I had only first begun reading about France's Plan XVII recently, and as someone who's only had a passing interest in both World Wars my whole life, I was quite surprised to learn that France had the inklings of a plan to invade part of Belgium in order to gain offensive initiative over the British. Of course, as we know from OTL, the Germans crossed the Belgian border on August 4th, and that elements of the French high command who believed an offensive into Belgium was the best strategy, specifically commander-in-chief Joseph Joffre, were ultimately kept in check until that point. Ultimately, Britain would join the war after the German invasion of Belgium both triggered an 1839 treaty and more importantly, helped sway public opinion to a pro-war angle. The rest is history.
Some corrections on this paragraph, from Joffre's memoires. The French army was not 'kept in check until August 4th'. What Joffre said was that in wargaming the problem the General Staff had concluded, (I think by 1912) that Belgian territory would be required for French objectives to become realistic. Specifically, although the Ardennes was not ideal terrain, that for any prospect of offensive success, an attack strictly along the border would be certain to fail. When Joffre reported these conclusions to Poincare, things get a bit murky. But what
appears to have happened was that the French sounded the British and received the reply that a pre-existing French intention to invade Belgium might be extradordinarily embarrassing for the British government if discovered and published. Therefore, Joffre altered the mobilization plan to be flexible, where a final decision on Army group deployments did not have to take place until M+8 (I think it was Day 8). Formal French Army campaign planning, like how was done in other countries with the plans and exercises filed on record, this was not done in France. Campaign planning and exercises were split off into an informal domain run by the French army high command but independent of the French government in planning and in record keeping. I think it's pretty obvious why such a remarkable step was taken. Historically France called general mobilization on 1 August, meaning that no decision needed to be made on Belgium until August 9th, had Germany not invaded. According to Joffre, the variant mobilization which made operations in Belgium practically mandatory was made on August 2nd,
before the Germans had made any demands of Belgium and before the French army had any fixed ideas on the German mobilization plan.
The British Cabinet had reviewed the 1839 treaty by the end of July and ruled that it would not dictate British policy in the crisis. The 1839 treaty was only of value to the British in the second matter you mention - swaying British public opinion.
However, suppose that Joffre had been able to sway the right people in the French government to an invasion, or had been able to at least maneuver his way into having enough autonomy to launch such an invasion without being stopped from doing so. In this series of events, where French troops would have violated Belgian sovereignty before the Germans, it seems extremely unlikely the Britain would have been able to enter on the Entente side, given the reluctance of the Liberal Party and the British public as a whole to go to war, especially with the Home Rule Crisis brewing.
A couple things to unpack there.
First, the variant mobilization Joffre called on the 2nd of August shifted the French 5th army northwards and inserted the French 4th army into the gap between 5th and 3rd armies, such that three French armies would finish mobilization facing neutral territory, (Belgium and Luxembourg). The implication of this is that the French government had authorized Joffre to do this on or before August 2nd. (In fact, I've always just assumed that in 1912 Poincare told Joffre he would get his wishes, but he needed to play pretend pattycakes so that the British could have their plausible deniability).
Secondly, the British had an entire war-entry scenario in play that had nothing to do with Belgium. This was the naval guarantee to France. Before the Germans actually invaded Belgium, there appears to have been a war party in London (Churchill) that was actively seeking to attack and sink the SMS Goeben under the pretext of protecting French shipping. Had Germany not invaded Belgium this naval narrative could have been made to serve the purpose.
Third, it's important how the British government actually functioned in 1914. The PM did not require a vote in the House to declare war, and in fact, there was no such vote. Parliament was simply informed of the new state of affairs and requested to vote war funding. The PM did require cabinet unity and the king to declare war, both of which were politically possible for him to get even without Germany invading Belgium.
While a British entry on the side of Germany is implausible (though it's fun to imagine a German/British wank scenario where they destroy France together), a WWI where the British don't participate, at least from the get-go, is likely a disaster for the French and Russians; one has to assume that a French invasion of Belgium goes like the ITL Battle of the Frontiers did, and from there on, a German push towards Paris without British troops opposing them on the field and without a blockade handicapping them is going to have that much more juice, even if it's not an immediate 1870-style success.
The British naval pledge was given to France without any condition, including their behaviour in Belgium. True, the French had declared just prior in a formal answer to the British that they would not invade Belgium, but the pledge itself made no reference to this and therefore, the pledge would remain even if the French had invaded Belgium.
An actual French invasion of Belgium with the historical German mobilization held with a refused right might have been an 1870's style catastrophe for France. It's different than the historical case in that the encirclement and destruction of the French left went from map fantasy to something that could really have happened, as Joffre sticks the 4th and 3rd armies' necks into the noose. As for the BEF, if Britain were neutral it may well mobilize and deploy to Belgium in August 1914, linking up with the Belgian army maybe on the Brussels-Antwerp axis.
Regardless, what do you think: would a French invasion of Belgium have led to a guaranteed defeat for the French and Russians? I'm curious to see if there are angles I hadn't considered here. I've tried to find some threads on this from the past, but the ones I've seen have kind of been "meh" at best.
The defeat of France? That's actually hilarious to think about WRT this scenario. Let's say France invaded Belgium and the British do as you imagine and stay neutral with loud declarations of outrage against Paris. Now, the Germans 7 armies strong hit Belgium like a tidal wave and defeat the French, carrying the front all the way through Belgium towards Paris. The British say to the Germans, 'you must evacuate Belgium because it is neutral'. The Germans tell the British to go pound themselves, they will occupy Belgium until the war is over. The British say to the French, 'you must agree that Belgium will suffer no annexations after the war'. The French reply that to be bound in such a way, the British will have to declare war on Germany immediately, and warn the British that if they are defeated, they may well be forced into a treaty with Germany in which Belgium is partitioned between France and Germany.
What are the British options here?