I am guessing that he would have had little difficulty getting such a resolution through Congress.
What effects would that have in future conflicts
What effects would that have in future conflicts
WI Harry Truman declared war on North Korea
- Thread starter Derek Jackson
- Start date
Truman and Nth Korea
For Harry Truman to declare war on North Korea without the North first attacking would require him to be someone totally unlike who he was with international priorities totally unlike what they were. Europe was the centre of his geopolitical world, and I look forward to an entertaining argument as to whether that was the only reasonable course of action or not.
General Mathew Ridgeway states in his history of the war was that he and the other US advisors in the south between 1945 right up to the invasion were given orders that in the event of a war between north and south they were to drive to Kimpo Field (Seoul Airport) and catch the first plane out, to NOT GET INVOLVED
Ridgeway further states that the ROK army was not organised, trained or equipped to fight a conventional enemy, ie the north which got a copy of the Red Army. All of this was to discourage the South Korean President from attacking the north as he kept saying he would, since he was a remarkably similar personality to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, ie he was bugfuck crazy or at least acted it to attract attention.
President Truman publicly denied the United States would fight for South Korea three times before the invasion. He gives the impression of not caring enough to think about the consequences of a communist conquest until after the north attacked. He had had five years to prepare, threw it away, then nearly started world war three. Task Force Smith was sent to stop a North Korean force with heavy T-34 tank support with its guns having "...a third of the anti-tank ammunition in Asia, nine rounds." It doesn't help that these were not actually anti tank guns but 105mm howitzers assigned to the role. The North Korean tank Battalion rolled over them like they were not even there. This was the army Truman would have had available to go to war with if he started one with the North.
Looking forward to reading your - or anyone else's - reasoning for how and why Truman would do what you speculate.
For Harry Truman to declare war on North Korea without the North first attacking would require him to be someone totally unlike who he was with international priorities totally unlike what they were. Europe was the centre of his geopolitical world, and I look forward to an entertaining argument as to whether that was the only reasonable course of action or not.
General Mathew Ridgeway states in his history of the war was that he and the other US advisors in the south between 1945 right up to the invasion were given orders that in the event of a war between north and south they were to drive to Kimpo Field (Seoul Airport) and catch the first plane out, to NOT GET INVOLVED
Ridgeway further states that the ROK army was not organised, trained or equipped to fight a conventional enemy, ie the north which got a copy of the Red Army. All of this was to discourage the South Korean President from attacking the north as he kept saying he would, since he was a remarkably similar personality to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, ie he was bugfuck crazy or at least acted it to attract attention.
President Truman publicly denied the United States would fight for South Korea three times before the invasion. He gives the impression of not caring enough to think about the consequences of a communist conquest until after the north attacked. He had had five years to prepare, threw it away, then nearly started world war three. Task Force Smith was sent to stop a North Korean force with heavy T-34 tank support with its guns having "...a third of the anti-tank ammunition in Asia, nine rounds." It doesn't help that these were not actually anti tank guns but 105mm howitzers assigned to the role. The North Korean tank Battalion rolled over them like they were not even there. This was the army Truman would have had available to go to war with if he started one with the North.
Looking forward to reading your - or anyone else's - reasoning for how and why Truman would do what you speculate.
I don't think the OP has said or implied that at all...
My understanding is that the POD is an actual declaration of war between the DPRK and the US. Officially, there was no war, just a 'United Nations Police Action', which has influenced successive conflicts. No war with North Vietnam or Panama or Iraq, which resulted in the War Powers Act of 1973 which put approval of medium-term (90+ day committments) in the hands of Congress.
The question is, then, what effect would having to approve every war-like conflict, and designate a country to be defeated and occupied like World War 1 and 2, Mexico and (technically) Spain, have on the progress of Korea's war, Vietnam and other committments, and on the new asymmetric conflicts with non-state entities. It may also involve a question of formulating International Law with regard to wars of other nations - I don't think there were formal declarations of war, for example, in the Holy Lands, African multinational efforts to remove Idi Amin, Liberian, Sierraleonian and other despots, etc.
For my view, I don't think anything much would have changed in Korea. China (backed by the Soviets) was too powerful to fully war with, so any move to declare a state of war would have had the same force behind it in a formalized or non-formalized system.
The conduct of the war would have been the same - there was widespread and multinational commitment. Ike's nuclear threat would have had the same force and thus effect. Stalin's death occurs on time, his views on the Korean War would not change because of some words.
The main change stemming from an actual Declaration would be that the United Nations would have less of a look-in. The view of Americans and others would be that this was a war between Korea and the US (and allied countries) rather than the birth of the United Nations. The emphasis, that is, would be on the first part and not the second. The UN itself would, I think, remain as it has been, involved in debate, a council of nations, tool for peacekeeping, etc.
The necessity of naming North Vietnam as an official enemy in order to bomb it in 1965 would, I think, present more problems. With the example of North Korea in their minds, the Soviets and Chinese, while not wishing to risk their own lives for Vietnam, would consider it a matter of honor and credibility to support a communist state under attack from a treaty-breaking capitalist bully (as they would see it). Given the ouster of Hruscov for lacking firmness, I can't exclude the possibility of severe tensions and some small-scale 'incidents' between the Soviets and Americans. Domestic dissent would, as a result, be looked at with less favor. It might also butterfly some of the antiwar movement's legitimacy. Or it may force the US to abandon South Vietnam once the Congress and people are asked to publicly support attacking a small country far away in order to defend an unwillingness to abide by the Geneva Accords.
Even if nothing else changes up to 1973 (and there will be changes), the War Powers Act is butterflied because Congress doesn't have a history of Presidential private wars being waged to refer to. Having been asked to approve or deny wars up to that point, there is no need or desire for the WPA.
And butterflies, and effects, continue....
My understanding is that the POD is an actual declaration of war between the DPRK and the US. Officially, there was no war, just a 'United Nations Police Action', which has influenced successive conflicts. No war with North Vietnam or Panama or Iraq, which resulted in the War Powers Act of 1973 which put approval of medium-term (90+ day committments) in the hands of Congress.
The question is, then, what effect would having to approve every war-like conflict, and designate a country to be defeated and occupied like World War 1 and 2, Mexico and (technically) Spain, have on the progress of Korea's war, Vietnam and other committments, and on the new asymmetric conflicts with non-state entities. It may also involve a question of formulating International Law with regard to wars of other nations - I don't think there were formal declarations of war, for example, in the Holy Lands, African multinational efforts to remove Idi Amin, Liberian, Sierraleonian and other despots, etc.
For my view, I don't think anything much would have changed in Korea. China (backed by the Soviets) was too powerful to fully war with, so any move to declare a state of war would have had the same force behind it in a formalized or non-formalized system.
The conduct of the war would have been the same - there was widespread and multinational commitment. Ike's nuclear threat would have had the same force and thus effect. Stalin's death occurs on time, his views on the Korean War would not change because of some words.
The main change stemming from an actual Declaration would be that the United Nations would have less of a look-in. The view of Americans and others would be that this was a war between Korea and the US (and allied countries) rather than the birth of the United Nations. The emphasis, that is, would be on the first part and not the second. The UN itself would, I think, remain as it has been, involved in debate, a council of nations, tool for peacekeeping, etc.
The necessity of naming North Vietnam as an official enemy in order to bomb it in 1965 would, I think, present more problems. With the example of North Korea in their minds, the Soviets and Chinese, while not wishing to risk their own lives for Vietnam, would consider it a matter of honor and credibility to support a communist state under attack from a treaty-breaking capitalist bully (as they would see it). Given the ouster of Hruscov for lacking firmness, I can't exclude the possibility of severe tensions and some small-scale 'incidents' between the Soviets and Americans. Domestic dissent would, as a result, be looked at with less favor. It might also butterfly some of the antiwar movement's legitimacy. Or it may force the US to abandon South Vietnam once the Congress and people are asked to publicly support attacking a small country far away in order to defend an unwillingness to abide by the Geneva Accords.
Even if nothing else changes up to 1973 (and there will be changes), the War Powers Act is butterflied because Congress doesn't have a history of Presidential private wars being waged to refer to. Having been asked to approve or deny wars up to that point, there is no need or desire for the WPA.
And butterflies, and effects, continue....