POTUS.
    Now, he would likely be facing a divided congress where his partisans would be at best a strong minority but nothing more, as they don't have a proper and united party structure, also owing to the choice of Long hoping to take over the Democratic party. However, neither Republicans nor Democrats would have a majority on their own, only together, which would happen to be but to exist as an opposition to Long and obstruct his agenda.

    This would give way to an incredible partisan political battle during the first part of Long's term, possibly beginning even with the filling of cabinet positions. I would expect little in way of actual legislation to be passed because of this obstruction of Long's agenda.
    In a feature coherent with Long's persona, I nevertheless believe that Long would happen to make a very extensive use of the presidency's executive powers to advance what he can of his agenda this way, and would also significantly impact foreign policy.
    Due to the obstructionist Republican-Democratic coalition and the impossibility to reconciliate with the Democratic establishment, Long and his allies would be eventually compelled to do what they didn't for years, creating a formal third party, united instead of being the loose coalition of interests it is, so it can stand in 1938 midterms to win a workable majority for Long agenda.


    That is the context for a coup plot, for as the title of this update shows: A Very American Coup.
    I intend to build the intrigue of a plot, based off the Business Plot.
    I can't say if that alledged conspiracy was actual, but it provides a good starting point for the intrigue and a base to establish imagining that as not much an unrealistic thought.

    I've not yet decided when in Long's first term (since there would be others), that coup attempt would take place, before or after the midterms elections, as much of that intrigue will depend on the balance of forces within the congress.

    The idea is to have first the Republican-Democratic coalition impeaching Long on some ground I have no doubt they would find due to Long's authoritarian habits (abuse of power may not be an uncommon or even untrue accusation), but the Senate trial fails to convict him due to the Long supporter's minority plus Long coercing practices preventing the required 2/3 majority, in a way not unlike Johnson's acquittal in 1868.
    Thus, failing to remove Long by legal means, you would find some people in the political, military and business establishment conspiring to launch a military coup (not all the establishment of course, just a few very angry people).
    I didn't have to look for long before finding a coup leader as I think General Douglas MacArthur would be naturally inclined by his political positions to be part of the plot.
    I can also speak of J. Edgar Hoover, who I don't doubt would have still risen through the ranks of BOI then FBI but not yet to the levels he reached during and after WWII in terms of domestic intelligence. That's to say he would not then be as threatening as he would be later IOTL. Actually, though I don't doubt Long had many skeletons in his closet, but neither IRS nor FBI launched by FDR against him were able to dig up any meaningful dirt. Also, my understanding of JE Hoover's persona let me think that he would more than abhor Huey Long's radicalism, especially left wing. If not actively involved in the plot, he could cover the plot organization by looking elsewhere.
    220px-MacArthur_Manila.jpg
    305px-J._Edgar_Hoover_cph.3b10753.jpg


    The plan is simply to arrest both the president, the vice president ,and possibly their cabinet, and to give some appearance of legality, make either House Speaker or Senate President Pro Tempore acting president. That later part implies some level of colusion between high level Congressmen and the military leaders of the coup.
    The most important factor is the succession.
    The problem is that with the succession as it stood in 1930s, still followed the Succession Act of 1886, the House Speaker and President Pro Tempore have been removed from the order of succession, while they were in the original 1792 act and would only be reinstated in 1947 IOTL. That could give way to a political battle since Long could well oppose this out of distrust with the opposition controlled Congress. Still, that reinstatement by veto override could happen during the impeachment proceedings, put forward as a necessity to remove Long's peoples from power.
    2016-09-29-huey-long.jpg

    The outcome of the coup as I see it is failure, and that's also why I wanted to bring into the figure of Smedley Butler.
    In a first time, MacArthur and units under his command would blockade Washington DC and move to arrest Long, Butler, and possibly the cabinet members, which they would do.
    Then, the undoing of the coup would be that, in some heavily dramatic scene, Vice President Butler, a well respected figure in the military and a highly decorated war hero would some way convince the unit come after him to switch side and stand against the coup, then convince the other units to follow suit and free Long and other government officials, before arresting those of the coup leaders who wouldn't have fled.
    warisracket.smedleycov6_small.gif


    The political fallout would be enormous.
    The army would be purged. Also, many high ranking members of the Congress and of Republican and Democratic parties would be arrested or have to flee due to their connection to the coup attempt. That would matter only a few people, but that would potentially decapitate political opposition to Long for a while, disorientating Republicans and Democrats in Congress without really destroying them.
    I wouldn't say that will cause Long to go further on the path to a 'dictatorship', but that will enable him to finally push his agenda through a neutered Congress and allow his new party, that it be in 1938 or 1940, to make landslide wins in the next Congressional elections, not to speak of the electoral landslide in the presidential election of 1940. But I think that Long would be compelled to moderation in the retribution by the more moderate elements of his new party that would be still essentially be a big tent party, and also by the need not to alienate permanently the whole Congress and the remaining Republican and Democratic establishments, to avoid further outcry and risks of civil war if ever some zealous governor or other military leaders wanted to start an uprising.

    On the conclusion, as Butler would still probably die of cancer in 1940, you would have quite emotion filled national funerals for him.

    I hope you'll find this scenario of coup attempt realistic.
     
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