WI: Constitutional Caliphate?

[wakobear]

OTL, In April 744 Yazid iii mentioned he would implement the following policies:

1. Not to build any buildings of stone or brick, nor to dig any canals. (Referring to palaces and private gardens)
2. Not to hoard wealth.
3. Not to give wealth to wives or children.
4. To transfer wealth from one province to another only after adquately paying the first province's troops and taking care of its needy.
5. To send any surplus to the nearest province and divide it among those most in need of it.
6. Not to keep troops in the field more than one year, because that would tempt both the troops and their families to immorality.
7. Not to lock out petitioners, which would allow the powerful to eat up the weak.
8. Not to put such high taxes on the non-Muslims that would cause them to flee their lands and not to reproduce.
9. To give all Muslim troops in all provinces Equal annual stipends and monthly provisions.
10. To acknowledge the right of the Muslims to reproach the caliph if he fails to carry out this program and to Remove Him from office if he does not heed the reproach.
11. To acknowledge the fight of the Muslims to Replace the caliph with another who will carry out the same program.

This is absolutely remarkable. Feeling like something that would come out of enlightenment Europe, not 8th century Arabia.
Addressing the main problems the populace had with the Umayyads. Caliphal extravagance, the provincial-central relationship, payment and rights of soldiers. And most strikingly, even recognising the rights of non-muslims.


The last 2 points are most important, recognising The Right to reproach and even remove the Caliph himself, if he doesn't obey these policies. Making the Caliph beholden to this program......
A Constitutional Caliphate.




Unfortunately, Yazid iii died 6 months later from a brain tumor, depsite being only in his 40s. This sparked the third fitnah, revolts everywhere.
Finally the Abbasid revolution dashed any hopes of a constitutional Caliphate. As they appealed to the divine and messianic imam-caliph of Shi'ism. Later further influenced by the Sassanian ideas of divine kingship.


If Yazid iii doesn't die early, the third fitnah wouldn't happen anywhere near the same scale, making it a fairly easy Umayyad victory, preventing the Abbasid revolution, allowing Yazid to carry out his policies. (Ideally carving the constitution into stelae, spreading them throughout the Caliphate, giving it a permanance which later Caliphs couldn't go against - unlike the similar, though ephemeral policies of Umar ii)

So how would a Constitutionalised Caliphate affect the Muslim world?

 

[Evil Crusader]

It would probably end up like Akhenaton, swallowed by the surrounding trends, and that if he doesn't get deposed far earlier than that.
It still could be recycled by modern states for legitimacy reasons.

 

[Nivek]

This is absolutely remarkable. Feeling like something that would come out of enlightenment Europe, not 8th century Arabia.

That was going back to Umar(RAA) AND GRANDAD UTHMAN(RAA) Ummayd himself, that's how they ruled(more Umar)

The Impact of Yazid 3 living and creating the system is giving genuine limits yet it never mention politics, to that give him great powers

 

[LibPrime]

1. Not to hoard wealth.

"what's up guys. it's time to teach you some irl hacks. Number 1, how to get your nobles to murder you"

 

[kholieken]

I dont think its unusual or Enlightement or Constitutional. Its personal oath, declaration by ruler at coronation. Many other Kings swore many oath, but there are no institution to limit Kingly action.

 

[Elfwine]

Which does ultimately bring up the question: If Muslims reproach the caliph - what, exactly stops the caliph from saying "I have an army. What do you have?" Nowhere in there is anything putting the army as loyal to anything besides the caliph, which would be crucial to making this stick.

Might does not make right, but might can do a pretty good job defying right without might.

 

[wakobear]

It would probably end up like Akhenaton, swallowed by the surrounding trends, and that if he doesn't get deposed far earlier than that.
It still could be recycled by modern states for legitimacy reasons.

Why?
These are basically the same policies as Umar ii. The only Umayyad accepted by even the Shia as righteous. But he only ruled for 2 and half years... And his successors undid everything.

Then 4 years prior to this, in 740, Zayd ibn Ali had a similar policy, though less radical and pushing for Alid supremacy.



The difference with Yazid iii is that he is clearly and directly addressing all the problems the provincial armies had.
But the most radical aspect is the last 2 points. That these policies are Greater Than The Caliph Himself.
As well as the concern for the non-muslims.


Yazid iii partook in the murdering of Walid ii. And then was elected by the Syrian army as the new Caliph. And received general acceptance throughout the Caliphate.
Only Marwan ii was a potential threat, with his large army in Armenia and Azerbaijan. But he was incredibly unpopular as shown by the OTL third fitnah.


Yazid iii tried to style himself as the second Umar ii, as in extremely pious and ascetic, But he went even further claiming that the fact he was Elected, and not merely inherited the Caliphate makes him better in that aspect than Umar ii.

 

[wakobear]

I dont think its unusual or Enlightement or Constitutional. Its personal oath, declaration by ruler at coronation. Many other Kings swore many oath, but there are no institution to limit Kingly action.

Caliphs didn't swear oaths.
Most of them styled themselves as semi divinely appointed, especially the Abbasids with their Shia view of a messianic caliph.

The fact that an Umayyad Caliph, renown for their tyranny would even mention Caliphal limitations is extraordinary.
No Caliph would ever do this again.



Sure, there isn't an institution as of yet. But the Umayyads barely had a proper bureaucracy and administration let alone institutions.
But this plants a seed in the minds of the populace. So that as the bureaucracy develops in the late 700s and 800s, an institution to limit Caliphal power can emerge.

Especially if these policies are carved into stelae and spread throughout the realm. Giving it a permanance and etching it into the minds of the populace as their due right. Preventing it from being ephemeral like Umar ii's policies

And preventing future caliphs from being unconstitutional, or else facing mass rebellions.

 

[wakobear]

Which does ultimately bring up the question: If Muslims reproach the caliph - what, exactly stops the caliph from saying "I have an army. What do you have?" Nowhere in there is anything putting the army as loyal to anything besides the caliph, which would be crucial to making this stick.

Might does not make right, but might can do a pretty good job defying right without might.

This isn't addressed to the powerless peasantry (who were near entirely non-Muslim). But to the provincial armies, urban elites and tribal chiefs who resented the Umayyad regime and the favouritism of the Syrian army. Which is why there was a significant rebellion every couple of years. But now tensions were rising even higher than usual with the Qays-Yamani rivalry.


This is why the some of the policies mention the rights of soldiers, like not campaigning for longer than a year, or all soldiers getting equal payment. Referring to ending Syrian favouritism and the discrimination against non-arab, mainly Transoxianan and Berber, Muslim troops.
They also mention the Provincial-central relationship. Stating that provincial wealth would be spent in the province itself, before being forwarded to Damascus.


This is Do or Die for the Umayyads. Either they radically reform.
Or the third fitnah happens and the Abbasids or another Hashimid/Alid becomes Caliph instead.

 

[Evil Crusader]

Why?
These are basically the same policies as Umar ii. The only Umayyad accepted by even the Shia as righteous. But he only ruled for 2 and half years... And his successors undid everything.

Then 4 years prior to this, in 740, Zayd ibn Ali had a similar policy, though less radical and pushing for Alid supremacy.



The difference with Yazid iii is that he is clearly and directly addressing all the problems the provincial armies had.
But the most radical aspect is the last 2 points. That these policies are greater than the Caliph himself.
As well as the concern for the non-muslims.


Yazid iii partook in the murdering of Walid ii. And then was elected by the Syrian army as the new Caliph. And received general acceptance throughout the Caliphate.
Only Marwan ii was a potential threat, with his large army in Armenia and Azerbaijan. But he was incredibly unpopular as shown by the OTL third fitnah.


Yazid iii tried to style himself as the second Umar ii. As in extremely pious and ascetic. But he claimed that the fact he was Elected, and not merely inherited the Caliphate makes him more worthy.

This isn't addressed to the powerless peasantry (who were near entirely non-Muslim). But to the provincial armies, urban elites and tribal chiefs who resented the Umayyad regime and the favouritism of the Syrian army. Which is why there was a significant rebellion every couple of years. But now tensions were rising even higher than usual with the Qays-Yamani rivalry.


This is why the some of the policies mention the rights of soldiers, like not campaigning for longer than a year, or all soldiers getting equal payment. Referring to ending Syrian favouritism and the discrimination against non-arab, mainly Transoxianan and Berber, Muslim troops.
They also mention the Provincial-central relationship. Stating that provincial wealth would be spent in the province itself, before being forwarded to Damascus.


This is Do or Die for the Umayyads. Either they radically reform.
Or the third fitnah happens and the Abbasids or another Hashimid/Alid becomes Caliph instead.

Maybe when wrapped in propaganda they can be similar, but no, #1-#7 are not the same policies, they don't come from a similar standpoint either (in 742, the Caliphate is weaker than a generation before), #8 is something that I doubt was much of a concern or problem for the Arabs, #10 and #11 are finally what makes it all come down, because that's hugely exploitable and a free unlimited help to any upstart that of course, is going to realize the even truer program because he's betterer than the corrupt Caliph!

 

[Nivek]

This isn't addressed to the powerless peasantry (who were near entirely non-Muslim). But to the provincial armies, urban elites and tribal chiefs who resented the Umayyad regime and the favouritism of the Syrian army. Which is why there was a significant rebellion every couple of years. But now tensions were rising even higher than usual with the Qays-Yamani rivalry.


This is why the some of the policies mention the rights of soldiers, like not campaigning for longer than a year, or all soldiers getting equal payment. Referring to ending Syrian favouritism and the discrimination against non-arab, mainly Transoxianan and Berber, Muslim troops.
They also mention the Provincial-central relationship. Stating that provincial wealth would be spent in the province itself, before being forwarded to Damascus.


This is Do or Die for the Umayyads. Either they radically reform.
Or the third fitnah happens and the Abbasids or another Hashimid/Alid becomes Caliph instead.

That seems what yazid wanted, something could stamp the ummayds legitimacy back to grandad Uthman

 

[holycookie]

Referring to ending Syrian favouritism and the discrimination against non-arab, mainly Transoxianan and Berber, Muslim troops.

I think this is unlikely to happen, even in Al Andalus with a much more sensible power base than in this situation, the Umayyads remained firm in their Arab-Syrian supremacy.

 

[wakobear]

Maybe when wrapped in propaganda they can be similar, but no, #1-#7 are not the same policies,

Umar ii lived an ascetic life. Ticking #1 - 3.
#4-#7 are quite specific, due to the huge provincial tensions caused by the losses of the 730s. But Umar ii did generally have a retrenchment policy. With every frontier becoming defensive. Giving half of Sindh back to the pre-711 ruler in exchange for Islam. He even considered to abandoning Iberia all together.

#9 was the main feat of his reign. The Berbers Transoxianans and other non-Arab Muslims no longer had to pay Jizya and we're treated equally.

they don't come from a similar standpoint either (in 742, the Caliphate is weaker than a generation before),

Of course, in 744, the Umayyads are on their last legs. That's why the Caliph and Syrian army would willingly push such a policy. As a last ditch effort to win support from the provinces and keep the Umayyads afloat.
These policies are a sign of desperation and weakness.

Umar ii did it out of personal piety. His successors instantly undid everything. Making the Berbers and Transoxianan aspects of the military resent the regime since they had to pay Jizya again after a 3 year respite ......

#8 is something that I doubt was much of a concern or problem for the Arabs,

It's not a problem or major concern.
Which is why it being mentioned is so shocking.

#10 and #11 are finally what makes it all come down, because that's hugely exploitable and a free unlimited help to any upstart that of course, is going to realize the even truer program because he's betterer than the corrupt Caliph!

Everything is dependent on tribal politics.

It would be nearly Impossible for a non Qurayshi to claim the Caliphate in this era.
And even within Quraysh, the only realistic options are:
1. Hashimids (family of the prophet)
Or
2. Umayyads - who had spent the last 80 years ruling over the Caliphate. And even before Islam were dominant within the Quraysh.
Now they had marriage alliances with many major tribal factions, including the granddaughter of Hassan ibn Ali.....

No major tribes would ever support an upstart, as shown by the endless khawarij failures. And the Syrian army, largest in the Caliphate, are Umayyad diehard loyalists.


So I doubt a non Umayyad Caliph would be installed. These policies merely acknowledge the right of the populace to rebel en masse if he doesn't uphold one of these policies.
Thereby providing a check to his power.

Perhaps if a particularly terrible Umayyad causes a third fitnah style divisions within the Umayyad house, an Alid could become Caliph. - but with decades of constitutional propaganda, they would find more difficultly in establishing Shia style divine/messianic kingship.

Over the decades and centuries, this would develop further until an institution is built to keep a check on Caliphal power.

 

[Elfwine]

This isn't addressed to the powerless peasantry (who were near entirely non-Muslim). But to the provincial armies, urban elites and tribal chiefs who resented the Umayyad regime and the favouritism of the Syrian army. Which is why there was a significant rebellion every couple of years. But now tensions were rising even higher than usual with the Qays-Yamani rivalry.

I didn't say anything about the powerless peasantry. Unless the army will refuse to fight for the caliph if he pulls "I have an army loyal to me." card, urban elites and tribal chiefs (and the armies not as loyal) are still "What do they have to make the Caliph peacefully step down?" (as "civil war and rebellion that ends with him dead" is not really the goal here)

It's an interesting set of promises, but the enforcement has to go past putting it in writing for it to be be a check on anything.

 

[wakobear]

I think this is unlikely to happen, even in Al Andalus with a much more sensible power base than in this situation, the Umayyads remained firm in their Arab-Syrian supremacy.

The Syrians are the ones who put this reform policy forward. Because they had been greatly weakened by the losses of the 730s. Resulting in at least 60,000 of them perishing. And the remainder scattered throughout the many provinces to bolster the provincial garrisons.

This policy was a desperate popularity appeal from the Syrians to support of non Syrians against the Jazirans.


Since only 6 months after Yazid's death, the Syrians were defeated in the 3rd fitnah and entirely sidelined by Marwan's Jaziran/Armenian/Azerbaijani. Who moved his capital out of Syria to Harran of the Jazirah.
The battle of the Zab was Jazirans Vs Khurasani, Syrians were no longer a powerful force.



But beyond that was the Qaysi-Yamani split. Which transcended provincial boundaries, with almost every Arab tribe being one of the two.

Since the Yamani victory at Marj Rahit 684, the Umayyads were dominated by the Yamani Syrians, until Walid ii's Qaysi policy which was extremely unpopular throughout the entire Caliphate.
In response, Yazid iii was more pro Yamanis, which caused problems with Khurasan's Qaysi governor Nasr ibn Sayyar who faced revolts from the Khurasani Yamanis under Juday alKirmani. But eventually Yazid iii acknowledged Nasr ibn Sayyar, depsite his pro Yamani status.

What broke the Umayyads was Marwan ii's Qaysi policy. This alienated almost the entire Caliphate, including many Princes of the Umayyads like Sulayman ibn Hisham, as well as most of their former supporters.
Marwan had to besiege Homs and Damascus itself. As well as Egypt - which was loyal to the Umayyad Yamani policy, not that of the Qaysi. Then he needed to defeat Yazid's Yamanis governor of Iraq.
As well as the Alid and Kharijite rebellions which sprung up in the interim.

Finally the Abbasids pushed the Yamani cause against the Qaysi policy of Marwan and eventually won. But Qaysi revolts in Upper Syria and Jazira plagued them into the 780s.






Andalus is a completely different story. It had barely any Arab migration. With the majority of the troops being Berber in 711. With Tariq's force probably being exclusively Berber.
It's Syrians also weren't like the Yamani Syrian majority of Syria. But were from the Qaysi minority of northern Syria, of Qinnasrin (near Aleppo) bordering fully Qaysi Jazira.

These Qaysis were originally sent to assist the Ifriqiyan Yamanis against the Great Berber revolt but lost. Partly due to Qaysi-Yamani tensions.
They then escaped to Andalus, where the governor let them in, if they agreed to defeat the Berber revolt but leave straight after.
They didn't leave, and started a civil war between the native Andalusi Arab Yamanis. The tensions simmered down a little when the governor of Ifriqiyah sent Yamanis reinforcements and deported some of the Yamanis.

But then Abdurahman I turned up. And supported the Syrians. The Yamanis were supported by the Abbasids in their rebellions, making them difficult to put down. But after that, the rebellions were less frequent, especially when more central rule was imposed.

 

[wakobear]

I didn't say anything about the powerless peasantry. Unless the army will refuse to fight for the caliph if he pulls "I have an army loyal to me." card, urban elites and tribal chiefs (and the armies not as loyal) are still "What do they have to make the Caliph peacefully step down?" (as "civil war and rebellion that ends with him dead" is not really the goal here)

It's an interesting set of promises, but the enforcement has to go past putting it in writing for it to be be a check on anything.

True.

Basically, I see this as planting a seed into the minds of the populace.
Once the Caliphate develops a proper administration and bureaucracy in the late 700s and throughout the 800s, bureaucrats would be the dominant force of the Caliphate, like the Barmakids, Fadl ibn sahl, Fath ibn Khaqan etc they would be able to make institutions to limit Caliphal power.


But in 744, the Umayyads barely have a bureaucracy. Partly because they don't have a metropolis city (Damascus was fairly small, much smaller than contemporaneous Basra or Kufa and probably even Marw. And completely Incomparable to Abbasid Baghdad). And would rule out of their small desert castles, which changed on the death of each ruler. (As i covered in https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/raqqa-ideal-caliphal-capital.544649/post-24400991 )

So this would be dependent on the provincial armies threatening revolt, unless the Syrian army removes the current Caliph and replaces him with one who upholds the reform policy.
(The Syrian army put forward the refrom policy, Yazid iii was just the Umayyad prince they chose to enact it)

 

[Evil Crusader]

Ok, I get it. It's all about idealism.
It's not just the evil Umayyads that dislike being equal to other Muslims when they can lord over them. And dislike not being able to build fancy palaces and live in wealth. And want to take wealth from conquered people with any of a thousand religious caveats. Or, as I already said, everybody likes the idea they can freely rise against an unjust Caliph and would abuse such a tenet to the best of their abilities.
Hence why I see this all as unfeasible, why everybody would undo it ASAP, and the individuals who attempted this would be either rebelled against or end up like Akhenaton. By all means, if you want to do a TL, do it, but I don't see this as anything even remotely plausible in sticking around for long - a fun novelty for modern doctors of Islamic law at best.

 

[Qastiel]

Ok, I get it. It's all about idealism.
It's not just the evil Umayyads that dislike being equal to other Muslims when they can lord over them. And dislike not being able to build fancy palaces and live in wealth. And want to take wealth from conquered people with any of a thousand religious caveats. Or, as I already said, everybody likes the idea they can freely rise against an unjust Caliph and would abuse such a tenet to the best of their abilities.
Hence why I see this all as unfeasible, why everybody would undo it ASAP, and the individuals who attempted this would be either rebelled against or end up like Akhenaton. By all means, if you want to do a TL, do it, but I don't see this as anything even remotely plausible in sticking around for long - a fun novelty for modern doctors of Islamic law at best.

You seem to be missing the historical point of the declaration. Which was to partly renew legitimacy with empty words and allow for the expansion of the Umayyad power base. It’s easy to misunderstand when you lack familiar with the historical context and ability to relate and understand the mental states and religious/material considerations a ruler would have to try to maintain their rule but I hope you understand in time.

You’re the one seeing idealism where it didn’t exist. Which perhaps comes from a lack of understanding of mentalities of the time and region. Fundamentally such promises weren’t intended to be taken seriously nor would they have been at the time, they were window dressing and decoration because Umayyad power was such that there was no feasible candidate to oppose them other than the Alids but that was always the case.

No one is suggesting that Yazid III actually would put such things into practice but by bringing it up and spreading it as an ideological buttress via appealing to the piety and fairness of earlier Caliphs (a sort of Caliphate that cannot fail but only be failed ideal) it changes the legal and theological underpinnings of the Caliphate.

Which essentially weakens later weaker Caliphs at the exchange of Yazid III (something which is hardly beyond the thought of rulers to make short sighted decisions) which will be cited upon the couping of a weak caliph. After which a trend has already been made.

Later Caliphs absolutely would try to change this because they’d recognise the weakness it creates to their position but as we solve from the Roman Empire, weaknesses in succession where appeals to the rights of the ideological civil construct are hard to change.

I see all this as plausible but I think the change this would cause is make Shiism more popular an ideology because of the messianic imam-caliph trope making it more attractive as a ruling ideology for caliphates. Though at the same time it might serve as a cause for realms to not wish to claim the Caliphate themselves which could impact the evolution of the Caliphate as an institution.

Though saying all this has me interested in reading up on the early caliphates some more because the Umayyad-Abassid transition has a lot going on so I’ll probably be a while before my next post in this thread.

 

[Evil Crusader]

You seem to be missing the historical point of the declaration. Which was to partly renew legitimacy with empty words and allow for the expansion of the Umayyad power base. It’s easy to misunderstand when you lack familiar with the historical context and ability to relate and understand the mental states and religious/material considerations a ruler would have to try to maintain their rule but I hope you understand in time.

You’re the one seeing idealism where it didn’t exist. Which perhaps comes from a lack of understanding of mentalities of the time and region. Fundamentally such promises weren’t intended to be taken seriously nor would they have been at the time, they were window dressing and decoration because Umayyad power was such that there was no feasible candidate to oppose them other than the Alids but that was always the case.

No one is suggesting that Yazid III actually would put such things into practice but by bringing it up and spreading it as an ideological buttress via appealing to the piety and fairness of earlier Caliphs (a sort of Caliphate that cannot fail but only be failed ideal) it changes the legal and theological underpinnings of the Caliphate.

Which essentially weakens later weaker Caliphs at the exchange of Yazid III (something which is hardly beyond the thought of rulers to make short sighted decisions) which will be cited upon the couping of a weak caliph. After which a trend has already been made.

Later Caliphs absolutely would try to change this because they’d recognise the weakness it creates to their position but as we solve from the Roman Empire, weaknesses in succession where appeals to the rights of the ideological civil construct are hard to change.

I see all this as plausible but I think the change this would cause is make Shiism more popular an ideology because of the messianic imam-caliph trope making it more attractive as a ruling ideology for caliphates. Though at the same time it might serve as a cause for realms to not wish to claim the Caliphate themselves which could impact the evolution of the Caliphate as an institution.

Though saying all this has me interested in reading up on the early caliphates some more because the Umayyad-Abassid transition has a lot going on so I’ll probably be a while before my next post in this thread.

The point is - are we to take the point seriously and thus potentially lasting as a political factor or not? If any form of yes, then only an idealistic leader would self-impose further limitations of program (the 'morality exception' for rebelling against a tyrant is universal and needs not formalisation), even if part of a law package (because self-restraint doesn't win you more allies, maybe it removes you some enemies). If not, then they carry no weight and would be an historical curiosity.

 

[wakobear]

I see all this as plausible but I think the change this would cause is make Shiism more popular an ideology because of the messianic imam-caliph trope making it more attractive as a ruling ideology for caliphates. Though at the same time it might serve as a cause for realms to not wish to claim the Caliphate themselves which could impact the evolution of the Caliphate as an institution.

If the Caliphate remains in Umayyad hands (I believe this is the only realistic TL where post-Walid ii Umayyads can survive, even if Marwan won the Zab, he was disliked by most of the Umayyads, let alone the rest of the Caliphate. And would probably never be able to take Khurasan back from the Abbasids) Then i heavily doubt Shi'ism would ever gain popularity, since it was the near antithesis to the Umayyads.

Though Zaynab bint Hassan ibn Hassan ibn Ali, Sister of Abdullah alMahd/alKamil, Aunt of Muhammad Nafs azZakiyyah married Walid i, father of Yazid iii, thereby his co-mother (he was son of a Persian princess) Giving him somewhat of a link to the Alids.
Other Umayyads also had other marital links to the Hashimids. But the Husainids - from which most Shia sects emerge - would never support the murderers of their forefather.

I could see a sect which raises the status of the Caliphs similar to Mutazilism being adopted by the ruling class. But never by the populace, as the OTL mihna showed.












But overall an Umayyad survival TL has a few interesting effects.
Such as Tribalism remaining important for decades longer, with the Syrian Bedouin resurgence of the late 800s and 900s: Uqaylids, Qaramita, Mazyadids, Hamdanids, Mirdasids, Jarrahids etc
Not occuring as these groups would make up the main forces of the Umayyads
This may avert the formation of slave armies, which mainly came about due to Mamun giving his Khurasani powerbase away to the Tahirids, who didn't obey him forcing him to rely on Mutasim


Beyond that, in terms of intellectual development the Umayyads would be quite peculiar. Since Kufa and Basra, the largest and intellectual centres of the Caliphate, are ideologically hostile to the Umayyad regime, though less so for Basra.
The Umayyads themselves had nothing to compare with the Iraqi metropolises. Since Damascus doesn't seem to have been that large, and may have still been Christian majority. Beyond that, the Caliphs didn't even rule from Damascus, preferring their desert castles.
The only option i see for an Umayyad Levantine metropolis would be Raqqa/Barbalisos, Navigable on the Euphrates for Iraqi grain barges. Or perhaps Homs/Hama if the Orontes could somehow be made Navigable, allowing Egyptian grain. A Levantine coastal capital wouldn't be secure from potential Byzantine raids and too far from the east.

But if they never make a metropolis the advanced administration and court culture of the abbasids might never be developed.
While Kufa and Basra would be pumping out more and more anti Umayyad sentiment as the literarization of Arabic develops and increases.


Other than that, due to remaining in Syria, the Persian influence would be lesser while the Roman influence greater.
Beyond that, the Persian Renaissance of the 900s most likely wouldn't happen, since it's very unlikely the Umayyads would set up semi independent Hereditary governorships in Persia.
And even though Yazid's policies might reduce/end ethnic discrimination of non-Arab Muslims, Arab culture and language would remain supreme. Probably the Persians assimilating to Arab culture much more than OTL, more similar to the muwallads of Andalus.







Finally, they would probably be more expansionist than the Abbasids.

But most immediately, the Caliphate was still reeling from the major losses of the 730s and early 740s. The worst being the great berber revolt, the first major Muslim region to secede from the Caliphate, which also cut off access to Andalus. So it would need to end it's strange policy of pushing every single frontier simultaneously. Even difficult and unrewarding ones like Afghanistan, Central Asia or Khazars. (it had already mostly come to a halt after the manpower losses of 730s). Similar to Umar ii in 717. Becoming defensive frontiers instead of offensive.

From there, the Caliphate would need to restore authority in the west. Yazid may be able to prevent Abdurahman alFihri from taking Ifriqiyah from the Umayyad governor Handhala ibn Safwan in 745, if he acts swiftly.
Then using the Ifriqiyan navy to found Annaba, Bejaia, Algiers, Oran. And to take Nekor and finally Tangier. Reopening the connection to Andalus.
Land campaigns into the Maghrebi interior would be far too costly, difficult and unrewarding. The coast is far easier.
As for Andalus itself, it was in a semi civil war between native Andalusi and Qaysi Syrian refugees from the Berber revolt. Andalus itself didn't have much of a navy. So the Caliphal Ifriqiyan navy should be able to take the coasts and Seville quite easily. Then teaming up with the Yamani and deporting the Qaysi Syrians back to the Maghreb or further east, replacing them with eastern Yamanis.
 The navy would also strengthen the defence of Narbonne/Septimania. And if the navy takes Gijon, Asturias loses Oviedo and is hemmed into the mountains.
(If Yazid acts after the Fihrids have established themselves, it would be more difficult, requiring more manpower, but fihrids were deeply divided between themselves....)


With that Umayyad control has been reasserted in the west, save the interior Maghreb. Which may gradually come back into Umayyad hands after decades of pushing propaganda of equality among Arabs and Berbers, as espoused by Yazid's policies. Especially if a Berber governor was placed in Ifriqiyah.....


From there, almost all frontiers should remain defensive, since the Caliphate still needs to recover from the 730s and these wouldn't provide much in loot in return.
The one exception is India. Due to its immeasurable riches, with Muhammad alQasim and Junayd alMurri bringing in 600 million and 400 million dirhams respectively. With what seem to be quite small forces.
India still hadn't fully recovered from Harsha's death, and was still chaotic. Currently Kashmir's Lalitaditya seems to have been most dominant perhaps briefly expanding as far as Bengal.

But with full Caliphal attention on India, the Gangetic plain shouldn't be too difficult to conquer. Bringing in unfathomable wealth to replenish the treasury.

Which could then be used to fund expansion elsewhere. Most importantly Sicily in the Mediterranean, to have better communication with Iberia. As well as making most of the Mediterranean under Umayyad control, save Adriatic and Aegean, reinvigorating Trans-Mediteranean trade