Part III: Adjustments
”That’s all?”
-The reported remark of Admiral Kajioka upon hearing of how many bombers returned from the first raid on Wake.
(From “An Unexpected Obstacle: The Japanese Story of the Battle of Wake Island” By Bill Ray)
…Commander of the 4th fleet, Admiral Inouye was a busy man on December 8th 1941. His command was responsible for operations throughout the Central Pacific ranging from the capture of Guam, to Makin, Tarawa and finally, Wake Island…
…The surprisingly large number of casualties taken by the 24th Air Flotilla called into question the trivial nature with which the Japanese had assigned the Wake garrison’s defensive forces. Heavy, accurate AA fire, coupled with at least 12 fighters would make further aerial attacks difficult. At the time the A5M Claude fighters, in addition to being obsolete and probably no match for the Wildcats at Wake, did not have the range to accompany the remaining G3M bombers. Even the Navy’s vaunted A6M fighter would not be able to engage in combat operations over the island due to range constraints…
…The failure of a second air raid on December 9th to do significant damage, coupled with the loss of another 5 bombers, forced a change in Japanese tactics. Inoue decided that without air superiority, an attack on the island would be foolish. The attack was postponed and instead naval units earmarked for supporting the amphibious assault on Wake were tasked with the nighttime bombardment of the island. Inoue and Kajioka hoped that by bombarding the airfield they could even the playing field for their bombers and ultimately the invasion…
…On December 11th Kajioka arrived off the southern shore of Wake Atoll and ordered his force consisting of 3 cruisers and 4 destroyers to open fire on the American positions. For two hours the Imperial Japanese peppered the island with no response. Unbeknownst to them, Devereux and Cunningham had agreed to issue an order to the batteries not to return fire. Believing their mission to be a success, Kajioka proceeded to reverse course and make for Kwajalein in order to be out of range by daybreak to avert a potential American strike…
…The only loss suffered by the Japanese during the first bombardment of Wake was the obsolete cruiser
Tatsuta which was hit by a salvo of torpedoes from the
USS Triton. The
Triton had been south of Wake, recharging her batteries when the bombardment began and had moved to intercept. Fortunately for the
Tatsuta out of the 6 torpedoes, only 4 hit, and of the 4, only one detonated due to the faulty Mark 6 Exploders present within the American torpedoes. Nevertheless, this hit effectively removed the
Tatsuta from combat operations (1)…
…The next day however, the Japanese found that their optimism regarding the previous night’s bombardment was unfounded. Inadequate intelligence and rough seas severely impeded the accuracy of the Japanese attack. This coupled with the sheer ingenuity and determination shown by the American defenders meant that no fewer than 6 F4F Wildcats were scrambled to meet the incoming Japanese attack the next day. Once again the 24th Air Flotilla was forced to limp back to Roi with fewer aircraft than it departed with…
…The failure of aerial raids and naval bombardment to reduce Wake led Inoue to request further reinforcements in order to provide air cover. Almost immediately, Japanese High Command recognized the problem posed by a strong American presence on Wake Island. If the garrison there would not succumb to the initial Japanese attack, more resources must be allocated in order to establish a defensive bulwark in the Central Pacific. Seeing that more air assets were required, on December 12th, orders were issued to the
Kido Butai now returning from the successful raid on Pearl Harbour. Carrier Division 2, consisting of the carriers
Soryu and the
Hiryu, the cruisers
Tone and
Chikuma, and a pair of screening destroyers, was detached from the main body and sent to rendezvous with elements of the 4th fleet (2)…
…The importance of Wake also necessitated the allocation of more conventional forces as well. 4 older cruisers from Cruiser Division 6, along with over a thousand additional troops, both fresh from taking the island of Guam were sent to rendezvous with the original invasion force, now deemed insufficient for the task at hand (3)…
…Unbeknownst to anyone in the Japanese high command, the Americans were also making adjustments to the unexpected resistance shown by the First Marines and the aviators of VMF 211…
(From “Kimmel’s Last Gasp: The Daring Expedition to Relieve Wake Island” by James Vandervelden)
…As most of the preparatory works that had taken place in 1941 had escaped popular notice, many Americans, even those in High Command positions, were taken by surprise. That a handful of fighters and AA guns could inflict such losses on Japanese aircraft if properly warned stood in stark contrast to the disaster at Pearl Harbor. Had the initial radar reports been heeded, perhaps the losses could have been fewer, perhaps the Japanese carrier forces would have been mauled as badly as the strikes above Wake. Ironically, though Kimmel had played a large role in preparing Wake to withstand a Japanese attack, it was precisely this resistance that exacerbated his failure at Pearl Harbor…
…Kimmel quickly became determined to do something, anything, to ameliorate or aid the American situation on Wake. This was only reinforced as news of Wake’s resistance reached the populace. The aerial victories of VMF-211, the cocky swagger of “Hammering Hank” Elrod, and Devereux’s infamous ending to his request for reinforcements and supplies “Send us more Japs!” all became prominent in American discourse. To leave Wake to “wither on the vine” would have been tantamount to political and popular suicide for Kimmel, and by the same measure, to relieve Wake would allow Kimmel to begin to repair the damage of Pearl Harbor…
...Initially, Kimmel had planned to send a carrier taskforce centered around the
USS Saratoga to provide not only additional planes to the island, but also reinforcements and spare parts onboard the
Tangier. Yet the
Saratoga’s delays in arriving at Pearl Harbour prevented Kimmel from moving as quickly as he wanted to. Problems with refueling the
Lexington and a lack of modern aircraft to reinforce VMF-211 also inhibited quick action…
...During these early hours, Kimmel must be credited with a great deal of prescience. On the 11th, after receiving the latest combat reports from Wake, he surmised, as did Admiral Inoue and Kajioka, that Japanese aircraft carriers were the only way the Japanese could subdue the island and its stubborn defenders. Though he desperately wanted to strike back, Kimmel had no idea how many carriers the Japanese would commit to the invasion. He simply couldn’t risk sending in a single carrier alone at this point, or even a pair of carriers (4)…
…At some point on the 11th Kimmel and his staff came up with the idea of using destroyers to ferry supplies and reinforcements to Wake. Apparently, a junior officer cited similar British actions in the Mediterranean with Malta and Kimmel seized upon the idea. A group of destroyers might be able to reach Wake before the Japanese if they maintained high enough speeds. In Kimmel’s mind, an infusion of men and equipment might buy enough time for a later relief expedition. Though part of him must have known that in all likelihood he was sending everyone to their death he pressed on nonetheless…
…Though several possibilities were raised, in the end Kimmel opted to use the 4 obsolete
Wickes class destroyers of Destroyer Division 80 as his “fast transports” for the initial Wake Island Relief convoy. They in turn would be escorted by several other destroyers, as, in order to carry as much cargo as possible, they would be stripped of most combat equipment, and be operated by skeleton navy crews. Kimmel’s decisions would be echoed months later as the USN pulled back a number of obsolete destroyers for the same purpose, only giving them far more thorough modifications (5)…
…Work proceeded at a breakneck pace on the 4 destroyers as the Wake relief convoy became one of the highest priority tasks at Pearl. Though each destroyer was stripped of features deemed “excessive” such as torpedoes, excess ammunition, and “excess” crewmembers, additional features such as additional AA machine guns were installed. Work began almost immediately and within 48 hours the 4 destroyers were deemed “ready” and loading began. As the
Saratoga sailed into Pearl Harbor on the 15th, the “Tin Can Convoy” sailed out making full speed for Wake Island…
…Though contemporaries criticized Kimmel for not sending the
Saratoga on a similar mission to deliver the aviators and planes of VMF-221 to the island. Later events would prove him right in this regard. Knowing the poor logistical situation on Wake and the supplies sent to the island, he must have known that the impact of sending VMF-221 and its F2A Buffalo fighters to the island would have been minimal. The real strength of the island was not in its aerial strength, though that had indeed been prominent in the initial days. Once the Japanese carriers arrived the Marines would need as much help as possible to dissuade or delay a Japanese naval assault…
…Though far from everything Devereux asked for, the first Wake relief convoy would bring valuable reinforcements and supplies to the island. Each converted destroyer left Pearl Harbor with 70 Marines and 5 Navy Corpsmen onboard. In barrels stacked on the decks of the ship and in every nook and cranny were ammunition, medical supplies, and spare parts. The latter mostly for the gunnery batteries as Kimmel held no illusions about keeping the fighters of VMF-211 flying much longer...
…The real question plaguing the Americans was whether the convoy of destroyers would reach Wake before the arrival of the Japanese carriers. Though not crippling, the loss of 8 destroyers, albeit only half of them being modern combat effective craft, would impede further efforts to pursue offensive operations in the Pacific. In fact, many expected the mission to be recalled after Kimmel’s relief on December 17th. However Kimmel’s replacement, Admiral Pye, also saw the importance of at least trying to relieve Wake. Furthermore, the decision to push the elderly destroyers to their limit and maintain a speed of nearly 25 knots meant that once Pye took command, the convoy had nearly reached its destination…
…Nevertheless, Pye’s caution would ultimately be his undoing. His orders to the convoy to dump their supplies and return to Pearl if they came under attack would later be coupled with future actions and make him incredibly unpopular. Most officers present with the convoy state that they were determined to do whatever it took to get supplies to Wake, even if it meant grounding the ships on the atoll…
…The Americans’ ingenuity, and sheer determination were aided by indecision on the part of the Japanese. Though it was apparent that Wake would only be able to be subdued by the use of carrier borne aircraft, the Japanese High Command wasted precious time ordering Carrier division 2 to launch a raid on Midway. Japan’s initial offensive was literally running on a shoestring and even the minor reallocation of resources to deal with Wake needed to be couched in efficiency. It was hoped that en-route to its rendezvous with the 4th fleet, Carrier division 2 could launch an aerial raid on Midway Island. Poor weather, coupled with the decision to press on with the attack gave the relief convoy and the defenders of Wake much needed breathing room (6)...
…Much to the chagrin of the Imperial Japanese Navy, the raid did little to
damage the American garrison on the island resulting in only a few casualties and putting some planes out of action for the coming raids against Wake…
…On the island of Wake itself, the days preceding the arrival of the relief convoy were oddly quiet. The 24th Air Flotilla was simply in no position to launch major air attacks after the events of December 8-11. The first 3 raids on Wake had resulted in the loss of nearly two thirds of the unit’s prewar strength. Though reinforcements were incoming, any major raids on Wake were delayed until adequate escort could be requisitioned. Instead, only a handful of reconnaissance missions were launched. These too were often the target of American fighters, with several being shot down prior to the arrival of the Japanese fleet…
…Henry “Hammering Hank” Elrod’s destruction of a G3M Nell on December 18th gave him his 5th aerial victory and made him the first American “ace” of the war. Something that was met with considerable celebration in America, and consternation as he later refused to leave his comrades...
…While the aviators of VMF-211 were busy chasing Japanese reconnaissance planes, Devereux and the men of Wake Island were busily preparing for the inevitable Japanese assault. Like Kimmel, Devereux believed that Wake was simply too important to be left alone. The same Japanese carriers that raided Pearl would eventually arrive and be accompanied by an amphibious landing force. Plans were made and a number of plans were made for the eventual Japanese landing…
…In a move that would foreshadow later Marine Defense Battalions, at the insistence of Peters, Devereux ordered the conversion of several pieces of heavy equipment into a makeshift armored unit. Though only armed with machine guns, the bolted on pieces of scrap metal provided adequate protection from small arms fire without decreasing their speed too much (7)…
…“Where are the transports?” was the whisper going through the garrison as the relief convoy arrived off Wake on the night of December 18th. Though it wasn’t everything they wanted, even the surliest of Marines had to marvel of the ingenuity as barrel after barrel of supplies was tossed overboard and promptly recovered…
…The unloading of the convoy continued through the night into the day of December 19th under the watchful eye of VMF-211. Though a Japanese reconnaissance plane spotted the convoy, no offensive action was taken. When the final tallies were reached, over 300 Marines, millions of rounds of .30 and .50 caliber ammunition, a 2 thousand modern 3-inch AA shells, valuable spares and supplies had been offloaded…
…What followed remains one of the most memorable moments of the Pacific War. From the inception of the convoy, the intent was to evacuate at least some of the civilians from the island. Devereux had made this known to the civilians, though he did not take any immediate action in this regard. An unspoken agreement existed that the wounded received priority on the ships. However, by the 19th this only comprised less than 50 people…
…A decision had to be made quickly and in the end it was made by none other than Peters. The de facto commander of the civilian contractors, Peters approached Devereux and Cunningham on the airfield, rifle in hand and spoke lines that would go down in history. “We’ve fought with you so far Colonel. I don’t know about you, but my men and I like to finish what we start. If you’ll have us, we’d like to stay and finish the job.”…
…Though remaining on Wake was not a compulsory decision, 17 healthy civilian contractors opted to leave with the convoy, their decision to remain behind and fight made waves throughout the United States. The civilians would stay, integrating themselves into the Marine battalion and steeling themselves for the coming Japanese assault…
…Of the 17 uninjured contractors that chose to leave with the convoy, half would be dead before the end of the war, the remainder before 1950…
…The relief convoy departed as quickly as it had arrived in the hopes of avoiding a Japanese aerial attack. By the 21st they had reached a safe distance and reduced speed to a more manageable 17 knots. The relief expedition to Wake Island had succeeded…
(From: “The Rock of the Pacific: Wake Island During World War II” by Arthur Devereaux)
…The Marine reinforcements having arrived on the 18th/19th wouldn’t have to wait long for their first taste of combat. They had barely begun to unpack the supplies brought by the convoy when on the 20th, the report from the radar sets came in. The real battle for Wake was about to begin…
Footnotes
1) The Triton was one of the subs patrolling the area in OTL around Wake. In TTL the Japanese night naval bombardment coupled with better positioning allows her to make an attack.
2) 3 days earlier than OTL due to the absolute trouncing of the 24th Air Flotilla by VMF-211. In TTL the Japanese see that there’s simply no chance in hell that they’re taking Wake without significant air support.
3) Also requisitioned earlier than OTL. Inoue and Kajioka both knew that the 450 men originally allocated to take Wake was far too few. Given that the troops are available, needed, and that the invasion date has been pushed back in TTL due to a lack of air support I don’t think this is too farfetched.
4) Perhaps I’m giving Kimmel too much credit. In OTL he launched the relief expedition without knowing that the Japanese were going to send in carriers. Given the fact that in TTL Wake has suffered almost no losses to enemy action, besides a handful of damaged planes. Coupled with the massive losses inflicted on the 24th Aerial flotilla I think his reasoning in TTL is sound.
5) Kimmel’s just jumping the gun here on what the USN would do a couple months later. Mind you, these APD’s aren’t nearly as efficient, but they’ll do in a pinch. I’m thinking along the lines of the infamous “Tokyo Express” brought about by desperation on the American side. Reinforcing Wake would be a huge propaganda coup given the fact that it was an instant bright spot on the rather dim news of Pearl Harbour.
6) The Japanese attempted such a raid in OTL on the 15th but were dissuaded by poor weather. In TTL they arrive earlier and thus the weather is better, they think they have a bit more time, and thus go through with the raid, inadvertently buying the Americans much needed time.
7)No such actions were undertaken in OTL due to the fact that there was a strict separation between the civilians and Marines as previously mentioned, and that Wake was under constant aerial attack. Without radar, or effective AA guns in OTL the Japanese bombers faced far fewer casualties. In TTL the defenders of Wake have over a week of relative peace in which they get to be…inventive.