WI: No Vichy regime - a continued 3rd Republic

[galileo-034]

In 1940, Albert Lebrun was president of the French Republic, in his second term (reelected in 1939, a first since Jules Grévy's reelection in 1885).
Along Paul Reynaud, he was partisan of a retreat into North Africa, but the resignation of Reynaud and political pressure let him no other choice but to appoint Pétain as President of the Council of Ministers (kind of prime minister). The armistice was signed, despite Lebrun's dislike, and eventually, as Lebrun refused to quit, Pétain had full powers voted on July 10th (569 votes to 80, along with 176 absences and 61 excluded communists).
Pétain then set up to establish the regime of Vichy.

What if a way or another, either Pétain removed (dying before the vote) or the vote failing, the new regime was never set up?

 

[The Lethargic Lett]

Specifically relating to Pétain, even if he died prematurely, chances are a puppet government would have still been set up, just with a different Head of State (such as Francois Darlan). If you're asking about the ramifications of Germany not establishing any French puppet state, then the French resistance would have probably been more successful, and there would've been less collaboration on the part of the French.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

In 1940, Albert Lebrun was president of the French Republic, in his second term (reelected in 1939, a first since Jules Grévy's reelection in 1885).
Along Paul Reynaud, he was partisan of a retreat into North Africa, but the resignation of Reynaud and political pressure let him no other choice but to appoint Pétain as President of the Council of Ministers (kind of prime minister). The armistice was signed, despite Lebrun's dislike, and eventually, as Lebrun refused to quit, Pétain had full powers voted on July 10th (569 votes to 80, along with 176 absences and 61 excluded communists).
Pétain then set up to establish the regime of Vichy.

What if a way or another, either Pétain removed (dying before the vote) or the vote failing, the new regime was never set up?

Assuming a flight to Oran, one of the biggest changes would be the balance of naval power in the Med.: with the retention of France's not unsubstantial fleet Italy is put in a pretty exposed position. I don't expect to see any offensives in North Africa, with Italian naval and air elements focused on a defensive stance along their exposed western and southern shore, with her industrial and supply resources dedicated to the build up of coastal craft, torpedo bombers, short range escort/patrol fighters, A-A and harbor defense installations, ect. This makes things tricky in terms of the eastern Med., with Germany needing to keep a watch of the British presence in the Levant and Egypt. Given time to build up, they have the luxury of attacking along the soft underbelly of Fortress Europe at a time and place of their leisure: a position that will certainly strengthen British negotiating power in terms of joint tactics when the Americans join as well as putting them in place to establish a wider Western presence in the Balkans post-war

 

[Oldbill]

Specifically relating to Pétain, even if he died prematurely, chances are a puppet government would have still been set up, just with a different Head of State (such as Francois Darlan). If you're asking about the ramifications of Germany not establishing any French puppet state, then the French resistance would have probably been more successful, and there would've been less collaboration on the part of the French.

I'm not sure Darlan would have been head of such a state. He seems to have been devoted to the MN, and would have fought with it and then fled with it to N. Africa vice staying behind in metropolitan France. Pierre Laval however, so a significant number of others, could have opted to do so.

 

[galileo-034]

It's more about keeping France out of the war without becoming a collaborationnist puppet.

Darlan was ambitious but not particularly fond of the Germans; he was initially against the armistice but changed position after the episode of Mers-el-kebir, and would later change back.
As for Laval, though an experienced politician, he was pretty much isolated on the political scene then (ie not reaching much beyond the far right), and he owed his come back to Pétain's popularity.

Actually, I wonder if avoiding Mers el kebir and the psychological and political fallout could, along having more deputies and senators present on July 10th at Vichy, help having the motion on full powers for Pétain defeated. In this context, if that motion fails, Pétain would have to resign, following the political tradition of then, or attempt a coup.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

English language accounts like Jacksons 'The Dark Years' & Paxtons 'Vichy France' indicate some Deputies had sought passage to Algeria expecting to join Reynauds government there. This & any others could form the legal basis for a resistance government. What other well known leaders would be part of this government depends on how you interpret their politics and the circumstances of the moment. i.e: Darlan with his intact Navy would have been more inclined to resist.

One of the reasons the ideas of cease fire and armistice was so popular was the French, like many people wanted to believe the German government would behave with some decency, & more important would sign a peace treaty within the year. They thought they have a unpleasant treaty imposed, lose some provinces and pay reparations, and the German army would march away. Retain expected this as did the Deputies who supported him. They were all nonplussed to discover the nazi government had zero interest in negotiating a peace treaty & was prepared to act on the temporary armistice for a indefinite long term.

Even if a group of Deputies and others form a government in Algeria its likely another larger remnant would make their own claim to legitimacy & still sign of on a armistice with the Germans. This of course leads to the colonies being split away as the isolated governors either follow the exile government, or are eventually replaced. Campaigns by the Resistance government to gain control of al the colonies will mark the next couple years. The peace government in France would be far more collaborationist than that of OTL. It would be much more a puppet government.

Since the French gold and other financial reserves had already been evacuated the Resistance government is in good shape financial for 1941 while the Metropolitan government is at the mercy of the nazis for its lunch money.

Assuming a flight to Oran, one of the biggest changes would be the balance of naval power in the Med.: with the retention of France's not unsubstantial fleet Italy is put in a pretty exposed position.

Italy is screwed in this situation. Germany will have a far more difficult time in the Mediterranean.

I don't expect to see any offensives in North Africa, with Italian naval and air elements focused on a defensive stance along their exposed western and southern shore, with her industrial and supply resources dedicated to the build up of coastal craft, torpedo bombers, short range escort/patrol fighters, A-A and harbor defense installations, ect. This makes things tricky in terms of the eastern Med., with Germany needing to keep a watch of the British presence in the Levant and Egypt.

Germany can watch, but other than divert airpower to the Mediterranean littoral and ensure the coast is garrisoned there is nothing beyond raids that can be done.

Given time to build up, they have the luxury of attacking along the soft underbelly of Fortress Europe at a time and place of their leisure: a position that will certainly strengthen British negotiating power in terms of joint tactics when the Americans join as well as putting them in place to establish a wider Western presence in the Balkans post-war

Not really. Soft underbelly was a Churchillian fantasy. The Mediterranean littoral is far more defensible than the wester littorals, the ports have less capacity & the transportation infrastructure into the interior of Europe. & of course there are the mountain ranges. The Axis do have to cover this this front, and where they leave it weak it give the Allies options, but its not the easy route to Berlin, or many other places of importance.

In this situation Germany can ignore Britain & get itself involved in a attempt to destroy the residual French resistance, even to the point of trying to invade Tunisia and Algeria. Since the French have a huge number of aircraft ordered and being delivered from the US, & there is much that Britain can send it won't be a walkover for the Axis. It might even end in defeat. Either way it interferes heavily with attacking the USSR, and attrits away the German air forces.

 

[Zheng He]

What are the ramifications in the Far East? It sounds like in this scenario that French Indochina is part of the larger Free French effort. The Japanese won't be able to just walk in like they did OTL.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

French Indo China would still be vulnerable. What happens depends on the local leaders. If they are with the Metropolitan government then Hitler can offer FIC as a gift to Japan as OTL. If they align with a Resistance government then Japan is assured of resistance & a war with Britain six to fifteen months early than OTL. If that happens things get crazy wild with butterflies.

 

[galileo-034]

I'm not talking avoiding the Armistice, but rather the active collaboration stance started at Montoire.
I have no doubt the peace treaty would be popular, and Darlan would be still warmongering, but what I mean is seeing how would fare the French government in a TL where the 3rd Republic isn't written off, with the Parliament and else still political forces instead of an authoritarian regime.
I am also under no illusion it would be susceptible to muscled blackmail by Germany over the terms of an hostage peace treaty, meddling to favor friendly right wing politicians, etc. But that would be more passive collaboration. On side effects, not the least is de Gaulle Free France unable to claim the legitimacy he had IOTL because of Pétain abolishing the Republic, potentially propping up Darlan as the champion of the war party, and also a very different political context for the Communists joining the Resistance in the aftermath of Barbarossa.

 

[Deleted member 109224]

French Indo China would still be vulnerable. What happens depends on the local leaders. If they are with the Metropolitan government then Hitler can offer FIC as a gift to Japan as OTL. If they align with a Resistance government then Japan is assured of resistance & a war with Britain six to fifteen months early than OTL. If that happens things get crazy wild with butterflies.

If there's a Free French Government based out of Algiers and no Mers el Kebir incident, then the French and British navies bottle up Italy's navy lickety split and the British have the resources to back up the French in Indochina who are resisting here.

Simply put, not nice for Japan.

 

[Enigmajones]

If the Franco British Union had formed it would have preempted the Vichy governments formation. Or at least given the Free French a base in say Algeria to prepare for the eventual invasion.

 

[Oldbill]

I don't know how long the 3rd Republic could last. If they make peace with the Germans, but stay in France proper, yes it gives them legitimacy, but only for a short time. Half the nation is under the Nazi boot, and suffering. A million POW are either in camps or working German farms and factories. The actions against Jewish citizens are unpopular in many quarters, the govt. will be very vulnerable to Nazi arm twisting. While the govt may retain nominal power, it isn't going to retain the approval of the people. There is also the very real risk that France, if it collaborates too much, will be seen as an enemy by the Allies.
I have a book I need to review tomorrow, I'll do so and possibly post more about it, as it is perhaps pertinent to this discussion.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I don't know how long the 3rd Republic could last. If they make peace with the Germans, but stay in France proper, yes it gives them legitimacy, but only for a short time. Half the nation is under the Nazi boot, and suffering. A million POW are either in camps or working German farms and factories. The actions against Jewish citizens are unpopular in many quarters, the govt. will be very vulnerable to Nazi arm twisting. While the govt may retain nominal power, it isn't going to retain the approval of the people. There is also the very real risk that France, if it collaborates too much, will be seen as an enemy by the Allies.
...

Thats more or less the trajectory of Petains government. He retained the support of a portion of the population but the majority deserted.

 

[galileo-034]

But here, we could see the governments and leaders changing at the rythm of crises instead of just one dictator managing the thing and granting ministries and offices as favors; and the policy followed changing as much, from times of German friendly ministers to skeptics and pro war politicians and so on.
As for the main source of popular legitimacy, it would remain with the National Assembly (not the lower house, but the whole parliament as it was named then), and given the deputies had their term extended by two years in 1939 (pushing the elections from 1940 to 1942), we can well think that they would be delayed again if needed.

 

[Historyman 14]

The Fall of France seal the fate of the 3rd Republic. It was pretty much doomed at that point.

 

[Zheng He]

If there's a Free French Government based out of Algiers and no Mers el Kebir incident, then the French and British navies bottle up Italy's navy lickety split and the British have the resources to back up the French in Indochina who are resisting here.

Simply put, not nice for Japan.

American shipyards will be very busy with a lot of the French ships...

 

[Oldbill]

I'm re-reading "France 1940: Defending the Republic" (Philip Nord, Yale Univ. Press, NY, 2015) rather, the last chapter. The book deals very little with the military aspect of the conflict. Rather, it focuses on the political aspects of it, in particular, trying to divine what happened. Here is a summation from page 104. "The regime had a fatal flaw, but it's not the one often identified. No doubt, French politics were divisive and the members of its political class al too often undistinguished, but what counted most in 1940 was the conduct of the nation's military and administrative elites. They had never much liked the Republic and found in the political crisis consequent on defeat an opportunity to exploit the regime's weakness against it, to do it in and replace it with an authoritarian more to their satisfaction." According to Nord, Reynaud made poor choices with some of the people he brought into the government, such as Laval. Unfortunately he brought enough in that after the Armistice, he was unable to retain power, and many of his followers also were swept away. This being so, it doesn't seem there is any way for a legitimate government to retain power, the 3rd Republic was dead, Petain was in and would remain so. I confess I am not in the least conversant with how the govt. of France works, so I may well be wrong. I am also not certain Nord is correct in all his assertions, I simply don't know enough yet to make my mind up on (the book) it, so the information I presented may be incorrect. I'll bow out now and listen to what others who are better informed have to say.

 

[galileo-034]

Well, Laval was never minister in Reynaud government. He wouldn't enter the Pétain government until after the Armistice on june 23rd.
In fact, Pétain much disliked him and the first negotiations to get Laval into his government from June 16th were a failure because Pétain refused to grant Laval the ministry he wished.

If I were to propose some sketch of POD, I would have Pétain still refusing to invite again Laval (or delaying it again), delaying the National Assembly vote on full powers, a vote Laval was the main artisan of actually, allowing more left wing Senators and deputies to get into the vote, including more big profile politicians such as Mandel and Daladier whose influence could have countered Laval tricks (in Daladier's case, his influence over the Radical party which dominated the Senate would be useful to tip enough Senators whose OTL votes went overwhemingly for Pétain).
The OTL vote looked overwhelmingly in favor of Pétain, but it wasn't I think so close.
There were only 670 parliamentarians present out of 846 and the vote was 569 in favor, 80 against, 20 abstentions and 1 non voting (Jules Jeanneney didn't vote as he presided). On the base of 846, the majority was 424, so the margin was barely 145 votes or 17 %.
Now, among the 569 yes, 286 were listed as left or center-left. I mind that with a more vigorous opposition (Mandel, Daladier and a reinvigorated Blum leading the charge), and at best increased absention (up from the OTL 20), we could get the vote failing.
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vote_des_pleins_pouvoirs_constituants_à_Philippe_Pétain

One thing to remember is that French parliamentarians of the 3rd Republic were jealous of their privileges and an energically headed opposition to the full powers would likely take this on the ground of the defense of the parliamentarian regime and democratic apparatus rather than on the debate surrounding the armistice as peace is thought to be underway and the war crisis maybe over.
Even though they were popular, the 3rd Republic's parliament never liked strong men. It did compell President MacMahon, Grévy and Millerand to quit, fiercely attacked Boulanger and disawoved Clemenceau twice, and even Gambetta himself.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

... I simply don't know enough yet to make my mind up on (the book) it, so the information I presented may be incorrect. I'll bow out now and listen to what others who are better informed have to say.

I'm not a expert, but the source cited does no sound very accurate in detail.

 

[Oldbill]

I'm not a expert, but the source cited does no sound very accurate in detail.

I've not done thorough study of the books cited sources nor of the author. He does seem to have decent sources, and its well footnoted. However, I am not at all convinced he doesn't have an agenda himself. I've kept the book as another source of information of that time period.