WI Guam

December 10-20 1941
After the freighter was off loaded, the fuel was sent by trucks to the two airfields along with the bombs and other ammunition for the aircraft. The ten new P-40s were sent to the airfield at Lupog, to be assembled. The Oregon National Guard units were assigned to cover the Orote Peninsula and Tolofofo Bay with one Battery each. The Heavy Weapons Company 81mm mortars was split into it’s three platoons with each platoon assigned to a Marine Infantry Company.

The Governors office contacted all the village and town Mayors as well as the Roman Catholic Bishop, and asked that they plan on meeting at the Governors office at 1400. Governor Davidson wanted to insure that the people of Guam understood what was happing and why. Additional caves were set up as air raid shelters. One large cave was near the Piti Navy yard it was decided to use it as a back up aid station. Medical supplies and cots were moved to it from the small hospital in Agana. Volunteers from the Guamanian population were given first aid training and would act as medics for the troops. The mayors were told that food would be rationed, that all extra supplies should be moved to caves to protect them. They in turn wanted to know about what air raids might mean to the fishing fleet. Governor Davidson asked that those engaged in fishing please continue to do so, so that fresh supply of fish would be available.


The S-41 returned to Agana Bay on the evening of the 10th. Damage
would be able to be fixed by the Submarine Tender. But might take up to a week. On the 12th a PBY patrol over Saipan reported that all Japanese shipping was gone from the Saipan anchorage including the damaged IJN Kako. Without any way to be sure it was thought that the warships and transports might have withdrawn to Yap or all the back to Japan. No Japanese aircraft lifted off of Saipan to challenge the PBY.

It was possible that the USAAC had destroyed all of Saipans planes. This information was relayed back to Pearl Harbor along with the news of the arrival of the SS Samuel Jackson and that the equipment, supplies and troops had been off loaded. The freighter would attempt to make a run back to Hawaii while the Japanese warships were gone from the area.

As military commander Admiral Davidson requested addition medical supplies be sent either by B-17 or submarine. Pacific fleet Headquarters was advised that with no Japanese aircraft on Saipan, B-17 ferry flights to the Philippines could resume.
Daily patrols over Saipan and out 300 miles from Guam by the PBYs were not finding any Japanese fleet units nor aircraft on Saipan. This pause in Japanese action in and around Guam would come to an end on December 21st.
 
Huh?

Wake wasn't hit by the invasion fleet until December 11th. You have them getting hit on the 8th or 9th, which was the original invasion date, but the Japanese set the date back. I recomend reading Bill Sloan's "Given Up for Dead" for info about Wake. Guam is doing WAY better than OTL. There they had to surrender without firing a shot.
 
Japanese Reaction​


IJN Forth fleet commander Admiral Nariyoshi and Major General Fomitaro Horii of the South Seas Detachment, were shocked and just a little dismayed that the Guam operation had failed so badly. Saipan by the second day of war had no aircraft left. Naval units and transports were withdrawn to Yap for repair and rethinking of what had gone so wrong. Both Wake and Guam had withstood the first attempts; however Wake had lost most of it’s fighters. Guam however had not been surprised all of it’s aircraft had been aloft and the P-40 was more than a match for the Type-96 fighter. Intelligence and reconnaissance were needed to discover why Guam had not been surprised. Additional aircraft were going to be needed to swamp the air defense of Guam.

Admiral Nariyoshi put a request into IJN Headquarters that at least two carriers be sent to assist in the next effort at Guam. He was told that none would be available until late December around the 20. The decision was made that he would use what was left of his original attack force and would attempt to land the South Seas Detachment on the either the 21 or 22 after the two carriers The IJN Shokaku and IJN Zuikaku launched an overwhelming air attack on Guam. The two carriers would then proceed to Wake to overwhelm it’s air defenses. It was thought that an attack again at sunrise would catch the Guam defenders asleep just as they had at Pearl Harbor. The thinking at Forth fleet Headquarters was that the warning from Pearl was what had alerted Guam before.

By the 20th the three damaged Havocs had been repaired as well as the one damaged P-40 from the first day. The USAAC now had 29 P-40s and 10 Havocs. The Navy still had all 8 PBYs and both the S-41 and S-43 were back out to sea. The S-43 was patrolling about 250 miles northwest of Guam on an arch back to the southwest. The S-41 was back by Saipan.

At 0455 On the morning of the 21st the radar reported a very large flight of aircraft from the northwest towards Guam, The operators thought it was at least 100 aircraft.
All fighters were scrambled and the 10 Havocs were sent with 5 P-40s on a backward vector from where the attacking aircraft were coming from. The dawn patrol of the PBY to the northwest reported that it could see two aircraft carriers at about 225 miles from Guam after giving the position report it went off the air and was thought to have been shot down. the S-43 was on the surface and was only 20 miles from the reported location. It increased speed heading for the contact reports and was able to close to within 10 miles before it had to submerge. Just after it submerged the 10 Havocs made an attempt to bomb the two carriers both turned right into the path of the S-43. At a distance of only 2000 yards it was able to put 2 torpedoes into the IJN Shokaku out of four fired.
The 5 P-40s were attempting to keep the carrier C.A.P. off the Havocs and were discovering that the Zeros could out turn them and that the Japanese pilots seemed to be better trained than the Type-96 pilots they had faced over Guam and Saipan. Still six of the Havocs dropped 500lb AP bombs on the IJN Zuikaku only two hit but they left it burning. Five Havocs and three P-40s went shot down. The remaining left for Guam wondering if there would any runways to land on. The S-43 while unable to continue it’s attack did watch the Japanese task force tow the two damaged carriers away. After the last Japanese ship had disappeared over the horizon the S-43 surfaced reported to Guam and Pearl what had happened and was able to pull 2 of the P-40 pilots and 6 Havoc crewmen from the water. There were no Japanese carriers able to land their strike force they would have to land at Saipan.
The remaining 24 fighters at Guam lost 15 of their number in the air battle but were able to down 5 Zeros and 15 Vals and 10 Kates. The Japanese dive Bombers (Vals and kates) were able to hit the Submarine Tender USS Seawall, the Minesweeper USS Penguin and sink the oil storage ship USS Robert L Barnes. While the Zeros attempted staffing attacks on the two airfields the quad 50’s were able to keep the damage limited. Two bombs hit the main runway at Barrigada but none at Lupog. Only 5 Havocs and 11 P-40s were left.

The Japanese had recovered around 60 aircraft at Saipan. Ten Zero fighters and a mix of Vals and Kates.
Air superiority was now in the hands of the Japanese. Unless Pearl Harbor would send a flight of B-17s that could be then armed and attack Saipan from Guam it did not look good. Once the USAAC recovered at Lupog while bomb repairs were being accomplished at Barrigada, Col Nash recommended an attack with what was left on Saipan right away. before it could be planned the S-41 reported the return of the Japanese invasion task force at the Saipan anchorage. The troop transports were more of danger than the Japanese aircraft something had to stop them.
 
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Japanese Reaction

IJN Forth fleet commander Admiral Nariyoshi and Major General Fomitaro Horii of the South Seas Detachment, were shocked and just a little dismayed that the Guam operation had failed so badly. Saipan by the second day of war had no aircraft left. Naval units and transports were withdrawn to Yap for repair and rethinking of what had gone so wrong. Both Wake and Guam had withstood the first attempts; however Wake had lost most of it’s fighters. Guam however had not been surprised all of it’s aircraft had been aloft and the P-40 was more than a match for the Type-96 fighter. Intelligence and reconnaissance were needed to discover why Guam had not been surprised. Additional aircraft were going to be needed to swamp the air defense of Guam.

Admiral Nariyoshi put a request into IJN Headquarters that at least two carriers be sent to assist in the next effort at Guam. He was told that none would be available until late December around the 20. The decision was made that he would use what was left of his original attack force and would attempt to land the South Seas Detachment on the either the 21 or 22 after the two carriers The IJN Kaga and IJN Zuikaku launched an overwhelming air attack on Guam. The two carriers would then proceed to Wake to overwhelm it’s air defenses. It was thought that an attack again at sunrise would catch the Guam defenders asleep just as they had at Pearl Harbor. The thinking at Forth fleet Headquarters was that the warning from Pearl was what had alerted Guam before.

IJN doctrine is for carriers to operate in specific pairs. Kaga is paired with Akagi (Carrier Division One) and Zuikaku is paired with Shokaku (Carrier Division Five). Akagi and Hiryu even had fairly unique port-side islands because of this doctrine. If you send Kaga, Akagi will accompany it (unlikely as Nagumo is Commander CarDivOne). If you send Zuikaku, Shokaku will accompany it.
 
United States Reaction​

The reports from the S-43 that two Japanese carriers had been badly damaged and were being towed to either Yap or Japan was acted upon by the Pacific Fleet Headquarters by dispatching a small convoy on Dec 23 of two merchant ships with an escort of two destroyers towards Guam. 20 More P-40s just arrived from San Francisco still in crates and 10 crated Havocs that had been planed to be shipped to American Samoa were, along with crews, ammunition more food and medical supplies being sent towards Guam. Two carriers the USS Saratoga and USS Enterprise along with their escorts would sail also but on the 24th and not with the convoy about 100 miles would separate the two groups. It was planed that maybe the Sara and Big E could raid the Saipan anchorage.

Fleet Intelligence thought that based on radio intercepts the Japanese did not know that the radar was giving the airraid warnings at Guam. The Japanese thought the carrier task force was seen by the PBY and the submarine. The question was could the two subs and the paired down aircraft on Guam hold for the 5 to 10 days to get there.

All over the United States calls to help Guam were coming into the White House, Congress and newspapers. People could see that at Guam and Wake we could fight back and win.
Could Guam hold? Would the relief convoy or it’s escorting carriers be seen by the Japanese? Pacific Fleet ordered that if seen by the Japanese before reaching Guam the convoy and escorts were to turn back.
 
 
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IJN doctrine is for carriers to operate in specific pairs. Kaga is paired with Akagi (Carrier Division One) and Zuikaku is paired with Shokaku (Carrier Division Five). Akagi and Hiryu even had fairly unique port-side islands because of this doctrine. If you send Kaga, Akagi will accompany it (unlikely as Nagumo is Commander CarDivOne). If you send Zuikaku, Shokaku will accompany it.
thanks was not aware of that carrier names have been changed.
 
The raid on the Saipan Anchorage

Col Nash could see that his pilots were exhausted but they had to hit the troop transports before they could land the IJA on Guam. Twice the Japanese had attempted sunrise attacks on Guam. It was time for some payback. The 5 remaining Havocs would be armed with general purpose bombs so as to damage as many troopships or transports as possible. Five P-40s would fly cover for the Havocs while the remaining six attempted to strafe the airfield. Should no CAP be seen over the anchorage the five P-40s there would attempt to strafe ships. Two passes only were planed if no CAP. Each Havoc could carry two 250lb general purpose bombs. After dropping the bombs they were to head for Guam at the lowest possible over water height as possible so that hopefully they could avoid the Japanese Zeros. The P-40s would climb and try to cover the return to Guam. Take off was planed for 0430 truck lights would line the runway.

The Japanese were caught off guard at both the airfield and anchorage. The first warning they had was when the P-40s started strafing the aircraft on the round. The Havocs had a free run over the transports and hit three of them, heavy damage was seen. At the airfield two passes over the parked aircraft destroyed 6 of the remaining Zeros and 10 Kates along with damaging 5 Vals. No Japanese aircraft attempted to catch the retiring USAAC aircraft. Major General Horii of the South Seas Detachment was wounded by a piece of shrapnel and would end up losing his leg due to the wound. Plans to send the South Seas Detachment attack force to Guam was put on hold until such time that the USAAC could be overcame.

Guam was turning into a tar pit for Japan. Two carriers and one cruiser along with 6 transports damaged. One cruiser sunk and almost 50 aircraft destroyed or damaged. Maybe it was time for Japan to do something to overwhelm the American forces on Guam. All across the Pacific Japan was winning except at Guam and Wake.

Plans had to be changed to delay deployment to the South Pacific. New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and the Bismark Islands would have to wait until Guam was taken. Carriers and other warships received new orders. Nothing could be pulled from Malaya, the Philippines or the plans for the DEI. But actions to the south would have to wait. It was planed to have the new covering naval forces to Yap by the the first of January. Then Japan would roll over Guam.
 
One of the failures of the Japanese at Pearl was not hitting the sub base. I know that (a) "modern" US torpedoes sucked and (b) sub commanders at the beginning of the war were overly cautious due to crappy doctrine/rules. Having said that, the successes of 2 obsolescent S boats being aggressive (of necessity if for no other reason) may give a jolt to the sub force. By the time the next wave of Japanese ships comes to swamp Guam, quite a few modern fleet boats can be cruising off Guam - with the added advantage of getting positioning info from PBY's & back vectors from radar. Also, given any ships (esp carriers) will have a limited area of operations due to the need to attack Guam and screen the transports a fair number of torpedoes can be fired and SOME of them will work. Additionally the S boats can be pulled back & saved to attack the warships used for gunfire support of the landing & the transports near the beach...sitting ducks. Remember at this time (and for most of the war) the only thing worse than US torpedoes was IJN ASW.
 
One of the failures of the Japanese at Pearl was not hitting the sub base. I know that (a) "modern" US torpedoes sucked and (b) sub commanders at the beginning of the war were overly cautious due to crappy doctrine/rules. Having said that, the successes of 2 obsolescent S boats being aggressive (of necessity if for no other reason) may give a jolt to the sub force. By the time the next wave of Japanese ships comes to swamp Guam, quite a few modern fleet boats can be cruising off Guam - with the added advantage of getting positioning info from PBY's & back vectors from radar. Also, given any ships (esp carriers) will have a limited area of operations due to the need to attack Guam and screen the transports a fair number of torpedoes can be fired and SOME of them will work. Additionally the S boats can be pulled back & saved to attack the warships used for gunfire support of the landing & the transports near the beach...sitting ducks. Remember at this time (and for most of the war) the only thing worse than US torpedoes was IJN ASW.
Good points I will try to work it in.
 
Wake
While the South Seas Detachment was licking it’s wounds in Yap. The attempts to attack Wake from the Marshall Islands had, had only limited success. The naval units had lost 2 destroyers with a cruiser damaged. Most of the twin engine Betty’s had been shot down by the remaining Marine 4F4s on Wake. Plans were that after the IJN Shokaku and IJN Zuikaku were finished at Guam, they would continue to Wake. Those plans had to change with both carriers damaged at Guam.. Wake would be left alone until Guam had fallen.

The United States Pacific Fleet Intelligence unit was reading most of the Japanese coded messages and the decision was made to take the chance to reinforce Wake. The USS Lexington , it’s escorts and supply ships set out for Wake on the 21st of December. This left Pearl Harbor without any carrier coverage. But with the knowledge that two of the Japanese carriers had been damaged it was felt this was a risk worth taking to get more aircraft and supplies to Wake. The United States had two carriers sailing towards Guam and one to Wake. Should both supply convoys get through it was felt that both Guam and Wake could hold.
 
Any diversion of IJN military assets towards the conquest of Guam will give the Americans in the Philippines Is. & the British in Singapore a slim chance to give them more time to rebuilt & fortify their military positions...

Maybe it will give MacArthur a chance to redeem himself for his error in judgment in allowing his Air Assets to be smashed during the first twenty-four hours of the beginning of the Pacific War...

I don't think US Military Intelligence at this early timeline was fully able to access all IJN & IJA radio chatter and decipher within days...
I could be wrong, tho...
 
The early Japanese successes OTL after Pearl Harbor were a Japanwank, too good to be true. This strikes me as a more realistic possibility. The US may still lose all those islands, but the cost to the Japanese may well shorten the war dramatically. Good work so far. You have other knowledgeable posters keeping the reality level high, and you're willing to listen to them. That's all to the good.
 
Actually, I think the P40/A24 strike against Shokaku and Zuikaku is pushing Ameri-wank. The two carriers between them have more Zeros than the island has Warhawks, and for an S-boat and a handful of USAAC dive bombers to mission-kill two of the IJN's best carriers...

The CAP over Guam also killed WAY too many Kates and Vals. They're going to have to tangle with the Zeros first, and while Shokaku and Zuikaku had the greenest air groups they're still flying superior fighters for the tactics of the time.

I'm still enjoying this, and up until the IJN CV's showed up I think you've done an excellent job of keeping things realistic.

If you really want to beat up on IJN flat tops, may I suggest substituting Hiryu and Soryu? They carried fewer aircraft, and were more lightly built. On the flip side, of course, their air groups were much better trained. A desire to deal with Guam quickly might lead the IJN to send Ryujo and/or Zuiho instead. They'll be much easier to deal with.
 
If you really want to beat up on IJN flat tops, may I suggest substituting Hiryu and Soryu? They carried fewer aircraft, and were more lightly built. On the flip side, of course, their air groups were much better trained. A desire to deal with Guam quickly might lead the IJN to send Ryujo and/or Zuiho instead. They'll be much easier to deal with.

I think he still has Hiryu and Soryu off dealing with Wake Island.
 
Actually, I think the P40/A24 strike against Shokaku and Zuikaku is pushing Ameri-wank. The two carriers between them have more Zeros than the island has Warhawks, and for an S-boat and a handful of USAAC dive bombers to mission-kill two of the IJN's best carriers...

The CAP over Guam also killed WAY too many Kates and Vals. They're going to have to tangle with the Zeros first, and while Shokaku and Zuikaku had the greenest air groups they're still flying superior fighters for the tactics of the time.

I'm still enjoying this, and up until the IJN CV's showed up I think you've done an excellent job of keeping things realistic.

If you really want to beat up on IJN flat tops, may I suggest substituting Hiryu and Soryu? They carried fewer aircraft, and were more lightly built. On the flip side, of course, their air groups were much better trained. A desire to deal with Guam quickly might lead the IJN to send Ryujo and/or Zuiho instead. They'll be much easier to deal with.
The surprise that the american strike force showed up as fast as it did and there was only a CAP of 10 Zeros to cover the two carriers. Then when the carriers maneuvered they did so right into the path of the S-43. While the Shokaku took the hits from the S-43 the two bomb hits from the Havocs on the Zuikaku damaged it's ability to launch more aircraft and to recover them. Lucky hits? God of War evens out the playing field. As to fight over Island Only 15 Zeros were sent to cover the Vals and Kates. They took out 15 P-40s and lost 5. But once the other 9 P-40s got into the Vals and Kates the 50cal just chewed them up. Plus the Val and Kate pilots were suprised by the quad 50's at the airfields.
 
Any diversion of IJN military assets towards the conquest of Guam will give the Americans in the Philippines Is. & the British in Singapore a slim chance to give them more time to rebuilt & fortify their military positions...

Maybe it will give MacArthur a chance to redeem himself for his error in judgment in allowing his Air Assets to be smashed during the first twenty-four hours of the beginning of the Pacific War...

I don't think US Military Intelligence at this early timeline was fully able to access all IJN & IJA radio chatter and decipher within days...
I could be wrong, tho...
All assests were to be from units assigned to take the South Pacific Islands. Nothing was to be taken from Philippines, DEI or Singapore units. The DEI was the reason for the War. Japan had to take that Oil.
 
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