#15: Blood and Iron, Cloaks and daggers
The collected Correspondences, journals and speeches of Otto Von Bismark, Oxsford university press, 1922:
April 1st 1859, letters to Joanah Von Bismarck
I have spent another fruitless day of posturing in consultations regarding reform today. The truth, my dearest Johana, is that no compromise is possible. The petty rulers of the accursed Trias wish to prolong negotiations indefinitely so that they may keep their independence of action and be bought off, as the occasion suits them, by subsidies and honors from either Prussia or Austria. Their main aim is not to reach a resolution of outstanding issues but to simply drive up their price. With one exception perhaps. Maximillian of Bavaria has his own ambitions, his own dreams of power extending beyond the highlands of Bavaria. Absurd as these dreams are it may well be worth to cultivate them.
For Austria this state of affairs is precisely as they wish. After all, they realize that the rot runs too deep within their polygot empire to ever assume rulership of Germany as is Prussia's destiny to accomplish, if not in my own day, then in Herbert's. For them too it is better to maintain the petty states as vassals for they can be certain that they shall check Prussia's power even as Prussian arms protect them from both the French republicanism and Russian despotism.
May 1st 1859, Personal journal
So it is war. I will not write of this, even to Joanah. But this may yet prove to be the most fortuitous event to occur in my post as minister to the Confederation. The Austrian minister tries to keep up a light air but his tension is palapable. All can feel it, and those who have in the past showed deference and caution now whisper behind closed doors.
June 1st 1859, Letters to Alberecht Von Roon(1)
My dear friend. I must implore upon you to speak with all urgency with the king. This is the moment for Prussia to seize leadership. It is clear by now that the war may well last for months and is not a casual border scuffle. For Prussia to navigate these currents and lead the lesser states in a clear purpose we must clench our mailed fist, and clench it hard (2). I well understand political difficulties in court (3) but surely those difficulties cannot compare to those which will arise if we drift without purpose awaiting the tender mercies of others?
June 25th 1859 Letters to Alberecht Von Roon (4)
News have just reached us. Now. Now is the time to gather our armies and march south to lake Constance or wherever the dominance of Protestantism ends (5). Whatever the dangers of social revolution they are as nothing should we fail to seize Prussia's destiny (6). I understand of course our military limitations all too well. I may not have the benefits of your own exalted experience (7) but it seems to me that when faced with many potential enemies it is best to make some your allies. It makes no point to play chess while denying yourself 16 squares of the board! As to France we both know what Napoleon III lusts after- we can have no hope of reaching an accomodation with him at terms acceptable to the public or our own dignity and security (8). But Russia's aims are of no concern to us- Whether Turk or Slav predominates in the Balkans is an issue not worth the Bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier (9). Yet Russia's ultimate aims are in conflict with French mercentalism (10). Can something not be made of this?
July 25th 1859, personal journal
In spite of our past differences (11) the regent understands at least what must be done. I fear however that he acts too late. I must act quickly to make clear to him that I am not to be grouped with Mantufel and the other relics of the council and that the past must remain in the past. We, after all, are men of the future.
July 26th 08:00, Telegram to Johanna Von Bismark (12)
Pray inform our dear friend that I will be in Berlin on the Morrow and that I look forward to a small, private dinner with those whom he thinks appropriate.
July 28th personal journal
I have met with the Austrian and Bavarian ministers. They are mine!
July 29th 1859 48th Speech to the DeutchBund Diet
The Vaterland is in Peril! The struggle being waged on the plains of Lombardy with the bastard child of the French wars (13) is a danger not only for the Habsburgs but to all of Germany. Prussia, Austria, and now Bavaria have already called their manhood to arms. Will Hannover and Saxony, Baden and Wurtenburg stint of blood and treasure to defend our common homeland? (14) I call not for German soldiers defend the Habsburg realms lying outside the boundaries of Germany(15)- only to move, to the Bavarian Palatinate under the command of Bavaria and to the Prussian Rhineland under the command of Prussia to defend our common Western border (16). Problems arising from the Joint command of the two forces will be mediated by Austria (17)
(1) That is, mobilize
(2) Prussian minister of war
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albrecht_von_Roon
(3) Liberals are making a fuss about the costs of mobilization and the arch-conservative king Fredrik Willams prefers not to give them a chance to hold him over a fire. The downside of having a reserve army is that getting it mobilized is a really hard political decision to make.
(4) In a properly functioning civil service Bismark should be addressing this letter to his boss Von Mantufel
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_Theodor_von_Manteuffel. But in the upper levels the Prussian civil service is based on influence and friendship, not formal titles. And Mantuffel, unlike his soon to be successor, is a statist.
(5) OTL quote from his letters from St Petersburg. And lake Constance? It's in Switzerland…
(6) Bismark isn't actually the monomaniacal fanatic his opponents make him sound- this is just him playing to the crowd. Like many nationalist politicians of the time how he says something means more to his audience than what he actually says.
(7) Bismark is a lieutenant in the reserves. This is about as low as someone as his aristocratic background can be.
(8) Bismark would change his mind later in life. What Napoleon III wants is of course the Left Bank of the Rhine. The Prussian Rhineland, Dutch ruled and Prussian garrisoned Luxembourg, The Bavarian palatinate and Belgium.
(9) OTL when Bismark said this (1878) he didn't actually mean it and was just trying to make himself out as an honest broker. TTL the strategic situation is different.
(10) France at this time still dominates the East meditiranian markets- partly because of diplomatic privillage accorded to it by Egypt and the Ottoman empire.
(11) In 1848 Bismark tried to have Fredrick William replaced (after he effectively surrendered to the revolutionaries) by the teenage son of William (Fredrick Williams brother the current regent), the future Fredrick III. William's wife Augusta vetoed this and was massively offended. She distrusted Bismark ever since and infected William (who had fled to England during the revolution) with the same attitude.
(12) Bismark is worried about his letters being monitored and no longer wishes to commit sensitive information to writing.
(13) Bismark does not mention anything about Russia because he wishes to maintain good terms with them and also because the small German states have no border with Russia or history of conflict with it.
(14) Well, yes, he is laying it on a bit thick. But the speech isn't aimed at the delegates to the Diet or their rulers. They're aimed at the nationalist newspapers and the masses. He's backing the minor rulers into a corner where if they do not comply with the call for total mobilization they will face unrest from their own populations. The delegates and the rulers of the German states understand Bismark's game. What they don't realize is that he's playing another game within that game.
(15) Actualy, Posen and both East and West Prussia are not part of the German confederation though most in Germany view them as "german" in a way Hungary is not.
(16) This is Bismark's finesse at work. He realizes that neither Austria nor the Minor states will accept Prussian command of ALL German confederation forces. He also realizes that Bavaria is the only other German state with both a direct stake in collective security Vs France AND imperial dreams of it's own. So he's playing to their vanity. They aren't aware of his deeper design yet. In practice Bavaria will assume, or demand, command of the Baden, Wurtenburg and the grand margrivate of Hessen. Prussia gets the rest except for a Saxon detachment under the crown prince moving in to defend the Moravian approach to Vienna. Prussia and Austria both have their "vassal" states which vote automaticly with them. With Saxony supporting Austria and Bavaria lobbying for this measure as well the other states grudgingly avoid active and open opposition to the joint mobilization.
(17) Who will command no troops of their own on the Rhine. You can probably see where this is going, right?