Would the Japanese have surrendered with no Soviet invasion?

[Wendigo]

In August 1945 would the Japanese have surrendered if the Soviets (for whatever reason) never declared war on them or invaded Manchuria?

Would atomic bombs alone have been enough to get the Emperor to surrender?

If they don't surrender what next?

How long and bloody would it have been to capture or defeat the millions of Japanese troops still in China and the rest of the Asian mainland WITHOUT help from the Red Army while at the same time dealing with the Japanese troops in the Home Islands?

 

[marathag]

Bomb Core #3 was on administrative hold on the West Coast, waiting for Truman to release it for use.
Given transit time, another Fatman goes off after the 16th

China was irrelevant, it was the growing peace at any cost faction around the Emperor is what would decide the War.

Those IJA troops in China were trapped there by the USN blockade

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Yes, although it probably would have been slightly later. A matter of additional weeks, at most.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The reports on the rice harvest had bad news as well. Even the soldiers would be on half rations by late autum. Large scale deaths from malnutrition could be certain in the winter.

 

[zert]

I believe Japan will still surrender. Maybe not until Winter or Spring at the latest, but the white flag will be flown.

Though a LOT more Japanese civilians and soldiers will die before that happens.

 

[Scomerger]

It would've been extremely bloody, to say the very least. Remember the Battle for Tarawa, where more than six thousand troops on both sides perished in a fierce battle lasting for three days, all on a tiny (190 sq mi) island thousands of miles away from Japan? Magnify that a hundred times, or more, for a campaign that would've been fought on a series of large islands known as Japan. The war would've dragged on until 1946 or 1947, at the latest.

 

[HMS Warspite]

Basically the threat of the USSR was significant in the thinking of the leaders in Japan, especailly in 1945, when the Japanese were already on their knees due to the losses, shortages of every basical supplies and fuel, besides lacking the means to defend themselves properly against the constant airraids hammering Japan, even without the possibilities of the Nuclear Bombs, which were merely an additional means to show the world, especially the USSR, the might of the USA and not so much to Japan itself. The Japanese Leaders were all originating from the Imperial Japanese Army core around the Prime Minister Tojo, who considered not the USA, but Russia/USSR the biggest threat to the Imperial ambitions of the Japanese Empire, in line with Army doctrine of the previous decades. (The Navy considered the USA the biggest threat, but was not in a possition to dictate its ideas in the Japanese politcal leadership).

So the war was seriously shortened by the entry of the USSR in the war against Japan, as the Japanese considered the USSR more a direct threat to the existence of the Empire, compared to the USA, even though the USA and her allies already had brought Japan on their knees. Without the USSR the japanese Empire would have surrendered anyway, as it had no longer the means to continue the war, withg her industry knocked out and lack of all basical supplies and duel, as well as no realistic means to counter any form of landing attempts by Allied forces on the Japanese home islands. They could go down fighting, but not longer provide enough military means to fight back on equal terms. It was the DOW of the USSR to Japan that sped things up towards an attempt to end the war diplomatically, rather than suffer more losses of men and equipment.

 

[kruscica]

Basically the threat of the USSR was significant in the thinking of the leaders in Japan, especailly in 1945, when the Japanese were already on their knees due to the losses, shortages of every basical supplies and fuel, besides lacking the means to defend themselves properly against the constant airraids hammering Japan, even without the possibilities of the Nuclear Bombs, which were merely an additional means to show the world, especially the USSR, the might of the USA and not so much to Japan itself. The Japanese Leaders were all originating from the Imperial Japanese Army core around the Prime Minister Tojo, who considered not the USA, but Russia/USSR the biggest threat to the Imperial ambitions of the Japanese Empire, in line with Army doctrine of the previous decades. (The Navy considered the USA the biggest threat, but was not in a possition to dictate its ideas in the Japanese politcal leadership).

So the war was seriously shortened by the entry of the USSR in the war against Japan, as the Japanese considered the USSR more a direct threat to the existence of the Empire, compared to the USA, even though the USA and her allies already had brought Japan on their knees. Without the USSR the japanese Empire would have surrendered anyway, as it had no longer the means to continue the war, withg her industry knocked out and lack of all basical supplies and duel, as well as no realistic means to counter any form of landing attempts by Allied forces on the Japanese home islands. They could go down fighting, but not longer provide enough military means to fight back on equal terms. It was the DOW of the USSR to Japan that sped things up towards an attempt to end the war diplomatically, rather than suffer more losses of men and equipment.

Except that the Japanese Were trying to surrender (or at least discuss terms) through the soviets - the soviets as officially neutral. Because the japanese were weak and making the western allies happy and in their debt by attacking Japan would advance multiple soviet objectives, the soviets agreed to attack and did so - Simultaneously currying goodwill on the part of the Anglo-Americans to use in European matters, improving the status of friendly powers on their Chinese borders (whether by strengthening communism or gaining goodwill of the Kuomintang), and improving access to the pacific (occupation of karafuto / Sakhalin and the kuriles) and with the potential of communist involvement in Japan.

In that sense it was not in soviet interests for the Japanese to surrender - but if the soviets had been truly neutral (and unless they'd been motivated and able to mediate conditional surrender) the war would likely have continued just as long if not longer, given the insistence on unconditional surrender. It would just have cost fewer Japanese lives on the Asian mainland and more in Japan itself, due to fighting, bombing and starvation...

 

[HMS Warspite]

Except that the Japanese Were trying to surrender (or at least discuss terms) through the soviets - the soviets as officially neutral. Because the japanese were weak and making the western allies happy and in their debt by attacking Japan would advance multiple soviet objectives, the soviets agreed to attack and did so - Simultaneously currying goodwill on the part of the Anglo-Americans to use in European matters, improving the status of friendly powers on their Chinese borders (whether by strengthening communism or gaining goodwill of the Kuomintang), and improving access to the pacific (occupation of karafuto / Sakhalin and the kuriles) and with the potential of communist involvement in Japan.

In that sense it was not in soviet interests for the Japanese to surrender - but if the soviets had been truly neutral (and unless they'd been motivated and able to mediate conditional surrender) the war would likely have continued just as long if not longer, given the insistence on unconditional surrender. It would just have cost fewer Japanese lives on the Asian mainland and more in Japan itself, due to fighting, bombing and starvation...

Japan was broken military, unable to defend itself against Allied attacks in all forms, especially from naval airpower, as the Imperial Navy was finished as a fighting force and the industry bombed to shatters, denying the left over armed forces supplies and weapons to defend against non stop attacks form sea and air. No matter what Japanese politicians said about resistance to invassion, the outcome of such a thing was a certainty: Japan was lost anyway and everybody in Japan knew this, though not necessarily accepting it.

Though broken military, any invassion of the Home Islands would be a costly one anyway for the Allies, in trerms of materiel, costs and especially manpower. The USA had calculated a likely loss of a million lives of GI's at least and a multitude of Japanese at the bare minimum. This seems logical in any sort of uneven warfare today, though this was knot yet fully understood at the time.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Except that the Japanese Were trying to surrender (or at least discuss terms) through the soviets - the soviets as officially neutral. ...

No surrender. They were asking for a cease fire & temporary armistice. And, they proposed terms to the Allies. That is they would only give up the territory taken since 1940, and open negotiations with China. The pre 1937 empire would remain in Japanese control, and there would be no restrictions on Japans military. They had previously sent the same proposal via the Swiss embassies. The US response was a unofficial reminder of the unconditional surrender terms. The sense of unreality in the minds of the Japanese leaders is clearly illustrated by the idea that they could retain a large army and navy.

In the case of the approach to the USSR the Japanese included inquiries about a tighter relationship. The cabinet members were under the illusion the tensions between the USSR, Britain, and the US would prevent any further alliance or military cooperation between them. Soviet military & diplomatic deception ops encouraged this misinterpretation.

'Japans Decision to Surrender' has a basic description of this.

 

[Nik]

Given the USAAF was working its way down a lonnng list of cities and towns to be razed by traditional incendiaries, nukes were almost an 'out of context' problem. IMHO, the Japanese High Command & Courtiers took a while to realise the rules had changed. As I understood it, they still felt there was scope for negotiation, for 'wheeling and dealing', and the 'Unconditional' demand was but an opening gambit...

Surely, they knew how sensitive the US was about combat losses...

Having the Russians attack those Northern islands with expendable, 'client state' forces must have been an 'Oh, Sh**t' moment....

 

[jahenders]

In August 1945 would the Japanese have surrendered if the Soviets (for whatever reason) never declared war on them or invaded Manchuria?

Would atomic bombs alone have been enough to get the Emperor to surrender?

If they don't surrender what next?

How long and bloody would it have been to capture or defeat the millions of Japanese troops still in China and the rest of the Asian mainland WITHOUT help from the Red Army while at the same time dealing with the Japanese troops in the Home Islands?

They do surrender, but it takes them longer. Sentiment in the cabinet was growing and they had already tried to get various nations to negotiate on their behalf (including, stupidly, Russia). It was a question of terms. The deadlock that the Emperor ultimately broke was whether to accept the Potsdam terms or wait for better terms. About half in the cabinet felt things would only get worse, but the military clique felt that they'd get better terms if they forced the US to invade and made it VERY bloody. That was silly since it hadn't worked elsewhere, many Japanese would die before the US invaded, and supplies of everything

The US did have 2 other atom bombs ready and would have dropped a 3rd in mid August, then another a few weeks later, while working on some more. Conventional bombing would also continue.

So, if the Soviets stay out of it, the Japanese probably surrender between September and February (after a cold, hungry winter).

Handling the Japanese troops abroad won't be too bad once the Emperor makes his broadcast about surrender. Other than pockets of disobedient troops, most of them surrender. The side effect is that the US controls all of Korea, the two Chinas fight over Manchuria, and the Russians don't get Outer Manchuria, N. Sakhalin, or the Kuriles. The Chinese civil war may end differently without Russian support through Manchuria.

 

[NolanFoster]

Japan probably would have surrendered after the loss of Kyushu to Operation Downfall.

 

[jahenders]

Japan probably would have surrendered after the loss of Kyushu to Operation Downfall.

Almost definitely, if not before. They were already trying to negotiate terms before the bombs fell -- they were asking too much and their diplomatic attempts were confused. They waited weeks while trying to get the Russians to mediate on their behalf. The Russians pointedly lead them on while meeting with the other allies and then suddenly declaring war on them. The Russians finally gave their ambassador an answer, "No, we can't mediate for you and as of tomorrow, we're at war."

 

[raharris1973]

Stay tuned we might find out the answer to the OP question if Cal Bear ever finishes his "Pacific Ordeal" thread!

 

[James Ricker]

Check out the bomb damage map from Hiroshima the main target wasn't the population of Hiroshima it was the warehouse district on the other side of the river.The lose of those supplies made the defense of Japan a logistical impossibility.

 

[raharris1973]

Check out the bomb damage map from Hiroshima the main target wasn't the population of Hiroshima it was the warehouse district on the other side of the river.The lose of those supplies made the defense of Japan a logistical impossibility.

I'd never heard this before. Where should I read up on this? I knew Hiroshima was an Army HQ, didn't know it was such a vital supply center. & did it house supplies critical for the defense of Kyushu (seems doubtful) or just Honshu?

 

[James Ricker]

I'd never heard this before. Where should I read up on this? I knew Hiroshima was an Army HQ, didn't know it was such a vital supply center. & did it house supplies critical for the defense of Kyushu (seems doubtful) or just Honshu?

Hiroshima is a port between Honshu and Kyushu the stuff was piling up due to a shortage of ships,the city commander ordered the supplies dispersed but ⅓ were still lost.