WI Guam
- Thread starter kent
- Start date
I did some edit work on original posts to corect grammer and spelling.
Thanks again for all the positive input.
I am working on a draft of an ASB type story on the Livermore National Lab that while doing a run up of the National Ignition Facility (nuclear fusion ignition) causes an ISOT that causes a shift of time for a seventy five mile radius around the lab in all directions. A ball of earth moved from 2011 to maybe 50 million years in the past. This in turn replaces the 2011 circle with one from that time. It also releases and causes all the major California earthquake faults to move causing massive SoCal earthquakes and a new bay of the Pacific to form after the earth movement causes an opening 25 miles wide 1 mile deep between San Diego and LA fifty miles inland. Might even have it cause the Cascadia fault to move southward with big earthquake off Washington coast. Lots of damage to 2011 California. Seventy five mile distance would include most of the Bay Area and Delta regions. Replaced into a time of prehistoric dino's and semi-tropical jungle. Also the other way a new seventy five mile ball dropped that has dino"s and jungle where the Bay had been.
I hope to start posting soon.
Thanks again for all the positive input.
I am working on a draft of an ASB type story on the Livermore National Lab that while doing a run up of the National Ignition Facility (nuclear fusion ignition) causes an ISOT that causes a shift of time for a seventy five mile radius around the lab in all directions. A ball of earth moved from 2011 to maybe 50 million years in the past. This in turn replaces the 2011 circle with one from that time. It also releases and causes all the major California earthquake faults to move causing massive SoCal earthquakes and a new bay of the Pacific to form after the earth movement causes an opening 25 miles wide 1 mile deep between San Diego and LA fifty miles inland. Might even have it cause the Cascadia fault to move southward with big earthquake off Washington coast. Lots of damage to 2011 California. Seventy five mile distance would include most of the Bay Area and Delta regions. Replaced into a time of prehistoric dino's and semi-tropical jungle. Also the other way a new seventy five mile ball dropped that has dino"s and jungle where the Bay had been.
I hope to start posting soon.
Bearcat
Banned
You have some geological problems there:
1. removing a big ball of crust might cause some earthquakes, but nothing like what you're thinking. Faults don't work like that: they can only release as much energy as they have stored (since the last big earthquake). The whole "California Coast falls into the ocean' meme is psuedoscience. And something in norcal is not going to have major effects in socal, hundreds of miles south. You may have a bay, but it will be because the equivalent plug from 50 MYA is lower than sea level, not because of earth movements.
2. The Bay wasn't there 50 million years ago. Plates move. Put SF Bay area in its then geologic position, its now an island off the Pacific coast. And all geography around is different. Most of coastal California has accreted to North America in the last 100 million years, and was still mostly underwater 50 MYA.
3. No dinosaurs 50 MYA; they died out at the end of the Cretaceous, about 15 MY or so earlier.
4. Wjether its jungle or not depends on latitude (though, yes, the world is vastly warmer at this time). 50 MYA, much of the coastal California strip was further south, as the San Andreas AND associated faults to its east have moved the west side farther north.
Having Wake and Guam screws the Marshall Islands completely. Wake makes a good place to set up shop for a submarine base, though it would likely take several months for any major facilities to go up. A submarine tender would be helpful.
Didn't I see mentioned a sub tender was at the island? Good source for naval plans check this out.
http://hnsa.org/doc/plans/index.htm Plans for the LEX and SARA, yep, even the Ranger.
docfl
Didn't I see mentioned a sub tender was at the island? Good source for naval plans check this out.
http://hnsa.org/doc/plans/index.htm Plans for the LEX and SARA, yep, even the Ranger.
docfl
I used the name of Admiral Cunningham in place of Admiral Daniel CallaghanWho is Admiral Cunningham?
in other words I made it up.
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Guam: Scenario Discussion Thread
Kent:
I am fascinated by your post. I find it an extremely cogent post in its overall concept. A miniscule measure of paranoia on the part of the U.S. might have resulted in a vastly different scenario in the Pacific Theater of Operations. I like the attention to detail as far as what specific ships and aircraft types were available at the time and what likely would have been delivered. The quad- fifties were a nice touch and even a few of those at Guam or Wake would have been a rude awakening to japanese pilots acustomed to straffing troops with little or no anti-aircraft.
I do not find the scenario implausble in its macro sense, but I have a few constructive criticisms. I do this only in the hope of improving your work, I found it quite enjoyable and I'm anxious to see future posts on this subject.
1. I think the rate of success of bomb hits and torpedo strikes by U.S. forces is well above what could have been expected. The USAAF was quite untested and in most of the early battles against Japanese forces were almost laughably ineffective. I think you are right in your premise that they would have done much better with P-40's and A-20's than P-36's and Brewster Buffalo's. Even at Midway, the AAF was horribly ineffective, months after hostilities began. They did almost zero damage to the Japanese fleet, but they did convince Admiral Nagumo to fatefully rearm his bombers for another strike at the Midway airfield. USAAF losses in aircraft were quite lopsided in favor of the Japanese because the Japanese had real combat experience and were flying "Zeros". Even with the updated equipment you describe I doubt the results would have been much different. The Type 96 fighter, however, was never a match for the P-40 and I found your description of their destruction quite accurate. I think your scenario and Japanese aircraft losses would be more believable if the Type 96 aircraft had been used in subsequent airstrikes on Guam. It would have given the defenders real combat experience so they could have a better chance against the later attacks by the "Zeros" and more plausible. Few airmen made "ace" in a day, and never in the early stages of the war against seasoned japanese pilots. Another point of divergence might have been to incorprate some of Chenault's "Flying Tigers" into the air group as advisors. They had a remarkable record against Japanese aircraft while flying P-40's, even against the "Zero".
2. The Philippines: Yes, Dugout Doug was caught with his pants down in OTL. There is no reason to believe he might not have again been a victim of his own arrogance. Having said that, if Guam in your timeline has an airfield and a regiment of Marines then what might the Philippines have received. Certainly they would have had more than one radar and many more aircraft. If their woeful performance in OTL was due to lack of communication and bad leadership, that might not change. If better vectoring was used, as on your Guam, then many of the B-17s might not have been lost on the ground. An extra radar set or two probably would have made poor communication a moot point as multiple radar sightings could have warned all of the Pursuit Squadrons. If the number of forces allowed McArthur was roughly doubled he would have had a formibable force and might have been able to hold Manilla until reinforcements arrived.
3. I like the early arrival of US submarines in theater. They were easily produced and if production were ramped up early, they would have been some of the first ships to arrive. They, also, were less effective than they could have been. They were cursed with faulty torpedos with weak firing pins and bad magnetometers. If it your premise that this problem was solved in the extra vigilance displayed by the U.S. then there effectiveness is given a plausible explanation.
4. Submarine doctrine for the U.S. Pacific Fleet was to attack merchant shipping in preference to capital ships. The use of the subs for intelligence gathering fit nicely with their role in the war. It is possible that in the desperate months of the early conflict they might have been used as you describe, especially in conjunction with air power to save a beleaugered outpost like Guam. But it was an aberation for Pacific Fleet subs to target warships unless they just stumbled upon a choice target. I find it more plausible that the subs would have been designated to target the freighters and troop ships, but they certainly would not have let a carrier slip by if they had a good firing solution.
5. The carrier planes landing on Guam after their ship was damaged was nice. It happened more than once in the action off Guadalcanal and I got the impression you based the conflict around Alter Guam on many of the actions fought near Savo and Iron Bottom Sound.. I also liked the mention of how many US pilots were recovered after being shot down, it was a strength of the US that they went to great liengths to pull pilots from the ocean. Many brought back invaluable experience and their failures were less likely to be repeated repeated. Going down in th ocean in a flaming wreck does wonders to focus the mind.
Good job! Can't wait for your next post.
Kent:
I am fascinated by your post. I find it an extremely cogent post in its overall concept. A miniscule measure of paranoia on the part of the U.S. might have resulted in a vastly different scenario in the Pacific Theater of Operations. I like the attention to detail as far as what specific ships and aircraft types were available at the time and what likely would have been delivered. The quad- fifties were a nice touch and even a few of those at Guam or Wake would have been a rude awakening to japanese pilots acustomed to straffing troops with little or no anti-aircraft.
I do not find the scenario implausble in its macro sense, but I have a few constructive criticisms. I do this only in the hope of improving your work, I found it quite enjoyable and I'm anxious to see future posts on this subject.
1. I think the rate of success of bomb hits and torpedo strikes by U.S. forces is well above what could have been expected. The USAAF was quite untested and in most of the early battles against Japanese forces were almost laughably ineffective. I think you are right in your premise that they would have done much better with P-40's and A-20's than P-36's and Brewster Buffalo's. Even at Midway, the AAF was horribly ineffective, months after hostilities began. They did almost zero damage to the Japanese fleet, but they did convince Admiral Nagumo to fatefully rearm his bombers for another strike at the Midway airfield. USAAF losses in aircraft were quite lopsided in favor of the Japanese because the Japanese had real combat experience and were flying "Zeros". Even with the updated equipment you describe I doubt the results would have been much different. The Type 96 fighter, however, was never a match for the P-40 and I found your description of their destruction quite accurate. I think your scenario and Japanese aircraft losses would be more believable if the Type 96 aircraft had been used in subsequent airstrikes on Guam. It would have given the defenders real combat experience so they could have a better chance against the later attacks by the "Zeros" and more plausible. Few airmen made "ace" in a day, and never in the early stages of the war against seasoned japanese pilots. Another point of divergence might have been to incorprate some of Chenault's "Flying Tigers" into the air group as advisors. They had a remarkable record against Japanese aircraft while flying P-40's, even against the "Zero".
2. The Philippines: Yes, Dugout Doug was caught with his pants down in OTL. There is no reason to believe he might not have again been a victim of his own arrogance. Having said that, if Guam in your timeline has an airfield and a regiment of Marines then what might the Philippines have received. Certainly they would have had more than one radar and many more aircraft. If their woeful performance in OTL was due to lack of communication and bad leadership, that might not change. If better vectoring was used, as on your Guam, then many of the B-17s might not have been lost on the ground. An extra radar set or two probably would have made poor communication a moot point as multiple radar sightings could have warned all of the Pursuit Squadrons. If the number of forces allowed McArthur was roughly doubled he would have had a formibable force and might have been able to hold Manilla until reinforcements arrived.
3. I like the early arrival of US submarines in theater. They were easily produced and if production were ramped up early, they would have been some of the first ships to arrive. They, also, were less effective than they could have been. They were cursed with faulty torpedos with weak firing pins and bad magnetometers. If it your premise that this problem was solved in the extra vigilance displayed by the U.S. then there effectiveness is given a plausible explanation.
4. Submarine doctrine for the U.S. Pacific Fleet was to attack merchant shipping in preference to capital ships. The use of the subs for intelligence gathering fit nicely with their role in the war. It is possible that in the desperate months of the early conflict they might have been used as you describe, especially in conjunction with air power to save a beleaugered outpost like Guam. But it was an aberation for Pacific Fleet subs to target warships unless they just stumbled upon a choice target. I find it more plausible that the subs would have been designated to target the freighters and troop ships, but they certainly would not have let a carrier slip by if they had a good firing solution.
5. The carrier planes landing on Guam after their ship was damaged was nice. It happened more than once in the action off Guadalcanal and I got the impression you based the conflict around Alter Guam on many of the actions fought near Savo and Iron Bottom Sound.. I also liked the mention of how many US pilots were recovered after being shot down, it was a strength of the US that they went to great liengths to pull pilots from the ocean. Many brought back invaluable experience and their failures were less likely to be repeated repeated. Going down in th ocean in a flaming wreck does wonders to focus the mind.
Good job! Can't wait for your next post.
Thanks for nice review.
Ref aircraft The command at Guam trained and worked with the radar crews learning to trust the information from the radar. Training paid off.
Ref Subs remember at first it was old S boats they had working torpedos.
The first six months of the war Japan ran wild because no one was ready for war except them. My pod is that training, and use of radar allowed the forces at Guam to be ready for that first attack. The planes at Guam were not caught on the ground.
Hepburn Board
Your post inspired me to do some research. According to Samuel Elliot Morrison in his book The Rising Sun In The Pacific (1931- April 1942), Congress appointed a board to make base recomendations in the Pacific. It was chaired by Rear Admiral A.J. Hepburn and made some very clear recomendations about Midway, Wake and Guam.
Re: Guam. "at present practically defenseless against a determined attack by any first class power based in the Pacific." "could be made secure against anything short of a major effort." Also, " Guam is adapted naturally to development as a major advanced fleet base."
The board's advice was brought before Congress with a $5,000,000 appropriation to begin dredging Apra Harbor on February 23, 1939, but was defeated. It might be interesting to get a full copy of the Hepburn Board recomendations.
Your post inspired me to do some research. According to Samuel Elliot Morrison in his book The Rising Sun In The Pacific (1931- April 1942), Congress appointed a board to make base recomendations in the Pacific. It was chaired by Rear Admiral A.J. Hepburn and made some very clear recomendations about Midway, Wake and Guam.
Re: Guam. "at present practically defenseless against a determined attack by any first class power based in the Pacific." "could be made secure against anything short of a major effort." Also, " Guam is adapted naturally to development as a major advanced fleet base."
The board's advice was brought before Congress with a $5,000,000 appropriation to begin dredging Apra Harbor on February 23, 1939, but was defeated. It might be interesting to get a full copy of the Hepburn Board recomendations.
Burton K Wheeler
Moderator
Hi Dave. Welcome to the board. Please don't post comments on threads in the Finished Timelines section. I split your posts off since you put a lot of effort into them.