What if the Truman Administration prevented the politicization of the PoW issue in Korea?
Specifically, meaning what if it prevented the emergence of the dispute, especially the public dispute, over only having voluntary PoW repatriation, instead leaving the default assumption and policy, universal PoW repatriation?
According to many studies and scholars, the Korean War was multiple wars. And the war, or wars, over territory, whether Korea would be united or divided, and what would be in North Korea and South Korea, was basically decided by the end of July, beginning of August, 1951. The frontline remained basically static after that.
The remaining 15 months of the war were a different war, fought over whether the American position that PoWs had a right to choose to repatriate or reject repatriation, or the Chinese position, universal repatriation of PoWs, would win out. In the end, a slightly modified version of the American view won out. Which was a triumph for the genuine choice of many Chinese and North Korean PoWs. But it also supported a choice made by PoWs that was not free of the taint of coercion and manipulation either. And what it did for those individuals' freedom should be measured against the resulting additional deaths of more numerous combatants and noncombatants on both sides, and prolongation of captivity of ultimately repatriated men on both sides but especially the US-UN-ROK side.
The taint of coercion and manipulation on the side of Communist PoWs choosing to not return comes from the fact that they were subject to US-ROC-ROK psychological warfare campaign that saw ROC Taiwan personnel given authority over PRC PoWs and empowering pro-ROC PoWs within the cell blocks. That biased larger numbers of prisoners short-term welfare calculations in favor of pro-ROC behaviors and anti-communist declarations whether that was their free will or not. And even for those who it was not, created a situation where they felt committed by fait accompli. Many anti-communist declarations were supplemented with tattoos for instance.
The ceding of control of PoWs to ROC Taiwan and pro-ROC Taiwan elements was an example of the Truman Administration letting its guard down when in other instances it had tried hard to keep the Taiwan straits conflict separate from the Korean War. Two examples of the latter include its rejection of Chiang's offers of troops from Taiwan to fight in Korea at the beginning of the war, and continued unwillingness to use troops from there, even after mainland China intervened, and the Administration's resistance to suggestions by MacArthur and others to "unleash Chiang" to mount Taiwan-based air, naval, and possibly amphibious attacks on Chinese island and coastal targets to distract, divert, and spread out PRC defensive forces.
So, the PoD here is that Truman, and other senior officials, especially newly minted SecDef George Marshall, mindful of this effort to stay disentangled from Taiwan, ask DoD staff some crucial questions about the workings of the psyop program on PoWs in Korea, and bring up the Taiwan link to Truman and Acheson.
They collectively decide, before this really got rolling in spring, summer 1951, to keep Taiwan-ROC linked personnel, and psyop program in general, out of touch with the Chinese PoWs, and with PoWs with anti-communist sentiments left effectively leaderless, Communist loyalists exercise effective internal leadership over Chinese Communists in the interior of PoW camps.
Marshall's concerns, shared with Acheson, and also Truman, are not just to avoid being a patsy of Chiang Kai-shek's propaganda agenda, but to avoid impediments to ending the war in Korea and to bolstering the build-up of defenses of the primary, European theater, since they all remember what Omar Bradley said about deepened, prolonged engagement with the war in Korea. [look it up if you don't remember], and a concern for preservation of US service members lives and for US service members in captivity.
Accordingly, the American side prevents its own diplomats and JAGs from making the voluntary repatriation only concept an issue at Panmunjon. Can the two sides reach an agreement on armistice by the end of August 1951? September? October?
From the Chinese point of view, universal repatriation removes their largest complaint about the American position at the talks. The North Koreans were really ready for the fight to be over and to get on with rebuilding - they wouldn't have even let the PoW issue stop it. Unfortunately, they were less relevant in the peacemaking decision. The Soviets had no problem letting the war just go on, and on, and on. But it was up to the Chinese to actually fight it, so it would seem strange for Stalin to manage to keep it going if the Chinese feel there are little or no substantive reasons to keep doing it.
Assuming an armistice is reached in 1951, what happens next, internationally and domestically?
An earlier start to China's land reform/anti-landlord campaign?
I think Truman is still not saving himself for a second term here. Critics will call the armistice/peace flawed. Truman might run and be nominated though instead of Stevenson getting the nod. I think the same contenders will play for the Republican nomination, however. And Taft's being the natural leader would probably attract Ike's entry into the race, and his nomination, and general election victory.
Different thoughts from this on US politics?
Would the pacing of the French Indochina War change at all? Earlier Dien Bien Phu?
Specifically, meaning what if it prevented the emergence of the dispute, especially the public dispute, over only having voluntary PoW repatriation, instead leaving the default assumption and policy, universal PoW repatriation?
According to many studies and scholars, the Korean War was multiple wars. And the war, or wars, over territory, whether Korea would be united or divided, and what would be in North Korea and South Korea, was basically decided by the end of July, beginning of August, 1951. The frontline remained basically static after that.
The remaining 15 months of the war were a different war, fought over whether the American position that PoWs had a right to choose to repatriate or reject repatriation, or the Chinese position, universal repatriation of PoWs, would win out. In the end, a slightly modified version of the American view won out. Which was a triumph for the genuine choice of many Chinese and North Korean PoWs. But it also supported a choice made by PoWs that was not free of the taint of coercion and manipulation either. And what it did for those individuals' freedom should be measured against the resulting additional deaths of more numerous combatants and noncombatants on both sides, and prolongation of captivity of ultimately repatriated men on both sides but especially the US-UN-ROK side.
The taint of coercion and manipulation on the side of Communist PoWs choosing to not return comes from the fact that they were subject to US-ROC-ROK psychological warfare campaign that saw ROC Taiwan personnel given authority over PRC PoWs and empowering pro-ROC PoWs within the cell blocks. That biased larger numbers of prisoners short-term welfare calculations in favor of pro-ROC behaviors and anti-communist declarations whether that was their free will or not. And even for those who it was not, created a situation where they felt committed by fait accompli. Many anti-communist declarations were supplemented with tattoos for instance.
The ceding of control of PoWs to ROC Taiwan and pro-ROC Taiwan elements was an example of the Truman Administration letting its guard down when in other instances it had tried hard to keep the Taiwan straits conflict separate from the Korean War. Two examples of the latter include its rejection of Chiang's offers of troops from Taiwan to fight in Korea at the beginning of the war, and continued unwillingness to use troops from there, even after mainland China intervened, and the Administration's resistance to suggestions by MacArthur and others to "unleash Chiang" to mount Taiwan-based air, naval, and possibly amphibious attacks on Chinese island and coastal targets to distract, divert, and spread out PRC defensive forces.
So, the PoD here is that Truman, and other senior officials, especially newly minted SecDef George Marshall, mindful of this effort to stay disentangled from Taiwan, ask DoD staff some crucial questions about the workings of the psyop program on PoWs in Korea, and bring up the Taiwan link to Truman and Acheson.
They collectively decide, before this really got rolling in spring, summer 1951, to keep Taiwan-ROC linked personnel, and psyop program in general, out of touch with the Chinese PoWs, and with PoWs with anti-communist sentiments left effectively leaderless, Communist loyalists exercise effective internal leadership over Chinese Communists in the interior of PoW camps.
Marshall's concerns, shared with Acheson, and also Truman, are not just to avoid being a patsy of Chiang Kai-shek's propaganda agenda, but to avoid impediments to ending the war in Korea and to bolstering the build-up of defenses of the primary, European theater, since they all remember what Omar Bradley said about deepened, prolonged engagement with the war in Korea. [look it up if you don't remember], and a concern for preservation of US service members lives and for US service members in captivity.
Accordingly, the American side prevents its own diplomats and JAGs from making the voluntary repatriation only concept an issue at Panmunjon. Can the two sides reach an agreement on armistice by the end of August 1951? September? October?
From the Chinese point of view, universal repatriation removes their largest complaint about the American position at the talks. The North Koreans were really ready for the fight to be over and to get on with rebuilding - they wouldn't have even let the PoW issue stop it. Unfortunately, they were less relevant in the peacemaking decision. The Soviets had no problem letting the war just go on, and on, and on. But it was up to the Chinese to actually fight it, so it would seem strange for Stalin to manage to keep it going if the Chinese feel there are little or no substantive reasons to keep doing it.
Assuming an armistice is reached in 1951, what happens next, internationally and domestically?
An earlier start to China's land reform/anti-landlord campaign?
I think Truman is still not saving himself for a second term here. Critics will call the armistice/peace flawed. Truman might run and be nominated though instead of Stevenson getting the nod. I think the same contenders will play for the Republican nomination, however. And Taft's being the natural leader would probably attract Ike's entry into the race, and his nomination, and general election victory.
Different thoughts from this on US politics?
Would the pacing of the French Indochina War change at all? Earlier Dien Bien Phu?
